PHILLIPS (STEVEN GARNER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 18, 2008; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
SUPREME COURT ORDERED OPINION NOT PUBLISHED:
JANUARY 14, 2009
(FILE NO. 2008-SC-0593-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001230-MR
&
NO. 2006-CA-001282-MR
STEVEN GARNER PHILLIPS
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. MCNEILL, III, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00079
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Steven Garner Phillips appeals from a conviction of
cultivation of marijuana, trafficking in marijuana, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. No sentence was imposed for
possession of marijuana as it was a lesser included offense of the trafficking
charge. Phillips waived jury sentencing and accepted a three year concurrent
sentence on both the trafficking and cultivation charge. The Commonwealth crossappeals on the suppression of testimony regarding the identity of seeds found
during the search of Phillips’ property. Upon careful review, we affirm the
judgment and sentencing of the trial court.
On August 13, 2004, two law enforcement officers were flying an
airplane over Phillips’ farm near Dover in Mason County. One of the officers had
received training on how to spot marijuana from the air; marijuana plants have a
bluish-green color, which allows police officers to recognize it. During the aerial
search, one of the officers saw the bluish-green color of what appeared to be
marijuana growing on Phillips’ land. It appeared to be growing behind a barn some
500 feet away from Phillips’ residence.
The officers landed the plane, met up with other law enforcement
officials, and proceeded to Phillips’ farm. When they arrived, they found that
Phillips’ property was blocked by a locked gate and had no trespassing signs. The
police officers removed the gate and proceeded onto the property. Once there, they
went to the house and announced themselves, however, no one was home. They
then proceeded to the barn and saw marijuana plants growing behind it. After
walking around the perimeter of the property, they found additional plants. After
finding the plants, one of the officers obtained a search warrant for the house. The
basis for the search warrant was the marijuana found on the property.
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Before the trial began, Phillips made a motion to suppress all the
evidence found on the property, asserting that the search was done on the curtilage
of his house and without a warrant. The lower court found that the barn was not
part of the curtilage and that the officers viewed the marijuana from a place they
had a right to be. Accordingly, it denied the motion to suppress. After a guilty
verdict was entered, Phillips waived his right to jury sentencing and accepted a
three year concurrent sentence on both the trafficking and cultivating charge. This
appeal followed.
Phillips first argues that the trial court erred in denying a motion to
suppress evidence found in connection with a warrantless search of the curtilage of
his home. The extent of curtilage is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on
review unless clearly erroneous. Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 S.W.3d 492, n.4
(Ky.App. 2004). In determining clear error, an appellate court's standard of review
requires a judgment of whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App.
2002). If they are, then they are conclusive. However, “[b]ased on those findings
of fact, we must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the
law to those facts to determine whether its decision is correct as a matter of law.”
Id.
Although the record does not contain a recording or transcript of the
two suppression hearings, we think that the facts of the case and the order
overruling the motion are sufficient for us to make a ruling. We have no reason to
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think the findings of fact set forth by the court are erroneous. We find that they are
supported by substantial evidence and therefore conclusive. We now turn to the
application of law to those facts.
We have long recognized that a flyover by law enforcement officers
who spot marijuana growing on a farm does not rise to the level of a search nor is
it illegal. See LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1996). Our
question, therefore, is not the validity of the flyover but whether the area searched
was curtilage or open fields.
U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326
(1987), established that:
[c]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular
reference to four factors: the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining
these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when
mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all
extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any
given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration-whether the area in question is so
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed
under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment
protection.
Areas and structures within the curtilage of a home are afforded the same
protection as the dwelling itself, whereas those outside the curtilage are merely
“open fields” for the purpose of Fourth Amendment analysis. Id., citing Hester v.
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United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924). The term
“open fields” may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the
curtilage and “need be neither ‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms are used in
common speech.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, n.11, 104 S.Ct.
1735, 1742, n.11 (1984). “[T]he government's intrusion upon [] open fields is not
one of those “unreasonable searches” proscribed by the text of the Fourth
Amendment.” See id. at 177, 104 S.Ct. at 1740.
First, the barn was missing several sides and there is no evidence of
any specific use that would weigh in favor of it being curtilage. Furthermore, the
proximity of the barn to Phillips’ house is not a determinative factor. In Dunn, the
Supreme Court held that a barn located 180 feet away from a home was a
“substantial distance” that did not support the idea that it was to be treated as part
of the curtilage. In this case, the barn was approximately 500 feet away from the
house. Therefore, neither the proximity of the barn to the home nor the nature of
the use of the barn weighs in favor of finding it to be curtilage.
