CHASITY DAWN MILLER v. RICHARD ALLEN TURNER and PEGGY MARIE TURNER
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RENDERED: June 16, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-002034-ME
CHASITY DAWN MILLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM UNION FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM E. MITCHELL, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-00152
v.
RICHARD ALLEN TURNER and
PEGGY MARIE TURNER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND MINTON, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
four children.
Chasity Dawn Miller is the mother of
Her second oldest child, R.S.M., is the subject
of this appeal.
In the past, Miller experienced great difficulties in
her personal life.
For this reason, on June 10, 2002, Miller
left R.S.M., who was three years old at the time, in the care of
her relatives, Richard Allen Turner and Peggy Marie Turner.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Sometime later, Union Family Court temporarily placed Miller’s
two youngest children in the custody of the Cabinet for Health
and Family Services as well.
Over a year later, on June 20, 2003, the Turners filed
a petition with Union Family Court seeking permanent custody of
R.S.M.
On September 4, 2003, the court granted the Turners
permanent custody of R.S.M. but granted Miller supervised
visitation with the child.
On November 25, 2003, the Turners moved to suspend
Miller’s visitation.
On March 25, 2004, after an evidentiary
hearing, the family court found, based on the testimony of
R.S.M.’s therapist, Linda Mock, that continued visitation with
Miller would seriously endanger R.S.M.’s physical, mental, moral
and emotional health, and it suspended Miller’s visitation.
In April 2005, Miller moved to reinstate her
visitation with R.S.M., but the motion was denied.
On July 19,
2005, Miller renewed her motion to reinstate visitation, and she
sought discovery of R.S.M.’s mental health records since the
Turners’ witnesses testified that R.S.M. was too emotionally
fragile to resume visitation with her.
Although those records
were found to be confidential, Farrah Burgess, a licensed
professional clinical counselor for Lighthouse Counseling
Services and Miller’s counselor, reviewed them.
In a letter
attached to Miller’s renewed motion, Burgess opined that
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R.S.M.’s records contained nothing that would raise concerns
regarding his mental health.
Miller also attached a proposed
plan, drafted by Burgess, which detailed how supervised
visitation could be reestablished.
On September 2, 2005, the family court held an
evidentiary hearing to consider Miller’s renewed motion.
Miller
testified that she had sought and received counseling, had found
gainful employment, had secured a three bedroom rental home and
had regained custody of her two youngest children.
Miller
confirmed that she understood that reestablishing visitation
with R.S.M. would be a slow process and expressed a willingness
to do whatever was necessary to facilitate that process.
Burgess testified that, in her opinion, reestablishment of
visitation would not endanger R.S.M.’s mental health.
On the Turners’ behalf, Linda Mock testified once
again.
She said that, years earlier, R.S.M.’s behavior severely
deteriorated after spending time with his mother, and she opined
that, despite R.S.M.’s improvements in his emotional and mental
health, reinstatement of visitation would be detrimental to him.
Dr. Lawrence Suess, who also testified, agreed with Mock’s
assessment.
His professional opinion was that there was little
chance of successfully reestablishing visitation and that the
risk to R.S.M. far outweighed any possible benefit to him.
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In its September 13, 2005 order, the family court
relied on Hornback v. Hornback,2 which interpreted Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.320 to mean that once a court has
found that visitation with a non-custodial parent may seriously
endangered a child, the court may not subsequently allow
visitation unless it finds that modification would be in the
child’s best interest.
The family court found that Miller
presented no evidence that reestablishing visitation would be in
R.S.M.’s best interest; therefore, it denied her renewed motion.
On appeal, Miller argues that the family court erred
when it used the “best interest of the child” standard to
resolve her motion to reinstate visitation.
She says that
Hornback, on which the family court relied, misinterpreted KRS
403.320, and insists that the court should have applied the
“serious endangerment” standard language found in the second
clause of KRS 403.320(3).
In addition, she contends, based on
the holding in Hornback, that once a non-custodial parent loses
visitation, that parent can never present evidence that
reestablishment of visitation would be in the child’s best
interest.
Miller maintains that she has shown that she has made
undisputed improvements, yet has no chance to reestablish
visitation as long as the Turners’ experts opine that visitation
would be detrimental to R.S.M.
2
636 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. App. 1982).
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Alternatively, Miller distinguishes the facts in
Hornback from the facts in the present case to justify disregard
of the Hornback decision.
