WARD CARLOS HIGHTOWER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: May 5, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000790-MR
WARD CARLOS HIGHTOWER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00509-001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Ward Carlos Hightower (a/k/a Orlando J.
Hightower) has appealed from a final judgment and sentence of
ten years’ imprisonment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on
March 16, 2005, upon his entry of a conditional plea of guilty
to one amended count of robbery in the second degree,1 and to
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO
II).2
Hightower’s motion to suppress evidence was denied by the
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.030.
2
KRS 532.080(2).
trial court on October 7, 2004, and he then entered his guilty
plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.
Having concluded that the trial court properly denied
Hightower’s motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
The facts of this case were succinctly set forth in
the trial court’s October 7, 2004, order denying the suppression
motion as follows:
[Hightower] was arrested on March 11,
2004[,] by Officer Joshua Yahr. Prior to
arresting [Hightower], Officer Yahr was
sitting in his patrol car at Coolavin
Apartments in Lexington, Kentucky, talking
to the security guard there.3 Approximately
one hour earlier, he heard an Attempt to
Locate (ATL) report over his radio regarding
a robbery.4 According to Officer Yahr, the
description was that of a white van with
plastic over the rear window5 containing
three suspects, a black male, a white female
and a white male. Officer Yahr observed a
white van with a plastic cover over the rear
window pull into the parking lot and leave.6
He was able to see two occupants through the
rear window[,] but could not tell anything
about them. Officer Yahr followed the van
from the parking lot to 513 Willy Street in
Lexington, Kentucky[,] and pulled in behind
the van when it parked in front of that
address. Officer Yahr believed the van
3
This occurred between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.
4
The location of the robbery was on the other side of town.
5
The ATL report also stated that the white van had plastic over the passenger
side window.
6
Officer Yahr only recalled seeing the rear window covered in plastic, but
the victim, William James, testified that when he was taken to the show-up
location, the passenger side window of the white van at the location also had
plastic covering on it.
-2-
might be the one described in the ATL and he
wanted to talk to the occupants.7 There is
no allegation of any traffic violations, nor
is there an allegation of an illegal stop.
In essence, Officer Yahr did not “stop” the
van; he simply allowed the van to park and
he pulled in behind the van.
A white female exited from the driver’s
side, and a black male exited from the
passenger side of the van. Officer Yahr
asked the occupants to come over toward his
cruiser so he could talk to them for a
minute. The white female began walking
toward the front porch of 513 Willy Street
and the [black male] was walking toward the
far front side of a vehicle parked in the
driveway of 513 Willy Street, away from
Officer Yahr.8 The vehicle parked in the
driveway was between Officer Yahr and the
[black male]. The [black male] was later
identified as the defendant, [ ] Hightower.
Hightower was standing near the front
of the vehicle in the driveway when Officer
Yahr stopped and asked him to come over and
talk for a few minutes. Hightower stated he
had to urinate. After a few seconds,
Officer Yahr asked Hightower to come over
and talk to him. A few seconds later,
Hightower came around the front of the
vehicle toward the porch and toward Officer
Yahr. Hightower was about 20 feet away from
Officer Yahr. Hightower’s hands were down
by his sides and he did not make any furtive
movements. Officer Yahr believed Hightower
and the white female to be suspects in the
robbery described in the ATL. He also was
fearful, especially since they did not
respond to his first request for them to
come over and talk to him.
7
This occurred one hour after Officer Yahr received the ATL report.
8
This was a different vehicle than the white van that Hightower arrived in.
-3-
Hightower and the white female were at
the front porch of the house when they
talked to Officer Yahr, giving him
information.9 Hightower initially gave
Officer Yahr false information regarding his
name.10
Officer Yahr then called for back
up.11 Officer Wolfe [sic] arrived on the
scene. Officer Yahr advised Officer Wolfe
[sic] of the situation and asked Officer
Wolfe [sic] to watch the two subjects while
he walked over to the car where Hightower
had been standing. Officer Yahr used his
flashlight to see if he could find any urine
in the area around the front of that
vehicle, but he did not see any.12 Officer
Yahr did see, however, the end of a plastic
baggie sticking out of the front bumper of
the vehicle. He extracted the baggie and
observed what he believed to be cocaine
inside. The substance in the baggie field
tested positive for cocaine. Officer Yahr
then arrested Hightower for Possession of
Cocaine, but did not give Hightower any
Miranda [v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S.Ct.
