CHILDERS OIL COMPANY, INC. v. BERTHA L. ADKINS and LAWRENCE R. WEBSTER
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001967-MR
CHILDERS OIL COMPANY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-CI-00663
BERTHA L. ADKINS and
LAWRENCE R. WEBSTER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Bertha L. Adkins was employed in
January 2003 to work at a convenience market, the Double Kwik,
in Shelbiana, Pike County, Kentucky.
Adkins was interviewed and
hired for the job by Mona Delong, regional supervisor for
Childers Oil Company, Inc.
Upon being employed, Adkins was
given the Childers Oil Company Employee Handbook of Personnel
Policies which identified Childers Oil as the employer of the
1
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580
handbook recipient.
It was her understanding, Adkins later
testified, that she was employed by Childers Oil.
However, the
weekly checks compensating her for her work were drawn on the
account of Hometown Convenience, LLC.
Adkins initially worked as a cashier at the Shelbiana
store and continued doing so for seven or eight months.
After a
restaurant, known as the Homecooker, was opened at the store,
Adkins was moved to the kitchen of the restaurant.
On January
31, 2004, Adkins was discharged, ostensibly in connection with
the closing of the restaurant section of the store.
When
informed that the restaurant portion of the Shelbiana store was
to be closed, Adkins requested that she be retained as a
cashier, the position for which she had originally been
employed, but her request was denied.
Not long after her discharge, Adkins returned to the
Shelbiana store and observed that a new employee, Sabrina, who
was in her 20s, was working as a cashier
She also saw a sign
posted at the entrance proclaiming that the store was “Now
Hiring All Positions.”
Sabrina had been employed on January 19,
2004, 11 days prior to Adkins’ discharge.
Before she was
discharged, Adkins overheard comments to the effect that
management sought to put “young, pretty, and skinny” girls at
the cash registers to draw in truck drivers.
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Adkins, who was
then 47 years of age,2 believed that this policy was the primary
motivating factor in her discharge and her replacement by a
younger person.
On May 17, 2004, Adkins filed suit against Childers
Oil Company, Inc. in Pike Circuit Court alleging age and sex
discrimination.3
Childers Oil filed an answer, and discovery
proceeded without incident - and with the apparent assent of
Childers Oil that it was the proper defendant in the case.4
On March 4, 2005, Childers Oil moved for summary
judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
56.02, but the motion was denied.
On April 20, 2005, one week
prior to the date on which the trial was scheduled to commence,
Childers Oil filed a motion to dismiss, alleging for the first
time that Adkins had not been an employee of Childers Oil, but
rather was an employee of Hometown Convenience, LLC, a separate
legal entity.
The motion was denied on May 9, 2005, following
the trial.
On April 27, 2005, a jury trial was held.
A verdict
was returned awarding Adkins damages on her age discrimination
claim of $11,922.00 for lost wages, $50,000.00 for “injury
caused by the wrongful discharge, including compensation for
2
Atkins was born on May 31, 1956.
3
The sex discrimination claim was not pursued.
4
Childers Oil did not make a specific negative averment in its answer raising
an issue as to its capacity to be sued. See Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 9.01.
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emotional distress;” and $50,000.00 for punitive damages.
On
July 20, 2005, the circuit court awarded Adkins’ attorney a fee
of $6,900.00 to be paid by Childers Oil, and on July 28, 2005, a
final judgment incorporating the verdict and the court’s
attorney fee award was entered.
After Childers Oil’s post-
judgment motions were denied, the corporation appealed to this
Court.
Denial of Motion to Dismiss
Childers Oil contends that the circuit court erred when it
failed to grant its motion to dismiss on the basis that Adkins
was not employed by Childers Oil Company, Inc., but instead by a
separate legal entity, Hometown Convenience, LLC.
In support of its April 20, 2005, pre-trial motion to
dismiss Adkins’ complaint on the ground that her suit had been
brought against the wrong party, Childers Oil submitted a
memorandum that included as exhibits Adkins’ W-2 forms
reflecting that her salary had been paid by Hometown
Convenience, LLC.
