DAVID LEE DUKE v. MELISSA ANN DUKE
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 4, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001508-MR
DAVID LEE DUKE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KRISTI HOGG GOSSETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00297
MELISSA ANN DUKE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; MILLER,1 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
David Lee Duke appeals from a decision of
the Carter Family Court setting child support to be paid to him
by his former spouse, Melissa Ann Duke, for the parties’ minor
children.
On appeal, David argues that the court erred by not
commencing the child support as of the date of the filing of his
motion for child support -- August 5, 2004.
1
Melissa contends
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
that the court had discretion to fix the beginning of her child
support obligation and that it did not abuse its discretion.
We
agree and affirm the order.
David first requested child support on August 5, 2004.
At a hearing that same month, the family court ordered Melissa
to produce within seven days evidence of her income in the form
of pay stubs.
When Melissa did not comply with the order, David
requested that she be held in contempt in April 2005.
cause hearing was held in June.
A show
The court held Melissa in
contempt and set her child support obligation at $226.26 per
month to commence in July 2005.
David requested that the
support obligation relate back to the date of his original
request for support nearly a year earlier.
The court denied
that request, and this appeal followed.
David argues that the court had “absolutely no basis”
for denying his request that the order relate back to the date
of his filing of the motion.
He complains that the court is
permitting Melissa to benefit from her wrongful refusal to
comply with the court’s earlier order.
David cites Pretot v.
Pretot, 905 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. App. 1995), in support of his
contention that child support orders must relate back to the
date that the motion was filed.
Pretot, however, does support his contention.
Pretot, the mother first was granted custody.
-2-
In
Custody was then
changed to the father with the mother paying support.
The court
then changed custody back to the mother according to its
original determination.
The mother filed a motion for support,
which the court granted retroactively as to the date that she
filed the motion.
On appeal, the mother contended that the
court had erred in not making the support obligation retroactive
to the earlier date of her taking custody of the child.
This
Court held that the trial court had acted properly in conformity
with the version of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.213(1)
then in effect.
Pretot discussed the history of the somewhat ambiguous
precedents establishing the effective date of a child support
obligation as either the date of taking custody of the child or
the filing of the motion for support.
As enacted on July 13,
1990, KRS 403.213(1) resolved the confusion and unequivocally
set the effective date as no earlier than the filing of a motion
to set or modify support.
Pretot recites that evolution of the
law but does not require that a court set the effective date of
support automatically as of the date of the filing of the
motion.
It merely clarifies that the effective date cannot be
earlier than the date of the motion.
Thus, neither Pretot nor
the relevant statutes support David’s contention that the family
court acted outside the scope of its discretion.
-3-
In addressing David’s argument that Melissa was
allowed to benefit from her violation of the court’s order, we
note that David waited nearly nine months (until April 2005)
before requesting that the court hold her in contempt for
failing to comply with its original order.
David’s failure to
act in a more timely fashion cannot be ascribed entirely to
Melissa.
Melissa argues that she was unable to produce the
record of her income because it did not exist.
She claims that
she lost her job shortly after the hearing and that she was
indigent, unemployed, and unable to find work by the time of the
April 2005 request for her to show cause.
She also states that
prior to the divorce, she was a housewife, that she did not work
or go to school outside the home, and that she was left
“displaced and penniless” after David filed for divorce after a
flood destroyed the family home and possessions.
The family court enjoyed the discretion to weigh the
merits of the relative arguments of the parties and to determine
the most equitable manner of assigning the support obligation.
Absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion, we cannot
substitute our judgment.
As we have discovered no abuse of
discretion, we have no basis to second-guess the ruling of the
court.
We affirm the judgment of the Carter Family Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Jeffrey Scot
Grayson, Kentucky
Robin L. Webb
Grayson, Kentucky
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