JIM LATTNER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 13, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-001239-MR
JIM LATTNER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00742
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER, JUDGE; KNOPF AND ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGES.1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Jim Lattner appeals from a judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of illegal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree and persistent felony
offender in the first degree.
Following a jury verdict, the
court sentenced Lattner to 10 years’ imprisonment.
alleges three trial errors on appeal.
1
Lattner
We affirm.
Senior Judges William L. Knopf and Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
On April 30, 2004, Lattner was charged with
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree after
being arrested while attempting to sell drugs to Gladys
Stevenson.
Earlier that day, the Lexington police served a
search warrant on the home of Stevenson.
police found drugs and paraphernalia.
During the search,
Stevenson admitted to
selling drugs and agreed to cooperate with police by placing a
recorded phone call to her drug supplier, Lattner, seeking to
buy drugs from him.
Unaware of the ruse, he agreed.
When
Lattner arrived, Lexington police moved in and arrested him.
As
Lattner was handcuffed, a police officer observed him drop two
baggies of crack cocaine.
On June 9, 2004, Lattner was indicted for trafficking
in a controlled substance in the first degree and persistent
felony offender in the second degree.2
On September 8, 2004, the
Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment to persistent felony
offender in the first degree.
This was apparently granted by
the trial court, although the record does not include a written
order.
On April 12, 2005, Lattner was found guilty of illegal
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (a
lesser included offense of trafficking) and persistent felony
offender in the first degree.
2
On May 20, 2005, the trial court,
KRS 218A.1412 and 532.080, respectively.
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pursuant to the jury’s recommendation, sentenced Lattner to ten
years’ imprisonment.
On appeal Lattner argues that the trial court erred by
finding that he “opened the door” to cross-examination regarding
prior drug use, refusing to give a facilitation instruction, and
permitting the Commonwealth to amend the indictment.
Such
additional facts as may be necessary to an understanding of the
legal issues will be presented as each issue is discussed.
Lattner first argues that the trial court erred by
permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine him regarding
whether he ever used drugs, because he had not “opened the door”
to such a question on direct.
This issue is not properly
preserved for appellate review.
to the question during trial.
Defense counsel did not object
An objection to alleged
improprieties that occurred during the trial cannot be made
after the jury verdict.
Patrick v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 69,
74 (Ky. 1968).
The general rule is that a party must make a proper
objection to the trial judge and request a ruling on that
objection, or the issue is waived.
See Commonwealth v. Pace, 82
S.W.3d 894 (Ky. 2002).
See also Bell v. Commonwealth, 473
S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1971).
However, an appellate court may consider
an issue that was not preserved if it deems the error to be a
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palpable one which affected the defendant’s substantial rights
and resulted in manifest injustice.
RCr 10.26.
On cross-examination, the Commonwealth referred to
Lattner’s testimony on direct to the effect that he had had
problems in past relationships because the girls were mixed up
with drugs.
Appellant explained that he had a “big heart” and
that “I try to save the world when I can.”
The Commonwealth
asked, “You testified that you don’t approve of drugs, right?”.
Appellant replied “No, I don’t”.
The Commonwealth then asked
about his earlier testimony that he hung out with drug users.
Appellant’s response included that his choices of women were
wrong.
The Commonwealth again asked appellant whether he
approved of drug use and he responded that he did not.
The
Commonwealth asked to approach the bench, at which time it
informed the court that it believed Lattner had “opened the
door” for the Commonwealth to introduce his prior conviction for
possession of drugs, for impeachment purposes.
Lattner’s
counsel objected on grounds that it was the Commonwealth’s
cross-examination that had “led him through the door”, that the
Commonwealth could not “open its own door”.
The Commonwealth
argued that Lattner had also made statements on direct implying
that he disapproved of drugs.
The trial court found that
Lattner had set up that he was an “innocent lamb type guy.”
The
Commonwealth then proposed asking “have you ever used drugs?”.
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Lattner’s counsel stated, “that’s fine.”
The Commonwealth
subsequently asked the question, “have you ever used them
[drugs]?”, without objection from Lattner.
Lattner testified
that he had used drugs in the 1970’s, but had been clean for
close to five years.
Because Lattner did not object to the question at
trial nor request a ruling by the judge on this issue, the error
is unpreserved, and as we find no palpable error, we are unable
to consider the issue on appeal.
Even if Lattner had properly
preserved this issue, our decision would be the same.
Prior to
Lattner’s testimony, his girlfriend, Keisha Cotton, called by
the defense, testified that Lattner was “very much opposed to
drugs”.