Because matters outside the pleadings were
submitted for the circuit court’s consideration, Childers Oil’s
motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary
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judgment5 which we examine in accordance with the summary
judgment standard of review.6
Summary judgment may only be granted if there are no
material issues of fact to be decided by a jury and if the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is to be granted when it would be impossible
for the non-moving party, in this case, Adkins, to produce any
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in her favor.7
In ruling
on Childers Oil’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit court
was required to construe the record in a light most favorable to
Atkins, the party opposing the motion.8
Applying these standards, it is apparent that at the
time the motion to dismiss was made, there was a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Childers Oil was Adkins’ employer
when the alleged age discrimination took place.
Adkins
testified that she was interviewed, hired and discharged by Mona
Daylong.
In its responses to the Adkins’ discovery requests,
Childers Oil identified Daylong as a Childers Oil employee who
is its area supervisor.
5
Childers Oil’s discovery responses also
CR 12.03; Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958).
6
Harrodsburg Indus. Warehousing, Inc. v. MIGS, LLC, 182 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Ky.
App. 2005).
7
CR 56.03; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky. 1991).
8
Steelvest, id.
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reflect that Adkins was hired and discharged by Daylong.
In
Childers Oil’s response to Adkins’ first set of interrogatories,
the following answers were submitted:
Interrogatory No. 4(B): Please state the
nature of the Plaintiff’s work for the
Defendant.
Answer: Employed at the Shelby (sic)
[D]oublekwik as a cashier and, later as a
deli cook/attendant.
Interrogatory No. 4(C): Please list the
Plaintiff’s job duties for all her positions
while employed by the Defendant.
Answer: Worked as cashier, prepared food,
took customer food orders, cleaned in the
kitchen, ordered stock and counted
inventory.
Interrogatory No. 4(D): Please identify all
stores that the Plaintiff worked at during
her employment with the Defendant.
Answer:
Shelby (sic) [D]oublekwik.9
Further, upon beginning work, Adkins was given an
Employee Handbook of Personnel Policies which welcomed Adkins as
an employee of Childers Oil.
The handbook describes Childers
Oil Company as consisting of, among other things, a chain of
convenience stores.10
Given this evidence, it would not have
been impossible at trial for Adkins to prove that the Shelbiana
store was one of a chain of stores operated by Childers Oil.
9
Emphasis supplied.
10
Childers Oil Company, Inc., we are told, operates some 54 convenience
stores and has over 500 employees.
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Viewing the evidence of record in the light most
favorable to Adkins, there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Adkins was an employee of Childers Oil, so the
circuit court did not err by denying the corporation’s motion to
dismiss and submitting the issue to the jury for a finding.11
Because of the manner in which Childers Oil has
raised this issue, further explanation is necessary.
In its
appeal, Childers Oil addresses the employment issue only within
the context of the circuit court’s denial of its pretrial motion
to dismiss.
It does not, for example, raise the issue by
arguing that the circuit court erred when it denied its motion
for a directed verdict or its post-judgment motions.
Hence, we
will not address the issue beyond consideration of the denial of
Childers Oil’s pretrial motion to dismiss.
Lastly, we note, as
indicated by the discussion above, that there were issues of
material fact as to which legal entity employed Adkins, and the
jury specifically found that “Bertha Adkins was employed with
the Defendant [Childers Oil] prior to January 30, 2004.”
Given
that there was evidence to support the jury’s finding, we will
treat Childers Oil as Adkins’ employer as we consider the
remaining issues that the corporation raises.
11
See Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1994),
which addresses the factors to be considered in determining whether a named
defendant or a related entity was the employer in an employment
discrimination case: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) common management;
(3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or
financial control.
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DENIAL OF DIRECTED VERDICT
Childers Oil next contends that the circuit court
erred when it declined to grant its motion for a directed
verdict on the basis that Adkins failed to establish that her
age was the motivating factor for her discharge.
There are two paths for a plaintiff seeking to
establish an age discrimination case.
One path consists of
direct evidence of discriminatory animus.
Absent direct
evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff must satisfy the
burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.12
The
rationale for the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach is
to allow a victim of discrimination to establish a case through
inferential and circumstantial proof.
As Justice O'Connor has
noted, “the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”13
If a plaintiff
attempts to prove her case using the McDonnell Douglas
12
411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) (When the former
employee in an age discrimination case establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show some nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employee action).
13
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1802, 104
L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S. Ct. 613, 622, 83 L. Ed.
2d 523 (1985) (“The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas
are designed to assure that the ‘plaintiff [has her] day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence’”).
