KARLA NUNLEY v. TIM NUNLEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000098-ME
KARLA NUNLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA E. SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00328
TIM NUNLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND STUMBO, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Karla Nunley has appealed from the order of the McCracken Family
Court modifying the custody of her minor children and naming her former husband, Tim
Nunley, the primary residential custodian. Because we have determined that the family
court did not make its decision on the basis of facts that had arisen since the original
decree was entered or on substantial evidence of record, we reverse and remand.
1
Senior Judge John W. Graves, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Karla and Tim were married in McCracken County, Kentucky, on October
17, 1992. Two children were born of the marriage: Skylar Timothy, born November 10,
1995; and Talon Eugene, born June 6, 2000. After several temporary separations, Karla
and Tim permanently separated on March 1, 2002, and Karla filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage one month later. The family court entered an interlocutory
decree of dissolution the following March, leaving the settlement of the marital estate and
custody to be decided. Karla and Tim reached an agreement on all remaining issues,
which the family court adopted in its Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree entered on June 17, 2003. Pursuant to the terms of their agreement, the
parties were awarded joint custody of the children, with Karla being named the primary
residential custodian. Tim was awarded standard visitation and ordered to pay Karla
child support. In October, Tim moved the family court to modify his visitation based
upon his move to Wisconsin the previous month. An agreed order was entered shortly
thereafter setting up a new visitation schedule. In October 2004, the family court reduced
Tim's child support obligation, presumably due to the imputation of income to Karla.
On May 11, 2005, Tim moved the family court to modify child support and
to reinstate standard visitation. By this time, Tim had moved back to Kentucky, but was
earning a lower hourly wage at Wal-Mart. The record does not reflect a ruling on the
motion. On September 12, 2005, Tim filed a motion to modify custody, alleging that
Karla had not complied with joint custody in that she made all of the decisions for the
children, and that she had recently uprooted the children without advance notice to him or
-2-
his parents and moved to Georgetown, Kentucky, several hours away. Tim also
mentioned that Karla was suffering from bipolar disorder. He requested that he be named
the primary residential custodian. In the affidavit attached to the motion, Tim's father,
Larry Nunley, stated that he was concerned for his grandsons' well-being, that Karla
suffered from bipolar disorder, and that Karla had taken the boys from the area without
letting anyone know. Finally, he stated that Tim was a good father and that it would be in
the boys' best interest for Tim to be awarded custody.
In support of his motion, Tim filed the deposition testimony of Larry
Nunley; his mother, Linda Nunley; and his sister, Kelly Gross. All three testified that
Karla was mentally unstable and recounted examples of past lies, including being raped
by Tim, her father, and her former brother-in-law. Tim testified at the hearing, which
took place over two days in October and November 2005. Tim first addressed Karla's
sudden move to Georgetown without notice to him. Tim testified that she claimed the
move was due to a break-in and attempted attack. For the most part, however, Tim
focused on Karla's past actions. He testified about false and suspected false accusations
Karla had made concerning incidents that took place before their children were born.
These incidents included a break-in at an apartment they shared early in their marriage as
well as rape allegations. Tim introduced undated, handwritten letters from Karla, either
making these accusations or recanting them. Tim admitted, however, that Karla's
accusations against her grandfather were substantiated. Further, Tim admitted that Karla
had taken out a Domestic Violence Order against him. On cross-examination, Tim
-3-
admitted that he relocated to Wisconsin to move in with a woman he met on the internet.
Regarding his children, he was unable to testify how old they were, what grade of school
they were in, or what medications they took. In further support of his motion, Tim called
a former supervisor from Wal-Mart and a woman he knew from church, who both
testified that Tim was a good father and interacted well with his children.
Karla testified that she lived with her sister's family in Georgetown,
Kentucky, and that her children were enrolled in the 4th grade and kindergarten. She
testified about her mental health problems, for which she had been in treatment with Dr.
