HICKS (WILLIAM) VS. ARCHIE (RICHARD)
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RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2008; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000811-MR
WILLIAM HICKS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS D. NICHOLLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00341
RICHARD ARCHIE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI, 1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: William Hicks appeals from a jury verdict in favor of
Richard Archie that awarded him medical expenses and punitive damages for assault
and battery. Hicks raises three issues on appeal: (1) the award of punitive damages
was excessive; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance; and (3) the
trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial when Archie failed to provide CR 8.01
information. We affirm.
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Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
The incident underlying this appeal originated in the worsening
estrangement of Silas Hicks, William's father, and Earmelie Archie Hicks, Richard's
mother. Although Hicks and Archie were brothers-in-law as a result of their parents'
marriage, the two had never met each other until August 7, 2005. On that day, Hicks
went to the residence of Earmelie Hicks ostensibly to retrieve a phone number on behalf
of his father. Archie was home on leave from the United States Navy visiting his
mother. When Hicks arrived at the home, Earmelie Archie was concerned as both
Hicks and his father, Silas, had a history of threatening her. Hicks was visibly angry
when he approached the door and Archie asked him to leave the property. Hicks then
lost control and began shouting and Archie stated that if Hicks would not leave then he
would call the police. Hicks refused to leave and continued shouting. As Archie turned
to instruct another family member to call the police, Hicks struck him through the screen
door causing a laceration beneath Archie's left eye. Hicks continued to attempt to gain
entry into the home through the torn screen door. He stepped toward Earmelie and
attempted to strike her as well. Archie struck Hicks twice and Hicks went back into the
yard where he continued his tirade. When police arrived on the scene, they arrested
both Hicks and Archie and transported Archie to the hospital for treatment. The charges
against Archie were eventually dismissed and Hicks pled guilty to fourth-degree assault.
Archie filed suit against Hicks in the Greenup Circuit Court seeking
damages for assault and battery. Following a jury trial, Archie was awarded $1,316.90
for medical expenses, zero dollars for pain and suffering, and $38,750.00 in punitive
damages. This appeal followed.
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Hicks first argues that the award of punitive damages was constitutionally
excessive. In order to satisfy due process, punitive damage awards must be evaluated
under three factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 1520, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). While few awards
in practice may constitutionally exceed a single-digit ration between compensatory
damages and punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
rejected a bright-line ratio or mathematical formula to determine the reasonableness of
a punitive damages award. Id. at 424-5. Appellate courts review the application of
these factors to a punitive damages award under the de novo standard. Id. at 418.
“[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.” Id. at 419
(quoting BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1599, 34
L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)). Courts are to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct by considering whether: “the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.” Id. Hicks argues that
this was a simple assault and battery case that was the result of an isolated incident of
misunderstanding between relatives.
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We find that Hicks's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to support the
jury's award of punitive damages. First, the harm caused by Hicks was obviously
physical rather than economic. Secondly, Hicks displayed an indifference to the health
and safety of others by striking Archie after he had turned away and by attempting to
strike his ailing mother. It is not apparent from the record whether Archie was financially
vulnerable. While Hicks argues that this was an isolated incident, the evidence showed
the circumstances of this case to involve repeated acts of hostility and threats to his
mother and other relatives at that residence. On the occasion of the battery, Hicks was
asked repeatedly to leave the premises, then struck Archie and attempted to strike his
mother. Afterwards, he engaged in a tirade on the lawn spewing profanities. The
award was reasonable under this factor.
Next, we examine the disparity between the compensatory damages and
the punitive damages award. Archie was awarded $1,316.90 for medical expenses,
zero dollars for pain and suffering, and $38,750.00 in punitive damages. The ratio
between the compensatory damages is approximately 29 to 1. As stated above, there
is no bright-line ratio or mathematical formula to determine the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award. Additionally, ratios exceeding single digits may be appropriate
where a “particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic
damages.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. The Court also stated that: “[w]hen
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”
Id. Conversely, a small amount of compensatory damages might require a higher ratio
of punitive damages to sufficiently punish or deter future conduct. We find that the
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award is reasonable based upon the egregiousness of Hicks's conduct coupled with the
relatively small amount of compensatory damages.
Thirdly, we evaluate the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases. While we are unaware of any civil penalties for assault and battery,
we note that the existence of a criminal penalty does have a bearing on the seriousness
with which the Commonwealth views this wrongful action. Id. at 428. However, criminal
penalties are of little use in the determination of the appropriateness of punitive
damages. Id. Nevertheless, in light of the circumstances surrounding this incident and
the egregiousness of Hicks's conduct, we find the award of punitive damages in this
case to be reasonable.
Next, Hicks argues that he should have been granted a continuance when
his original counsel left the practice of law and was substituted by younger, allegedly
more inexperienced, counsel. We are cited to no authority in support of this position.
Additionally, Hicks's new counsel was substituted over two months before the
scheduled trial date with a warning from the court that the trial would proceed as
scheduled. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by failing to grant Hicks a continuance.
Finally, Hicks argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Archie failed
to disclose the specific elements of damages as required by CR 8.01. CR 8.01(2)
states in pertinent part:
[w]hen a claim is made against a party for unliquidated
damages, that party may obtain information as to the
amount claimed by interrogatories. If this is done, the
amount claimed shall not exceed the last amount stated in
answer to the interrogatories . . .
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(emphasis added). No interrogatories were served in this case and this matter was
explored during the deposition testimony of Archie. Hicks suffered no prejudice and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John R. McGinnis
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland
Greenup, Kentucky
Gordon J. Dill
Ashland, Kentucky
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