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framework, then she is not required to introduce direct evidence
of discrimination.14
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by proving
that she:
(1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was
discharged; (3) was qualified for the position from which she
was discharged; and (4) was replaced by a person outside the
protected class.15
In age discrimination cases the fourth
element is modified to require replacement not by a person
outside the protected class, but by a significantly younger
person.16
Childers Oil essentially concedes that Adkins proved
the first three elements of her case.
However, the corporation
asserts that Adkins did not establish that she was replaced by a
significantly younger person, thus failing to satisfy the fourth
requirement.
Adkins’ age discrimination claim was presented to the
jury upon the following instruction:
Do you believe from the evidence ALL of the
following:
14
Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 349 (6th Cir. 1997);
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Ky. 2005).
15
Kline, id. at 349.
16
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S. Ct.
1307, 1310, 134 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1996).
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A. Bertha Adkins was employed with the
Defendant prior to January 30, 2004.
B. Bertha Adkins was forty-one (41) years
of age or older on January 30, 2004.
C. Bertha Adkins was qualified for her job
and performed her job satisfactorily prior
to January 30, 2004.
D. On January 30, 2004, an agent of the
Defendant laid off or terminated Bertha
Adkins from her job;
E. A younger person
at her job;
replaced Bertha Adkins
AND
F. Bertha Adkins’ age OR the Defendant’s
pursuant [sic] of a policy of favoring or
preferring younger workers was a substantial
and motivating factor but for which she
would not have been laid off or terminated
from her job by the Defendant’s agent?
The jury unanimously found for Adkins.
We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict
according to the standard set forth in Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface
Mining Company.17
Our role is limited to determining whether the
circuit court erred in failing to grant the motion.18
All
evidence that favors the prevailing party must be taken as true;
and we are not at liberty to assess the credibility of witnesses
or to determine what weight is to be given the evidence, these
17
798 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1990).
18
Id. at 461.
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being functions reserved to the jury.19
The prevailing party, in
this case, Adkins, is entitled to all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidence.20
We are limited to determining
whether the verdict rendered is “‘palpably or flagrantly’
against the evidence so as ‘to indicate that it was reached as a
result of passion or prejudice.’”21
Drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence
and viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to Adkins,
we conclude, as did the circuit court, that the verdict in her
favor was neither palpably nor flagrantly against the evidence
nor the result of passion or prejudice.
There was testimony that store management had made a
deliberate decision to seek to place young females at the cash
registers, and the jury was informed of specific comments to
that effect.
There was testimony that store manager Pauline
Combs told employee Eva Brooks that “the company wanted pretty,
young girls up front to draw in truck drivers and that the
‘younger ones’ went ‘up there.’”
In addition, a young female
employee, Sabrina, was hired on January 19, 2004, only eleven
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
- 11 -
days prior to Adkins’ discharge.22
Although Adkins had
originally been hired as a cashier and had held that position
for several months, Childers Oil retained the younger, lessexperienced Sabrina and discharged the older, more experienced
Adkins.23
The jury could have reasonably concluded that Childers
Oil’s stated reason for Adkins’ discharge – that the restaurant
at the store had been shut down – was a pretext.
According to
Childers Oil, the restaurant closed on January 30, Adkins was
laid off on that date, but the restaurant reopened on January
31.
Hence there is room for skepticism regarding whether
Adkins’ discharge was in connection with a legitimate closing of
the restaurant.
From the foregoing, a jury could infer that Childers
Oil calculatedly chose to retain the younger employee because of
her age and thereby discriminated against Adkins because of her
age.
It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that
Adkins was replaced by a person from outside the protected class
and that its ostensible reason for discharging Adkins was merely
a pretext.
As the Supreme Court has said, “a trial court cannot
enter a directed verdict unless there is a complete absence of
22
At least five younger persons, ages 18, 18, 20, 23 and 33, were employed to
work in the store not long after Adkins was discharged.
23
The Childers Oil employee handbook said that seniority would be the
deciding factor in lay-offs.
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proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist
upon which reasonable minds could differ.”24
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Childers Oil contends that the circuit court erred
when it gave an instruction on punitive damages.
The
corporation asserts that Adkins failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that it acted toward her with
oppression, fraud or malice as required by Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 411.184(2).
