RHONDA A. SANTOS v. DOUGLAS J. SANTOS
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 21, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000975-ME
RHONDA A. SANTOS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-501170
DOUGLAS J. SANTOS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND MOORE, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Rhonda A. Santos (Rhonda) appeals from the Jefferson Family
Court's April 5, 2006, order denying her post dissolution motion for child support. In that
order, the family court stated that Rhonda had failed to meet her burden of proving a
change of circumstances. In support of her appeal, Rhonda argues that, since she
previously received no child support, application of the child support guidelines would
result in an increase of 15% to the amount of child support due, thus creating a rebuttable
presumption that there had been a substantial change in circumstances. In response,
Douglas J. Santos (Douglas) argues that, even if Rhonda met her burden of proof, she
waived any entitlement to child support in the property settlement agreement the parties
reached at the time their marriage was dissolved. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
We note at the outset that the parties appear to have had some difficulty
getting along following the dissolution of their marriage and that they have litigated a
number of issues, including visitation and custody. However, we will only recite the
facts relevant to whether the family court properly denied Rhonda's motion for child
support.
Rhonda and Douglas were married on June 3, 1995. One child, Nicholas,
was born of that marriage. Douglas filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on
September 17, 2001, and the parties dissolved their marriage on December 3, 2001. The
parties entered into a property settlement agreement and agreed that Rhonda would have
custody of Nicholas with Douglas receiving reasonable visitation. In the decree of
dissolution, the circuit court found that the parties' property settlement agreement was not
unconscionable and adopted that agreement as part of the decree. With regard to child
support, the property settlement agreement states that:
The parties have agreed that there will [be] no child support
paid on behalf of the parties' minor child. During the period
of this marriage, the Petitioner has assisted with the financial
support of the Respondent's two children from a previous
marriage. Therefore, the Respondent is not requesting
payment of child support.
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On June 2, 2003, the parties entered into an amended property settlement,
specifying that Rhonda would have custody of Nicholas during the school year and that
Douglas would have custody during all school vacations. We note that, at the time this
amendment was entered, Rhonda continued to reside in Kentucky while Douglas was
residing in Maine.
On February 20, 2004, Douglas filed a motion seeking custody of Nicholas.
On April 29, 2004, Rhonda filed a motion to modify child support, noting that
"[a]pplication of the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines to the facts of this case . . . will
create a fifteen percent (15%) change of support level thereby requiring modification."
On February 17, 2005, the family court entered an order giving the parties
joint custody. Furthermore, the court placed Nicholas's primary residence during the
school year with Douglas and with Rhonda for seven weeks during the summer and
during Nicholas's spring break. Finally, the court gave the parties alternating visitation
schedules during the Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays. Rhonda filed an appeal from
the court's February 17, 2005, order, which this Court affirmed.1
On March 1, 2005, Douglas filed a motion seeking child support from
Rhonda. On July 15, 2005, the court entered an order finding that Douglas had an
adjusted gross monthly income of $2,614.40 and that Rhonda had an adjusted gross
monthly income of $5,728.68. The court then ordered Rhonda to pay Douglas $704.00
per month in child support plus 70% of Nicholas's extraordinary medical expenses.
1
Santos v. Santos, 2005-CA-000394-ME (March 3, 2006).
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On April 5, 2006, the family court finally ruled on Rhonda's motion for
child support, finding that:
For the time periods covered by the Respondent's motion, the
Respondent presented no evidence of a material and
continuing change of circumstances other than that she
received a raise in salary in January 2004.
KRS 403.213 requires a showing of a material and continuing
change in circumstances for modification of a child support
order. The burden is on the movant - in this case the
Respondent. [The] Court finds that no material and
continuing change of circumstances occurred. Movant failed
to sustain her burden. Her motion for child support is denied.
It is from this order that Rhonda appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The family court has broad discretion with regard to matters of child
support and a family court's decision will not be reversed unless it has abused that
discretion. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1975). However, the lower
court's discretion is not limitless. See Price v. Price, 912 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1995), and
Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566 (Ky.App. 1992). It is with this standard in mind
that we undertake our analysis of the issues raised by Rhonda on appeal.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, Rhonda argues that, pursuant to the property settlement
agreement, she did not receive any child support. Therefore, any application of the child
support guidelines would result in a 15% increase in the amount of child support due.
KRS 403.213(1) provides that "child support may be modified . . . only upon a showing
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of a material change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing." KRS
403.213(2) provides that:
Application of the Kentucky child support guidelines to the
circumstances of the parties at the time of the filing of a
motion or petition for modification of the child support order
which results in equal to or greater than a fifteen percent
(15%) change in the amount of support due per month shall
be rebuttably presumed to be a material change in
circumstances.
Based on the above, one seeking a modification in child support must establish: (1) a
material change in circumstances; (2) that the change is substantial; and (3) that the
change is continuing. KRS 403.213(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that a material
change has occurred but it does not create a rebutabble presumption that said change is
substantial or continuing. Based on the record before us, we can identify nothing
establishing that, if a change in circumstances occurred, that change in circumstances was
substantial or continuing. Therefore, we hold that the family court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Rhonda's motion for child support.
We affirm the order of the Jefferson Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Russell Lloyd
Louisville, Kentucky
Harold L. Storment
Louisville, Kentucky
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