140, 24 L.Ed.2d 122 (1969)] warning.
Believing that he had located the
robbery suspects, [Officer] Yahr contacted
the officer who called the ATL. The victim
was brought to the scene for a show-up
during which the victim identified Hightower
9
The white female provided information that she was Heather Adams.
10
Hightower initially told Officer Yahr that he had no identification on him
and that his name was Orlando J. Hightower; however, he had no written
identification and did not know his social security number. Officer Yahr
informed Hightower that lying to the police as to his name and address was an
arrestable offense.
11
Officer Yahr wanted another officer, Officer Franz Wolff, to observe
Hightower and Adams while he ran their information through the police radio
channel for confirmation and while he walked over to check the area where
Hightower urinated.
12
Officer Yahr believed that there would be a “reflection” on the grass
caused by the urine.
-4-
and the white female13 as two of the three
people who robbed him.14 Hightower was
handcuffed standing in the headlights of the
cruiser accompanied by police officers. The
victim was inside a police cruiser.
Hightower was subsequently charged with the
robbery.
On April 26, 2004, Hightower was indicted by a Fayette
County grand jury for robbery in the first degree,15 possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree,16 giving an
officer a false name/address,17 and being a PFO II.18
Hightower
was arraigned on April 29, 2004, and he waived formal
arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.19
Although
13
During the show-up, Hightower and Adams were shown separately to the victim
for identification.
14
Hightower was identified by the robbery victim in a show-up at the scene.
However, he states in his brief to this Court that “[he] can find no fault
with the court’s ruling on the issue of prejudice to [him] due to the nature
of the show-up, in view of the length of time [he] spent with the alleged
victim before the alleged robbery, so that issue will not be pursued on this
appeal.”
15
KRS 515.020. This offense is a Class B felony. The indictment stated
that, “[o]n or about the 11th day of March 2004, in Fayette County, Kentucky,
[Hightower] committed the offense of Robbery First Degree when [he] used
physical force upon William James, causing physical injury, in the course of
committing a theft[.]”
16
KRS 218A.1415.
17
KRS 523.110.
This offense is a Class D felony.
This offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
18
This offense is a Class B felony. The indictment stated that “[p]rior to
the commission of the felony offenses contained in this Indictment,
[Hightower] committed and was convicted of Assault Third Degree by final
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court in May 2002[.]”
19
A pretrial conference was held in the case on May 14, 2004, at which time
the Commonwealth offered a plea bargain in which the count of robbery in the
first degree would be amended to robbery in the second degree and because of
Hightower’s charge of PFO II, his sentence on the robbery charge would be
enhanced from a five-year prison term to a ten-year prison term. The charges
of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and giving an
officer a false name/address would be dismissed as part of the agreement. A
-5-
Hightower did not file a written motion to suppress evidence, an
evidentiary hearing was held on August 18, 2004, on his oral
motion to suppress, wherein the trial court heard his arguments
that he was illegally seized and arrested without probable
cause.20
On September 14, 2004, Hightower filed a brief in
support of his motion to suppress.
The Commonwealth filed its
memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to suppress on
September 29, 2004.
On October 7, 2004, the trial court entered
an order, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
denying Hightower’s first motion to suppress.21
The case was set for trial on February 14, 2005.
However, on February 11, 2005, pursuant to an offer by the
Commonwealth, Hightower entered a conditional plea of guilty to
the amended charge of robbery in the second degree and to being
status conference was held on June 18, 2004, and the trial court set a date
for the suppression hearing.
20
This was one of two suppression hearings in this case.
21
The second suppression hearing was conducted on November 19, 2004, which
related solely to Hightower’s written motion to suppress in which he argued
that the robbery victim’s identification of Hightower at the time of his
arrest was prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion to suppress by
order entered on November 22, 2004. Hightower states in his brief that he is
not raising an issue as to any fault with this identification, based on
evidence offered at the second suppression hearing as to length of time that
Hightower spent with the victim before the alleged robbery. The trial court
determined that, based on the totality of the circumstances and factors
listed in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972),
the show-up was not unduly prejudicial and that under other circumstances,
the victim would be able to identify Hightower as one of the perpetrators.
