JACQUELINE HINSHAW (NOW LENARZ) v. REN RICKY HINSHAW; SANDRA RAGLAND; DIANA L. SKAGGS & DELAHANTY, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 17, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002510-MR
JACQUELINE HINSHAW (NOW LENARZ)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PAULA SHERLOCK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-502107
REN RICKY HINSHAW; SANDRA
RAGLAND; DIANA L. SKAGGS &
ASSOCIATES; AND DONNA L.
DELAHANTY, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Jacqueline Ann Hinshaw (now Lenarz) appeals
from a post-dissolution order of the Jefferson Family Court
granting a motion for relief filed by attorneys for her former
husband.
Representing Ren Hinshaw during the divorce, Diana L.
Skaggs & Associates asked the family court to amend its first
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
judgment as to payment of attorneys’ fees.
Jacqueline had
originally been ordered to pay toward Ren’s attorneys’ fees.
The court amended that judgment, ordering her to pay the fees
directly to Diana L. Skaggs & Associates and providing that the
law firm was entitled to enforce the order in its name.
We
reverse.
The Hinshaws married in December 1988.
born of the marriage in June 1999.
One child was
In January 2003, Jacqueline
filed for divorce, and a decree of dissolution was entered
approximately eighteen months later.
On January 28, 2005, the
family court entered judgment with respect to issues involving
custody of the child, child support, maintenance, and an
equitable division of debts and property.
In the final
substantive sentence of the judgment, the family court ordered
Jacqueline to “pay $25,000.00 toward [Ren’s] attorney fees.”
On April 21, 2005, Jacqueline filed a timely notice of
appeal contesting the court’s award of joint custody and
attorneys’ fees.
She also filed for bankruptcy protection and
named Ren as a creditor.
By mid-May 2005, Diana L. Skaggs & Associates filed a
motion for leave to withdraw from representation of Ren.
Ren
raised no objection, and the firm was permitted to withdraw by
order of the family court entered on July 7, 2005.
-2-
On August 24, 2005, the law firm filed a notice of an
attorney fee lien pursuant to the provisions of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 376.460 in the amount of $26,386.48.
Although
the law firm was no longer involved in the litigation, it also
filed a motion requesting the court “to permit the $25,000
attorney fee award that [Jacqueline] was ordered to pay [Ren] to
be allowed enforceable in the name of Diana L. Skaggs &
Associates.”
Jacqueline responded by filing a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the motion of the law firm to amend the judgment
was untimely under the provisions of Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 59.
She noted that her appeal of the family
court’s award of attorneys’ fees was already pending before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals and that the law firm was not a party
to the appeal.2
She contended that the family court was
impermissibly exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
The law firm responded with a written memorandum that
based its request for relief from the judgment on the provisions
of CR 60.01 and CR 60.02(f) rather than CR 59.
The firm argued
that “if [Ren] no longer cares to vigorously try to collect the
Judgment, it is critical that the undersigned have authority to
enforce the Judgment. . . .”
Noting that the judgment failed to
2
Sandra Ragland, an associate of the firm, was named as an appellee in
Jaqueline’s notice of appeal. Ragland filed a brief on her own behalf in the
matter, arguing that the fee award in favor of Ren should be affirmed by this
court.
-3-
provide that the fee award was enforceable directly in its name,
the law firm feared that it would lack standing to assert its
position in the bankruptcy proceedings initiated by Jacqueline.
The firm contended that this oversight or omission could be
corrected by the family court at any time.
In the alternative,
the firm argued that the circumstances were of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief under the provisions of CR 60.02(f).
In an order entered October 11, 2005, the Jefferson
Family Court amended its judgment of January 28, 2005, making
its award of attorneys’ fees to Ren enforceable in the name of
his former attorney, Sandra G. Ragland, or in the name of
Ragland’s firm, Diana L. Skaggs & Associates.
This appeal
followed.
