RODNEY McDANIEL JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and ANDREA SHAREE STOKES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 26, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001394-MR
RODNEY McDANIEL JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-01064-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2005-CA-001395-MR
ANDREA SHAREE STOKES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-01064-001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
That the police lacked time to get a warrant
without thwarting the arrest or making it more dangerous is the
essence of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement.
In this appeal, Rodney McDaniel Jr. and Andrea
Stokes argue that exigent circumstances did not justify the
warrantless entry into their apartment because the police had
adequate time to get a warrant.
Because the trial court failed
to make specific findings on the crucial time-lapse issue, we
must vacate and remand.
Officers of the Lexington Police Department were
dispatched in the early morning hours to an apartment building
where a possible domestic disturbance was underway.
Joshua Masterson arrived first.
Officer
He could hear a man yelling and
a woman crying in an upstairs apartment.
Because of the
possible volatile situation and his lack of experience, Officer
Masterson did not approach the apartment, awaiting Officer
William Richardson’s arrival two to three minutes later.
When Officer Richardson arrived, he and Officer
Masterson knocked at the apartment door and announced their
identity.
The sound of argument inside the apartment ceased;
and the apartment became quiet, except for the sound of a woman
whimpering.
Officer Masterson testified that he and Officer
Richardson knocked at the door for five to six minutes when they
heard what sounded like a firearm being prepared for use.
Unsure of the gravity of the situation, Officers Masterson and
Richardson retreated from the door of the apartment and
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interviewed a neighbor to gather more information.
The neighbor
told the officers that a fight had been going on for a couple of
hours and that someone in the apartment had been “bounced around
the walls.”
Approximately five minutes after the officers
retreated, Sergeant William Richmond arrived.
Sergeant Richmond
talked to the neighbor for fifteen to twenty minutes before he
and Officer Masterson returned to the door of the apartment.
Sergeant Richmond also heard a woman inside the
apartment whimpering.
He then knocked on the door for five to
ten minutes more before a female, Stokes, finally opened it.
Stokes appeared to be shaken and upset but told the officers
that she was alone in the apartment and did not know why the
police had been called.
Sergeant Richmond asked Stokes to step
outside the apartment and into the hallway.
He said that an
officer had heard a weapon being prepared for use inside the
apartment.
While he was in the hallway with Stokes, Richmond
noticed the silhouette of a man in the rear of the dimly lit
apartment.
Stokes then changed her story and admitted that her
boyfriend, McDaniel, was also there.
Sergeant Richmond then
ordered McDaniel to come out and show his hands.
McDaniel
hesitated but finally came as far as the living room where
Sergeant Richmond ordered him to lie on the floor.
Sergeant
Richmond and Officer Masterson then entered the apartment,
handcuffed McDaniel, and patted him down for weapons.
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Sergeant
Richmond informed the uncooperative and belligerent McDaniel
that he was not under arrest but that they were going to keep
him handcuffed until they could satisfy themselves that the
apartment was safe.
When they entered the apartment, the
officers smelled marijuana smoke.
After Sergeant Richmond and Officer Masterson entered
the apartment, Officer Jerry Curtsinger, who had been stationed
at the rear of the apartment building to foil an escape attempt,
also entered.
As Officer Curtsinger glanced around the living
room for any possible weapons, he noticed a small plastic baggie
containing a white powder lying in a small trashcan.
Based on
their experience and training, the officers believed the white
powder was cocaine.
At that point, Sergeant Richmond and Officer
Curtsinger went out into the hall to speak to Stokes.
The
officers informed her of her rights and told her that they had
smelled marijuana in the apartment.
They then asked her if
there were any weapons or drugs in the apartment.
Stokes
admitted to the presence of marijuana, and she led the officers
to the bedroom where she showed them some marijuana joints in an
ashtray.
The officers then asked Stokes for consent to search
the remainder of the apartment, but she declined.
then arrested for possession of marijuana.