-6-
a PFO II.22
This conditional plea was accepted by the trial
court on the same day, and on February 14, 2005, the trial court
entered a judgment on the guilty plea and reserved ruling on the
Commonwealth’s sentencing recommendation.
The trial court set
the sentencing hearing for March 11, 2005, and ordered the
Division of Probation and Parole to prepare a Prehearing
Sentencing Investigation Report.23
The trial court denied
probation and entered its final judgment and sentence of
imprisonment on March 16, 2005.
Hightower was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment, enhanced to ten years by virtue of his PFO
II conviction.24
Hightower reserved his right to appeal the
denial of his first motion to suppress, and this appeal
followed.
Hightower raises two issues before this Court.
First,
he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress the evidence, i.e., the cocaine and the show-up
identification,25 which identified him as the perpetrator of the
22
The trial court dismissed the charges of possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree and giving an officer a false name/address as
part of the plea bargain agreement between Hightower and the Commonwealth.
23
On March 11, 2005, the Commonwealth filed a victim impact statement from
James. On the same date, the Division of Probation and Parole filed a report
recommending conditions of probation if granted by the trial court.
24
Hightower’s sentence was to run consecutively with any other previous
felony sentence that he must serve. He also received 366 days of credit for
jail time already served.
25
While Hightower is not bringing before this Court the issue of the
prejudicial nature of the show-up, he is arguing that he was unreasonably
-7-
robbery, as this evidence was obtained as the result of an
illegal seizure.
Second, he argues that the trial court erred
in concluding that Hightower’s arrest for possession of cocaine
was proper.
First, Hightower argues that the information from the
ATL report was not sufficient to justify his seizure.
The
Commonwealth conceded to the trial court that Hightower was
seized, but argued that under the totality of the circumstances
the seizure was based upon reasonable articulable suspicion that
Hightower was involved in criminal activity.26
We accept and
adopt the ruling of the trial court as to this issue as set out
in its order entered October 7, 2004, as follows:
1.
The seizure
[Hightower] argues that Officer Yahr
had no basis to conduct the initial
investigatory detention of him, and
therefore, he was illegally seized in
violation of his constitutional rights.
[The] Commonwealth concedes that Hightower
was seized at the time Officer Yahr began to
detained for the show-up based on the cocaine retrieved from the bumper of
the vehicle.
26
In its brief to this Court, the Commonwealth lists the circumstances
supporting Officer Yahr’s reasonable suspicion that Hightower was involved in
criminal activity as follows: (1) Hightower did not come immediately over to
Officer Yahr when he was asked to do so; (2) Hightower gave Officer Yahr a
false name; (3) when Hightower walked over to the vehicle to urinate he
placed himself in a manner which obstructed Officer Yahr’s visibility from
Hightower’s waist down, even when illuminated with a flashlight; (4) while
Hightower was allegedly urinating, he held his hands down at his waist; (5)
Hightower and Adams informed Officer Yahr that they were at the location to
visit someone and did not live there themselves; and (6) Officer Yahr
received the ATL report about an hour before he saw the van in the area of
the Coolavin apartments.
-8-
question him. [The] Commonwealth argues
that Officer Yahr conducted a proper Terry
[v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)] investigation and had a
reasonable articulable suspicion to question
Hightower. Therefore, no violation of
Hightower’s constitutional rights occurred.
If a police officer has a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that criminal
activity has occurred or is about to occur,
a police officer may briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes. Terry v. Ohio,
20 L.Ed.[2d] 889. Baltimore v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 119 S.W.[3d] 532, 538
(2003) sets forth a two-part analysis for
evaluating the legitimacy of an
investigatory stop. “First, whether there
[was] a proper basis for the stop based on
the police officer’s awareness of specific
and articulable facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion. Second, whether the
degree of intrusion was reasonably related
in scope to the justification for the stop”
[footnotes omitted]. Id.
Hightower argues that Officer Yahr was
acting on a hunch and his suspicions were
not reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. However, the Court
disagrees. The standard for reasonable
suspicion is less demanding than the grounds
for probable cause and falls considerably
short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard. Id. A hunch is an
intuitive feeling or guess about something
or a premonition without basis.
