JUDITH ANN POWELL v. JOSE L. LIRA
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 13, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-002563-ME
JUDITH ANN POWELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00153
v.
JOSE L. LIRA
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ACREE, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Judith Ann Powell (Judy) appeals from a
judgment entered by the Carroll Circuit Court awarding sole
custody of the parties’ child to appellee Jose L. Lira (Luis).
We affirm.
The parties, who never were married to one another,
are the parents of a daughter who was born in July 1994.
In
December 1994, Luis filed a petition seeking joint custody and
visitation.
In April 1995 the court entered an order granting
Judy temporary custody of the child, subject to Luis’s
reasonable visitation rights.
regarding permanent custody.
However, no order was entered
In July 1996 the action was
dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
Luis then filed motions in 1997 and 1998 seeking
permanent child custody, but again no orders were entered.
In
March 2001 he filed a motion seeking joint custody, which was
denied by the trial court on the ground that Luis had not filed
two supporting affidavits.
Luis filed another motion seeking
joint custody in September 2003.
In February 2004 the court
remanded the case to the Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC)
after finding that the matter had been erroneously dismissed
without prejudice in September 1996, rather than merely being
remanded from the court’s active docket, and that the court’s
consideration of contested issues in May 2001 “included an
implied reinstatement of this case.”
The court therefore
overruled Judy’s motion to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction, and it directed the DRC to conduct a hearing
regarding permanent custody.
Ultimately, the court entered an
order confirming and adopting the DRC’s report, which
recommended that Luis should be awarded sole custody of the
child.
This appeal followed.
Judy first contends that the trial court erred by
failing to find that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order
altering child custody.
We disagree.
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Circuit courts retain jurisdiction to modify previous
child custody orders even if those orders otherwise are final.
See KRS 403.340.
See also Wright v. Wright, 305 Ky. 680, 205
S.W.2d 491 (1947); Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307, 308
(Ky.App. 1979).
Here, although the trial court purported to
dismiss the underlying custody proceeding in September 1996,
that dismissal was without prejudice and it did not disturb the
existing temporary award of child custody to Judy.
Although Luis filed additional motions some fifteen
months later, another six years passed before Judy finally
challenged the pending proceedings on the ground that the
underlying case had been dismissed.
Given Judy’s active
participation in the various proceedings until that time, we
must conclude that she waived any objection to what was, in
effect, a reinstatement of the original proceedings.
In any
event, given the trial court’s ongoing ability to alter its
prior temporary custody order regardless of whether it had
otherwise dismissed the original proceedings, we cannot say that
the court erred by exercising jurisdiction below.
Next, Judy alleges that the trial court erroneously
considered a custodial evaluation report in violation of KRS
403.300(3).
We disagree.
KRS 403.300 addresses the “investigation and report
concerning custodial arrangements for the child” which a court
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may order in a contested custody proceeding.
KRS 403.300(3)
provides in part that when such an investigation and report are
completed,
[t]he clerk shall mail the investigator’s
report to counsel and to any party not
represented by counsel at least 10 days
prior to the hearing. The investigator
shall make available to counsel and to any
party not represented by counsel the
investigator’s file of underlying data, and
reports, complete texts of diagnostic
reports made to the investigator pursuant to
the provisions of subsection (2), and the
names and addresses of all persons whom the
investigator has consulted.
If these provisions are satisfied, “the investigator’s report
may be received in evidence at the hearing.”
KRS 403.300(2).
Here, the record shows that in April 2004, Luis filed
a motion which in part requested the court to order a custodial
evaluation pursuant to KRS 403.300.
The court granted the
motion and an evaluation was conducted by Dr. Claudia Crawford,
who timely filed a report in the record on January 24, 2005.
On
that same date, in accordance with KRS 403.300(3), the circuit
court clerk mailed copies to Luis’s counsel and to Judy, who at
that point was proceeding pro se.
On May 9, after Judy retained
new counsel, her attorney sent a letter to Crawford requesting
her to
forward a copy of your report, and a copy of
your file in this matter, and curriculum
vitae. Please make sure to include any
underlying data, reports, complete texts of
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diagnostic reports, names and addresses of
all persons whom you consulted. I will also
need to know the financial arrangements made
between yourself and the father.
On June 6 Judy’s attorney filed a motion requesting the court to
strike Crawford’s evaluation report from the record and to
suppress her testimony at the hearing, stating that Crawford had
ignored the May 9 request for information in violation of the
KRS 403.300 requirement “that an evaluator open their file” to
counsel.
In the first place we note that counsel’s May 9
request to Crawford for copies of all items in Crawford’s file,
including “any underlying data, reports, complete texts of
diagnostic reports, names and addresses of all persons whom you
consulted[,]” far exceeded the KRS 403.300(3) requirement that
Crawford make her file “available” to counsel.
Second, this
issue was waived when it was neither ruled upon prior to the
DRC’s hearing, nor renewed during the hearing even though
Crawford testified.
KRE 103(d).
S.W.3d 574, 596 (Ky. 2005).
See Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175
The trial court therefore did not
err by failing to exclude the report from evidence.
Finally, Judy contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding sole custody of the child to Luis rather
than to her.
We disagree.
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Judy suggests that this matter could be reviewed
either as an original custody action or as a modification of
custody.
However, as previously there was only a temporary
award of custody to Judy, the matter was properly considered by
the trial court as an original custody action made pursuant to
KRS 403.270, which required the court to equally consider both
parents and to determine custody in accordance with the child’s
best interests after considering all relevant factors including
those enumerated in KRS 403.270(2).
The trial court found below
that both parents can provide adequate and
proper homes and that both parents love
their child and legitimately want to care
for her. If the decision of custody was to
be based on these factors alone, it would be
very difficult.
However, after considering other relevant factors, the court
noted that
[p]roviding a home and a loving environment
. . . is not enough. The law requires that
a child be sent to school, and a loving and
caring parent, regardless of this legal
requirement, should realize the importance
of education. In this case, the mother has
been solely responsible for getting the
child to school, making certain homework was
completed and that the child understands the
course material. On this issue, the record
of the mother is abysmal. No child can miss
over ten percent of the school year and be
expected to succeed. This court must infer
from the excessive absenteeism that either
the mother places no priority on school
attendance or that she acquiesces in the
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child’s desire not to attend. Neither of
these inferences is acceptable for a parent.
The court awarded sole custody to Luis after concluding that the
parties’ past inability to cooperate precluded an award of joint
custody.
The record includes substantial evidence which
supports the court’s findings, including those findings
pertaining to school attendance and performance.
As noted
below, school attendance reports indicated that the child
averaged more than 23 absences and 10 tardies per year, nearly
half of which were unexcused without satisfactory explanations.
Although the child was not believed to have any learning
disabilities, she performed poorly in school and reportedly
tested significantly below grade level.
Further, although Judy
asserts that the child made significant progress after enrolling
at the Sylvan Learning Center, that enrollment occurred only at
the behest of Luis and its costs were paid by him.
Having
reviewed the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s
findings are erroneous, or that the court abused its discretion
by awarding sole custody to Luis.
CR 52.01.
See B.C. v. B.T.,
182 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Ky.App. 2005) (citing Sherfey v.
Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.App. 2002)).
The court’s judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Judy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Laurel S. Doheny
Jesse A. Mudd
Louisville, Kentucky
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