The most persuasive fact in Phillips’ favor is the existence of the
padlocked gate at the edge of his property. At first glance, it suggests that he was
trying to protect the property from observation, and it clearly meets the definition
of an enclosure as set forth in factor two. However, the Supreme Court has held
that neither fences nor no trespassing signs are completely effective bars against
the Open Fields Doctrine. See Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 183, n.13, 104 S.Ct.
1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)(“Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth
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Amendment should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with criminal intent
choose to erect barriers and post ‘No Trespassing’ signs.”); see also McCray v.
Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.App. 1984) (holding that a fence around the
property was not sufficient to override the Open Fields Doctrine). The fence did
not set off Phillips’ home but instead set off all of his property, and there was no
specific enclosure to prevent observation of the marijuana plants found by the barn.
Therefore, we find the existence of a locked gate at the edge of Appellant's
property insufficient in light of the totality of the circumstances to establish the
barn as curtilage. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress.
Phillips next argues that the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to
testify that untested plants and/or plant material found on his property was
marijuana. We disagree.
Two laboratory technicians, Mr. Boggs and Mr. Morrow, each
testified at trial. Boggs testified that he had received seventy-four samples from
the plants removed from Phillips’ property and had randomly tested five samples,
which were perhaps chemically determined to be marijuana. Boggs visually
confirmed that the other sixty-nine samples were marijuana. Additionally, Morrow
testified that he had received four bags of material from the search and tested one
of the four samples, which was again determined to be marijuana.
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 984 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Ky.App. 1998),
this Court adopted the reasoning of United States v. Scalia, 993 F.2d 984 (1st
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Cir.1993), and held that the government presented sufficient reliable evidence to
attribute the full quantity of marijuana seized to a defendant when:
a proper random selection procedure was employed; the
tested and untested substances were contemporaneously
seized at the search scene; the tested and untested
substances were sufficiently similar in physical
appearance; the scientific testing method conformed with
an accepted methodology; all of the samples subjected to
scientific analysis tested positive for the same substance;
and the absence of evidence that the untested substance
was different from the tested substance.
Phillips relies on the facts that the search took two days and that the plants were
located in various areas of his property. He asserts that this makes the testimony
unreliable because it was not sufficiently contemporaneous. There is no evidence,
however, in the record to suggest that the untested substance was different from the
tested substance, and we decline to find that an ongoing search of the same piece
of property for two days is not “contemporaneous” as contemplated by this Court
in Taylor. The samples were properly taken at random, and the remaining samples
were visually verified as marijuana. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court allowing the testimony that all plants seized were marijuana.
Phillips also alleges that the trial court erred in allowing in testimony
as to the weight of the marijuana seized without actually weighing the plants.
However, the laboratory technician, Mr. Boggs, testified that the bags of marijuana
in the home weighed 3.96 ounces and that the five samples he specifically tested
weighed approximately one ounce in total. Phillips’ charge of trafficking required
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only eight ounces. Therefore, the other sixty-nine plants had to have a combined
weight of only a little over three ounces to convict.
Phillips contends that the testimony of the police officers as to the
approximate weight of the plants when lifted was reversible error as they were not
expert witnesses. The testimony was not offered as expert opinion but rather as lay
opinion, which under KRE 701 is admissible if it is a rationally based perception
helpful to the understanding of a fact in issue, in this case the total weight of the
seized marijuana. Therefore, we find no error. Alternatively, in light of the
totality of the evidence offered, specifically the number of plants in total and the
weight of the very limited number actually weighed, any error in admitting lay
opinion as to the weight of the plants was harmless.
Phillips additionally argues that the trial court improperly allowed
testimony regarding seeds that had already been determined to be inadmissible.
Phillips, however, ignores the fact that the trial court did not permit testimony that
the seeds were in fact marijuana seeds. The Commonwealth, in its cross-appeal,
alternatively argues that the trial court erred in not allowing all testimony regarding
the nature and identification of the seeds. We disagree with both parties.