Karl Klauburg since 1989 when she was 16 years old. Karla stated that she had not had
any significant problems since 1993 when she was last hospitalized and that she was
well-regulated on medication. She stated that Tim was aware of her mental health issues
when he agreed to the custody arrangement. Furthermore, Karla testified that she had
always been the primary caregiver for the children and that her mental health had not
affected her children's lives. Regarding her marriage, Karla stated that she and Tim had
separated two times before the final separation, once in 1997 due to his drinking and
affairs, and again after Talon's birth in 2000. Tim had little interaction with the children
during the periods of separation. Regarding her move to Georgetown, Karla testified that
she moved in order to protect herself and her children after she had been sexually
assaulted in her home in April and again in July 2005. She also related threats to her life
since July. Regarding her past accusations of rape, Karla testified that her grandfather
-4-
had gone to prison for raping her, and that she made similar, but admittedly false,
allegations against her father because she was angry with him for failing to protect her.
Judge Sanderson conducted a rather lengthy examination of Karla. Under
her questioning, Karla admitted that she had been receiving Social Security Disability
benefits for the past few years solely due to her diagnosis of bipolar disorder, but that she
was properly medicated for this condition. She testified that she was sexually abused by
her grandfather from the age of 10 until she was approximately 17 years old. Her
grandfather admitted to the abuse and was serving a prison sentence when he died of
cancer when Karla was 18. Judge Sanderson then questioned Karla about the reported
rapes in April and July. Karla testified that she contacted the police and that rape kits
were completed, but that she did not know the results. She stated that photographs were
taken of bruises on her face after the second rape. Karla also testified about threats to her
life that were made to her current boyfriend in September, one from a payphone to his
work and one in the form of a letter left on his car.
Karla's sister, Kim Unfried, testified that Karla lived with her and was
mentally fine. She detailed Karla's daily routine with her children. McCracken County
Sheriff's Department Detective Jim Smith testified regarding his investigation of the
second sexual assault. He indicated that no foreign DNA was found in either rape kit,
and that the letter found on Karla's boyfriend's car was being processed for fingerprints.
He spoke with Karla about the telephone threat, noting that she was scared and concerned
-5-
for her safety. They discussed her options and he told her that children are resilient,
referring to a move to her sister's home.
In addition to her testimony, Karla submitted the deposition testimony and
medical records of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Klauburg. Dr. Klauburg first saw Karla
in 1989 when she was referred by Family Services following an altercation between her
and a classmate, as well as a threat of suicide. He noted that Karla had been adopted
when she was 9 days old. Karla saw a therapist at Massac County Health Center over the
next two years. In 1991, Karla, while married to her first husband, was admitted to
Charter Hospital for two weeks due to mood swings, prominent depression, and mild
psychotic thinking after she threatened a peer. At that time, Karla disclosed her history
of sexual abuse by her grandfather. Her diagnosis of major depression with psychotic
features was managed by Prozac. Karla continued to follow up with Dr. Klauburg's
office, during which time she learned to deal with her past sexual abuse. She
successfully continued her course of therapy and medication until she was tapered off of
her medication and discharged from Dr. Klauburg's care in June 1992.
Karla was hospitalized for the second and last time in October 1993 for
depression and suicidal thoughts. At this point, she was married to Tim and they were
having difficulties. Dr. Klauburg prescribed Paxil to manage her depression. Karla
continued with therapy, where she continued to show good control of her depression. Dr.
Klauburg discontinued the Paxil, and then discharged her from his care in July 1994.
-6-
Four years later, Karla returned to Dr. Klauburg for a reevaluation, noting
that her depression had worsened significantly in the preceding two months. Karla began
taking Paxil again, and showed good improvement once the medication was reinstated.
She started therapy again and over the next several years she recounted her two
pregnancies as well as her marital difficulties, including separations and reconciliations.
Throughout the process, Dr. Klauburg's record show that Karla maintained good control
of her depression and would immediately contact his office if her symptoms of
depression began to recur.
In 2000, Karla reported experiencing wild mood swings. At that time, Dr.
Klauburg diagnosed her with rapid cycling bipolar disorder, and began treating her with
Depakote, a mood stabilizing agent. She showed a significant improvement in her mood
swings once she began taking Depakote. She continued to do well through 2001 and
2002, despite the unexpected death of her father in 2001 and finally leaving Tim in 2002.
