NOVA E. MATHENEY v. J. NEAL SHARPE, M.D.; SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.; AND J. MATTHEW SCHWAB, M.D.
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RENDERED: JULY 14, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
OCTOBER 13, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001456-MR
NOVA E. MATHENEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00157
v.
J. NEAL SHARPE, M.D.;
SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.;
AND J. MATTHEW SCHWAB, M.D.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Nova E. Matheney brings this appeal from March
18, 2005, summary judgments of the Shelby Circuit Court
dismissing his medical malpractice complaint against Dr. J.
Matthew Schwab and Dr. J. Neal Sharpe.
1
We reverse and remand.
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
In March 2004, Matheney filed a complaint in the
Shelby Circuit Court against, inter alios, Dr. Schwab and Dr.
Sharpe.
The facts leading to the filing of this complaint are
fairly straightforward.
On or about March 25, 2003, Matheney
went to the emergency room at Jewish Hospital Shelbyville
complaining of stomach cramps.
Dr. Schwab performed and read an
ultrasound as showing gallstones present in Matheney’s
gallbladder.
On March 26, 2003, Dr. Sharpe, a surgeon,
performed a laparoscopic procedure on Matheney to remove his
gallbladder.
During the procedure, it was discovered that the
gallbladder was surgically absent.
Dr. Sharpe admitted in his
answer to the complaint that he had previously removed
Matheney’s gallbladder.
The record reflects that Matheney’s
gallbladder had been removed in 1998.
Matheney initiated this
action against Dr. Sharpe and Dr. Schwab for their negligence in
subjecting Matheney to an unnecessary surgical procedure.
Dr. Schwab and Dr. Sharpe both filed motions for
summary judgments, and on March 18, 2005, the circuit court
entered orders granting their motions.
In both summary
judgments, the court specifically held that “with no expert
witnesses, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing of
negligence.”
This appeal follows.
Matheney contends the circuit court committed error by
granting Dr. Schwab and Dr. Sharpe’s motions for summary
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judgment and dismissing the medical negligence claims.
For the
reasons hereinafter elucidated, we agree.
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no
genuine issue of material fact and movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 56; Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.
1991).
When considering a summary judgment motion, the record
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party
with all doubts resolved in his favor.
Id.
In granting the summary judgments, the circuit court
opined that Matheney could not prove his medical malpractice
claims against Dr. Schwab and Dr. Sharpe in the absence of
expert testimony establishing their negligence.
The record
indicates that Matheney failed to properly disclose the identity
of his medical experts and the substance of their opinions in
compliance with CR 26.02.
Both Dr. Schwab and Dr. Sharpe
propounded interrogatories to Matheney requesting the identity
of all experts and the substance of their opinions.
failed to timely respond to the interrogatories.
Matheney
Matheny did
tender a late response that consisted of two names and
addresses.
However, there was no summary of facts or opinions
as to the experts’ testimony.
The circuit court concluded that
Matheney failed to comply with CR 26.02 and with the court’s
previously entered pretrial order.
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With no expert witness
testimony, the court then concluded that summary judgment was
proper because Matheney would be unable to prove medical
negligence without such expert testimony.
It is well-established that the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case.
Hoffman, 551 S.W.2d 8 (Ky.App. 1977).
Morris v.
The negligence of a
physician generally must be established by medical or expert
testimony unless the negligence and “injurious results” are so
apparent that a layperson with general knowledge would have no
difficulty recognizing it.
591 (Ky. 1963).
Id.; Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d
See also Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652
(Ky. 1992).
In this case, the record indicates that Dr. Sharpe
admitted in his answer that he had previously surgically removed
Matheney’s gallbladder.
However, Dr. Sharpe stated that he was
unaware of such fact at the time of the laparoscopic procedure
in March 2003.
In light of this admitted fact, we are of the
opinion that the alleged medical negligence of both Dr. Sharpe
and Dr. Schwab was well within the general knowledge of a
layperson.
Indeed, a layperson would have no difficulty in
recognizing Dr. Sharpe’s purported deviation from the standard
of care in advising and undertaking to remove a gallbladder that
he had previously removed.
Moreover, we, likewise, believe that
a layperson would have no difficulty recognizing Dr. Schwab’s
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purported deviation from the standard of care in reading
Matheney’s ultrasound as a diseased gallbladder, when, in fact,
no gallbladder existed.
Simply put, the alleged medical
negligence is such that expert testimony was simply unnecessary.
We believe that material issues of fact exist upon whether Dr.
Schwab and Dr. Sharpe were negligent, thus creating disputed
factual issues for a jury.
Accordingly, we conclude the circuit
court committed error by entering summary judgment dismissing
Matheney’s malpractice claims against Dr. Schwab and Dr. Sharpe.
Additionally, we note that it is inappropriate to use
a CR 56 summary judgment in a procedural dispute as a sanction
against a party’s counsel.
Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v.
Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676 (Ky. 2005).
The court’s order
“overruling” appellant’s motion to reconsider and set aside
summary judgment clearly reflects that the court was sanctioning
counsel for the disregard shown for an earlier court order
regarding discovery.
At minimum, to consider summary judgment
as a sanction under the circumstances of this case, the court
must make findings of willfulness or bad faith on behalf of the
party to be sanctioned and must show whether less drastic
sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was
granted.
Greathouse v. Am. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d
868 (Ky.App. 1990).
-5-
These necessary findings were absent from the circuit
court’s order.
Given our holding that expert witnesses are
unnecessary in this case, the circuit court clearly abused its
discretion in imposing summary judgment as a sanction against
Matheney’s attorney.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgments of
the Shelby Circuit Court are reversed and this cause remanded
for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Robert G. Lohman, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES J. NEAL
SHARPE, M.D. AND SURGICAL
ASSOCIATES, P.S.C.:
Gerald R. Toner
Amy M. Stewart
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE J. MATTHEW
SCHWAB, M.D.:
Richard P. Schiller
Kimberly S. Naber
SCHILLER, OSBOURN & BARNES,
PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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