JOSEPH CAVE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001865-MR
JOSEPH CAVE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN P. RYAN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 01-CR-000581 & 01-CR-001996
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Joseph Cave brings this pro se appeal from a May
5, 2005, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court summarily denying
his Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate sentence.
We
affirm.
Between 1997 and 1999, a series of seven sexual
offenses were committed in the Louisville area.
1
The incidents
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
were known as the “Flashlight Rapes” because the assailant used
a flashlight to blind his victims.
In November 2002, Cave was
arrested for forty-two burglaries committed in the Louisville
area.
A Louisville Police Detective suspected Cave might also
be the flashlight rapist.
Subsequently, DNA evidence
conclusively linked Cave to all seven sexual offenses.
As a
result, Cave was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to eight
counts of burglary, five counts of first-degree rape, four
counts of first-degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree
sexual abuse, one count of attempted rape, and to being a
persistent felony offender in the second-degree.
The circuit
court sentenced Cave in July 2002, as follows:
BURGLARY I – COUNTS 1 THRU 8 – 20 YEARS
EACH COUNT ENHANCED TO LIFE BY PFO II
RAPE I – COUNTS 9 THRU 11 – 20 YEARS
EACH COUNT ENHANCED TO LIFE BY PFO II
RAPE I – COUNTS 12 AND 13 – 20 YEARS
EACH COUNT ENHANCED TO 24 YEARS BY PFO II
SODOMY I – COUNTS 14 THRU 17 – 20 YEARS
EACH COUNT ENHANCED TO LIFE BY PFO II
SEXUAL ABUSE I – COUNTS 18 THRU 20 – 5
YEARS ENAHNCED TO 10 YEARS BY PFO II
CRIMINAL ATTEMPT RAPE I – COUNT 21 [-]
10 YEARS ENHANCED TO 20 YEARS BY PFO II
PERSISTANT FELON IN THE II – ENHANCED
ALL CHARGES SEE ABOVE
-2-
Cave’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme
Court of Kentucky on February 12, 2004, in Appeal No. 2002-SC000710-MR.
Cave subsequently filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate sentence on February 3, 2005.
The circuit court
summarily denied appellant’s motion without an evidentiary
hearing by an opinion and order entered May 5, 2005.
This
appeal follows.
Cave contends the circuit court committed error by
denying his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate sentence without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Additionally, Cave contends
his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of an RCr
11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing, we must determine
whether movant’s allegations are refuted upon the face of the
record.
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).
If
material issues of fact exist that cannot be conclusively proved
or disproved upon the face of the record, the court is required
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Id.
However, conclusory
allegations unsupported by specific facts do not justify the
court conducting an evidentiary hearing.
116 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2003).
Hodge v. Commonwealth,
Based upon our review of the record
-3-
before the circuit court, we find no error in denying Cave an
evidentiary haring.
Having concluded that Cave was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, we will next address Cave’s contention that
his guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered.
Cave alleges he “was under the Influence of mental duress and
impaired on medication that was prescribed from the Psychiatrist
at KCPC” when he entered the guilty plea.
Cave maintains that
these medications impaired his ability to voluntarily and
intelligently enter the guilty plea.
To constitute a valid guilty plea, the plea must have
been a “voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
course[s] of action open to the defendant.”
Centers v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky.App. 1990).
In reviewing a
guilty plea, the totality of the circumstances surrounding entry
of the plea must be considered.
Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565
S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1978).
In this case, the circuit court pointed out that the
record conclusively demonstrated the court engaged in an
extensive guilty plea colloquy with Cave upon the voluntariness
of his plea and waiver of his constitutional rights.
The
circuit court stated that Cave expressed he was satisfied with
the advice of his counsel, had never been treated for a mental
illness and was not currently under the influence of alcohol,
-4-
drugs, or narcotics.
The court further stated Cave agreed he
had been evaluated and found competent to stand trial.
Thus,
the circuit court concluded that Cave’s contention regarding the
voluntary and intelligent nature of his guilty plea was refuted
upon the face of the record.
We agree with the circuit court’s
reasoning on this issue and can find no error.
We now turn to Cave’s contentions that he received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The proper standard
for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
See
Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985); Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998).
The Strickland
standard requires a showing that (1) trial counsel’s performance
was deficient as it fell outside the range of professionally
competent assistance and (2) such deficiency was prejudicial as
there existed a reasonable probability that the outcome would
have been different if not for counsel’s performance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
Furthermore, the burden is upon the
moving party to overcome the strong presumption that trial
counsel’s performance was sufficient or may be considered trial
strategy.
Id.
Cave specifically contends his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.
-5-
Cave asserts that trial counsel failed to present any evidence
to demonstrate that Cave “was a lifelong resident of Louisville,
he was raised in a Catholic Family and attended Catholic School
. . . .”
Cave’s Brief at 10.
Cave further complains that trial
counsel failed to interview any members of his family, review
any of his school records, or compile any information regarding
his work history.
The record reflects that at the time of the sentencing
hearing, Cave was serving a thirty-year sentence in a separate
case for forty-four counts of burglary.
At the hearing, six of
Cave’s victims testified regarding the devastating impact of the
sexual crimes he committed against them.
Given the heinous
nature of the crimes committed and the amount of evidence
amassed against Cave, we cannot say that there was a reasonable
probability that presentation of mitigating evidence would have
affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Thus, we cannot
conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
produce the evidence at the hearing.
Cave’s final contention is that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel “when counsel failed to advise
him of a viable defense pertaining to the DNA Evidence that
linked Cave to the Flashlight rapes.”
Cave merely makes this
conclusory allegation without supplying any supporting facts.
-6-
Absent specific facts to support Cave’s conclusory allegations,
the circuit court correctly denied Cave’s RCr 11.42 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Cave, Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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