CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. VS. DELK (HUGH), ET AL.
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RENDERED: APRIL 25, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001582-MR
CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00159
HUGH DELK and LOLA DELK
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Concrete Products, Inc. (Concrete Products), which is owned
and operated by David Poore (Poore), appeals the June 22, 2006, order of the Hon.
James L. Bowling of the Bell Circuit Court which granted Hugh and Lola Delk’s (Delks)
motion for summary judgment. On appeal Concrete Products claims that the court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Delks for a multitude of reasons.
We disagree with Concrete Products and therefore affirm the order of the Bell Circuit
Court.
The Delks at the time of the proceedings owned approximately 41 acres in
Bell County which Concrete Products leased. As the name implies, Concrete Products
operated a concrete processing plant on the leased property. The lessor-leassee
relationship dates back to the original lease signed in the year 1991 between the Delks
and Atlas Concrete Company, Inc. This lease was assigned to Concrete Products on
February 24, 1995, without any changes or amendments in favor of Concrete Products.
The original term expired on March 31, 1996. Two five-year extensions were granted
with the lease then expiring on March 31, 2006.
Negotiations between Mr. Delk and Mr. Poore to renew or extend the
lease began in the spring of 2005. According to Poore, he sent Delk the first lease draft
in May 2005, which Delk rejected by not responding. Poore contacted Delk afterwards
and claims to have learned that Delk did not want such a complicated lease. Poore
then sent Delk a second lease draft in October 2005. This draft was also ignored.
Poore next contacted Delk on November 4, 2005. Poore claims that this phone
conversation resulted in an extension on the lease for six (6) months should Delk decide
to sell the property. Poore explained to Delk that the concrete business was difficult to
move and six (6) months would be necessary to accomplish same. Permits from the
state were required in addition to finding a new location and moving. Poore also claims
that in this conversation it was agreed that Delk would notify Poore if Delk successfully
sold the property. Poore sent Delk a letter dated November 9, 2005, which allegedly set
out the agreement.
Delk tells quite a different version of events. He claims that the first
proposed lease from May 2005 was so ridiculous in its terms that he did not reply. Delk
asserts that he never received the October 2005 lease. As to the November 4, 2005,
conversation, Delk maintains that there was no agreement to a six (6) month extension,
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only that he would look into it. Delk’s attorney notified Poore in two different letters
dated December 16, 2005, and February 9, 2006, that the lease would not be renewed
or extended.
In September 2005, CJ May entered into an option to purchase the
property from Delk. The closing was to occur April 1, 2006, immediately after Concrete
Products was to have vacated. As Concrete Products refused to vacate on March 31,
2006, the option to purchase had to be extended. As of the date of filing of the
complaint on April 3, 2006, the deal had yet to go through due to the holdover tenancy
of Concrete Products.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916
S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Since summary judgment involves only legal
questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court
need not defer to the trial court's decision and will review the issue de novo. Lewis v. B
& R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001).
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law .” CR 56.03. The trial
court must view the record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Thus, summary
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judgment is proper only “where the movant shows that the adverse party could not
prevail under any circumstances.” Id.
However, “a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment
motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some affirmative evidence
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.” Hubble v.
Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992), citing Steelvest, supra. See also O'Bryan v.
Cave, 202 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Ky. 2006); Hallahan v. The Courier Journal, 138 S.W.3d
699, 705 (Ky. App. 2004). The trial court's focus should be on what is of record rather
than what might be presented at trial. Welch v. American Publishing Co. of Kentucky, 3
S.W.3d 724 (Ky. 1999).
Given the standard of review, we shall address each of Concrete Products
eight arguments on appeal.
