LANCE CONN v. JAMES L. MORGAN, WARDEN, AND AL MCQUEARY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-002446-MR
LANCE CONN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00299
JAMES L. MORGAN, WARDEN, AND
AL MCQUEARY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*** *** *** ***
BEFORE: THOMPSON, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND HENRY, SENIOR JUDGES1
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Lance Conn appeals from an order of the Boyle
Circuit Court that dismissed his petition for declaration of rights involving the imposition
of disciplinary penalties for the violation of the prison regulation prohibiting the physical
assault of another inmate. More specifically, Conn challenges the use of confidential
1
Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judges by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 21.580.
information from other inmates in the disciplinary action. After reviewing the record, the
arguments of the parties, and the law, we affirm.
On May 16, 2005, while Conn was at the Northpoint Training Center, two
inmates, Chadwick York and Ernest Nickell, assaulted another inmate, Kenneth Carter.
Carter was injured seriously enough that he was transported outside the prison for
medical treatment. During the initial investigation of the incident, Corrections Officer
Lieutenant Gribbins obtained information from confidential informants that Conn had
given York and Nickell gloves and rags that had been used during the assault. In an
interview with Sergeant Bryant, Conn admitted giving the gloves and rags to York earlier
in the evening before the incident. However, Conn asserted he had no prior knowledge
of the two inmates' intent to assault Carter.
Lieutenant Gribbins prepared an incident report entitled Disciplinary
Report Form-Writeup and Investigation that indicated Conn had taken the gloves and
rags hidden under his shirt to a smoke tunnel and had given them to York. York and
Nickell put on the gloves, covered their faces, and then went to the upper left wing of the
prison where they assaulted Carter. Gribbins stated in the report that the confidential
informants had provided reliable information in the past and that he had submitted a list
of the confidential informants to the disciplinary hearing officer. Conn was charged with
a major violation of the prison disciplinary regulations, Corrections Policies and
Procedures (CPP) Policy Number 15.2, Category VII, Item 2, Physical Action Resulting
in the Death or Serious Injury of Another Inmate.
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At the disciplinary hearing conducted by Lieutenant Al McQueary acting as
the Adjustment Officer, Conn presented several witnesses who said he was with them
watching television during the time of the incident. Conn stated that he had given the
gloves and rags to York, but he denied knowing anything about the planned assault.
Conn maintained that he had borrowed the gloves and rags earlier for working out with
the prison weightlifting equipment and had merely returned them to York.
Lieutenant McQueary found Conn guilty of an inchoate violation of the
CPP category VII-2 involving aiding the action of others in committing a violation. See
CPP 15.2(E)(1)(d). The penalty imposed included disciplinary segregation for 180 days,
forfeiture of two years non-restorable good time credit, and restoration of medical
expenses. Upon administrative appeal, James Morgan, the prison warden, concurred in
the Adjustment Officer's decision.
On June 28, 2006, Conn filed a petition for declaration of rights in the
Boyle Circuit Court assailing the disciplinary action on due process grounds involving
the use of the confidential information in the administrative process. The Justice and
Public Safety Cabinet filed a combined response to the petition for declaration of rights
and motion to dismiss the action denying any due process violations. Conn also filed a
motion requesting an in camera review of the confidential information by the circuit
court, which was denied. On September 1, 2006, the circuit court entered an order
dismissing the petition and rejecting Conn's constitutional claims. This appeal followed.
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Conn condemns the use of the confidential information as violating his
constitutional right of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution as reflected in case law and the
prison disciplinary regulations. He contends that the Adjustment Officer's finding of
guilt was arbitrary because he failed to account properly for the reliability of the
confidential sources.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d
935 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “prison discipline proceedings are
not part of the criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due to a defendant in
such proceedings does not apply.” Moreover, given security concerns in the prison
setting, an inmate's right to confront his accuser and cross-examine witnesses may be
circumscribed within the sound discretion of prison officials. Id. at 568-69, 94 S.Ct. at
2981.
While the court in Wolff dealt with procedural requirements, in
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), the Supreme Court articulated the substantive
quantum of evidence required to support a decision in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
The Court held that a disciplinary action negatively impacting a protected liberty interest
must be supported by “some evidence in the record” in order to comport with the
minimum requirements of due process. Id. at 454, 105 S.Ct. at 2773. “Ascertaining
whether this standard is satisfied does not require [a reviewing court's] examination of the
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entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing the
evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct.
at 2774. Kentucky has similarly adopted a “some evidence” standard for judicial review
of prison disciplinary proceedings under Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution. Smith
v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Ky.App. 1997); Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 118
(Ky. 2007).
