LINDA S. PRATHER v. PROVIDIAN NATIONAL BANK n/k/a WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
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RENDERED: JUNE 8, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000630-MR
LINDA S. PRATHER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. TRUDE, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00391
PROVIDIAN NATIONAL BANK
n/k/a WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Linda S. Prather appeals from a judgment of the Madison
Circuit Court in favor of Providian National Bank, n/k/a Washington Mutual Bank, in an
action for breach of contract. Prather presents numerous issues for our review: the trial
court’s exclusion of testimony, its rejection of proposed jury instructions, and the denial
of several pre-trial motions. After our review, we affirm.
The procedural history of this case is rather complicated. The matters
litigated by the parties entail three related actions addressed to four different courts. A
summary of the first stages of the proceedings was included in a decision rendered in July
2006 by another panel of this court. We borrow from that opinion as follows:
On May 18, 1999, Providian filed a civil action in the
Madison District Court, seeking to recover a credit-card debt
which it alleged that Prather owed. [Action No. 99-C-00323]
Prather disputed the debt alleging that the credit-card
statements were withheld and, when they were provided,
were fraudulently altered and did not reflect accurate
information, and that the interest charges and fees were
improperly calculated. In November 2001, Prather filed
counterclaims against Providian and its attorneys, Weltman
[Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA], alleging fraud and breach of
contract. Following filing of Prather’s counterclaims, the
matter was transferred to Madison Circuit Court. [Action No.
02-CI-00391]. During the course of the litigation, a discovery
dispute arose between the parties concerning proof of
Providian’s ownership of the credit-card account. Providian
failed to provide such proof as ordered by the court, and on
August 25, 2003, the trial court entered an order dismissing
with prejudice Providian’s claim against Prather.
Around the same time, Prather attempted to file an amended
counterclaim against Providian and Weltman, asserting
additional claims for fraud, wrongful use of civil proceedings,
defamation, and unlawful debt collection practices. The trial
court denied the motion to amend, taking the position that the
additional claims were more appropriately addressed in a
separate action. Thereafter, in August of 2005, Prather filed a
new complaint against Providian and Weltman and the
several individually named attorneys in the Weltman firm,
reasserting her prior causes of action and adding additional
counts alleging violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
wrongful use of civil proceedings, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. [Action No. 04-CI-00995].
Later in 2004, Providian and Weltman had the 2004 action
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removed to the United State District Court of the Eastern
District of Kentucky. [Civil Action No. 04-432-JBC].
However, the federal court determined that removal of
Prather’s state-law claims was not warranted, and the court
ordered those claims remanded back to the Madison Circuit
Court. Upon remand, the trial court ordered the 2004 action
consolidated with Prather’s 2002 counterclaims.
In an order entered on April 14, 2005, the trial court
dismissed the individually named attorneys, and noting the
agreement of the parties, also dismissed Prather’s Consumer
Protection Act claim. On May 18, 2005, the trial court
dismissed all of Prather’s claims against Providian and
Weltman except the [2002] breach of contract claim.
Prather v. Providian National Bank, 2005-CA-001254 (rendered July 7, 2006). The trial
court designated its order as final and appealable on June 6, 2005, and Prather appealed
to this court. In that first appeal, we reversed the trial court’s order dismissing Prather’s
claims against Providian for wrongful use of civil proceedings and remanded for
additional proceedings on the merits of that claim. We affirmed the trial court’s order
dismissing the remaining claims against Providian and Weltman.
The appeal presently before us concerns the proceedings involving
Prather’s breach of contract claims against Providian. These proceedings were ongoing
at the time of our disposition of the first appeal – as was her claim for wrongful use of
civil proceedings (which we presume is still pending before the trial court).
As to the claims for breach of contract, the trial court granted Providian’s
pre-trial motion and dismissed Prather’s claim for damages for the emotional distress that
she claimed to have suffered as a result of Providian’s alleged breach of contract.
Discovery continued until the parties were ready to proceed to trial.