The Court finds that Officer Yahr had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
investigation. First, Officer Yahr heard an
ATL one hour prior to the stop. The ATL
described the van as being a white van with
plastic over the rear window. When Officer
Yahr saw the van he observed the plastic
[over] the window. The ATL also described
the occupants of the van as being a white
-9-
female, a black male and a white male. When
the van stopped in front of 513 Willy
Street, a white female and a black male
exited the vehicle. Based on the totality
of the circumstances, the brief detention of
Hightower passes constitutional muster. The
information that Officer Yahr acted upon was
sufficient to satisfy reasonable suspicion.
It was more than a hunch.
The second part of the analysis
involves whether the degree of intrusion was
related in scope to the justification of the
stop. In this case, a robbery had occurred
approximately one hour prior to Officer
Yahr’s investigatory detention. Two people
matching the general description of the
suspects were in the van. This was
sufficient to allow the officers to briefly
stop the suspects, ask questions, or check
identification in the absence of probable
cause in an effort to solve crimes and bring
offenders to justice. United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221[, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83
L.Ed.2d 604] (1985).
Second, Hightower argues that there was no probable
cause for Officer Yahr to arrest him for possession of cocaine
and everything thereafter must be “thrown out”.
Hightower
argues that his presence in the area of the cocaine stashed in
the bumper of the vehicle is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause for his arrest.
In support of this position
Hightower argues the following facts: (1) Officer Yahr did not
see Hightower place the cocaine inside the bumper; (2) Officer
Yahr did not ask Hightower about his connection to the cocaine;
(3) Officer Yahr did not inquire as to the owner of the vehicle
or as to who lived near where it was parked; (4) Officer Yahr
-10-
never saw Hightower bend over in the area to prove he could have
placed the cocaine inside the bumper; and (5) Officer Yahr took
no steps to investigate who owned the cocaine, but only assumed
it belonged to Hightower because he was the closest person to it
at the time it was found.
The Commonwealth argues that Hightower was already
properly being detained on suspicion of the robbery at the time
Officer Yahr found the cocaine, which was in plain view.
Further, the Commonwealth argues that the degree of suspicion
necessary to support probable cause to arrest is not based on
whether conduct was innocent.27
The trial court was persuaded by
the Commonwealth and we accept and adopt the trial court’s
language from in its October 7, 2004, order as follows:
2.
The arrest
Did Officer Yahr have probable cause to
arrest Hightower? In order to have probable
cause to arrest, a police officer must
reasonably believe, in light of the facts
and circumstances within their knowledge at
the time of the arrest, that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.
“The standard is a flexible, practical[,]
commonsense one which is met if the facts
are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed”
[citation omitted]. [United States] v.
Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2001).
However, the mere presence of a person near
the area where criminal activity has
27
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
-11-
occurred does not support probable cause to
arrest that person. [United States] v.
Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 1999).
In response to Officer Yahr’s request,
Hightower told him he had to urinate. A few
seconds later, Officer Yahr again requested
Hightower [to] come over and [to] talk to
him. After a few seconds, Hightower came
around the front of the vehicle toward the
porch and toward Officer Yahr. They were
about 20 feet apart. After backup arrived
on the scene, Officer Yahr walked over to
where Hightower had “allegedly” urinated and
shined his flashlight in the area around the
front of the vehicle in [the] driveway
looking for urine[,] but did not see any
urine. However, Officer Yahr did see the
end of a plastic baggie sticking out of the
front bumper of the vehicle. He extracted
the baggie and observed what he believed to
be cocaine inside. The substance field
tested positive for cocaine. Officer Yahr
then arrested Hightower, but did not give
Hightower any Miranda warning. Officer Yahr
did not mirandize Hightower because he did
not intend to interrogate him. It is
unclear whether Officer Yahr informed him of
the charges. No questions were asked of
Hightower regarding the cocaine or anything
else. The Court finds that the facts stated
in this paragraph are sufficient to create
probable cause to believe that Hightower
was, in fact, in possession of the cocaine.
Therefore, the arrest was justified.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and
sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
-12-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.