However, in October 2002, she reported that she was not doing well, and that “I feel like
2 different people.” She related that she had been caught shoplifting twice at Wal-Mart,
but could not remember anything about the incidents. Because she appeared to be
developing a significant level of depression, Dr. Klauburg prescribed Lexapro and
discontinued Paxil. Karla showed significant improvement on Lexapro. However, in
August 2004, Karla reported a fairly rapid onset of progression of her symptoms. Dr.
Klauburg opted to increase Karla's dosage of Lexapro. At her next appointment six days
later, Karla reported that she did not feel like herself, noting disturbing thoughts and
-7-
intermittent suicidal thoughts. Dr. Klauburg described this result as a failed trial of
Lexapro, which he discontinued, and began Karla on a trial of Wellbutrin (an antidepressant) and Seroquel (an anti-psychotic medication), along with Depakote. Karla
improved on the new combination of medication and continued to remain stable.
At her April 11, 2005, appointment, Karla reported an incident the prior
Saturday when she had been raped at gunpoint in her house. Dr. Klauburg noted a
modest degree of depression, secondary to trauma. When she reported problems sleeping
since the rape, Dr. Klauburg increased the dosage of Seroquel. During her next
appointments, Dr. Klauburg noted that Karla was feeling better and responding to her
medication. The last office note was dated October 13, 2005. During that appointment,
Karla related that she had recently had to relocate after a second rape in July and after her
boyfriend had received threats to her life. Despite this, Dr. Klauburg noted that she had
continued good control of her depression and mood swings.
In his deposition, Dr. Klauburg testified that he was not aware of any
evidence that Karla's mental health issues had affected her ability to parent, or that her
rape allegations were the product of her mental disorder. He testified that Karla was still
compliant with her medications and displayed no evidence of psychotic thinking or
hallucinations.
On September 16, 2006, almost a year later, the family court entered an
order granting Tim's motion to modify custody and making the following findings:
1. The court has some very grave concerns about the
mental health capacity of [Karla]. Specifically, her
-8-
propensity to make false allegations of abuse and sexual
abuse against innocent parties, including but not limited to
[Tim]. Not only was credible evidence of this propensity
presented at the hearing, but the psychological and medical
records submitted to the court for review bear out that
[Karla's] mental health is unstable at best.
2. [Tim] is able and willing to drive [sic] a stable
home for the parties' minor children. Additionally, [Tim] has
the strong support of his family who live in the area and are
willing to assist him in providing childcare to the parties'
minor children.
3. The court regrets the long delay in issuing this
Order; but it took a significant amount of time to secure the
psychological records of [Karla] as requested by the court.
4. After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the
court finds that it is [in] the best interests of the parties' minor
children that custody should be modified and [Tim] should be
named as the primary residential custodian of the parties'
minor children subject to the reasonable visitation of [Karla].
[Karla] is hereby granted the standard visitation schedule of
the McCracken Family Court effective as of the date of this
Order.
Following the entry of this order, the family court apparently allowed the
parties to supplement the record with evidence of events that had taken place since the
hearing the previous year. While Tim did not submit any additional evidence, Karla
introduced the medical report and live testimony of licensed clinical psychologist Dr.
Laura Liljequist. Dr. Liljequist performed a psychological evaluation on Karla in
October 2006, and reviewed Dr. Klauburg's records. Based upon her evaluation, Dr.
Liljequist agreed with Dr. Klauburg's diagnosis and stated that Karla's condition was
stable on medication. Regarding her mental stability, Dr. Liljequist testified that Karla
-9-
would experience a mild impairment in her day-to-day functioning when her symptoms
reoccurred, at which times she would see Dr. Klauburg more often. Karla was able to
self-monitor her symptoms, and then would call her physician. Regarding Karla's refusal
to discuss the details of the 2005 rapes, Dr. Liljequist testified that this was common for
trauma victims, as it would cause anxiety. Therefore, such victims avoid talking about
the incidents.
At the conclusion of Dr. Liljequist's testimony, the family court reaffirmed
its decision on the record, and stated that Karla was not stable enough to have her
children full-time. The family court also found that Karla's lack of stability affected her
children, as her fear made her move, and that the children were not sheltered from her
mental problems. Finally, the family court found that Tim was a better parent at that
point under the best interest standard.
