LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP v. ANTHONY THOMPSON; HON. W. BRUCE COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court Of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-000567-WC
LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-00240
ANTHONY THOMPSON; HON. W. BRUCE
COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE:
Liberty Mutual Group petitions for review
from a February 17, 2006, opinion and order by the Workers’
Compensation Board (Board) affirming an award to Anthony
Thompson by the administrative law judge (ALJ).
1
Liberty argues
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
that the ALJ improperly enhanced Thompson’s benefits based on
the general contractor’s violation of safety regulations and
that the ALJ improperly calculated its subrogation rights to the
proceeds from Thompson’s settlement of a third-party civil
action.
We conclude the award was subject to the enhancement
provisions of KRS 342.165(1), and that the ALJ properly
calculated Liberty Mutual’s subrogation interest.
Hence, we
affirm.
The underlying facts of this action are not in
dispute.
Liberty Mutual is the workers’ compensation carrier
for Thompson’s employer, Merrick Construction.
Merrick had a
contract to perform construction and maintenance at a plant
owned by the Budd Company in Shelbyville, Kentucky.
On November
29, 1995, Merrick assigned Thompson to help another Merrick
employee, Chuck Cummings, perform routine maintenance on the
plant’s heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system.
The maintenance included replacing air filters in the HVAC
system and much of the work was done on the roof of the
building.
The filters and filter frames were stored on a
mezzanine floor of the building which housed an electrical
substation.
The mezzanine level was a restricted area and was
normally kept locked.
Cummings, the site supervisor, had a key
to the area and he also had a desk on the mezzanine.
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Cummings
took Thompson to the mezzanine, and showed Thompson the doors to
the mechanical pump room, where the filters were stored and how
to open them.
However, Cummings did not show Thompson another
set of double doors on the mezzanine.
These doors opened into a
space sixteen feet above the factory floor and were used by Budd
employees to load equipment and supplies onto the mezzanine
level.
The double doors were not marked or locked.
Thompson estimated Cummings had given him ten to
fifteen minutes of training for the HVAC maintenance job.
then left to perform the maintenance work.
They
Shortly thereafter,
Thompson returned to the mezzanine to get more filters.
However, he mistakenly went through the double doors instead of
the door to the pump room.
The doors opened outward and
Thompson fell sixteen feet to the factory floor below.
As a
result, Thompson fractured his cervical spine and is now
confined to a wheelchair.
Thompson settled civil suits against the builder and
architect of the Budd plant, for a total of $2,550,000.00.
Budd
was dismissed from the civil action because it is immune from
liability as an up-the-ladder contractor.2
Thompson’s attorney
from the civil case testified that he received a total of
$909,578.48 in fees and costs from the settlement proceeds.
2
KRS 342.610.
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There were two primary issues in Thompson’s workers’
compensation claim against Merrick.
First, Thompson argued that
his award was subject to a 15% enhancement because his injury
was caused by Merrick’s intentional failure to comply with a
safety regulation or statute.
The ALJ found that Merrick did
not create the hazardous condition involving the double doors.
Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that Merrick, through its agent
Cummings, controlled the area, knew of the safety violation, and
failed to adequately protect Thompson against it.
Consequently,
the ALJ enhanced Thompson’s award by 15%.
Second, Liberty Mutual sought a subrogation credit for
the settlement proceeds that Thompson received in the civil
action.
After allocating the percentages of fault and
determining the total damages which Thompson would have received
had his case gone to trial, the ALJ found that Liberty Mutual
was entitled to a subrogation interest of $1,200,000.00.
However, the ALJ further held that Thompson was only entitled to
a subrogation credit to the extent that Thompson’s workers’
compensation benefits exceeded $909,578.46, representing the
amount which he paid to his attorney in fees and costs.
Liberty
Mutual appealed these two determinations to the Board, which
affirmed the ALJ.
This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, Thompson asserts that Liberty
Mutual’s appeal should be dismissed for two reasons.
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First,
Thompson argues that Liberty Mutual’s appeal is fatally flawed
because it failed to name the Board as a party to the appeal.
