DOUGLAS (CATHY), ET AL. VS. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY HOSPITAL , ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 23, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002149-MR
CATHY DOUGLAS; JOHN DOUGLAS;
AND JUSTIN DOUGLAS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00519
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY HOSPITAL;
DALIA ELKHAIRI, M.D.; MIRIAM MARCUM,
M.D.; PAUL DEPRIEST, M.D.; UNKNOWN
MAKER OF THE NOVASURE DEVICE; UNKNOWN
NURSE; AND WALLER DALTON, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: This appeal stems from a medical malpractice case1 filed
pro se2 on February 3, 2006, by Cathy, John and Justin Douglas (hereinafter
Douglas) against the University of Kentucky Hospital, various physicians at the
University of Kentucky Chandler Medical Center including Dr. Dalia Elkhairi, Dr.
Miriam Marcum, Dr. Paul DePriest, Dr. Waller Dalton, and “Unknown Nurse”
(hereinafter U.K. Physicians), as well as against the Unknown Maker of the
Novasure Device, Unknown Gynecologic (sic) Unit, and Dr. Charles Dietrich, a
physician of the United States Armed Forces.3
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed
Douglas’ claims against the U.K. Physicians without prejudice on the basis of
insufficient service of process under CR 12.02(e) and CR 4.044. After careful
review of the record, we affirm the Order of Dismissal issued by the Hon. Pamela
Goodwine, Judge, Fayette Circuit Court.
In filing her Complaint, Douglas claims that two medical procedures which Cathy Douglas
underwent at The University of Kentucky Medical Center in February of 2004 were performed
negligently, resulting in injury.
1
On May 8, 2007, Appellants filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. That Motion was
denied on June 1, 2007, by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals on grounds that there is no
statutory authority for appointment of counsel in a civil appeal.
2
Because Dr. Dietrich was initially joined as a party to this claim, the case was removed to
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2679. Dr. Dietrich filed a motion to substitute, and the
United States was substituted as a party for Dr. Dietrich. A Motion to Dismiss was filed on
behalf of the U.S. which was sustained, and this case was remanded back to the Fayette Circuit
Court for further proceedings.
3
The case against the University of Kentucky was dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity
via an Order of September 8, 2006. Although the University of Kentucky is listed as a party on
this appeal, the September 12, 2006 Order of the Trial Court dismissing the claims against the
University has not been appealed.
4
-2-
Douglas initially filed a complaint with the Fayette Circuit Court
Clerk on February 7, 2006. At that time, Douglas attempted service on the U.K.
Physicians via certified mail through the office of the circuit clerk, as set forth in
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 4.01(a). That statute provides:
1) Upon the filing of the complaint (or other
initiating document) the clerk shall forthwith issue the
required summons and, at the direction of the initiating
party, either: (a) Place a copy of the summons and
complaint (or other initiating document) to be served in
an envelope, address the envelope to the person to be
served at the address set forth in the caption or at the
address set forth in written instructions furnished by the
initiating party, affix adequate postage, and place the
sealed envelope in the United States mail as registered
mail or certified mail return receipt requested with
instructions to the delivering postal employee to deliver
to the addressee only and show the address where
delivered and the date of delivery. The clerk shall
forthwith enter the facts of mailing on the docket and
make a similar entry when the return receipt is received
by him or her. If the envelope is returned with an
endorsement showing failure of delivery, the clerk shall
enter that fact on the docket. The clerk shall file the
return receipt or returned envelope in the record. Service
by registered mail or certified mail is complete only upon
delivery of the envelope. The return receipt shall be proof
of the time, place and manner of service. To the extent
that the United States postal regulations permit
authorized representatives of local, state, or federal
governmental offices to accept and sign for "addressee
only" mail, signature by such authorized representative
shall constitute service on the and be recoverable as
costs(emphasis added).
In this instance, the certified mail was delivered to the University’s
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, but was not delivered directly to the U.K.
Physicians named as defendants. Upon arrival at the Department, the mailing was
-3-
signed for by one Matthew Lally (Lally), whom the Department states is a
temporary employee, engaged in minor clerical and staff duties.