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Stokes was
As Stokes was being led from the apartment, McDaniel
stated that he was responsible for any illegal substances in the
apartment but declined to consent to a search of the entire
apartment.
McDaniel was then arrested and removed from the
apartment.
Officer Masterson stayed at the apartment to secure
it while Sergeant Richmond and Officer Curtsinger went for a
search warrant.
When they returned with the search warrant,
they searched the apartment.
That search yielded the baggie
with the white powder, as well as a firearm and ammunition in a
closet.
McDaniel and Stokes were indicted for trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree while in possession of
a firearm, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of
marijuana.
Each filed a suppression motion, arguing that the
officers’ initial entry into the apartment was an unconstitutional invasion of their home.
The trial court denied
suppression following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the
warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances
exception.
McDaniel later entered a conditional guilty plea to
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving the right to appeal
the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion.
He was
ultimately sentenced to seven years’ incarceration, but that
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sentence was probated for five years.
After the denial of her
motion to suppress, Stokes entered a conditional guilty plea to
first-degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana, reserving the
right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to
suppress.
Stokes was ultimately sentenced to one year of
imprisonment, probated for five years.
filed separate appeals.
Stokes and McDaniel have
But since these cases share a factual
background and present the same questions of law, we have
elected to resolve both appeals in this opinion.
Stokes and McDaniel argue that the trial court erred
by finding that the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement permitted the police to enter their
apartment without a warrant.
When reviewing the denial of
motions to suppress, the standard of review requires that
“[f]irst, the factual findings of the court are conclusive if
they are supported by substantial evidence.
The second prong
involves a de novo review to determine whether the court's
decision is correct as a matter of law.”1
No one questions that the police had no warrant when
they first entered the apartment.
And “all warrantless searches
are deemed unreasonable unless they fall under one of the
1
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Ky.App. 2000) (internal
footnote omitted).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement.”2
The Commonwealth bears
the burden of showing that a warrantless search falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.3
If a trial
court finds that exigent circumstances existed at the time of
the warrantless entry into a person’s dwelling, however, the
entry does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection from
warrantless searches and seizures.4
The presence or absence of
exigent circumstances is a finding of fact, which we review
under the clearly erroneous standard.5
Although the exigent circumstances exception applies
in many situations, the one relied upon here by the Commonwealth
is the need to protect the suspects, bystanders, and the police
themselves from possible harm.6
So the Commonwealth contends
that exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’
entry into the apartment because the safety of the officers and
others was endangered based upon the fact that the officers:
had heard sounds of an argument and a woman whimpering; had
information from a neighbor that the argument had been ongoing
2
Gillum v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Ky.App. 1995).
3
Id.
4
Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Ky. 2006) (“[a]bsent exigent
circumstances, it is not reasonable for a law enforcement agent or officer
to enter a person's home without consent or a warrant.”).
5
Commonwealth v. McManus, 107 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Ky. 2003) (Graves, J.,
dissenting). See also 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 128 (2005).
6
See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky.App. 1979)
(holding that warrantless search is permissible if necessary to prevent
harm to officers); 68 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 134 (2005).
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for a couple of hours and that it sounded like someone was being
thrown about the apartment; had heard what they believed to be
the sound of a weapon being readied for use; had seen Stokes’s
distressed condition; did not know how many people were in the
apartment; and McDaniel had been belligerent and slow to comply.
Conversely, Stokes and McDaniel contend that the Commonwealth’s
claim that the situation involved exigent circumstances is
belied by the fact that approximately thirty minutes elapsed
from the time Officer Masterson first arrived and the time
Sergeant Richmond and Officer Masterson entered the apartment.
Stokes and McDonald may have a valid issue about
whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement properly lies in light of the fact that the officers
waited for approximately thirty minutes to elapse before
entering the apartment.
It stands to reason that in a true
emergency, the officers would have had to take decisive action
much sooner.