Recently, however, in Hutchins v. General Electric Co.,3 the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Board is not an
indispensable party to invoke this Court's jurisdiction over the
matter.4
Consequently, dismissal of the appeal is not
appropriate.
We also disagree with Thompson’s argument that Liberty
Mutual’s appeal to the Board was untimely.
The ALJ issued his
initial order opinion and award on April 14, 2005, but
specifically reserved a ruling on the issue of Liberty Mutual’s
subrogation credit.
Both Thompson and Liberty Mutual filed
petitions for reconsideration, which the ALJ sustained in part
and denied in part on July 29, 2005.
After entry of that order,
Liberty Mutual filed a second petition for reconsideration,
which the ALJ denied on September 28, 2005.
Thompson contends that Liberty Mutual’s notice of
appeal should have been filed within thirty days of the ALJ’s
denial of the first petition for reconsideration.
But as the
Board correctly noted, the ALJ’s initial opinion and award was
interlocutory.
The ALJ did not finally adjudicate all issues
until the July 29, 2005 supplemental opinion and award.
3
190 S.W.3d 333 (Ky. 2006).
4
Id. at 336-37.
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Liberty
Mutual filed a timely petition for reconsideration of that order
and thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial
of that motion.
Consequently, the matter was timely appealed to
the Board.
Thus, we return to two central issues in this appeal.
Liberty again argues that the ALJ erred by imposing the 15%
safety penalty allowed by KRS 342.165(1).
The version of KRS
342.165(1) that was in effect on the date of the injury
contained the following language:
If an accident is caused in any degree by
the intentional failure of the employer to
comply with any specific statute or lawful
administrative regulation made thereunder,
communicated to the employer and relative to
installation or maintenance of safety
appliances or methods, the compensation for
which the employer would otherwise have been
liable under this chapter shall be increased
fifteen percent (15%) in the amount of each
payment.5
KRS 342.165(1) promotes workplace safety by
encouraging workers and employers to follow safety rules and
regulations.6
Strictly speaking, the additional compensation
allowed under the statute is not a “penalty”, but serves to
compensate the party that benefits from it for the effects of
5
The current version of the statute provides for enhanced benefits of 30%.
6
Apex Mining v. Blankenship, 918 S .W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1996).
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the opponent's intentional misconduct.7
By its terms, the
statute requires two conditions to be operative before the
penalty can be applied.
The injury to the employee must have
been caused by: 1) the employer of the injured party; and 2) the
employer must be the employer who would otherwise have been
liable for the payment of worker's compensation benefits.8
The parties agree that the design of the doors and
Budd’s failure to properly mark and lock the doors were
violations of applicable building codes and OSHA regulations.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Budd had been given notice
that the doors constituted a violation.
However, Liberty Mutual
emphasizes that the ALJ must find the injury was caused by
Merrick’s intentional violation of a safety statute or
regulation.
In this case, Merrick did not create the dangerous
condition.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that Cummings had
directed Thompson to use the doors to fulfill the job
requirements.
Consequently, Liberty Mutual argues that there
was no evidence to support the conclusion that the accident was
caused by Merrick’s intentional violation of any safety
regulations.
7
See AIG/AIU Ins. Co. v. South Akers Mining Co., 192 S.W.3d 687, 689 (Ky.
2006).
8
Ernest Simpson Construction Co. v. Conn, 625 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Ky. 1981).
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In determining that the accident was caused by Merrick
rather than Budd, the ALJ and the Board focused on the control
exercised by Merrick, through its agent Cummings, over Thompson.
Cummings had control over the area – he had a key to the
restricted area on the mezzanine and he had a desk there.
Cummings also knew of the dangerous condition involving the
double doors and he had previously informed managers at Budd
that it constituted a safety violation.
Finally, Cummings was
responsible for training and supervising Thompson in the
performance of his job duties.
Thus, the ALJ and the Board
concluded that Cumming’s failure to warn Thompson about the
hazardous condition of the doors caused the injury.
We agree with the ALJ’s conclusion, but on somewhat
different grounds.
