SCATTOLONI (TOM), ET AL. VS. HALLENBERG (ROBERT L.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 30, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001893-MR
TOM AND DONNA SCATTOLONI
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-001510
ROBERT L. HALLENBERG AND
WOODWARD HOBSON & FULTON, PLLP
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: On appeal, Tom and Donna1 Scattoloni (Scattoloni or Tom
Scattoloni) appeal from an opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court in
which the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Robert Hallenberg and
Woodward Hobson & Fulton, PLLP, whom Scattoloni sued for legal malpractice.
A review of the record reveals that Donna Scattoloni was not actively involved in any of the
events leading up to the malpractice suit in this present case nor was she actively involved in the
prosecution of that lawsuit or the present appeal.
1
On appeal, Scattoloni argues that the trial court ignored the evidence in the record
that was favorable to his claims against Hallenberg. Finding that the trial court
correctly granted summary judgment to Hallenberg as a matter of law, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1992, Tom Scattoloni purchased Fleming Wholesale, a wholesale
floral company. Subsequently, in 1998, Scattoloni decided to sell Fleming. To
that end, Scattoloni contacted the Walter J. Engel Company (WJEC) in August
1998 and entered into negotiations regarding selling Fleming to WJEC. According
to the record, Scattoloni handled the negotiations with WJEC alone. He primarily
negotiated the transaction with Richard J. White, Jr., a financial adviser hired by
Walter J. Engel, III, WJEC’s president. Scattoloni also negotiated with Engel at
times. After approximately six months of negotiations, Scattoloni met with
attorney Robert L. Hallenberg of Woodward Hobson & Fulton, PLLP in February
1999 regarding the potential sale of Fleming.
In their initial meeting, Scattoloni did not disclose to Hallenberg that
he had received two offers to buy Fleming; he did not disclose the identity of either
potential purchaser; he did not disclose that he was personally negotiating with
WJEC; and he did not bring any documents regarding the sale of Fleming.
According to Scattoloni, the purpose of the meeting with Hallenberg was to solicit
“input with regards to whether or not the offers were the type of thing that [he]
should undertake.” Yet, in his deposition, Scattoloni admitted he never mentioned
any actual offers. Moreover, according to Scattoloni, he and Hallenberg spoke
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only in general terms regarding the sale of Fleming. And at the time of the initial
meeting, Scattoloni did not ask Hallenberg to do anything. During the meeting,
Hallenberg advised Scattoloni about the importance of having a “first in line
security” provision or having other personal guarantees incorporated into any
potential purchase agreement.
Despite his meeting with Hallenberg, Scattoloni continued to
personally negotiate with White and Engle. Scattoloni neither spoke nor consulted
with Hallenberg until the middle of May 1999, nearly three months after their
meeting. During their second meeting, which lasted approximately an hour and a
half, Scattoloni and Hallenberg discussed the ramifications of WJEC, a C
corporation, acquiring Fleming, an S corporation; the importance and possible
inclusion of security provisions such as personal and asset guarantees; and the
benefits of “tag-along” agreements. After the second meeting with Hallenberg,
Scattoloni personally continued negotiating the terms of the sale of Fleming to
WJEC without consulting Hallenberg. After Scattoloni secured the final terms of
the sale, Scattoloni approached Hallenberg to review the purchase agreement.
Hallenberg did and suggested changes.
After Hallenberg reviewed the purchase agreement, Scattoloni and
WJEC finalized the purchase in November 1995. The purchase agreement
included a provision for delayed stock reimbursements to Scattoloni, a five-year
lease regarding Fleming’s building, and a three-year employment agreement for
Scattoloni. For approximately the next three years, Scattoloni received various
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payments outlined in the purchase agreement. However, WJEC failed to make the
first stock reimbursement to Scattoloni because it was insolvent.
In February 2005, Scattoloni filed a legal malpractice suit against
Hallenberg and Woodward Hobson & Fulton, PLLP in the Jefferson Circuit Court.
Scattoloni alleged that Hallenberg had deviated from the standard of care for a
lawyer by failing to advise Scattoloni about the necessity of including a default
provision in the purchase agreement which would have returned Fleming to
Scattoloni in the event WJEC defaulted on its obligations under the purchase
agreement.
Hallenberg filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that
Scattoloni could not prove “but for” causation. Moreover, Hallenberg argued: (1)
that it was undisputed that Scattoloni had personally handled all the negotiations
for the sale of Fleming; (2) that Scattoloni could not have negotiated a better deal
that would have included a default provision; and (3) that even if a default
provision had been included in the purchase agreement, it would not have
prevented Scattoloni’s loss.
According to the trial court,
[a] court may decide causation in the context of a
summary judgment motion as a matter of law when there
[is] only one reasonable conclusion to be reached. Lewis
v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2003).