Further, Lattner placed his character in issue with his
direct testimony as well, wherein he portrayed himself as
opposed to drug use.
Accordingly, we conclude that appellant
did “open the door” for inquiry by the Commonwealth as to his
drug use.
See, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441
(Ky. 2003).
Thus, the question, “have you ever used them
[drugs]?,” was proper under the facts of this case.
Lattner next contends that the trial court erred by
denying his request for a criminal facilitation instruction.
Lattner’s defense at trial was that the drugs were not his, and
at the time of his arrest he was only there to take Stevenson
somewhere to buy drugs for herself.
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Accordingly, Lattner
contends that he was entitled to a facilitation instruction.
We
disagree.
KRS 505.020(2) defines lesser-included offenses and
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense
that is included in any offense with which
he is formally charged. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It consists of an attempt to commit the
offense charged or to commit an offense
otherwise included therein; or
(c) It differs from the offense charged only
in the respect that a lesser kind of
culpability suffices to establish its
commission; or
(d) It differs from the offense charged only
in the respect that a less serious
injury or risk of injury to the same
person, property or public interest
suffices to establish its commission.
KRS 506.080(1) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation
when, acting with knowledge that another
person is committing or intends to commit a
crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly
provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime
and which in fact aids such person to commit
the crime.
The trial court declined to give the facilitation instruction on
grounds that facilitation would have required Stevenson to have
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actually committed the crime of trafficking.
We agree that the
trial court properly denied appellant’s request for the
instruction, although on different grounds.
In Houston v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925 (Ky. 1998), the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that facilitation is not a lesser-included offense of
trafficking.
The Court stated:
The offenses of trafficking in or possession
of a controlled substance require proof that
the defendant, himself, knowingly and
unlawfully committed the charged offense.
The offense of criminal facilitation
requires proof that someone other than the
defendant committed the object offense and
the defendant, knowing that such person was
committing or intended to commit that
offense, provided that person with the means
or opportunity to do so. Thus, criminal
facilitation requires proof not of the same
or less than all the facts required to prove
the charged offenses of trafficking in or
possession of a controlled substance, but
proof of additional and completely different
facts. A fortiori, it is not a lesser
included offense when the defendant is
charged with committing either of the object
offenses.
Id. at 930 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the
appellant was charged solely with the offense of trafficking.
Per Houston, as facilitation is not a lesser included offense of
trafficking, the trial court did not err in not giving a
facilitation instruction.
Finally, Lattner contends that the trial court erred
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by permitting the Commonwealth to amend the indictment against
him by motion.
Lattner’s argument is without merit.
On June 9, 2004, Lattner was indicted for persistent
felony offender (PFO) in the second degree.
At a status hearing
on September 3, 2004, at which both Lattner and his attorney
were present, he had no objection to the Commonwealth’s stated
intention of amending the indictment by motion from PFO in the
second degree to PFO in the first degree.
At another status
hearing on September 9, 2004, Lattner’s counsel again agreed
with the Commonwealth stating, “we specifically waive any legal
arguments we might have against [amending the indictment] . . .”
The Commonwealth’s motion to amend the indictment was
filed on September 8, 2004, and was granted on September 10,
2004, without objection from Lattner’s counsel.
Apparently, no
written order granting the motion was prepared by the trial
court.
On September 13, 2004, while free upon bond, Lattner was
arrested on a new charge of trafficking.
On September 15, 2004,
Lattner entered a plea of guilty to the June 9, 2004, charges,
with the PFO in the first degree amended back to PFO in the
second degree for the purposes of the plea.
Prior to
sentencing, Lattner moved to withdraw the guilty plea.
Lattner’s motion was granted.
Thereafter, Lattner’s counsel
withdrew from representing him.
Legal Aid was appointed to
represent Lattner, although the first appointed counsel also
-8-
withdrew.
A second Legal Aid counsel then represented Lattner
at trial.
Lattner argues that the record does not have a written
order from the trial judge granting the Commonwealth’s motion to
amend.
Also, Lattner argues that the record does not indicate
that he or his new counsel knew of the amended indictment.
Consequently, Lattner contends that his constitutional rights
were violated and he is entitled to a new trial.
We disagree.
At a status hearing on March 18, 2005, Lattner’s
counsel agreed that the Commonwealth had moved to amend the
indictment and she was aware of it.
no objection.
Lattner’s counsel offered
Lattner properly waived any objection to amending
the indictment and affirmatively agreed to it.
We conclude that
Lattner knowingly and intelligently waived any objection to the
amendment and, finding no palpable error, we decline to grant
relief on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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