Miller points out that, in Hornback,
the trial court ordered the non-custodial parent, who had been
denied visitation, to obtain a certificate from comprehensive
care that she had achieved mental and emotional stability prior
to requesting to reinstate visitation.3
The non-custodial parent
moved to reinstate visitation before obtaining the necessary
certificate and had not achieved the stability required by the
court.4
In contrast to Hornback, Miller points out that the
family court did not set any requirements for her to follow in
order to reestablish visitation.
However, despite this, Miller,
on her own initiative, has made dramatic improvements in her
life in order to become a better parent to her children.
In
fact, she has improved so much that the same family court has
returned custody of her two youngest children to her.
Finally, in the alternative, Miller argues that, by
requiring her to show that visitation would be in the best
interest of the child, the family court has, in effect,
constructively terminated her parental rights without giving her
the due process to which she is entitled.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 25.
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When this Court reviews a family court’s decision
regarding visitation, we will reverse only if the court abused
its discretion or, in light of the facts and circumstances, its
decision was clearly erroneous.5
KRS 403.320 controls a non-custodial parent’s
visitation with a minor child.
The relevant portions of the
statute are set forth below:
(1) A parent not granted custody of the
child is entitled to reasonable
visitation rights unless the court
finds, after a hearing, that visitation
would endanger seriously the child’s
physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health.
. . .
(3) The court may modify an order granting
or denying visitation rights whenever
modification would serve the best
interests of the child; but the court
shall not restrict a parent’s visitation
rights unless it finds that the
visitation would endanger seriously the
child’s physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health.
Interpreting the statute’s first subsection, the
Hornback court said “the noncustodial parent has absolute
entitlement to visitation unless there is a finding of serious
endangerment to the child.
No ‘best interests’ standard is to
be applied; denial of visitation is permitted only if the child
5
Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Ky. App. 2000).
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is seriously endangered.”6
But, regarding the third subsection,
the Hornback court held that “[i]n modifying a previous denial
of visitation to allow visitation, there is no presumption, as
in subsection (1), of entitlement to visitation.
child’s best interests must prevail.”7
Instead, the
In addition, the Hornback
court held that
[T]he second clause of subsection [(3)]
[refers] to a situation where a party seeks
to modify visitation rights that have been
previously granted. In such a situation the
court may not take away a parent’s
visitation rights without a showing that the
child would be seriously endangered by
visitation.8
The Hornback court concluded that once a trial court has found
that visitation with a non-custodial parent seriously endangers
a child, the court cannot subsequently modify visitation unless
it is in the child’s best interest.9
When we interpret a statute, we attempt to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly.10
neither add to nor subtract from the statute.
6
Id. (emphasis supplied.)
8
Id.
9
Neither are we
Hornback v. Hornback, supra, note 2, at 26.
7
We may
Id.
10
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 446.080(1); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442,
445 (Ky. 2004).
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permitted to interpret the statute in such a way to produce an
absurd result.11
Applying these rules of statutory interpretation, the
Hornback court properly interpreted KRS 403.320(3).
It
ascertained the legislature’s intent in drafting the statute and
gave effect to all of the language found in subsection (3).
In
contrast, if we were to adopt Miller’s interpretation, the
language found in the first clause of subsection (3) would be
rendered moot.
The rules of statutory interpretation prohibit
such an outcome.12
This Court has reaffirmed the Hornback interpretation
in two subsequent cases:
McNeeley.14
Smith v. Smith13 and McNeeley v.
Citing Hornback, the McNeeley court held that
“[w]hen visitation has already been denied, the standard for
modification is not serious endangerment; rather, the best
interests of the [child] governs.”15
Furthermore, the McNeeley
court concluded that once the non-custodial parent’s visitation
11
Reynolds, id. at 445.
12
Id.
13
869 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Ky. App. 1994).
14
45 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Ky. App. 2001).
15
Id.
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has been denied, he or she bears the burden of proving that
reinstating visitation is in the child’s best interest.16
The family court was bound to following the holding in
Hornback interpreting KRS 403.320 and apply the best interest of
the child standard in resolving Miller’s motion to reinstate
visitation.
While we applaud Miller’s efforts and her
accomplishments, a review of the testimony clearly shows that
the family court’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
Although the court neither abused its discretion nor
acted erroneously when it denied Miller’s motion, we assume that
it will reconsider its decision when additional time has passed
and R.S.M. has achieved a level of physical and emotional
maturity that will enable him to resume contact with his mother.
Miller’s two remaining assignments of error lack
merit, so it is not necessary that we address them.
The decision of the Union Family Court to deny Miller
visitation with R.S.M. is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Susan E. Neace
KENTUCKY LEGAL AID
Madisonville, Kentucky
C. Michael Williamson
Morganfield, Kentucky
16
Id.
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