EMC/HAMILTON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO v. HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR. JUDGE MICHELLE LOWE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF BRANDY MICHELLE LOWE, DECEASED
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-001121-MR
EMC/HAMILTON MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR. JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00093
MICHELLE LOWE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF BRANDY MICHELLE LOWE, DECEASED
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIMRING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND MOORE, JUDGES; GUIDUGLI,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GUIDUGLI, SENIOR JUDGE: The single question in this appeal is whether substantial
evidence supports a jury determination that appellant Hamilton Mutual Insurance
Company failed to mail a notice of non-renewal to appellee Michelle Lowe. We affirm.
Lynn and Michelle Lowe purchased a personal automobile insurance policy
with EMC/ Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company of Cincinnati, Ohio (Hamilton) through
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Senior Judge Daniel T. Guidugli sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Kentucky Constitution Section 110(5)(b) and KRS 21.580.
Rankin Insurance Center in Monticello, Kentucky. The policy provided that Hamilton
could decide not to renew the policy by mailing a notice to the Lowes at the address
shown on the declarations page of the policy at least 75 days prior to the end of the policy
term. Hamilton alleges that it mailed two separate non-renewal notices on June 19, 2000,
one to the Lowes and a second to Firstar Bank, the holder of the lien on the automobile
covered by the policy. The letter in question informed the Lowes that Rankin Insurance
Center no longer represented Hamilton and that provisions in their present policy “make
it necessary for us to send you this notice of our intention not to renew.” Hamilton also
maintains that a copy of this letter was received by Chilton Rankin in his Monticello,
Kentucky office on June 22, 2000.
In the upper right-hand corner of the letter was the following information:
POLICY # 38A-98-05---009
EXPIRING 09/11/00
AGENCY # RT-0626-3
RANKIN INSURANCENTER, INC.
7 PUBLIC SQ
MONTICELLO, KY 42633-1460
Ms. Lowe maintains that she has no recollection of receiving this letter. She does,
however, remember receiving a monthly bill on or about September 21, 2000 which she
paid on October 16, 2000. She testified that she received another monthly invoice in
October which she paid on or about November 17, 2000. Ms. Lowe also stated that these
invoices looked just like the ones she had regularly received from Hamilton. An
accounting supervisor for Hamilton testified that these invoices were for premiums due
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prior to cancellation and that Ms. Lowe's second check was returned upon receipt on
November 20, 2000.
On November 24, 2000, the Lowes' eighteen-year-old daughter Brandy was
killed in an automobile accident. A complaint seeking underinsured motorists coverage
against Hamilton was filed on March 8, 2002. At trial, the jury was instructed to find for
Ms. Lowe unless they believed from the evidence that Hamilton had mailed notice of its
intention not to renew the policy to the Lowes at the address shown on the policy. The
parties had previously agreed that if Ms. Lowe was successful under that instruction, she
would be entitled to judgment against Hamilton without the necessity of additional
findings.
The jury found that Hamilton did not mail notice of its intention not to
renew the policy and on March 22, 2006, judgment was entered for Ms. Lowe in the
amount of $100,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $36,657.30. The trial
court denied Hamilton's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
this appeal followed.
The law regarding mailing notices of cancellation is well-settled. In Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc. v. Com., By Allphin, 649 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Ky. 1983), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held:
. . . summary judgment is improper where there is no proof
of a regular system or scheme for mailing the notices. Once
such positive proof of a regular system of mailing has been
offered, a mere denial of receipt would not overcome the
presumption that a letter properly mailed has been received.
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In the absence of such proof, it is a question of fact whether
the movant received the notice of assessment.
Hamilton argues that the proof offered by Ms. Lowe is insufficient to overcome the
presumption established by its proof of a regular mailing system or to create a fact
question for the jury. We disagree.
Implicit in the Koscot analysis is the submission of “positive proof of a
regular system of mailing” which allows for a presumption that the system was applied to
the notice in question. Here, however, Ms. Lowe sufficiently countered Hamilton's
evidence on the pivotal issue by challenging the proof which provided the factual
underpinning for the presumption. In addition to her statement that she did not remember
having received the non-renewal letter, Ms. Lowe offered additional evidence
concerning: 1) the fact that Hamilton had no written policy as to its mailing system; 2)
the fact that the testimony of its own employees demonstrated that the group of letters
which allegedly contained the notice to the Lowes was treated differently than other
groups of letters mailed the same day in that the mailing certification did not contain a list
of addressees as did the other groupings; 3) the fact that Hamilton's employees could not
explain this discrepancy in terms of type of correspondence; 4) the fact that Hamilton's
own documentation concerning events affecting the Lowes' policy does not show that a
notice of non-renewal was ever entered into the system; and 5) the fact that Hamilton
could not produce copies of the “earned premium notice” it allegedly sent to the Lowes
and which it cites as support for its contention that the non-renewal notice was in fact
mailed. In fact, the computer entries refer to the latter as “monthly invoices.” Given the
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conflicting evidence as to implementation of Hamilton's mailing system in reference to
this particular letter, we are convinced that a jury question was presented as to whether
the non-renewal notice was indeed mailed to the Lowes.
As noted in Hamilton's brief, this Court's role in reviewing a ruling on a
motion for JNOV is well-summarized in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., 798
S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Ky. 1990):
All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken
as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to determine
credibility or the weight which should be given to the
evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact.
Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Cantrell, 298 Ky.,
743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (1944), and Cochran v. Downing, Ky.,
247 S.W.2d 228 (1952). The prevailing party is entitled to all
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the
evidence. Upon completion of such an evidentiary review,
the appellate court must determine whether the verdict
rendered is “ ‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the evidence so
as ‘to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.’” NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 855, 860
(1988).
An appellate court, then, is to “review all the evidence presented to the jury and must
uphold the trial court's decision [to grant a JNOV] if 'after all the evidence is construed
most favorably to the verdict winner, a finding in his favor would not be made by a
reasonable [person].'” Moore v. Environmental Construction Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13,
16 (Ky. 2004)(internal citation omitted). Having conducted that inquiry, we are
convinced that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict. Given the
conflicting evidence as to the implementation of Hamilton's mailing system with regard
to the notice to the Lowes, we cannot conclude that the verdict was palpably contrary to
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the evidence or that a reasonable person could not have reached the same decision as the
jury. We are thus persuaded that the trial court correctly declined to set aside the
decision of the jury on the issue of mailing.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bryan E. Bennett
David A. Nunery
Nunery & Bennett, PLLC
Campbellsville, Kentucky
Thomas E. Carroll
Lance W. Turner
Carroll & Turner, P.S.C
Monticello, Kentucky
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