On December 14, 2006, the family court entered an order memorializing its
oral findings:
1. In Ordering the [sic] custody be modified to name [Tim]
as the primary residential custodian of the parties' minor
children, SKYLAR TIMOTHY NUNLEY and TALON
EUGENE NUNLEY, the court, in addition to hearing the
testimony and reviewing the evidence presented at the
hearing by the parties' respective counsel, also reviewed the
psychiatric records of [Karla] developed over her course of
treatment [with] her psychiatrist, Dr. Klauberg [sic]. The
records from Dr. Klauberg [sic] show that [Karla] was under
his care and treatment, and continues to be under his
treatment, for the past sixteen (16) years. Based on the court's
review of Dr. Klauberg's [sic] records and the testimony
presented at the original custody modification hearing, the
court believes that [Karla] was not mentally stable.
- 10 -
2. At the supplementary hearing held on October 31, 2006,
[Karla] presented expert witness, Dr. Laura Lilequist [sic], a
Ph.D. in clinical psychology. The court accepted Dr.
Lilequist [sic] as an expert witness and allowed her to testify
as to her psychological opinion of [Karla] with whom Dr.
Lilequist [sic] had met on two (2) occasions and had
administered various psychological tests to [Karla]. It
became apparent during the course of the hearing and Dr.
Lilequist's [sic] testimony that she had reviewed Dr.
Klauberg's [sic] psychiatric records of Ms. Nunley, but did
not have a full and complete set of records from Dr. Klauberg
[sic]. Nevertheless, Dr. Lilequist [sic] still agreed with Dr.
Klauberg's [sic] findings.
3. No testimony was produced at the supplemental hearing to
change the court's ruling that Karla Nunley is not stable
enough to care for the children on a permanent basis. The
court finds that it was Ms. Nunley's mental instability and fear
that led her to uproot the children from the community in
which they lived near their extended family, and to move
them several hundred miles away to live in a basement.
Although the court believes that Ms. Nunley was afraid and
traumatized in part due to her condition, her actions as a
result of that condition were witnessed by her children and it
was certainly detrimental to them.
4. While the court believes that Ms. Nunley has sought
treatment when she feels necessary, the fact that she has to
seek treatment for her mental issues certainly affects the
children and the court believes that the father, [Tim], remains
better suited to have primary custody of the children.
The family court went on to order Karla to send the children's Social Security Disability
checks to Tim and terminated Tim's child support obligation as of October 1, 2006. It is
from this order that Karla has appealed.2
2
We note that at the conclusion of the December 14, 2006, order, the family court stated, “This
is a Final, unappealable Order, there being no just cause for delay.” (Emphasis added.) We shall
assume that the family court meant to state that the order is final and appealable.
- 11 -
Karla raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the family court
erred in considering irrelevant mental health testimony and records, specifically any
information that predated the birth of her children or that had no impact on her ability to
parent. Second, she argues that the family court erred in modifying custody based upon
the relocation of the primary residential custodian. In his brief, Tim asserts that Karla's
mental health is relevant to the determination of child custody. He then argues that the
family court did not modify custody based on Karla's relocation, but rather on her lack of
mental stability.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our standard of review in this matter is set forth in CR 52.01:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an
appropriate judgment . . . . Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.
In Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
addressed this standard, and held that a reviewing court may set aside findings of fact,
only if those findings are clearly erroneous. And, the
dispositive question that we must answer, therefore, is
whether the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous,
i.e., whether or not those findings are supported by substantial
evidence. “[S]ubstantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion” and evidence that, when “taken alone or in the
light of all the evidence . . . has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”
Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the
- 12 -
evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have
reached a contrary finding, “due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses” because judging the credibility of witnesses and
weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of
the trial court. Thus, “[m]ere doubt as to the correctness of
[a] finding [will] not justify [its] reversal,” and appellate
courts should not disturb trial court findings that are
supported by substantial evidence. (Citations omitted.)
With this standard in mind, we shall review the family court’s decision in this matter.
ANALYSIS
The applicable statute in this case is KRS 403.340, which provides for the
modification of a custody decree. The statute, as amended by the General Assembly in
2001, provides:
(2)
No motion to modify a custody decree shall be made
earlier than two (2) years after its date, unless the court
permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that
there is reason to believe that:
(a)
(b)
(3)
The child’s present environment may endanger
seriously his physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health; or
The custodian appointed under the prior decree
has placed the child with a de facto custodian.
