CAROLYN JONES MORGAN v. BETTY MORGAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001739-MR
CAROLYN JONES MORGAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00532
v.
BETTY MORGAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
On January 14, 2001, Carolyn Jones
Morgan was a passenger in an automobile operated by Doug Morgan
when it was struck in the rear by an automobile operated by
Betty Morgan.
The jury found Doug to be 60% at fault and Betty
40% at fault but did not award Carolyn any damages.
Carolyn
appeals alleging that the trial court should have directed a
verdict on liability and on incurred medical expenses or, in the
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
alternative, sustained her motion for a new trial.
Because we
find that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could base its verdict, we affirm.
At the time of the collision the parties were involved
in a love triangle.
Doug and Betty had recently divorced and
Carolyn was Doug’s girlfriend.2
After a conversation between
Doug and Betty at a local convenience store, Doug, with Carolyn
as his passenger, left the store and departed to his father’s
home.
Betty also left the store following directly behind Doug.
Betty contends that she followed Doug in passing a
slower vehicle, but that when she attempted to return to the
proper travel lane, Doug applied his brakes causing her to hit
the rear of his vehicle.
Carolyn and Doug testified that during
the chase Betty struck Doug’s vehicle on least two separate
occasions.
Jimmy Morgan, son of Betty and Doug, testified without
objection that he frequently rode with his father and that he
was in the “habit” of applying his brakes when a vehicle was
following his vehicle.
Michael Morgan, also a son of Betty and
Doug, testified without objection that Doug told him that he
applied his brakes in front of Betty.
Immediately after the accident, Carolyn, who has
multiple sclerosis, did not seek immediate medical treatment and
2
At the time of trial, Carolyn and Doug were married.
-2-
was able to drive to her home where she lived with her husband.
Two days after the accident, she reported to a nurse at her
place of employment, Mrs. Smith’s Bakery, that she was having
pain but made no mention of the collision.
After Carolyn was
notified that her supervisory position was being eliminated, she
applied for disability benefits on the basis of a degenerative
condition but made no reference to having been involved in a
collision.
From March 2001 until the spring of 2005, Carolyn
worked a regular schedule.
The medical testimony was contradictory as to whether
Carolyn sustained an injury as a proximate result of the
collision or whether her complaints are attributable to her
multiple sclerosis and the degenerative changes that pre-existed
the collision.
Dr. Taylor, Carolyn’s treating physician, first
saw her on January 16, 2001, and testified that the collision
was a substantial factor in causing her injuries and
necessitated his continued treatment.
Although he found
significant degenerative changes in the cervical region that
pre-dated the collision, he opined that the collision aggravated
or accelerated the cervical and lumbar pain suffered by Carolyn.
Two other physicians, Dr. Donald Douglas and Dr. Steven Morton,
also found significant degenerative changes in Carolyn’s
cervical region that were not attributable to the accident.
Both physicians admitted that Carolyn’s pre-existing
-3-
degenerative changes and her multiple sclerosis can cause the
pain she described.
Dr. Morton testified that when he first saw
Carolyn in August 2002, she did not report that she had been
involved in an automobile accident and that Carolyn’s multiple
sclerosis and work, which required carrying trays of baked
goods, could cause pain in the neck and tepezius regions.
Finally, Dr. Wagner did not express a conclusive opinion about
the cause of Carolyn’s physical complaints.
At the close of the proof, Carolyn moved the court for
a directed verdict on the issue of liability and damages which
was denied.
The trial court also denied her timely motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for
a new trial.
The standard of review applicable to a denial of a
motion for directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is the same.
The appellate court is required to
consider the evidence in the strongest light possible in favor
of the opposing party.
(Ky.App. 1985).
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416
After completion of the evidentiary review, the
decision must be affirmed unless the verdict rendered is
“‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the weight of the evidence so
as ‘to indicate it was reached as a result of passion or
prejudice.’”
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d
459, 461-462 (Ky. 1990).
Despite Carolyn’s attempt to persuade
this court that the evidence was conclusively in her favor on
-4-
the issues of liability and damages, the record reveals evidence
to the contrary.
There is a general duty on all drivers to operate
their vehicles in a “careful manner, with regard for the safety
and convenience of pedestrians and other vehicles upon the
highway.”
KRS 189.290(1).
“A driver of an automobile that
strikes another in the rear is not subject to strict liability,
but rather must be proven to have violated the duty of ordinary
care before he can be found to be at fault.”
USAA Casualty
Insurance Company v. Kramer, 987 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Ky. 1999).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Betty, there was
no error in the trial court’s submission of the issue of
liability to the jury.
Drawing all reasonable inferences from
the evidence, it cannot be said that Betty was negligent as a
matter of law.
In fact, the reasonable conclusion to reach from
the facts is that both Doug and Betty operated their vehicles in
a negligent manner.
Betty, angered by Carolyn’s presence,
chased Doug and Doug, irritated by Betty’s pursuit, braked in
front of her causing Betty’s automobile to collide with the rear
of his.
The jury’s verdict finding Doug 60% at fault and Betty
40% at fault was not so palpably or flagrantly against the
weight of the evidence so as to indicate that it was reached as
a result of passion or prejudice.
-5-
The jury awarded zero damages which, Carolyn contends,
indicates that the jury either ignored the evidence or acted as
the result of passion or prejudice.
Although not a common out-
come, a zero-damage award is not the basis for a new trial if
the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s conclusion that
the plaintiff did not suffer any damages as a result of the
defendant’s tortious conduct.
Thomas v. Greenview Hosp. Inc.,
127 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Ky.App. 2004), overruled on other grounds
Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2005).
Carolyn submitted $47,247.16 in medical bills incurred
between January 16, 2001, and May 2005, the date of the trial.
She argues that pursuant to KRS 304.39-020(5)(a), her medical
expenses are presumed to have been reasonable.
Medical expenses
must not only be reasonable but they must be incurred as a
result of the accident and when the evidence is not conclusive,
a jury is not required to accept the medical bills submitted by
the plaintiff.
1983).
Thompson v. Piasta, 662 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App.
The statutory presumption does not remove from the jury
the ability to weigh the evidence and testimony and decide
whether the medical expenses are reasonable and incurred as a
result of the accident.
Lewis v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 11
S.W.3d 591 (Ky.App. 2000).
Although the medical testimony
differed as to the extent Carolyn’s pre-existing conditions
caused her complaints, the jury considered the evidence and
-6-
found that the collision did not cause her to suffer any
damages.
Because there was a material issue of fact as to
whether Carolyn was damaged by the collision, we find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion denying the motion for
a directed verdict and Carolyn’s post-trial motions.
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Bruce R. Bentley
Zoellers, Hudson & Bentley
London, Kentucky
Michael A. Goforth, PLLC
Crabtree & Goforth, PLLC
London, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.