Case law has clearly recognized the legitimate use of confidential
information and limited access to the identity of confidential informants in prison
disciplinary actions. See, e.g., Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616 (Ky.App. 1996);
Gilhaus v. Wilson, 734 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.App. 1987); Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156
(2nd Cir. 2001). Inmates have no absolute due process right to information possibly
exposing the identity of the confidential informant because of the legitimate need to
prevent retaliation. See, e.g., Wells v. Israel, 854 F.2d 995, 998-99 (7th Cir. 1988);
Stanford, supra. Thus, a disciplinary committee may consider confidential information
even though the inmate has not been permitted access to it. However, testimony of
confidential informants cannot be given any weight unless there has been a determination
that the informants are reliable. See Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir.
1987); Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 701 (10th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Fountain, 77
F.3d 372, 375 (11th Cir. 1996).
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The federal courts have held that there is no single mandatory method for
determining and documenting the reliability of the confidential informant in a prison
setting. Taylor, 931 F.2d at 698; Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 810 n.9 (8th Cir. 1988).
Generally, where the disciplinary committee relies on confidential sources, there must be
sufficient information in the record to convince the reviewing authority that the
disciplinary committee undertook an independent inquiry and correctly concluded that
the confidential information was credible and reliable. Taylor, 931 F.2d at 702; McKinny
v. Meese, 831 F.2d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 1987); Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 655 (2nd Cir.
2004).
For instance, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have identified four nonexclusive methods for establishing informant reliability: 1) the oath of the investigating
officer as to the truth of his report containing confidential information along with his
appearance before the disciplinary committee; 2) corroborating evidence or testimony; 3)
a statement on the record by the disciplinary committee of knowledge of the sources of
the information and their reliability in prior instances; or 4) in camera review of material
documenting the investigator's assessment of the reliability of the confidential informant.
See Henderson v. U.S. Parole Commission, 13 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994)(citing
Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1298 (7th Cir. 1985)); Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 831 F.2d
183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit has noted several factors relevant to
determining the reliability of an informant based on the totality of the circumstances
approach, including the informant's motive for giving the information, the specificity of
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the information, the reliability of the informant in prior situations, and the degree to
which the information is corroborated by other evidence. See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d
57, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 2004); Gaston, 249 F.3d at 163-64.
In Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit held
that in cases where the prisoner is found guilty of misconduct based on evidence
consisting entirely or substantially on the statements of a confidential informant, the
disciplinary committee could not rely only on the investigator's opinion that the informant
was credible and must make an independent assessment of the informant's reliability.
The court indicated that due process required the disciplinary committee have “some
evidentiary basis . . . upon which to determine for itself that the informant's story is
probably credible.” 850 F.2d at 277. (Emphasis in original). It further stated:
At a very minimum the investigator must report that a
particular informant has proved reliable in specific past
instances or that the informant's story has been independently
corroborated on specific material points. Such information
although skeletal would enable the committee to come to a
reasonable conclusion that the informant is reliable and
therefore that the story he has related to the investigating
officer is likely to be true.
Id. The court held that prison authorities must make a contemporaneous
record of the evidence that can be made available to a reviewing court. In
addition, “[a]lthough due process does not require that the committee's
findings and reasonings [on the reliability of the confidential sources] also
be recorded contemporaneously, this is a better practice.” Id. at 283.
Conversely, other courts have recognized that where there is sufficient
evidentiary basis under the “some evidence” standard, independent of the information
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from confidential sources, to support the disciplinary action, there is no due process
violation despite the disciplinary committee's failure to independently assess or make a
finding on the informant's reliability.
However, because the overarching due process
concern is whether “some evidence” supports
the disciplinary decision, a reviewing court
must examine the reason for non-disclosure and
the reliability of the confidential informant only
in cases where the confidential information is
needed to satisfy the some evidence standard . .
. . When there is other evidence supporting the
disciplinary decision, due process is satisfied
“without determining the reliability of the
confidential informant” or the institutional
reasons for non-disclosure. Any other rule
would violate the core principle that the some
evidence standard “does not require
examination of the entire record, independent
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses or
weighing of the evidence.”
Espinoza v. Peterson, 283 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). See
also Turner v. Caspari, 38 F.3d 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1994); Broussard v. Johnson, 253 F.3d
874, 877 (5th Cir. 2001); Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the independent inquiry by the disciplinary committee into the reliability of informants
may be diminished or eliminated where there is corroborating evidence of the
confidential information).
In the current case, the Adjustment Officer relied in part on information
from confidential informants. The Investigation Report states that Conn's role in the
incident was determined from circumstantial evidence and information obtained from
confidential informants who were deemed reliable in the past. This report indicates that a
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list of the confidential informants was submitted to the hearing officer. The Hearing
Report states that Conn admitted he had given the gloves to Nickell and York and that
other sources provided information that he had hidden the gloves and rags under his shirt
and had given them to the other two inmates.