We are aware that the Supreme Court has held that
punitive damages are not available under the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act, the underpinning for Adkins’ age discrimination
action.25
However, this issue is unpreserved because Childers
Oil did not object to the giving of a punitive damages
instruction on this ground nor did it otherwise raise the issue
below either before, during or after the trial.26
Thus, it may
not obtain relief on this appeal on the ground that punitive
damages are not authorized under KRS Chapter 344.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 51.01(3)
provides that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving [of] an
24
Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.w.2d, 16, 18 (Ky. 1998), quoted with approval in
Hilsmeier v. Chapman, 192 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Ky. 2006).
25
Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 138 (Ky.
2003). See also KRS 344.450.
26
Counsel for both parties acknowledged at oral argument that neither was
aware of the 2003 McCulloch decision until well after the 2005 trial had
concluded.
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instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his
position by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless he
makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating
specifically the matter to which he objects and the ground or
grounds of his objection.”
In Duo-Therm Division, Motor Wheel
Corp. v. Sheergrain, Inc.,27 Kentucky’s highest court said that
although a defendant may very well have had valid objections to
instructions as to damages, where it failed to assert them in
the trial court, the instructions are controlling on appeal in
determining whether the damage award was excessive.
In
Pipelines, Inc. v. Muhlenberg County Water District28 the same
Court pointed out that a complaint as to instructions will not
be considered on appeal when the trial court's attention was not
called to the point.
To the same effect is Business Realty,
Inc. v. Noah's Dove Lodge No. 2029 where the Court refused to
consider the appellants' contentions with respect to
instructions because of they failed to present those questions
to the trial court.
Likewise, in Burgess v. Taylor30 this Court
declined to consider a complaint as to the jury instructions
that was not called to the trial court's attention.
27
504 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1973).
28
465 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1971).
29
375 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1963).
30
44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. App. 2001).
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In this
case, Childers Oil submitted brief proposed instructions that
omitted any reference to punitive damages, but it cannot be said
that its proposed instructions clearly presented the position it
now takes, that punitive damages are impermissible in an age
discrimination case.31
Moreover, Childers Oil may not rely upon the
substantial error rule contained in CR 61.02 to invoke
McCullough, nor does it seek to do so.
"In applying [CR 61.02],
palpable error must result from action taken by the Court rather
than from an act or omission by the attorneys or litigants."32
Here, the error in giving an instruction on punitive damages
resulted from Childers Oil’s omission – the failure to object on
the ground that punitive damages are not recoverable under the
Civil Rights Act.
It follows that the error was not as a result
of action taken by the circuit court.
If it were otherwise,
then any error in the instructions could be considered a
“substantial error.”
Childers Oil did, however, preserve its objection to
the verdict on the basis that the conduct complained of did not
rise to a level that would warrant an instruction on punitive
damages.
31
See Myers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc, 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992), and
Fields v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 659, 58 A.L.R.2d 210 (Ky. 1955).
32
Carrs Fork Corp. v. Kodak Mining Corp., 809 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 1991);
Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997).
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KRS 411.184(2) provides that “[a] plaintiff shall
recover punitive damages only upon proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant from whom such damages
are sought acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or
malice.”
Fraud is not applicable under the facts of this case.
Further, the Childers Oil’s conduct does not amount to
oppression, which means conduct that is specifically intended by
the defendant to subject the plaintiff to cruel and unjust
hardship.33
"Malice,” on the other hand, means “conduct which is
specifically intended by the defendant to cause tangible or
intangible injury to the plaintiff . . . .34
Based on the evidence in this case, a reasonable jury
could have found that when Childers discharged a more
experienced employee in favor of a younger employee simply
because of the older employee’s age, it intentionally subjected
Adkins to tangible or intangible injury.35
Consequently, the
award of punitive damages was proper.
33
KRS 411.184(1)(a).
34
KRS 411.184(1)(c). As the Supreme Court said in Bowling Green Municipal
Utilities v. Atmos Energy Corp., 989 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Ky. 1999), “[m]alice .
. . may be characterized as intentionally cruel and unjust or intentionally
injurious behavior.”
35
See Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Ky.
App 2001), quoting Simpson County Steeplechase Ass’n v. Roberts, 898 S.W.2d
523, 525 (Ky. App. 1995), to the effect that “the key element in deciding
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DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Following the trial, Childers Oil filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a
motion for a new trial.
The corporation contends that the
circuit court erred when it failed to vacate that portion of the
judgment that awarded Adkins $50,000.00 for “damages for injury
caused by the wrongful discharge, including compensation for
emotional distress.”