First, Concrete Products argues that the Delks are not the real party in
interest as the property was controlled by CJ May. Concrete Products directs the
Court’s attention to statements made by Delk at his deposition. There Delk stated that
he did not have the power to authorize a six (6) month extension on the lease since he
had signed an option with CJ May. Concrete Products is mistaken. The signing of an
option to purchase does not create a foregone conclusion that transfer of ownership will
occur. See Greater Louisville First Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Etzler, 659 S.W.2d
209, 211 (Ky. App. 1983). The record title holder is obligated to deliver free and clear
title upon the exercise of the option and clearly retains power to do so. When the
complaint was filed, the option to purchase held by CJ May had yet to be exercised.
The Delks were still the record title holders and, as such, are the real party in interest.
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Second, Concrete Products argues that summary judgment was improper
since discovery was in its early stages. At the time of the motion for summary
judgment, which was filed after the twenty-day restriction found in CR 54.01, three
depositions had already been taken. Concrete Products claimed that at least two more
depositions were needed, those of CJ May and Mike Bowling, May’s attorney. While
summary judgment was granted within a few months, three key depositions were taken.
Prior to granting summary judgment, discovery need not actually be completed as long
as a suitable opportunity to do so was available. Hollins v. Edmounds, 616 S.W.2d 801,
804 (Ky. App. 1981). Concrete Products has failed to allege any potential material facts
to support their claims that would be provided by additional discovery. The mere “hope
that something will come to light in additional discovery is not enough to create a
genuine issue of material fact.” Benningfield v. Pettit Environmental, Inc., 183 S.W.3d
567, 572 (Ky. App. 2005). As such, there was no error in granting the summary
judgment.
Third, Concrete Products argues that the motion for summary judgment
was not timely filed. Under CR.56.03, the motion must be filed at least ten days prior to
the hearing. Additionally, CR 4.01 requires a three-day extension for service by mail.
Concrete Products contends that the service of a June 1, 2006, motion via mail for a
June 12, 2006, notice was insufficient and thus the court should not have heard the
matter. Concrete Products objected to the hearing date but did supply a full brief to the
trial court prior to the hearing. This brief eloquently presented Concrete Products’
position and beautifully detailed their legal arguments. On appeal, Concrete Products
has presented this Court with almost the same brief that was submitted to the trial court.
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The ten-day notice requirement may be waived absent a showing of prejudice.
Equitable Coal Sales, Inc. v. Duncan Machinery Movers, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 415 (Ky.App.
1983). Concrete Products has not shown it has suffered prejudice. Further, the
additional time between the two brief due dates has not resulted in any substantial
changes to the brief indicating little, if any, additional time was needed in preparing the
brief. As such, it was proper for the trial court to go ahead with the summary judgment
motion.
Fourth, Concrete Products argues that the Statute of Frauds has no
application to this matter. It is the position of Concrete Products that the six (6) month
extension of the lease was capable of being performed within the year and as such falls
outside the statute of frauds, KRS 371.010. Similarly, arguments five, six, and seven
are that the cases Delk cites do not support their position, summary judgment is
disfavored, and oral contracts are valid. Concrete Products contends that material facts
were in question which precluded summary judgment and that a jury should have been
empaneled to decide the existence of the oral contract.
Delk argues that Concrete Products’ holdover tenancy is wrongful as there
was neither a written nor oral extension of the lease for six (6) months or otherwise.
Delk argues that the original lease for a term of five (5) years was required to be in
writing and thus any oral agreement would violate the statute of frauds. Delk argues
that Poore had notice of the impending sale and notice that the lease would not be
extended by the letters of December 16, 2005, and of February 2006, which clearly
evidence that no extension was agreed to by Delk; that Delk’s real estate agent had
surveyors on the property in the winter of 2005 which resulted in Poore’s having notice
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of the impending sale; and the contemplated May 2005 lease prepared by Poore
explicitly mentions that a sale of the land by Delk was contemplated.