Conn contends that the disciplinary action violates due process because the
Adjustment Officer failed to perform an independent assessment or provide a specific
reference or statement in the Hearing Report on the reliability of the confidential
informants.2 Unfortunately, this court's review is hampered by the fact that the record on
2
Conn also maintains that the disciplinary action violated the prison regulations related to the
handling of confidential information from informants as set out in CPP 9.18 (effective date
February 3, 2006). CPP 9.18 (II) (E) (3) states: “Ordinarily, an Adjustment Committee decision
that an inmate committed a prohibited act shall be supported by more than one reliable
confidential source, unless the circumstances of the incident and the knowledge possessed by the
confidential informant convince the committee that the confidential informant's information is
reliable (see Section II, E(6) for establishing reliability of an informant). If there is only one
source, the confidential informant information shall be corroborated by independently verified
factual evidence linking the inmate charged to the prohibited act.” Confidential information
generally is to be presented to the committee in writing with a signed statement of the informant
or the investigating officer that includes factual information and a description of the manner in
which the informant arrived at the knowledge of those facts. CPP 9.18 II (E)(4). The identity of
the confidential informant shall be known by at least the committee chairperson and may be
revealed to the other members, while the substance of the information shall be available to all of
the committee members. CPP 9.18 II (E)(5). “Reliability may be determined by a record of past
reliability or by other factors that reasonably convince the Adjustment Committee of the
confidential informant's reliability.” CPP 9.18 II (E)(6)(a). The investigating officer providing
the confidential information shall also provide a written statement describing: 1) the frequency
with which the confidential informant has provided information; 2) the time period that the
confidential informant has provided information; and 3) the degree of accuracy of the
information. CPP 9.18 II (E)(6)(b). If reliability is based on factors other than a history of
reliability, the investigating officer shall specify those other factors. CPP 9.18 II (E)(6)(c). The
committee hearing report shall identify the specific information relied on for the decision, a
summary of the confidential information, and a statement on the rationale for a decision that is
supported solely by information given by a single confidential informant. CPP 9.18 II (E)(7)(b),
(c), and (d). The committee chairperson shall include in the record of the hearing a statement of
the basis for finding the information provided by a confidential informant reliable. CPP 9.18 II
(E)(7)(a). If the committee determines that the disclosure of information in the hearing report
may reveal the identity of the informant(s), a separate confidential report should be prepared that
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appeal contains only the Investigation Report and the Hearing Report. It does not include
the audiotape of the hearing or any other documents produced in association with the
disciplinary action. Moreover, the circuit court denied Conn's motion for an in camera
view of the documentation related to the confidential informant information. The better
practice would have been for the Department of Corrections to submit these documents to
the circuit court for in camera appellate review with their response and motion to dismiss
given Conn's complaints concerning the use of confidential information in a disciplinary
proceeding. Nevertheless, we believe that Conn's petition was properly dismissed.
Although the Adjustment Officer failed to make an explicit reference in the
Hearing Report revealing an independent assessment of the reliability of the confidential
sources, the record does suggest that the Adjustment Officer was given information on
the reliability of the confidential informants and the information they provided.3 The
Hearing Report indicates that the confidential information was corroborated in significant
aspects by Conn's admission that he gave the gloves and rags to Nickell and York. An
contains a copy of the confidential informant's statements and a statement identifying the specific
information relied on by the committee. CPP 9.18 II (E)(8).
3
Conn asserts that the disciplinary action violated CPP 9.18 because the hearing report failed to
include a statement and make specific findings that show the Adjustment Officer performed an
independent assessment of the confidential informants' reliability. The hearing report does
include a summary of the confidential information and the specific information relied on for the
decision. Since the record on appeal does not include the complete administrative record of the
investigation and hearing, we are unable to determine if it contains a more specific statement by
the hearing officer on his independent assessment of the reliability of the confidential
information. Additionally, because the hearing officer did not rely solely on the information
from a single confidential informant, the Hearing Report did not have to include a specific
statement on the reliability of the confidential informant. Moreover, the Hearing Report contains
findings including Conn's admissions that corroborate the confidential information and provide a
rationale for the decision. Thus, Conn has not shown that the disciplinary action Hearing Report
did not substantially comply with CPP 9.18.
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extensive analysis of the confidential informant's reliability was unnecessary. While a
more specific statement would have been preferable, the reference to the corroborating
testimony in the disciplinary reports suggests that the Adjustment Officer made an
independent assessment of the reliability of the confidential information, which was
sufficient for appellate review.
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence independent of the confidential
information to support the disciplinary action. The Adjustment Officer found Conn
guilty of the inchoate offense of aiding in the assault, rather than direct participation. It is
undisputed that the gloves and rags were used in the assault in an attempt to conceal the
identity of the assailants. Conn admitted giving the gloves and rags to the other inmates
the very night of the incident. While he adamantly contends that he had no prior notice
that an assault was planned, that is a question of fact bearing on his credibility. Appellate
review of prison disciplinary actions are differential, especially in respect to the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Conn testified at the disciplinary hearing and
had several witnesses testify on his behalf. Although not extensive, there is enough
evidence to support the Adjustment Officer's decision under the “some evidence”
standard regardless of the confidential information. Accordingly, Conn has not
demonstrated that he was deprived of due process.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Boyle Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lance Conn
Central City, Kentucky
James D. Godsey
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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