The University asserts that Lally was never appointed or designated
by the U.K. Physicians to accept service of process on their behalf. In support of
their position, the University of Kentucky (U.K.) filed the May 2, 2006, affidavit
of John Allen, Department Administrator for the University of Kentucky
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In that Affidavit, Allen states that
neither he nor any other U.K. official or faculty member appointed or otherwise
delegated to Mr. Lally the authority to accept service of process for any of the
defendants in this matter.
On May 2, 2006, the U.K. Physicians, by special appearance, moved
to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to CR 12.02 and CR 4.04, on the basis
of insufficient service of process. After conducting a hearing on the motion, on
September 26, 2006, the trial court entered an Order dismissing Douglas’ claims
against the U.K. Physicians for insufficiency of service of process, without
prejudice. Douglas now appeals the dismissal of her claim against the U.K.
Physicians to this Court.
The U.K. Physicians cite R.F. Burton Tower Co. v. Dowell Div. of
Dow Chemical Co., 471 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1971), for the proposition that Kentucky
has long followed a strict rule of “in-hand service of process.” In so arguing, the
U.K. Physicians cite to CR 4.04(2), which provides in pertinent part that “(s)ervice
shall be made upon an individual within this Commonwealth … by delivering a
-4-
copy of the summons and of the complaint (or other initiating document) to him
personally …”. That rule further provides that if a defendant refuses personal
service, it is appropriate to deliver the summons and complaint to “an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process” for the
defendant.
We believe the U.K. Physicians are correct in citing Burton insofar as
personal service is still the preferred method of service, primarily because it offers
the most assurance that the intended defendant received the summons and
complaint. However, Kentucky statutory law is clear that personal delivery is not
the only method by which service of process may be effected.
Clearly, CR 4.01(a) provides an alternative method of service via
certified mail in lieu of personal delivery to the defendant, and if the intended party
receives and accepts the service by certified mail, it is equivalent to receipt through
personal service. Thus, in the instant matter, the issue is not whether service via
certified mail is proper in general, but whether it was effective in this case. It is
undisputed that Douglas attempted service through CR 4.01(a) when the complaint
was mailed. Regardless of Plaintiff’s efforts at service pursuant to the Rule of
Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of proving the service
was proper if challenged, as here, or suffer the consequences of lack of service. A
court finding of lack of service may merely mean service must be re-issued and an
individual or entity be properly served or, alternately, may be so harsh as to forever
bar a plaintiff from his day in court. Regardless, the necessity for service of
-5-
process is axiomatic and deeply rooted in constitutional law; to be before a court, a
person or entity must be properly served.
If a party challenges the validity of service of process, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving compliance with the governing rules for process.
Griffith v. St. Walberg Monastery, 427 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1968). However, there is
always a presumption that a communication that was properly stamped, addressed
and deposited in the mail was received by addressee. Once the fact of address,
stamp and deposit is proven, the burden shifts to the addressee to prove that he
never received the letter. Haven Point Enterprises, Inc. v. United Kentucky Bank,
Inc., 690 S.W.2d 393 (Ky. 1985).
In the instant case, the trial court found that the U.K. Physicians had
met their burden of proving they had never personally received the summons and
complaint as required by statute. Douglas does not dispute that the certified mail
was received and signed for by Lally, nor does Douglas effectively dispute the
Physician’s assertion that Lally was not designated by any of the U.K. Physicians
to accept service of process on their behalf.
We do believe that there is nothing in the record to dispute that
Douglas made a good faith attempt to serve the U.K. Physicians. Unfortunately,
neither CR 4 nor the case law provides a good faith exception to proper service
under the civil rules. The law is clear that a summons is delivered to a person only
when placed within his reach and he accepts it. Fleishman v. Goodman, 67 S.W.2d
691 (1934). As noted in CR 4.01(a), “Service by registered mail or certified mail
-6-
is complete only upon delivery of the envelope.” In this instance, a cursory
examination of the record and examination of the return receipt would have
revealed that the summons and complaint were not signed for by the physicians for
whom they were intended. At the very least, Lally’s name on the return receipt
should have led one to inquire as to whether or not he was an authorized agent of
the addressee. We believe that this failure forms a proper basis for the trial court’s
order of dismissal.
We also find the case of Mitchell v. Money, 602 S.W.2d 687 (Ky.
