JIMMY DANN NUNN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 6, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001833-MR
JIMMY DANN NUNN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00022
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Jimmy Dann Nunn, appeals pro se from orders of the Bell
Circuit Court denying his motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 and
CR 59. Finding no error, we affirm.
On February 11, 2004, Appellant was indicted for receiving stolen property
with a value in excess of $300. Appellant and his appointed counsel, DPA attorney
Linda J. West, appeared for arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. In June 2004,
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Appellant secured private counsel, Michael A. Taylor, and the trial court thereafter
granted West's motion to withdraw.
In July 2004, Appellant entered a guilty plea to the receiving stolen
property charge. In exchange, the Commonwealth recommended a sentence of five
years, with 90 days to be served in the Bell County Jail and the remainder of the sentence
probated for a period of five years. The trial court accepted the plea and entered
judgment accordingly.
In January 2005, the Commonwealth filed a motion to set aside probation
alleging that: (1) On November 23, 2004, Appellant was charged in the Harlan District
Court for driving on a DUI suspended license and use/possession of drug paraphernalia;
(2) On December 15, 2004, Appellant was arrested for DUI and possession of a
controlled substance (Oxycontin); (3) On December 22, 2004, Appellant was charged in
the Bell Circuit Court with theft by unlawful taking; and (4) On December 23, 2004,
Appellant was charged in the Bell Circuit Court with use/possession of drug
paraphernalia and improper use of a signal. Following a revocation hearing, Appellant
was ordered to serve the remainder of his five year sentence. In April 2005, the trial
court denied Appellant's motion for shock probation.
On July 11, 2006, Appellant filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied Appellant's motion without
an evidentiary hearing. Appellant thereafter filed a CR 59.01 motion for a new trial,
which was also denied. This appeal ensued.
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The crux of Appellant's argument in this Court is as follows:
In this case, Appellant on the record rejected a two year plea
offer based upon [West's] advice. Shortly thereafter, [Taylor]
was assigned to represent your Appellant who immediately
advised Appellant to accept a five year plea offer, three
additional years without any elaboration as to any factual
differences. Logic dictates, based on a common-sense
recognition, that three additional years of imprisonment
based solely on having different lawyers, says that
Appellant did not have effective assistance during a
critical stage of the proceeding. (Emphasis in original).
Essentially, Appellant believes that West was ineffective for advising him to reject the
two-year plea offer2 and Taylor was ineffective for advising him to accept the five-year
offer. We disagree.
The standard of review for claims raised in a motion filed pursuant to RCr
11.42 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is limited to issues that were not
and could not be raised on direct appeal. The movant in an RCr 11.42 proceeding has the
burden of establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary post-conviction relief. Haight v. Commonwealth,
41 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ky. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 998 (2001). (Citing Dorton v.
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1968)). An evidentiary hearing is not required
about issues refuted by the record of the trial court. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854
S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994).
When this Court analyzes claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it
usually applies the two-prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
2
We would note that there is no evidence in the record relating to this purported offer by the
Commonwealth.
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668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, when analyzing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, the second prong found in
Strickland is replaced with the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106
S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Thus, a criminal defendant who alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel must, first, prove that his trial attorney's performance was deficient
to such an extent that the attorney was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, and, second, prove he was so prejudiced by the attorney's deficient
performance that there exists, "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. App. 1986). A reasonable
probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Strickland, supra, at 694.
In his RCr 11.42 motion, Appellant claimed that he repeatedly informed
counsel that he was innocent and that he did not want to accept the Commonwealth's plea
offer. Appellant further argued that counsel failed to interview a witness who would
have allegedly confirmed Appellant's innocence. Notably, however, the trial court's order
denying Appellant relief provides, in relevant part,
The Court has reviewed the motion and can rule in this matter
by resorting to the record. The record reveals that on July 27,
2004, the Defendant entered an informed, voluntary and
intelligent plea of guilty to the charge. At the time of the
plea, the Defendant advised the Court that he was fully
informed and aware of the evidence against him. The
Defendant further advised the Court that he received the
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stolen property in question and that he knew the property was
stolen at the time he received it.
It is clear that Appellant not only admitted guilt at the time he entered his
plea, but again in his motion for shock probation. As such, it is certainly disingenuous at
this point for Appellant to claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his
innocence or for advising him to accept the Commonwealth's offer. Moreover, we find
absolutely no significance in the fact that Appellant's first appointed counsel may or may
not have advised him to reject an initial plea offer.
We find no evidence that counsels' performance in this case was deficient.
Notwithstanding, Appellant fails to establish that there was a reasonable probability that,
but for counsels' errors, [he] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." Taylor, supra. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's RCr
11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing and did not err in denying the CR 59.01
motion for a new trial.
The orders of the Bell Circuit Court denying Appellant's RCr 11.42 and CR
59.01 motions are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jimmy Dann Nunn, Pro Se
Pineville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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