But courts reviewing the actions of officers must
view the facts objectively,7 and courts are cautioned against
being “unduly demanding in calculating the time at which the
warrant clock begins to run[.]”8
And several courts have issued
opinions on the crucial issue of whether a lapse of time between
when the authorities become involved in a situation and when
7
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 338 F.3d 535, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).
8
3 Wayne R. LaFave Search and Seizure § 6.1(f) at 281 (3d ed. 1996).
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they engage in a warrantless search negates the element of
urgency necessary to justify a warrantless entry.9
A
determination of this time-lapse issue is critical because it
“appears to be the essence of ‘exigent circumstances’ that there
was ‘the lack of time to obtain a warrant without thwarting the
arrest or making it more dangerous.
Where time was adequate,
failure to obtain a warrant should not be excused.’”10
Although lapse-of-time issue is the most important
issue in this appeal and the focus of much of Appellants’ briefs
and arguments below, the Commonwealth’s brief does not address
it.
More importantly, the trial court’s order denying
McDaniel’s and Stokes’s motions to suppress also does not fully
address the issue since the order contains no specific finding
addressing whether the trial court believed that the time lapse
before the officers entered the apartment had any impact upon
the exigency of the circumstances.
Without this factual
finding, we may not review this critical issue because the
question of whether exigent circumstances existed to justify
warrantless intervention is inherently fact-specific.
Furthermore, it is well settled that we may only review, not
9
See, e.g., United States v. Minick, 455 A.2d 874 (D.C. 1983); State v.
Welker, 683 P.2d 1110 (Wash.Ct.App. 1984); United States v. Chuke, 554
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1977).
10
State v. Johnson, 313 S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. 1984) (citing Latzer,
Enforcement Workshop: Police Entries to Arrest⎯Payton v. New York, 17
Crim.L.Bull. 156, 165 (1981)) (emphasis added).”
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make findings of fact,11 nor may we review issues not fully
addressed by the trial court.12
So we must remand these cases to
allow the trial court to make specific findings on the effect,
if any, of the time lapse between the officers’ arrival on the
scene and their entry into the apartment on the existence of
exigent circumstances.
We are prohibited from addressing
whether the officers acted within the bounds of the constitution
when, after they entered the apartment, they seized the illegal
drugs since the propriety of those seizures rests upon whether
the officers’ initial entry into the apartment was permissible.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court denying McDaniel’s and Stokes’s motions to
suppress are vacated; and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent
from the result reached by the majority opinion.
Generally, I
would agree with the majority that the lapse of time between
when the officers arrived on the scene and when they entered the
apartment would be relevant to determine whether exigent
circumstances existed justifying a warrantless search.
But even
11
Parrigin v. Sawyer, 457 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Ky. 1970).
12
Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989).
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without a warrant, the officers at the scene were entitled to
continue knocking at the door to elicit a response.
The trial
court found that Stokes voluntarily answered the door.
Stokes’s
appearance and demeanor further roused the officers’ suspicions
that domestic abuse was occurring.
Stokes denied that anyone
else was present in the apartment but changed her story after
Officer Richmond saw someone standing in the back bedroom.
The
individual refused to step out of the darkened apartment or show
his hands.
Furthermore, Officer Masterson testified that he had
heard a weapon being prepared for use inside the apartment.
If Stokes had not answered the door, I would agree
with the majority that the thirty minutes which elapsed between
the officers’ arrival and the search would weigh against a
finding of exigent circumstances.
But once Stokes opened the
door, new circumstances presented themselves which heightened
the urgency of the circumstances.
Given the trial court’s
findings regarding the facts known to the officers at the time
they entered the apartment, I would find that there were exigent
circumstances justifying their warrantless entry into the
apartment.
Once the officers were lawfully inside the
apartment, they were entitled to seize any incriminating items
which were in plain view.
Consequently, I disagree with the
majority that this matter must be remanded for additional
factual findings.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Marie Brannon
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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