COLLEEN BLOSE v. HUMANA, INC.
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RENDERED:
July 28, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-001546-MR
COLLEEN BLOSE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-CI-008296
v.
HUMANA, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
On January 3, 1995, Colleen Blose,
who is afflicted with cerebral palsy, began working as a mail
clerk in the distribution department of Humana, Inc. in
Jefferson County, Kentucky.
On January 5, 2001, nearly six
years to the day after Humana hired Blose, the corporation
closed its distribution department and terminated Blose’s
employment.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On September 30, 2004, Blose filed suit against Humana
claiming that Humana had been guilty of outrageous conduct while
she was employed by the corporation and that she had been
discriminated against in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 344.040.2
Blose alleged that, starting in 1999 and
continuing until her termination in 2001, employees at Humana
harassed her causing physical injury, humiliation and emotional
distress.
Although Blose complained to Humana’s management
about the harassment, no action was taken to address the
problem.
In addition, after Humana closed its distribution
department, the corporation began hiring employees from that
department for other positions.
According to Blose, she applied
for several new positions with Humana but was refused because
she was afflicted with cerebral palsy.
On November 8, 2004, Humana moved, pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02, to dismiss Blose’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Humana coupled its motion to dismiss with a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to CR 56.03.
In support of its motions, Humana claimed that on
January 5, 2001, the last day of Blose’s employment, she signed
2
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 344.040(1) provides, in pertinent part, that it is an
unlawful practice for an employer “[t]o . . . discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because . . . the person is a
qualified individual with a disability . . . .”
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a “Release and Agreement” in which, in exchange for twelve
weeks’ severance pay and twelve additional weeks of health
insurance coverage, she waived any claim against Humana based on
federal, state or local law.
According to Humana, Blose
actually received twelve weeks’ severance pay and twelve
additional weeks of insurance coverage in consideration for
waiving any and all claims against the corporation.
Thus,
Humana argued, Blose’s complaint was subject to summary
dismissal.
On December 28, 2004, Blose filed a written response
to Humana’s motions in which she requested time to conduct
discovery and argued that the circuit court would violate CR 56
if it ruled on Humana’s motion without giving her the
opportunity to complete discovery.
She also argued that
Humana’s motion was not appropriate under CR 12 since a motion
under that rule is limited to the facts contained in the
pleadings, and Humana had referenced facts outside the complaint
in its motion.
Blose also asserted in affidavits that her supervisor
never told her that the Release and Agreement contained a waiver
of her right to pursue a claim against Humana:
the supervisor
told her that the document was nothing more than a
confidentiality agreement.
And, she claimed, she was never
given an opportunity to read the Release and Agreement.
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Blose
also said that she was not allowed to remove the document from
Humana’s premises, was not given a copy of the document, and had
no opportunity to consult with an attorney before signing it.
At the termination conference, Blose maintained, her supervisor
simply turned to the document’s signature page and told her to
sign it after insisting that if she did not sign the document,
she would not receive her last paycheck or any severance pay.
Blose argued, based on her recitation of the facts, that the
Release and Agreement was invalid because she was fraudulently
induced to sign it.
Alternatively, she argued that she signed
the Release and Agreement under duress because Humana threatened
to withhold her last paycheck if she failed to do so.
On February 24, 2005, the circuit court held a hearing
to consider Humana’s motions and Blose’s response.
Blose again
asked the court to refrain from ruling on Humana’s motion
pending completion of discovery.
Instead, immediately following
the hearing, the circuit court signed an order dismissing
Blose’s complaint, citing both CR 12 and CR 56.
Several months
later on June 7, 2005, the order was finally entered.
Soon
thereafter, Blose appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Blose points out that Humana filed its
motion to dismiss relying on both CR 12 and CR 56.
According to
Blose, a complaint can only be dismissed pursuant to CR 12 when
it is certain that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under
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any legal theory that is supported by the facts alleged in the
complaint.3
Furthermore, in ruling on a CR 12 motion, the court
may not consider any facts outside the pleadings.
If matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in CR 56.4
As Blose notes, Humana,
in its motion to dismiss, referred to matters not found in her
complaint and the circuit court based its decision on these
additional facts.
We agree with Blose that the court clearly
erred when it considered matters outside the pleadings to
support the dismissal of Blose’s lawsuit pursuant to CR 12.
Humana, according to Blose, recognized that dismissal
under CR 12 was not appropriate since it simultaneously sought
summary judgment pursuant to CR 56.
In response to that motion,
Blose sought time to conduct discovery, but the circuit court
did not accede to the request.
Blose asserts that the court
should not have granted summary judgment once she requested
additional time to conduct discovery.5
Blose reminds us that in considering Humana’s motion
under CR 56, the circuit court was limited to determining
whether an issue of material fact regarding the validity of the
3
Kevin Tucker & Associates, Inc. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873,
874 (Ky. App. 1992).
4
Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 12.03.
5
See Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Release and Agreement existed.
Despite the lack of discovery,
Blose insists that the allegations in her complaint, together
with the facts set forth in the affidavits she tendered,
constituted “some affirmative evidence” that a genuine issue of
material fact exists that requires a trial.
