KRISTIN MCELROY (NOW GOODLETT) v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002547-MR
KRISTIN MCELROY (NOW GOODLETT)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 99-CR-00163
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, JUDGE; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Kristin McElroy3 appeals from an order
of the Boyle Circuit Court revoking her May 11, 2000, pretrial
diversion agreement with the Commonwealth.
Finding no error, we
affirm.
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
In various court documents appellant’s name is also spelled “Kriston.”
is also referred to as “Krissy.” Additionally, her last name became
“Goodlett” following marriage. For clarity, we refer to appellant as
“McElroy.”
She
On December 17, 1999, McElroy was indicted by a Boyle
County grand jury for theft by failure to make required
disposition over $300.00, a violation of KRS4 514.070.
On
February 16, 2000, McElroy entered a guilty plea to the charge
and moved for pretrial diversion.
On February 25, 2000, the
court accepted and entered judgment on McElroy’s guilty plea.
On May 17, 2000, the court entered an order granting her motion
for pretrial diversion, pursuant to KRS 533.250 et seq.
The
period of diversion was set for five years and scheduled to
expire on May 11, 2005.
One of the conditions for pretrial
diversion required that McElroy not commit another offense
during the period of diversion.
On December 1, 2004, McElroy was arrested on an
indictment warrant charging her with thirty-six counts of theft
by unlawful taking over $300.00.
On January 31, 2005, the
Commonwealth moved to extend the period of McElroy’s period of
diversion until the new charges were resolved.
In the
alternative, the Commonwealth also moved to revoke McElroy’s
diversion and sentence her as recommended in the diversion
agreement.
At the March 8, 2005 hearing on the motion, the
court declined to extend the period of diversion because it
would require extending it beyond five years, in violation of
KRS 533.020.
4
The court did, however, agree that McElroy’s
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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diversion could be revoked and set a revocation hearing for May
3, 2005.
The court concluded that the Commonwealth’s motion
tolled the diversion period so that the pretrial diversion would
not automatically expire on May 11, 2005.
At the May 3, 2005 hearing, the court did not decide
the revocation issue.
Instead, defense counsel stated that
McElroy wished to plead guilty both to the pending new charges
as well as violating the terms of the diversion agreement.
The
court ordered McElroy to return on June 2, 2005 to hear the
guilty plea on the pending new charges.
At the June 2, 2005
hearing, McElroy entered and later withdrew her guilty plea to
the new charges.
Also at that hearing, McElroy informed the
court that since there had been no ruling on the revocation
issue prior to May 11, 2005, the time had expired on the
diversion agreement and she could not be sentenced pursuant to
its terms.
Declining to rule on the issue, the court set a
revocation hearing date for July 7, 2005.
At the July 7, 2005 revocation hearing, the court
heard testimony regarding the new charges against McElroy to
determine whether she had violated the terms of the diversion
agreement.
McElroy argued that the court no longer had
jurisdiction over the matter because the period of diversion had
already expired.
The court found that McElroy had violated the
terms of the agreement, but held the matter in abeyance until
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the new charges against her were resolved.
On September 8,
2005, the court entered an order voiding McElroy’s pretrial
diversion.
This appeal followed.
McElroy contends that the court erred when it voided
her pretrial diversion after the agreement’s May 11, 2005
expiration date.
We disagree.
McElroy argues that nothing in the statutory language
of Chapter 533 “lends to the interpretation that it is
permissible for a court to purposely delay” making a revocation
decision beyond the expiration date of a pretrial diversion
agreement.
In addition to the statutory language, McElroy also
relies on one Supreme Court opinion, Curtsinger v. Commonwealth,
549 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1977), in support of her argument.
In
Curtsinger, our Supreme Court held that a trial court may not
extend a term of probation beyond the maximum five year
statutory limitation.
Id. at 516.
In Curtsinger, the trial
court could have revoked the defendant’s probation, but instead
sought to extend the probationary period and thus lost
jurisdiction to revoke it after the five year limit.
Id.
McElroy argues that, like the defendant in Curtsinger, the trial
court lost jurisdiction to revoke her pretrial diversion
agreement after its expiration on May 11, 2005.
However,
Curtsinger is distinguishable from the present case.
trial court in Curtsinger, here the court denied the
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Unlike the
Commonwealth’s motion to extend the diversion period.
Instead,
the court sought to revoke McElroy’s diversion agreement,
although the actual decision to revoke was not entered until
after the May 11, 2005 expiration.
Thus, unlike Curtsinger, the
court here did not lose jurisdiction to revoke McElroy’s
pretrial diversion.
The present case is controlled by RCr5 8.04(5), which
states:
Termination of the agreement; automatic
dismissal. Upon the expiration of the
period of suspension of prosecution and upon
the completion of the agreement and where
there is no motion by the Attorney for the
Commonwealth to terminate the agreement . .
. . the indictment, complaint or charges
which are the subject matter of the
agreement shall be dismissed with prejudice.
McElroy would have been entitled to a dismissal of the charge
underlying the pretrial diversion agreement had, 1) the period
of suspension expired on May 11, 2005; 2) she completed the
agreement; and, 3) there been no motion from the Commonwealth to
revoke the agreement.
The use of the conjunctive “and” requires
that all three factors be met before the charges underlying a
pretrial diversion agreement can be properly dismissed with
prejudice.
Here, on the May 11, 2005 expiration date, McElroy
had not completed the agreement because she had been charged
with additional new offenses.
5
Further, and perhaps more
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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importantly, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke the
agreement on January 31, 2005, well before the agreement
expired.
Thus, the charge underlying the diversion agreement
could not have been dismissed with prejudice and the court did
not err in voiding the pretrial agreement.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boyle
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Angela Johnson
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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