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At trial, Prather called as a witness her accounting expert, James Roller.
Roller indicated that according to the data and assumptions provided to him by Prather,
she had lost in excess of $1,500.00 as a result of Providian’s actions. On crossexamination, Roller freely admitted that he had little or no independent knowledge
regarding the underlying facts. He based his computations on Prather’s contention that
certain charges and payment credits to her account were inaccurate. Roller was not able
to verify the underlying information provided by Prather regarding any disputed charges.
Prather also testified. She indicated that she had given unrestricted access
to her account to her son in college. She told the jury that she had suffered from memory
problems between 1993 and 1995.
Following Providian’s presentation of evidence and closing statements, the
jury retired to deliberate and quickly returned a verdict in favor of Providian. The jury
rejected Prather’s contention that Providian had failed to credit her account when
payments were made, had permitted unauthorized charges to be billed to her account, had
altered statements, and/or had failed to honor her wishes with respect to an insurance
product sold with the account. This appeal followed.
Prather argues first that the trial court erred by dismissing her claim for
emotional damages resulting from the alleged breach of contract. She contends that the
trial court’s failure to permit the claim to proceed violates Section 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
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We have consistently held that parties are not entitled to recover damages
for mental anguish or annoyance suffered due to a breach of contract. Robinson v.
Western Union Tel.Co., 24 Ky.L.Rptr. 452, 68 S.W.656 (1902). “[T]he declared object
of awarding [contract] damages is to give compensation for pecuniary loss . . . . Id. at
658. (Emphasis added).
While Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees that individuals
“shall have remedy by due course of law,” it is construed to provide that a court will be
accessible for claims arising from recognized legal injuries and remedies – not that
Kentucky courts are required to provide or fashion a remedy for every alleged injury or
element of damages. Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998). Prather cannot
recover contract damages for her alleged emotional distress pursuant to long-established
precedent, and the trial court did not err by dismissing that portion of her claim against
Providian.
Next, Prather argues that the trial court erred by ignoring the choice-of-law
provision included in Providian’s contract. Providian concedes that the agreement
provided that New Hampshire law would govern the parties’ disputes.
Under New Hampshire law, Prather contends that every contract contains
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Two days before trial, she sought
leave to amend her complaint in order to add a separate claim based on Providian’s “bad
faith.” Since we are not persuaded that Prather has been prejudiced by the court’s
application of Kentucky law in this proceeding, reversal of the judgment is not justified.
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In Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 190 – 193
(N.H.1989), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire summarized the state’s rule of
implied good faith as follows:
[W]e have relied on such an implied duty in three distinct
categories of contract cases: those dealing with standards of
conduct in contract formation, with termination of at-will
employment contracts, and with limits on discretion in
contractual performance.
*****
In our decision setting standards of conduct in contract
formation, the implied good faith obligations of a contracting
party are tantamount to the traditional duties of care to refrain
from misrepresentation and to correct subsequently
discovered error, insofar as any representation is intended to
induce, and is material to, another party’s decision to enter
into a contract in justifiable reliance upon it.
*****
[T]he good faith enforced in the second category of our cases
is an obligation implied in the contract itself, where it fulfills
the distinctly different function of limiting the power of an
employer to terminate a wage contract by discharging an atwill employee.
*****
[The third category of cases are] those governing discretion in
contractual performance. . . .
*****
[U]nder an agreement that appears by work or silence to
invest one party with a degree of discretion in performance
sufficient to deprive another party of a substantial proportion
of the agreement’s value, the parties’ intent to be bound by an
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enforceable contract raises an implied obligation of good faith
to observe reasonable limits in exercising that discretion. . . .
The facts and circumstances underlying Prather’s action do not fall under any of these
enumerated categories. Thus, none of New Hampshire’s common law good faith
doctrines is implicated.