App. 1980), to be illustrative of the issue at hand. In that case, this court held that
service of process through certified mail was not sufficient to bind a decedent's
estate when a copy of the summons and complaint was sent to the decedent's
address and was signed for by his wife. The court reasoned that Money, the
decedent, never became a party to the action because the trial court failed to obtain
jurisdiction over him or his estate. Similarly, although the certified mail was
delivered to the correct place of business of the defendants sub judice, it was
nevertheless an incomplete delivery as the mail reached neither the intended
addressee nor an authorized agent of same.
In the appeal to this court, Douglas argues that the trial court’s
dismissal of the U.K. Physicians was premature. In response, we would note that
Douglas first made attempts to serve the U.K. Physicians in February 2006. The
12.02(e) motion to dismiss was not filed until May 12, 2006, and the motion was
not actually ruled upon until September 26, 2006.
-7-
Douglas asserts that after receiving the motion to dismiss based on
failure to serve the U.K. Physicians pursuant to CR 4.04, that attempts were made
to serve summons pursuant to CR 4.05(a) and/or 4.05(e). After a careful review of
the appellate record, we do not find evidence that such attempts were made.
Further, case law is clear that a diligent search for the individual intended to be
constructively served must be established before constructive service of this nature
is properly effected. W.G.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 708 S.W.2d 109
(Ky. App. 1986). As we find no such evidence in the record of either a diligent
search for the individuals or attempts to serve them pursuant to CR 4.05, we will
assume that the facts support the ruling of the trial court.
Upon review, we are confined to a determination of whether the
pleadings supported the judgment. Porter v. Harper, 477 S.W.2d 778, (Ky. 1972).
In the case sub judice, as to the alleged attempt at service through CR 4.05, we
believe the pleadings supported the judgment. Pursuant to CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), it is
clear that each argument asserted by the parties shall have ample supportive
references to the record, to include: citations of authority pertinent to each issue of
law, a statement with reference to the record, which indicates such argument was
properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner. Our past decisions make
clear that when an appellant fails to comply with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), a reviewing
court need only undertake an overall review of the record for manifest injustice.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991). In the case sub judice,
we find no manifest injustice.
-8-
Douglas also sites to CR 4.04(9) in support of the argument that
because the certified mail reached the place of business of the U.K. Physicians that
it was sufficient to constitute personal service. That portion of the civil rules reads:
Service may be made upon a nonresident individual who
transacts business through an office or agency in this
state, or a resident individual who transacts business
through an office or agency in any action growing out of
or connected with the business of such office or agency,
by serving the person in charge thereof.
Douglas has not established that the “person in charge thereof” was Lally, and it is
clear from the record that Lally is the individual who received and signed for the
documents at issue in this matter. Thus, Douglas’ argument fails.
Finally, Douglas, as a pro se claimant, invokes the precedent set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and
Baag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982), that allegations of a pro se complaint
are to be construed liberally, and held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. While this Court certainly recognizes and
appreciates the principle set forth in those decisions, we do not find that precedent
to be directly on point in the instant matter. In the matter currently under review,
the issue is not the allegations or the substance of the complaint itself, but rather
both the manner in which service was attempted and whether or not that service
was sufficient to meet the requirements set forth by the civil rules.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing this action for insufficiency of service of process. The
-9-
absence of proper service of process renders a court without jurisdiction to enter a
judgment against the non-responding party. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Hon. Pamela Goodwine, Fayette Circuit Court, is affirmed.
LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed this action for insufficiency of
service of process. I write only to comment on the absurdity of this case being
before this Court.
The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, thus Douglas
could easily have re-filed his complaint and proper service of process
accomplished. As this Court has observed, there is nothing in the record to dispute
that Douglas made a good faith effort and had a bona fide intent to have the
process served. Under our Civil Rules, the statute of limitations was tolled when
the complaint was filed and summons issued in good faith. See Louisville & N.R.
Co. v. Little, 264 Ky. 579, 95 S.W.2d 253, 255 (1936).
Instead, Douglas appealed the order of dismissal and now will
presumably again file his complaint and obtain service on the defendants. It
cannot be said that anything has been gained by either party as a result of the
needless appeal of the order of dismissal. I point out the futility of this appeal only
to suggest that future litigants who fail in the proper service of a defendant, and
-10-
when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice, strive to first obtain proper
service on the defendants before expending the time and expense to pursue an
appeal.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Cathy Douglas, Pro Se
John Douglas, Pro Se
Justin Douglas, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
Bradley A. Case
Jeremy S. Rogers
Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP
Louisville, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.