Childers Oil insists that the only proof
of Adkins' emotional distress was her own self-serving testimony
that she was embarrassed because she was discharged from her
job, and that the award should be set aside because it is
clearly excessive and bears no reasonable relationship to the
evidence of loss suffered.
Adkins testified that she suffered
nervousness, crying spells and embarrassment as the result of
being discharged and replaced by a younger person.
This issue is governed by the Supreme Court's
decisions in Cooper v. Fultz,36 and Davis v. Graviss.37
As
explained in Hazelwood v. Beauchamp,38 the Davis standard for
determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion by
whether [punitive damages] are appropriate is malice or conscious wrongdoing.
Malice may be implied from outrageous conduct and need not be express so long
as the conduct is sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdoing.” To the same
effect, see Bowling Green Municipal Utilities v. Atmos, id. at 580.
36
812 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1991).
37
672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984).
38
766 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. App. 1989).
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not granting a new trial on the ground that the award of damages
was excessive is as follows:
The amount of damages is a dispute left to
the sound discretion of the jury, and its
determination should not be set aside merely
because we would have reached a different
conclusion. If the verdict bears any
reasonable relationship to the evidence of
loss suffered, it is the duty of the trial
court and this Court not to disturb the
jury's assessment of damages.39
While admittedly the evidence on this issue is not
extensive, we know of no objective test to determine the extent
of one’s humiliation and embarrassment that results from a civil
wrong.
We agree with the Supreme Court that this matter is best
left to a jury of twelve ordinary citizens to evaluate.
Because
the award bears a reasonable relationship to the evidence of the
loss suffered, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in
declining to set the verdict aside and grant a new trial.
ATTORNEY FEES
Adkins’ was awarded a fee for her attorney of record,
Lawrence R. Webster, in the sum of $6,900.00.
An award of such
fees to the prevailing party is permissible under the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act.40
Childers Oil does not suggest that the fee awarded was
unreasonable.
39
Id. at 440.
40
Instead, the corporation objects only upon the
KRS 344.675.
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ground that the award was impermissible because it was not
Adkins’ employer, and, therefore, Adkins was not entitled to
prevail upon her age discrimination claim.
That issue has been
addressed, so there is no need to revisit Childers Oil’s
argument.
The award of an attorney’s fee was appropriate
The judgment is affirmed.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART,
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART:
While I concur with much of the majority opinion, I
respectfully dissent from so much of the majority opinion as
upholds the portion of the judgment awarding punitive damages.
As recognized by the majority opinion, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has held that punitive damages are not recoverable in
actions brought under KRS Chapter 344.
Kentucky Dep’t of
Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130, 138 (Ky. 2003).
My
view is that Childers Oil’s tender of jury instructions which
omitted any award for punitive damages was sufficient under CR
51(3) to preserve the issue for review.
See Surber v. Wallace,
831 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ky. App. 1992) (court noting that "inasmuch
as [the appellants] tendered proposed instructions, under CR
51(3) no specific objections were necessary to preserve their
right to appeal").
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Furthermore, assuming the issue was not sufficiently
preserved, then the error is a palpable one under CR 61.02 for
which Childers Oil may have relief.
See Carrs Fork Corp. v.
Kodak Mining Corp., 809 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 1991); Cobb v.
Hoskins, 554 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ky. App. 1977).
While “the
palpable error must result from action taken by the court rather
than an act or omission by the attorneys or litigants[,]” 809
S.W.2d at 701, Childers Oil’s attorney’s failure to object to
the instructions does not constitute an omission which renders
the matter ineligible for consideration under the palpable error
rule.
In all cases, a proper objection results in a preserved
error, which is not considered under the palpable error rule.
But under the majority’s reasoning, a failure to object, i.e.,
an unpreserved error, is also eliminated from consideration
under the palpable error rule as an omission by an attorney.
As
a result, the palpable error rule is rendered meaningless as
inapplicable to any situation.
In this case, which was tried in 2005, the trial court
and, as admitted at oral argument, the attorneys for the parties
failed to recognize that punitive damages were not recoverable
under McCullough, a 2003 decision.
As a consequence, the trial
court gave an erroneous instruction which affected the
substantial rights of Childers Oil and resulted in manifest
injustice.
- 20 -
I would affirm the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court
in all respects except to the award of punitive damages, which
should be vacated.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Lawrence Forgy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Lawrence Forgy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Darrell Hall
Whitesburg, Kentucky
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