If a court of this state has jurisdiction pursuant to the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the court
shall not modify a prior custody decree unless after
hearing it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of entry of the prior decree, that a
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child
or his custodian, and that the modification is necessary
to serve the best interests of the child. When
determining if a change has occurred and whether a
- 13 -
modification of custody is in the best interests of the
child, the court shall consider the following:
(a)
(b)
Whether the child has been integrated into the
family of the petitioner with consent of the
custodian;
(c)
The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2)3 to
determine the best interests of the child;
(d)
Whether the child’s present environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral,
or emotional health;
(e)
Whether the harm likely to be caused by a
change of environment is outweighed by its
advantages to him; and
(f)
(4)
Whether the custodian agrees to the
modification;
Whether the custodian has placed the child with
a de facto custodian.
In determining whether a child’s present environment
may endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health, the court shall consider all relevant
factors, including, but not limited to:
(a)
The interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his parent or parents, his de facto
custodian, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child’s best
interests;
(b)
The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved;
3
The factors listed in KRS 403.270(2) include the wishes of the parent or parents as to the
child’s custody; the child’s wishes; the interaction of the child with parents and siblings; the
child’s adjustment to his home, school and community; and the mental and physical health of
everyone involved.
- 14 -
(c)
Repeated or substantial failure, without good
cause as specified in KRS 403.240, of either
parent to observe visitation, child support, or
other provisions of the decree which affect the
child, except that modification of custody
orders shall not be made solely on the basis of
which parent is more likely to allow visitation
or pay child support;
(d)
If domestic violence and abuse, as defined in
KRS 403.720, is found by the court to exist, the
extent to which the domestic violence and abuse
has affected the child and the child’s
relationship to both parents.
In amending the statute, “the General Assembly not only relaxed the standards for
modification of custody, but it also expanded upon the factors to be considered when
modification is requested. . . . The former standards for modification . . . are now mere
elements or factors to be considered by the court.” Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357,
359 (Ky.App. 2004). KRS 403.350 requires a party seeking modification of a custody
decree to submit an affidavit supporting the motion. The court must deny the motion
“unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits,
in which case it shall set a date for hearing on an order to show cause why the requested
order or modification should not be granted.” Id.
In the present case, Tim filed his motion to modify custody over two years
after the entry of the custody decree. Therefore, we shall concentrate on the two-prong
test set out in KRS 403.340(3); namely, whether a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the children or their custodian and whether modification would be in the
- 15 -
children's best interest. The statute makes it clear that both findings must be based on
facts that have arisen since the original, or prior, custody decree was entered.
Karla first argues that the family court improperly considered irrelevant
testimony and records concerning her mental health. She asserts that conduct of which
the children were not aware and that did not adversely affect them should not be
considered. She relies upon KRS 403.270(3) in the general custody section of the Act,
which provides that, “[t]he court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child. . . .” She also relies upon this Court's opinion
in Basham v. Wilkins, 851 S.W.2d 491 (Ky.App. 1993), Superseded by Statute on other
grounds as stated in Elery v. Martin, 4 S.W.3d 550 (Ky.App. 1999), which addressed, in
part, the lower court's consideration of the mother's mental health in deciding the custody
of a child born out of wedlock. In Basham, the Court noted that the record contained
evidence that the mother's mental disorder affected her ability to parent. Here, Karla
argues that there is no evidence in the record that her mental health affected her ability to
parent, and should therefore have been excluded. Finally, Karla relies upon Krug v.
Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1983), for the proposition that misconduct of a proposed
custodian must have adversely affected, or be likely to adversely affect, the child before
such misconduct may be considered.
We disagree with Karla's assertion that the family court improperly
considered her mental health in deciding to modify custody. The mental health of all
individuals involved in a custody dispute is a relevant factor the court must consider.
- 16 -
KRS 403.270(2)(e). However, we note that Karla's medical records reveal that she, for
the most part, had good control of her depression and bipolar disorder, that her symptoms
were successfully regulated by an evolving regimen of medications, and that she was able
to recognize changes in her mental health and would promptly seek treatment.