KRS 342.165(1) applies only when the
employer who is responsible for payment of benefits
intentionally violated a specific safety statute or regulation.9
In this case, the design of the double doors on the mezzanine
and Budd’s failure to keep the doors locked and to post signs
warning of the hazard were intentional violations of applicable
safety regulations.
But these intentional violations cannot be
imputed to Merrick.
9
Id.
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Nevertheless, Merrick had an independent duty under
KRS 338.031(1)(a) to furnish
“to each of [its] employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to [its] employees.”
In interpreting
this duty in the context of KRS 342.165, this Court has adopted
a four-part test to assess whether Kentucky’s safe workplace
statute has been violated.
(1) [a] condition or activity in the
workplace presented a hazard to employees;
(2) [t]he cited employer or employer’s
industry recognized the hazard; (3) [t]he
hazard was likely to cause death or serious
physical harm; and (4) [a] feasible means
existed to eliminate or materially reduce
the hazard.10
The first three elements of this test are satisfied in
this case.
The condition involving the double doors clearly
presented a hazard to employees.
Merrick’s employee, Cummings,
recognized the danger and reported it to Budd.
Furthermore, the
likelihood of death or serious injury posed by such condition is
established by both commonsense and the catastrophic injuries
which Thompson actually suffered.
The fourth part of this test is the closest call.
Merrick was conducting its operations on Budd’s premises and was
10
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Offutt, 11 S.W.3d 598, 599-600
(2000); citing Nelson Tree Services, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission, 60 F.3d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1995).
- 9 -
not in a position to alter or correct the dangerous condition
involving the double doors.
However, there were two feasible
means available to Merrick for eliminating or materially
reducing the hazard: (1) a large caution sign on the door (handlettered if necessary) and (2) adequate training which would
apprise anyone working on the mezzanine of the serious danger
lurking behind those particular doors.
Budd’s ownership of the
premises in no way prevented Merrick from taking these simple
steps to avoid certain serious physical injury or death.
We emphasize that a subcontractor would not be liable
for enhanced benefits for an injury caused by a condition
entirely within the general contractor’s knowledge and control.
But under the specific facts presented in this case, Merrick’s
failure to take any action or to properly warn and train
Thompson constitutes a violation of its duties under KRS
338.031(1)(a).
Consequently, the ALJ properly found that
Merrick was liable for payment of enhanced benefits under KRS
342.165(1).
Liberty Mutual next argues that the ALJ erred by
holding that all of Thompson’s legal fees and expenses from the
civil action must be deducted from its subrogation claim.
In
reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied a discussion in AIK
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Selective Self Insurance Fund v. Bush,11 stating that that the
employee's entire legal expense, not just a pro rata share, must
be deducted from the employer's or insurer's portion of any
recovery.12
Liberty Mutual urges that this language should be
disregarded because it was not necessary to the outcome of the
decision in Bush.
Furthermore, Liberty Mutual argues that this
interpretation of KRS 342.700(1) is unfair because it subjects
its subrogation interest to a credit for all of Thompson’s legal
fees rather than merely a pro rata share.
Although Liberty Mutual’s argument is not
unreasonable, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently rejected this
position in AIK Selective Self Insurance Fund v. Minton.13
In
Minton, the Supreme Court adopted the Bush dicta applying the
“made whole” doctrine to an insurer’s subrogation interest.
The
Court specifically held that the plain language of KRS
342.700(1) requires insurers to share in the employee’s cost of
pursuing recovery from a third party.14
The Court further held
that all of the employee’s attorney fees and legal expenses must
be deducted from the insurer’s subrogation credit, not merely a
11
74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002).
12
Id. at 257.
13
192 S.W.3d 415 (Ky. 2006).
14
Id. at 418.
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proportionate share.15
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Minton, the ALJ properly calculated Liberty Mutual’s
subrogation credit.
Accordingly, the Board’s opinion and order is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy J. Walker
Ferreri & Fogle, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert Lindsay
Segal, Lindsay & Janes, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
15
Id. at 419-20.
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