ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. RICK D. SMITH, DECEASED; BARRETT SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR; HON. GRANT S. ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
July 28, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002546-WC
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-78095
v.
RICK D. SMITH, DECEASED;
BARRETT SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR;
HON. GRANT S. ROARK,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Abbott Laboratories has appealed from the
November 10, 2005, opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board
which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion and order
concluding that Rick D. Smith died in a work-related motor
vehicle accident, and that his wife, Barrett Smith, was entitled
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
to death benefits and unpaid medical benefits under KRS2 342.750.
Having concluded that the Board did not overlook or misconstrue
controlling statutes or caselaw, or flagrantly err in assessing
the evidence so as to cause gross injustice, we affirm.3
Because the Board succinctly set forth the facts of
this case in its opinion, we quote them herein as our own:
Smith was an employee of Abbott,
working for a subsidiary, Ross Products, as
a pediatric product sales representative.4
He was required to call on physicians,
pediatricians, neonatologists, pediatric
offices, and hospitals. As part of his
employment, Smith was provided with a
company vehicle, gas credit cards, cell
phone, PDA, and laptop computer. He had no
office other than an office located in his
home in Mt. Sterling, Ky.
On the day of his death, May 28, 2004,
Smith left his home at 6:30 a.m. to spend a
day making calls in eastern Kentucky, and
his last stop was in Pikeville. This was
not his usual sales route, but he was
covering for another employee. On his way
home that evening, Smith called his wife,
[Barrett] Smith,5 and asked her to meet him
at a restaurant en route. According to
[Barrett], the restaurant was approximately
fifteen miles from their home, or a thirty
minute drive. This was the first time
[Barrett] had met her husband on the road.
She testified the usual practice was for
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
See Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992).
4
Smith had been employed by Abbott for 20 years.
5
The Worker’s Compensation Board has misspelled her name “Barret;” however,
we believe the correct spelling of her name is “Barrett,” and will use this
spelling throughout this Opinion.
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Smith to first come home and then go out to
eat. [Barrett] stated Smith would have
stopped to eat even if she had not gone to
meet him. After dinner, Smith and [Barrett]
left the restaurant in their respective
vehicles and Smith was involved in a motor
vehicle accident which resulted in [his]
death.6
In addition to the testimony of
[Barrett], the depositions of Barry Barnard
(“Barnard”), chief financial officer for
Abbott, and Susan Kramer (“Kramer”), Smith’s
immediate supervisor, appear in the record.
The Abbott employees were questioned
concerning Abbott’s reimbursement and
reporting policies. Barnard testified the
company van furnished to Smith was used for
both business and personal purposes. Workrelated travel expenses were paid by Abbott,
but personal use of the vehicle was [ ]
reimbursed [by Smith]. Barnard explained
that salesmen were required to report
personal use of a vehicle, which was charged
at a rate per mile plus a flat fee. Kramer
was asked questions concerning what was
considered business or personal use when
stopping to eat dinner on the way home. She
admitted there was a gray area, depending on
how far the restaurant was from a salesman’s
home.
Both [Barrett] and Kramer were
questioned concerning Smith’s duties to
report both expenses and business matters.
Kramer testified Smith was provided with a
company vehicle, gas credit card, cell
phone, hand held computer device, and laptop
computer, which he kept at his home. Kramer
explained that sales representatives’ weekly
expense reports were due by noon on the
following Monday. They could either be done
daily or weekly. Business reports were
submitted electronically. The daily reports
6
Because Abbott refused to pay any medical expenses or Smith’s funeral bill,
Barrett filed an Application for Resolution of Injury Claim on November 12,
2004.
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were entered into the PDA, which were then
downloaded to the laptop on a daily basis.
[Barrett] testified her husband did his
reimbursement expense reports on either
Friday evening or Saturday morning.
Also introduced into the record were
Abbott documents setting forth the duties
and requirements of their salespeople. One
document titled District Expectations
indicates sales people were required to
perform administrative tasks at times other
than 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., which was
allotted for sales calls. Sales people were
required to fuel their vehicles at the end
of the day for the next day’s travels.
Sales information was synchronized, using a
PDA, with the company’s system on a daily
basis.
The Administrative Law Judge issued his opinion and
order on July 12, 2005, wherein he found that it was undisputed
that Smith had been traveling all day on May 28, 2004, within
the course of his employment, and that, Smith’s accident and
death occurred “after [Smith’s] last sales call but before he
reached home that evening.”
Based on all of the evidence of
record, the ALJ found that at the time of the accident, Smith
was within the course of his duties as a salesman for Abbott.
The ALJ found that Smith’s stopping to eat supper with his wife
did not amount to a substantial deviation from his duties.
The
ALJ was further persuaded by the fact that Smith’s only office
was out of his home and that it was undisputed that Smith was
required on a daily basis to enter sales reports into the
company’s computer after returning home from sales calls.
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Further, the ALJ gave great weight to Barrett’s testimony that
it was “normal custom” for Smith to enter this information in
his computer each night, and that Smith was on his way to refuel
the company vehicle at the time of the accident.
In reviewing Abbott’s company policy, the ALJ found it
significant that sales persons were required to perform
administrative and planning tasks at times outside of the 8:30
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. period allotted for sales calls, that sales
people were required to fuel company vehicles daily outside the
period for sales calls, and that sales information was required
to be entered and synced with the company’s computer system
daily.
The ALJ also noted that the restaurant was on Smith’s
expected route home and stated that he found unpersuasive
Abbott’s contention that if Smith had not been killed it would
have required him to reimburse it for the miles between the
restaurant and his home.
The ALJ did not find a substantial
deviation from Smith’s course of employment, as he regularly ate
meals on the road and was expected to do so.7
The ALJ also found
unpersuasive Abbott’s argument that Barrett’s presence at the
restaurant took Smith out of the course of his employment.
