ROBERT K. DELABAR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 18, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001319-MR
ROBERT K. DELABAR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN W. McNEILL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00091
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; POTTER,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Robert K. Delabar appeals from a
conditional guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
Reserved for our review is the trial
court’s determination that Delabar is subject to persistent
felony offender (PFO) sentencing enhancement pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080.
1
Delabar committed his
Senior Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
present felony on the fifth anniversary of his release from
prison on a prior felony.
Because we conclude that Delabar’s
release did not occur within the period called for in the
statute, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
The facts are not in dispute.
On September 1, 1998,
at approximately 9:30 a.m., Delabar was released from
incarceration on a prior felony charge.
On September 1, 2003,
at approximately 9:59 p.m., Delabar was arrested at a Mason
County Wal-Mart Store for an earlier attempt to shoplift, at
approximately 8:45 p.m., two computer ink cartridges valued at
less than $300.00.
Of significance to this case, however, at
the time of his arrest Delabar possessed a forged Ohio driver’s
license, a felony.
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 516.060.
On October 10, 2003, Delabar was indicted for seconddegree possession of a forged instrument, KRS 516.060; theft by
unlawful taking under $300.00, KRS 514.030; and first-degree
persistent felony offender, KRS 532.080.
On March 22, 2004, Delabar filed a “Motion to Prohibit
Improper PFO Enhancement.”
In the motion, Delabar argued that
he had been released from custody more than five years before he
committed the present felony, and, accordingly, his prior felony
could not be used to enhance his present felony.
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On April 14, 2004, the trial court entered an order
overruling Delabar’s motion.
The trial court determined that
the five-year period contemplated in KRS 532.080(3)(c)(1) began
to run on September 2, 1998, the first full day following
Delabar’s release from incarceration, and ran through the entire
length of the day of September 1, 2003.
After the trial court’s ruling on the PFO issue,
Delabar entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to RCr 8.09,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s determination
that his present offense could be enhanced.
KRS 532.080(3) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A persistent felony offender in the first
degree is a person who is more than twentyone (21) years of age and who stands
convicted of a felony after having been
convicted of two (2) or more felonies. As
used in this provision, a previous felony
conviction is a conviction of a felony in
this state or conviction of a crime in any
other jurisdiction provided:
. . . .
(c) That the offender:
. . . .
1. Completed service of the sentence imposed
on any of the previous felony convictions
within five (5) years prior to the date of
the commission of the felony for which he
now stands convicted;
The Commonwealth argues, and the trial court agreed,
that the counting of the five-year time period referred to in
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the statute began to run on the first full day following
Delabar's release and, accordingly, the five-year period ran
from September 2, 1998, though September 1, 2003.
Delabar, on
the other hand, argues that the day of his release should count
as the first day, and that the five-year period ran from
September 1, 1998, through August 31, 2003.
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE STATUTE DOES APPLY
KRS 446.030, which in all significant respects took
its present form in 1970, reads as follows:
(1) (a) In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by order of court, or
by any applicable statute or regulation, the
day of the act, event or default after which
the designated period of time begins to run
is not to be included. The last day of the
period so computed is to be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, a legal holiday,
or a day on which the public office in which
a document is required to be filed is
actually and legally closed, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next
day which is not one (1) of the days just
mentioned. . . .
(b) When a statute, regulation, or order of court
requires an act to be done either a certain time
before an event or a certain time before the day on
which an event occurs, the day of the event shall be
excluded in computing the time. If the day thereby
computed on which or by which the act is required to
be done falls on a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or
a day on which the public office in which the act is
required to be completed is actually and legally
closed, the act may be done on the next day which is
none of the days just mentioned.
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Under Section 1(a) the statute looks into the future
and deals with an act to be done after an event.
In computing
the applicable period the statute excludes the day on which the
event occurs.
For example, the one-year statute of limitation
for an accident occurring on January 1 expires on January 1 of
the next year and a complaint filed on that date is timely.
Derossett v. Burgher, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977).
Therefore,
looking forward from the day Delabar was released, the day of
his release would be excluded and the five year period beginning
on September 1, 1998 would include September 1, 2003.
Under Section 2(b) the statute looks into the past.
Under that provision, the day of the present event, i.e., the
day of the present crime, is excluded, and the five-year period
before September 1, 2003 would include September 1, 1998.
While the statute does make allowances for Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays, those exceptions are limited to
situations in which the act contemplated to be done is the
filing of a document in a legally closed office.
those provisions have no application here.
Therefore
If anything, by
limiting the exceptions to situations where something must be
done in an office that is closed, the statute recognizes that it
has application to situations where there are no documents to be
filed.
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Therefore we could easily hold that the trial court
correctly held that Delabar was subject to being prosecuted
under the PFO statute.
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE PFO STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY
Delabar contends that in order to avoid an absurd or
unreasonable result, the five-year period referred to in KRS
532.080(3)(c)(1) must be calculated by counting the day of a
defendant’s release from incarceration.
This interpretation is
supported by the legislature’s palpable intent that a defendant
be subject to PFO enhancement from the moment of his release
from incarceration, including the remaining hours of the day of
release.