Relying on Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability
Plan6 and Finz v. Schlesinger,7 as well as other federal cases,
Blose argues that a fact finder (either the circuit court or a
jury) was required to evaluate the validity of the Release and
Agreement under the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether she signed it knowingly and voluntarily.
Based on the
affidavits she tendered in opposition to Humana’s motion, Blose
insists that there is a material issue of fact for a fact finder
to resolve as to whether Humana fraudulently induced her to sign
the agreement containing the waiver, and, she insists, her
complaint and affidavits establish the elements of fraud, at
least to such an extent that her complaint can withstand a
motion for summary judgment.
In the alternative, Blose argues
that there is a material issue of fact as to whether she signed
the Release and Agreement under duress which rendered the waiver
void and unenforceable.
6
70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1995).
7
957 F.2d 78, 82 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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In the rather perfunctory order granting dismissal,
the circuit court cited both CR 12 and CR 56.
Since the court
apparently considered facts outside the pleadings, it was
required to treat Humana’s motion under CR 12 as one for summary
judgment under CR 56 and to dispose of it accordingly.8
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the
court was required to view the record in a light most favorable
to Blose, the party opposing the motion, and was required to
resolve all doubts in her favor.9
On her part, Blose was
required to present, at the very least, some affirmative
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact that requires a trial.10
The court was not
authorized to grant summary judgment if any issue of material
fact exists.11
We, on the other hand, must determine whether the
circuit court correctly found that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and that, as a matter of law, Humana was entitled to
judgment in its favor.12
Since findings of fact are not in
issue, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo.13
8
See Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958).
9
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991).
10
Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992).
11
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., supra, note 9.
12
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
13
Id.
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In Roberson v. Lampton,14 Kentucky’s highest court said
that “every litigant must have the opportunity to search for and
secure whatever evidence may be necessary to perfect [her] case,
and unless it is manifestly impossible for [her] to produce it
[she] cannot be forced to a premature showdown in that respect
by a motion for summary judgment.”
Later, this Court addressed
Roberson, stating that
we believe that Roberson must be interpreted
narrowly as holding that summary judgment
may not properly be entered before the
respondent has had an opportunity to
complete discovery, rather than that a
movant must show that it would be impossible
to produce evidence. It is not necessary to
show that the respondent has actually
completed discovery, but only that
respondent has had an opportunity to do so.15
This narrow interpretation has been followed in at least three
other cases:
Hollins v. Edmonds,16 Hasty v. Shepherd17 and
Pendleton Brothers Vending, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Finance and
Administration Cabinet.18
In the present case, Blose filed her complaint on
September 30, 2004.
14
Thirty-nine days later, Humana filed its
516 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky. 1974).
15
Hartford Ins. Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579 S.W.2d 628,
630 (Ky. App. 1979) (emphasis supplied and citations omitted).
16
616 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. App. 1981).
17
620 S.W.2d 325 (Ky. App. 1981).
18
758 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1988).
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motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and for summary judgment.
In her December
28, 2004, response and at the hearing held on February 24, 2005,
Blose requested time to conduct discovery.
Given the rapid
chain of events, Blose did not have an adequate opportunity to
complete discovery.
Thus, the circuit court acted precipitously
when it granted summary judgment before discovery reasonably
could be completed.19
Since we vacate because the circuit court ruled on
Humana’s motion for summary judgment before Blose had an
opportunity to complete discovery, we find it unnecessary to
address Blose’s other assignments of error.
However, we direct
the circuit court’s attention to this Court’s decision in Curtis
v. Belden Electronic Wire and Cable.20
In Curtis, the employer,
Belden Electronic, terminated Curtis’ employment on June 30,
1985.
Curtis subsequently filed a complaint, pursuant to KRS
344.040(1), with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights
alleging age discrimination.
On June 4, 1985, Curtis and Belden
had entered into a contract in which Curtis agreed to waive any
action based upon age discrimination in return for sixteen
weeks’ severance pay and sixteen additional weeks of insurance
coverage.
The Commission dismissed Curtis’ complaint, and Wayne
19
Hartford Ins. Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., supra, note 15.
20
760 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. App. 1988).
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Circuit Court dismissed his petition for review.
On appeal to
this Court, we agreed with Belden Electronic that
the waiver was a binding contract. It is
also indisputable [we continued] that when
[Curtis] filed his action for age
discrimination he placed himself in breach
of the contract. Nevertheless, Belden’s
remedy for the breach should have been an
original action or counterclaim for recovery
of damages incurred as a result of the
breach. [Curtis] still had a statutory
right to file his civil rights action,
although his doing so subjected him to a
suit for breach of contract.21
In the present case, since the circuit court
prematurely granted summary judgment, the validity of the
Release and Agreement remains at issue.
If, however, on remand
the fact finder determines that the Release and Agreement is
valid and enforceable, the circuit court must still apply the
law as declared in Curtis.
We vacate the order of dismissal and the summary
judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted and remand this
case to Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings.
Upon
remand, the court shall afford Blose a reasonable opportunity to
complete discovery before ruling on Humana’s motion for summary
judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
21
Id. at 98, citing Duff v. Chaney, 291 Ky. 308, 164 S.W.2d 483, 487 (1942).
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Callie E. Walton
HELMER DEMUTH & WALTON, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Craig P. Siegenthaler
GREENEBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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