7
The
The ALJ rationalized, “[i]f stopping to eat supper rendered any subsequent
travel upon return not work-related, then any such miles incurred after
breakfast or lunch on the way to subsequent sales calls would also not be
work-related." We also note that a company policy that would require an
employee who stopped for supper while he was en route home to pay for
personal mileage for the remainder of the trip home after he ate supper would
have the illogical effect of financially rewarding the employer for waiting
to eat his supper.
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ALJ awarded workers’ compensation death benefits under KRS
342.750, as well as any unpaid medical expenses associated with
the accident.
Abbott appealed the ALJ’s award on August 9, 2005.8
In
an opinion entered on November 10, 2005, the Board affirmed the
ALJ’s opinion stating that there was substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s finding that “Smith was a traveling employee
and had not abandoned his business purpose.”
This petition for
review followed.
When reviewing one of the Board’s decisions, this
Court will only reverse the Board’s decision when it has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly
erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross
injustice.9
To properly review the Board’s decision, this Court
must ultimately review the ALJ’s underlying decision.
Where the
ALJ has found in favor of the party, who had the burden of
proof, this Court must determine whether the ALJ’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence.10
The Supreme Court of
8
Barrett argues in her brief that pursuant to KRS 342.281 and Halls Hardwood
Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky.App. 2000), Abbott has failed to
properly preserve the issue raised herein by choosing not to file a Petition
for Reconsideration with the ALJ. However, as Abbott points out in its brief
its argument is not only that the ALJ’s opinion was not based on substantial
evidence of record, but also that it was the result of misconstruing
applicable statutory and caselaw. Therefore, we conclude that the issue has
been properly preserved for our review.
9
10
Western Baptist, 827 S.W.2d at 687-88.
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
-6-
Kentucky has defined substantial evidence as “evidence of
substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable [people]” [citation
omitted].11
In other words, substantial evidence is, “evidence
which would permit a fact-finder to reasonably find as it did.”12
And, as the fact-finder, the ALJ, not this Court and not the
Board, has sole discretion to determine the quality, character,
and substance of the evidence.13
Not only does the ALJ weigh the
evidence, but the ALJ may also choose to believe or to
disbelieve any part of the evidence, regardless of its source.14
Under KRS 342.0011(1), “injury” is defined as “any
work-related traumatic event . . . arising out of and in the
course of employment which is the proximate cause producing a
harmful change in the human organism evidenced by objective
medical findings.”
“[T]he language, ‘in the course of . . .
employment’, refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the
accident, and the words, ‘arising out of . . . employment’,
relate to the cause or source of the accident.”15
The sole issue
11
Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971).
12
Special Fund, 708 S.W.2d at 643.
13
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999) (citing Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985)).
14
Id. (citing Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky.
1977)).
15
Masonic Widows & Orphans Home v. Lewis, 330 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Ky. 1959).
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in this appeal is whether Smith was within the course of his
employment when the car accident occurred following his stop for
dinner.
Abbott argues that based on the “going and coming”
rule that the ALJ erroneously found in favor of Smith because
his injury and death did not arise out of and in the course of
his employment.
In Receveur Construction Co./Realm, Inc. v.
Rogers,16 our Supreme Court stated:
The general rule is that injuries sustained
by workers when they are going to or
returning from the place where they
regularly perform the duties connected with
their employment are not deemed to arise out
of and in the course of the employment as
the hazards ordinarily encountered in such
journeys are not incident to the employer’s
business. However, this general rule is
subject to several exceptions. For example,
transitory activities of employees are
covered if they are providing some service
to the employer, i.e., service to the
employer exception [citations omitted].
In Olsten-Kimberly Quality Care v. Parr,
17
a nursing
assistant for a home health care service provider was injured in
a car accident on her way home after performing services for an
in-home patient.18
Based on the “service to the employer”
exception, the Court held that even though the employer did not
16
958 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Ky. 1997).
17
965 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ky. 1998).
18
Id. at 156.
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provide her with transportation, traveling was an “essential
element” of the employment relationship, as driving to and from
the patients’ homes was a part of the nurse’s job
responsibilities and incident to the employer’s business.19
In this case, Smith was killed while returning to his
home following dinner after a 12-hour work day.
Abbott argues
that since Smith was only approximately 15 miles from his home,
he could have just as easily driven home and picked up Barrett
before returning for dinner.
Abbott claims that the stop for
dinner was made as a convenience to Smith, not as a convenience
to Abbott.
However, the evidence was that Smith was following
the route of another employee on that day, and the route he took
home was directly in relation to where he stopped for dinner.
In fact, Smith’s manager testified that it was not unusual for a
salesman to stop for dinner on the way home after making sales
calls, and as such the stop was not personal, but was still part
of the integral and necessary travel for the business.
Thus,
the evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that regardless of
whether Smith had eaten dinner alone or with his wife, his
travel from the restaurant en route to his home was not a
distinct departure from the normal course of the employer’s
business.20
Since Smith had not returned home from the sales
19
Olsten-Kimberly, 965 S.W.2d at 158.
20
Black v. Tichenor, 396 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1965).
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trip his travel continued to be “for the convenience of the
employer as opposed to travel for the convenience of the
employee” [citations omitted].21
Pursuant to established caselaw, Smith’s stopping to
eat dinner, whether or not accompanied by his wife, did not
disrupt his status as a traveling employee.
Thus, there was
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s factual findings and
the ALJ correctly applied the law to those facts.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BARRETT
SMITH:
Walter E. Harding
Louisville, Kentucky
Harry E. Budden, Jr.
Paris, Kentucky
21
Receveur Construction, 958 S.W.2d at 20.
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