Furthermore, her long-time treating psychiatrist testified that he was not aware of any
evidence that her mental health issues affected her ability to parent. We perceive no error
in the family court's reliance upon the evidence of Karla's mental health.
Next, Karla argues that the family court erred by basing its decision to
modify custody on her relocation, which she asserts is not enough to justify modifying
custody. Tim points out, correctly, that the family court did not base its decision on
Karla's decision to relocate. Rather, Tim states that the decision was based upon the
family court's finding that Karla was too mentally unstable to care for her children on a
permanent basis.
However, we do agree with Karla that the family court abused its discretion
in modifying custody in this matter, as the decision was not based on facts that had arisen
since the prior decree. Additionally, the family court's finding that Karla was too
mentally unstable was clearly erroneous. The two orders made it clear that the decision
was solely based upon the family court's finding that Karla was mentally unstable. The
Legislature made it clear that a decision to modify custody must be based on “facts that
have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry
- 17 -
of the prior decree.” KRS 403.340(3). Furthermore, such facts must be based upon
substantial evidence of record. Otherwise, such factual findings are clearly erroneous.
While it is arguable that the family court did not know of Karla's mental
health history when the custody decree was entered, as it was based upon Karla and Tim's
agreement, neither Tim nor the family court can be permitted to rely upon incidents prior
to the 2003 custody decree to justify a modification. Tim quite clearly knew of Karla's
mental health issues when he agreed that she should be designated as the primary
residential custodian. Despite this knowledge, Tim specifically stated in his motion to
modify custody that Karla had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, a diagnosis that
Karla received in 2000, well before Karla even filed the petition for dissolution. In the
initial order modifying custody, the family court specifically cited to Karla's “propensity
to make false allegations of abuse and sexual abuse against innocent parties[.]” Many of
these allegations happened years before the children were born, and at least one
allegation (against her grandfather) was indisputably true. Karla's false accusations
against her father were explained by expert witness testimony as a transfer of blame for
her father's failure to protect her from abuse. Additionally, Karla's accusations against
Tim precipitated their final separation, which necessarily came before the custody decree
in the matter.
The only possible false allegations post-dating the 2003 custody decree
were about the rapes in 2005. However, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that
Karla was lying about the 2005 rapes; in fact, at the time of the hearing, those police files
- 18 -
remained open and active. Any inference the family court could have made that Karla
fabricated these accusations would necessarily be based upon pre-2003 incidents.
Karla's relocation to Georgetown serves as the only possible change in
circumstance, post-decree, upon which the family court could have based its decision to
modify custody. However, the family court did not cite to this relocation when it made
its decision; rather, the family court based its decision solely on its finding that Karla was
mentally unstable.
Even if we were to hold that the family court properly found a change in
circumstance took place, we nevertheless hold that the family court's findings that Karla
was not mentally stable and that her mental health issues affected her children are not
based upon substantial evidence of record. Even a brief review of Dr. Klauburg's records
reveals that Karla was able for a majority of her many years of treatment to maintain
good control of her depression and later her bipolar disorder through psychotropic
medication and therapy. Even when her symptoms returned, she immediately sought
treatment and was able to quickly regain control of her disorders.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that her seeking treatment affected the
children, as found by the family court. Dr Klauburg specifically testified that there was
no evidence that her mental health issues had affected the children. The one incident
when her symptoms increased following the 2003 custody decree came about when the
children were staying with Tim, and that incident represented a failed trial of a
medication that Dr. Klauburg prescribed. There is also no evidence that the children
- 19 -
were negatively affected by the move to Georgetown. Karla's sister testified that Karla
enrolled them in school and that she had already implemented a routine with her children.
Detective Smith also testified that he told Karla that children were resilient in their
discussion of her possible relocation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the family court erred in failing to
base its decision to modify custody on facts that had occurred since the original decree in
2003. Furthermore, we hold that the family court's findings were not based on substantial
evidence of record. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the McCracken Family Court
modifying custody and remand this matter for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Delbert K. Pruitt
Paducah, Kentucky
Jeffery P. Alford
Paducah, Kentucky
- 20 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.