Prather has not suggested or demonstrated that New Hampshire contract
law differs substantively from Kentucky law in any other way. Kentucky law provides
that “[i]n every contract, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
Ranier v. Mount Sterling National Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154 156 (Ky. 1991). That covenant
imposes a duty upon the parties to do everything necessary to carry out the purposes and
provisions of the contract. Id., citing Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Jones, 262 S.W.2d 174
(Ky. 1953). The trial court did not err in refusing to permit Prather to amend her
complaint to include any additional cause of action specifically provided under New
Hampshire law as it had no meaningful relevance to her claims.
Prather contends that the court erred in omitting and declining to utilize
three of her tendered jury instructions. She had asked the court to instruct: (1) that the
law does not require mathematical certainty in computing damages; (2) that the jury be
apprised of how to determine damages to place her in the same position as if Providian
had fully performed the terms of the contract; and (3) that damages be awarded to the
extent that Providian had reason to foresee them as a probable result of its breach of the
agreement.
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The purpose of instructions to a jury is to submit disputed issues of fact for
determination. Bennett v. Horton, 592 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1979). In this case, there was no
uncertainty as to the amount of damages. There was no legitimate issue regarding
Providian’s ability to foresee damages as a likely consequence of a breach of its
agreement. Prather’s proposed instructions simply did not relate to any fact at issue in
the matter. Prather’s accountant had summarized the extent of the damages resulting
from the alleged improper charges, incorrect accounting of interest, and failure to apply
payments. There was no dispute about whether these damages would have flowed from a
breach of the agreement. The trial court did not err by rejecting the tendered instructions.
Prather also argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a missing
evidence instruction. She focuses on Providian's inability to produce microfiche from
which her statements were produced. She contends that the jury should have been
instructed that it could infer fraudulent alteration of her statements as a result of
Providian's lack of microfiche evidence. Therefore, she contends that that inability
indicated that her statements had been fraudulently altered.
Prather did not raise any issue regarding a fraudulent alteration of her
monthly statements through her evidence at trial. As a result, there was no evidentiary
dispute which required the trial court to instruct the jury as to permissible inferences from
any missing evidence. Thus, there was no error.
Prather next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to permit her to
read the deposition testimony of three witnesses. However, the disputed testimony was
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not read into the record by way of avowal, and by order of this court entered July 5, 2006,
the disputed depositions were excluded from the record on appeal. Given the state of the
record, we are precluded from reviewing this alleged error.
Next, Prather contends that the trial court erred by permitting Becky Cull, a
manager of the consumer credit division at Providian, to testify as an expert witness. We
disagree. Providian properly identified Cull as a potential trial witness and disclosed in
timely fashion its expectation that she would provide relevant expert testimony. At trial,
Cull identified archival copies of account statements that were sent by Providian to
Prather from 1992 through 1998. She explained in detail the process by which credit card
transactions initiated by a merchant were handled by Visa and then forwarded to the
consumer’s bank for processing. She discussed how consumer statements were prepared
and why they were provided to consumers.
Cull’s specialized knowledge appeared to be based upon her training and
experience. Her opinions were relevant and helpful to the jury in evaluating the evidence
before it and in determining the facts in issue. Consequently, the trial court did not err by
permitting the testimony pursuant to the provisions of Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE)
702.
Next, Prather contends that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence and that, therefore, it should be set aside. We disagree. We have
carefully reviewed the trial proceedings. While the evidence presented to the jury was
conflicting, its verdict in favor of Providian was clearly supported by competent
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evidence. See Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky.App. 2001). Therefore, it cannot be
set aside.
Finally, Prather argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain
business records from the evidence. We disagree. Our review of the proceedings
indicates that the court instructed Prather to lay a proper foundation for the contested
documents before tendering them for admission. As the proponent of the records, Prather
was required to comply with the particularized requirements of KRE 902. Since the
documents were not properly identified and authenticated pursuant to the rules of
evidence, the trial court did not err by excluding them.
The judgment of the Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT PRO SE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda S. Prather
Richmond, Kentucky
Trevor L. Earl
Louisville, Kentucky
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