KRS 403.220 provides as follows:
The court from time to time after
considering the financial resources of both
parties may order a party to pay a
reasonable amount for the cost to the other
party of maintaining or defending any
proceeding under this chapter and for
attorney’s fees, including sums for legal
services rendered and costs incurred prior
to the commencement of the proceedings or
after entry of judgment. The court may
order that the amount be paid directly to
the attorney, who may enforce the order in
his name. (Emphasis added.)
The judgment of January 28, 2005, clearly did not mirror the
statutory language by ordering that any portion of the
$25,000.00 award be paid directly to Ren’s attorneys, who could
-4-
then enforce the order in their names.
However, we do not agree
that relief from the judgment is available to Ragland or to her
law firm under the provisions of either CR 60.01 or CR 60.02(f).
CR 60.01 provides for the correction of clerical
mistakes in judgments.
The provisions of KRS 403.220 authorize
and permit a family court to order an amount of attorneys’ fees
to be paid by one spouse directly to the attorneys of the other
spouse, but the court is not required to do so.
In this case,
Ren’s motion for fees did not request that any award be ordered
to be paid directly to his attorneys.
Before entry of the
judgment, Ren was the primary obligor with respect to his
attorneys’ fees.
Following entry of the judgment, his status
remained unchanged.
The law firm was an incidental beneficiary
of the terms of the judgment, still wholly dependent upon Ren to
satisfy its fees.
After the judgment was amended, however, the
law firm had a direct claim to the fees awarded.
In light of these substantive ramifications, the
original decision of the family court not to make such an award
directly to Ren’s attorneys assumes legal significance far
beyond the status of a simple clerical mistake.
Furthermore,
the provisions of CR 60.01 require that any correction of a
clerical mistake sought while an appeal is pending may be made
only by leave of the appellate court.
No such permission
appears to have been sought or granted in this matter.
-5-
Thus, we
conclude that the family court was not authorized by the
provisions of CR 60.01 to alter its judgment based on an alleged
clerical mistake.
CR 60.02(f) gives a trial court authority to relieve
“a party or his legal representative” from its final judgment
for any reason “of an extraordinary nature. . . .”
It has long
been held that relief may be granted under this provision only
with extreme caution and only under the most unusual and
compelling circumstances.
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d
359 (Ky.1996); Bishir v. Bishir, 698 S.W.2d 823 (Ky.1985); Ringo
v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49 (Ky.1970).
We first examine the
status of the law firm as “a party” or “legal representative” at
the time of the filing of its motion to amend.
Both during the original dissolution proceedings and
during the post-judgment proceedings, Ren and his attorneys had
opportunities to present a motion requesting that the award of
fees be ordered payable directly to the law firm.
The firm
waited to seek that order in its motion to amend until after it
had withdrawn from representation and an appeal had been filed.
The firm itself was not a party to the appeal.
Thus, we
conclude that the law firm did not have standing to pursue its
motion for relief in the family court.
In addition to the issue of lack of standing, the
circumstances alleged by the firm in its motion certainly did
-6-
not provide a sufficient basis to justify the extraordinary
relief it sought.
Even if we were to assume that the law firm
had standing to pursue this remedy, it was not entitled to
relief under the stringent standards of CR 60.02(f).
The
circumstances at issue do not qualify as so exceptional as to
justify relief.
The firm itself was in the best position tactically to
take steps to prevent the original judgment from being entered
by the family court.
It omitted to do so, candidly admitting
that it made no effort to have the award made payable directly
to the attorneys representing Ren.
The issue only became
pertinent and obvious when Ren indicated that he, too, intended
to file for bankruptcy protection.
Although unusual, this turn
of events was foreseeable; its eventual occurrence did not
constitute the kind of exceptional circumstance warranting the
extraordinary remedy available under CR 60.02(f).
The order of the Jefferson Family Court is reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Peter L. Ostermiller
Louisville, Kentucky
Diana L. Skaggs
Sandra G. Ragland
Louisville, Kentucky
James P. McCrocklin
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