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees
with [Hallenberg] that there is no evidence of record that
“but for” [Hallenberg’s] alleged malpractice, [Scattoloni]
“(i) would have secured a deal including a default clause,
(ii) WJEC would and could have signed a deal with a
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default clause, [and] (iii) that such a clause would have
prevented [Scattoloni’s] losses.”
Consequently, the trial court granted judgment in Hallenberg’s favor.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must view the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, in
this case, Scattoloni, and must resolve all doubts in his favor. Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). However, the
party opposing the motion must present, at the very least, some affirmative
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that
requires a trial. Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992). The trial
court should not grant summary judgment if any issue of material fact exists.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. Normally, the issue of causation is a question of
fact, but “where only one reasonable conclusion can be reached, a court may
decide the issue of causation as a matter of law.” Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 56
S.W.3d 432, 438 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
On appellate review, we must determine whether the trial court
correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that, as a matter
of law, the moving party was entitled to judgment in its favor. Scifres v. Kraft, 916
S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Because findings of fact are not in issue, we
review the trial court’s decision de novo. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
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To prove legal malpractice, Scattoloni is required to prove (1) that an
employment relationship existed between him, as the client, and Hallenberg, as the
attorney; (2) that Hallenberg, in his capacity as an attorney, failed in his duty to
exercise the ordinary care that a reasonably competent attorney acting in the same
or similar circumstances would; and (3) that Hallenberg’s alleged negligence was
the proximate cause of Scattoloni’s damages. Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W.3d 856, 860
(Ky. 2003). To prove that Hallenberg’s alleged negligence caused him harm,
Scattoloni was required to prove that, but for Hallenberg’s negligence, Scattoloni
would have had a better result in the underlying claim. Id. In other words,
Scattoloni was required to show that, absent Hallenberg’s alleged negligence,
Scattoloni would have negotiated a purchase agreement containing a default
provision that would have prevented his losses.
We find that an attorney/client relationship existed between Scattoloni
and Hallenberg. However, Scattoloni cannot meet the remaining elements for a
legal malpractice case.
Scattoloni claims that he did nothing to limit Hallenberg’s
representation of him regarding the sale of Fleming. Turning to the record, we find
that Scattoloni personally handled all the negotiations with WJEC for the sale of
Fleming. The record demonstrates that this process took well over a year to
complete. In that time, Scattoloni met with Hallenberg approximately two to three
times for a total of approximately three to four hours. During their first meeting,
Scattoloni only discussed the potential sale of Fleming with Hallenberg in general
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terms. Furthermore, Scattoloni did not dispute that he had WJEC’s financial
information, which was less than stellar, yet Scattoloni never provided that
information to Hallenberg.2 While Scattoloni claims he did nothing to limit
Hallenberg’s representation, the record does not support this contention. In light of
Hallenberg’s limited representation and the dearth of case law supporting
Scattoloni’s assertions regarding duty, Scattoloni has presented no affirmative
evidence that Hallenberg violated any duty owed to Scattoloni.
Regarding the issue of causation, Scattoloni was required to
demonstrate some affirmative evidence that, absent Hallenberg’s alleged
negligence, Scattoloni, would have received the desired default provision. To
support this contention, Scattoloni relies on his own self-serving assertion and his
claim that Engel testified that Engel would have agreed to such a provision.
Turning to Engel’s deposition, we find that Scattoloni’s attorney
asked if Engel would have had a problem with such a default provision and Engel
replied, “That’s a tough question. I don’t know. I - - personally, yes, I - - I - that’s my nature, yes, I would have said that.” However, Engel testified that both
White, whom he had hired to handle the negotiations with Scattoloni, and Engel’s
attorney would have advised against the inclusion of such a default clause.
Looking at Engel’s testimony, we find that it does not constitute affirmative
evidence that Scattoloni would have received that default provision; rather, Engel’s
testimony is nothing more than speculation. Furthermore, Scattoloni presents no
According to the record, Scattoloni never supplied Hallenberg with any documentation
regarding the sale except for a draft of the purchase agreement for Hallenberg to review.
2
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affirmative evidence, other than his own speculation, that such a clause would have
prevented his losses.
Moreover, the record clearly demonstrates that, after the purchase,
Engel’s bank had a first in line security interest in all of WJEC’s assets including
Fleming. Even if Scattoloni’s desired default provision had been included in the
purchase agreement, it would not have prevented Scattoloni’s losses.
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Scattoloni and
considering the lack of affirmative evidence supporting Scattoloni’s assertions, we
agree with the trial court’s decision to grant judgment in Hallenberg’s favor.
Consequently, the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kevin George
Louisville, Kentucky
Matthew W. Breetz
Andrew G. Beshear
Louisville, Kentucky
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