This interpretation of legislative intent is
buttressed by the holding in Garrett v. Commonwealth, 675 S.W.2d
1 (Ky. 1984), which determined that for purposes of application
of the PFO statute, a defendant was "over the age of 18" from
first moment of day on which his eighteenth birthday fell.
However, under the Commonwealth’s construction, counting would
not commence until the day following release, and an unaccounted
for gap between the moment of release and the commencement of
the following day would result.
This unaccounted for gap in the
Commonwealth’s proposed interpretation produces an unreasonable
and absurd result.
Moreover, since to carry out the legislative intent
the first day must be counted, the five-year anniversary date of
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the defendant’s release (September 1, 2003, in the present case
- the first day of the sixth year) cannot be counted.
The
counting of that day would result in a total covered period of
five years and one day, which does not comport with the statute.
Further, Kentucky case law has established the
principle that in computing time from a particular day, that day
is to be excluded, but, in computing time from an act done, the
day on which act occurs is to be included in the computation.2
See Randall v. L. L. Morris Transport Co., 380 S.W.2d 221 (Ky.
1964); Coles v. Johns, 377 S.W.2d 587 (Ky. 1964); Fannin v.
Lewis, 254 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1952); Charles v. Big Jim Coal Co.,
314 Ky. 778, 237 S.W.2d 68 (1951); Dehart v. City of Olive Hill,
305 Ky. 864, 205 S.W.2d 351, (1947); Salisbury v. Commonwealth,
254 Ky. 77, 70 S.W.2d 987, (1934).
In the situation at bar, it
would be reasonable to conclude that the better application of
the rule is to view the calculation as a computation from an act
done; i.e., the act of the completion of service of the sentence
imposed on the previous felony conviction.
Under this
construction, the day on which the act occurred (release from
incarceration on the prior felony) would be included in the
computation.
2
We are mindful that the cited cases precede the 1970 revisions to KRS
446.030. See pgs. 4-5, supra.
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DECISION
Generally a statute is open to construction only if
the language that is used is ambiguous and requires
interpretation.
If the language is clear and unambiguous and if
applying the plain meaning of the words would not lead to an
absurd result, further interpretation is unwarranted.
Overnite
Transportation v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Ky.App. 1990).
As the two arguments above indicate, the portion of the PFO
statute at issue here is ambiguous.
The fundamental rule in the interpretation and
construction of a statute is that the court should "ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature and that
intention must be determined from the language of the statute
itself if possible."
Moore v. Alsmiller, 289 Ky. 682, 686-87,
160 S.W.2d 10, 12 (1942).
However, when a statute is ambiguous
and its meaning uncertain, the legislative intent should be
ascertained by considering the whole statute and the purpose
intended to be accomplished.
Department of Motor Transportation
v. City Bus Co., 252 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1952).
In construing
the statute, the court must consider the policy and the purpose
of the statute, the reason and the spirit of the statute, and
the mischief intended to be remedied.
32 S.W.3d 515, 516-17 (Ky.App. 2000).
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Barker v. Commonwealth,
Unfortunately, none of these rules is of assistance
here.
The limitations period set by the legislature is an
arbitrary line.
All parties agree that if Delabar had been
arrested three hours later he would not be subject to the PFO
enhancement.
Fortunately, Kentucky case law does have one principle
that is applicable here.
It has long been recognized that when
there is an ambiguity or conflict in a penal statute, the "rule
of lenity" is applicable.
Commonwealth v. Lundergan, 847 S.W.2d
729, 731 (Ky. 1993) (citing Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d
615 (Ky. 1980)). “Penal statutes are not to be extended by
construction, but must be limited to cases clearly within the
language used.”
1990).
Woods v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Ky.
“In interpreting an ambiguous penal statute, doubt is to
be resolved in favor of the accused.”
132 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Ky.App. 2004).
Kirby v. Commonwealth,
Doubts about the meaning of
a penal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity and
against a construction that would produce extremely harsh or
incongruous results or impose punishment totally
disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses.
Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Colonial Stores, 350 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Ky.
1961)).
The notions of fairness which lie at the heart of the
rule of lenity can best be satisfied in this case by construing
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the five-year period at issue to include the day of Delabar’s
release from incarceration, and to have ended on August 31,
2003, the day prior to his subsequent felony offense on
September 1, 2003.
In summary, we believe that the trial court
erroneously applied KRS 532.080(2)(c)(1) to encompass Delabar’s
September 1, 2003, felony.
For the foregoing reasons the Judgment of the Mason
Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
dissent.
I must respectfully
I am unable to discern any ambiguity whatever in KRS
532.080(3)(c)(1) or in KRS 446.030(1)(a) as they apply to this
situation.
The first says that if Delabar completed sentence of
one of his felony convictions within five years prior to the
date of commission of the felony resulting in the PFO charge, he
is a persistent felony offender.
The second says that in
computing a time period prescribed by a statute (here, five
years) the day of the act after which the designated period of
time begins to run is to be excluded, and the last day of the
period is to be included.
In this case, that means that
September 1, 1998 is excluded and September 1, 2003 is included,
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which clearly and simply means that Delabar stole the ink
cartridges one day too soon.
arithmetic.
There is no ambiguity, only simple
That may seem harsh to Delabar but when the General
Assembly has imposed a clear rule it is not our province to
reach for the “rule of lenity” to extricate him.
I would affirm
the circuit court.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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