While the existence of a contract is the province of the jury in Kentucky,
the construction of a contract and the determination of its legal effect are judicially
determined. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1997) and
Morganfield Nat'l Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, 836 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Ky. 1992). It
has long been held that oral contracts are valid and enforceable unless the statute of
frauds precludes their enforcement. Motorists Mut. Ins. at 445 and Bennett v. Horton,
592 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1979). In addition, “[w]here a contract is required by the Statute of
Frauds to be in writing, a subsequent agreement which changes its terms must also be
written and signed by the party to be charged to be enforceable.” Cox v. Venters, 887
S.W.2d 563, 566 (Ky.App. 1994).
Concrete Products produced the November 9, 2005, letter from Poore to
Delk as representative of the terms of the oral agreement. The letter reads as follows:
Dear Hugh,
Let this serve as a letter of understanding between us
regarding our conversation last Friday (11-4-05).
It is my understanding that you have entered into
negotiations to sell the property which we (Concrete
Products)presently have under lease from you. Should you
be successful in selling the property while still under lease
and because of our long term relationship, you agree to
make a six (6) month extension provision allowing Concrete
Products six (6) months in which to move its operation. This
six (6) months will commence after proper notice by certified
mail to our address. [address omitted]
This option will terminate with the expiration of the
present lease term. If the sale of the property fails to
develop by the end of the year, I would expect to have our
new lease in place by the 1st of the next year.
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Hugh, thank you for your understanding and
cooperation. 1
The language of the letter bases the six (6) month extension on the
original written lease. The original lease for a period of five (5) years was required by
the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. See KRS 371.010. If we take Concrete Products’
position that this was an extension of the original lease, then the letter modifies the
original lease’s terms of five (5) years to five and half (5 ½) years and calls the
modification an extension. Cox requires a modification of the original written contract to
also be in writing and signed by the parties. The letter of November 9, 2005, is neither
signed by Poore nor Delk. Therefore, the trial judge correctly determined that summary
judgment was appropriate as the statute of frauds precluded enforcement of this alleged
oral agreement.
If we take a different view of the November 9, 2005, letter, we arrive at the
conclusion that by the terms of the letter no contract was formed. The letter’s language
is one of a mere offer to modify an existing contract with explicit terms contained in the
letter for method of acceptance, proper notice by certified mail to Concrete Products at
a specified address, and expiration of the option which, if not exercised, then expires at
the end of the current lease. Proper notification under the terms of the letter never
occurred by the expiration date of the current lease terms. Delk’s only notice to Poore
was two letters from his attorney that he refused to extend the lease. Therefore,
acceptance never occurred. In addition, Delk had not actually sold the property; selling
the property was a condition precedent in the letter to the extension of the lease.
Therefore, the option to modify the contract was never accepted, which meant no new
1
Strangely, Poore did not sign his own letter.
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contract was formed nor was there a modification of the existing contract. See Venters
v. Stewart, 261 S.W.2d 444 (Ky. 1953). The trial judge properly concluded that the
original lease had expired without being renewed or extended.
The eighth and last argument of Concrete Products is that its
counterclaims, particularly that of promissory estoppel were prematurely dismissed.
Promissory estoppel can be invoked when a party reasonably relies on a statement of
another and materially changes his position in reliance on the statement. Rivermont Inn,
Inc. v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 636, 642 (Ky. App. 2003).
In the case sub judice, Concrete Products failed to show how it reasonably
relied on a statement of Delk. Even if Delk had made a verbal reassurance that he
would either look into an extension, as Delk claims, or that Concrete Products would not
be tossed out on the street, as Poore claims, Concrete Products had ample notice of
Delk’s intention not to extend the lease. Concrete Products received two letters, one in
December and the other in February, which explicitly refused to extend or renew the
lease. It is hard to see how Concrete Products then reasonably relied on an alleged
promise by Delk for a six (6) month extension.
Summary judgment was properly granted as there were no material facts
in dispute and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
we affirm the order granting summary judgment by the Hon. James L. Bowling of the
Bell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jason E. Williams
Kelly, Brown, Williams & Breeding
London, Kentucky
Gerald Greene
Greene & Lewis
Pineville, Kentucky
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