The determination of admissibility may only be overturned on appeal
if there was an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941,
945 (Ky. 1999). The record reflects that the trial court properly considered the
probative value of the testimony that the seeds were in fact marijuana seeds versus
the prejudicial effect of that testimony. Accordingly, we find that it was within the
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court’s discretion to permit questioning regarding the seeds generally and to admit
the seeds marked as “Panama Red” but to exclude the officer’s testimony that the
seeds were in fact marijuana seeds when no seeds had been tested for that fact.
Phillips next contends that it was reversible error for the prosecuting
attorney to ask if Phillips had asked for an independent testing of the plants seized
on his property. He specifically asserts that this line of questioning attempted to
shift the burden of proof on him rather than on the Commonwealth, where it
rightfully belonged. He ignores, however, the trial court’s specific instruction that
the question be rephrased to “[w]hile he had no duty to do so, did the defendant
request any additional testing of the plants?” The corrected phraseology clearly
does away with any implication that the burden was on Phillips to prove his
innocence. Therefore, we find no error.
Phillips finally argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion
for directed verdict. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence
that there were more than eight ounces of marijuana seized from his house and
farm and that charging him with both cultivation of marijuana and trafficking in
marijuana constituted double jeopardy and reversible error. We disagree.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt. See
Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Ky. 2003). “For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and
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weight to be given to such testimony.” See Commonwealth v. Benham, 816
S.W.2d 186, 188 (Ky. 1991).
We have previously addressed the validity of the testimony submitted
at trial regarding the weight of the marijuana, and, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, it was proper for the trial court to deny the
directed verdict on this issue.
Additionally, Phillips’ argument that he was subject to double
jeopardy by being charged with both cultivation and trafficking of marijuana is
completely without merit. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that,
in a single proceeding, the government may prosecute a defendant for multiple
offenses that are constitutionally the “same offense” without violating the Double
Jeopardy Clause, but they may not punish for convictions of the same offense.
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499-500, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L.Ed.2d 425
(1984). Phillips accepted a concurrent sentence of three years, and he raises no
issue on appeal as to the punishment he received but only as to the charges.
Therefore, we find that there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
alternatively that Phillips waived any appeal of his sentencing by waiving his right
to jury sentencing and accepting the three year concurrent sentence.
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment and
sentencing of the Mason Circuit Court.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
STUMBO, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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STUMBO, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I must dissent. I
disagree with the majority’s resolution of the curtilage issue. The factors to
consider when deciding if certain property is considered curtilage is set forth in
U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed.2d 326 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court held that:
curtilage questions should be resolved with particular
reference to four factors: the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is
included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining
these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when
mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all
extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any
given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration-whether the area in question is so
intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed
under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment
protection.
Id. I believe that the lower court erred in its analysis of this law, and that the barn
was part of the curtilage of Appellant’s home. As the Court in Dunn stated, the
four factors are not to be applied mechanically. The second and fourth Dunn
factors support my conclusion that the barn was part of the curtilage. The entire
parcel of Appellant’s property was surrounded by fencing and wooded area, the
entrance to the property was blocked by a locked gate that had to be removed, and
the house and farm were set back a good distance from the road. In fact, the
locked gate is the strongest indication that the barn was part of the curtilage. It is
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obvious that the locked gate was to stop any uninvited guests or members of the
public from gaining access to his land.
While police officers are allowed to enter onto someone’s property
without a warrant for legitimate police purposes, they can only enter those parts
that are impliedly open to public use. Cloar v. Commonwealth, 679 S.W.2d 827
(Ky. App. 1984). The locked gate shows that no part of Appellant’s land was open
to the public. This forces me to believe that once the police officers removed the
gate and entered Appellant’s property, they violated Appellant’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. The marijuana was not
positively identified as contraband until the officers went onto the land. Since the
incriminating nature of the marijuana was not certain until after the officers
breached the curtilage, not even the plain view doctrine can save the
Commonwealth’s case. See Hazel v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1992).
The incriminating nature of the marijuana must have been seen from a place the
police officers had a right to be in order for the plain view doctrine to work. Since
the officers were illegally on Appellant’s curtilage, the plain view doctrine fails.
Also, since the warrant to search Appellant’s house was based on the
marijuana found during the search of the curtilage, the evidence found inside the
house must also be suppressed. Any evidence found once the curtilage was
breached must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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BRIEF FOR PHILLIPS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stacey S. Sanning
Raymond S. Bogucki
Maysville, Kentucky
Gregory Stumbo
Attorney General
Michael A. Nickles
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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