RACHAEL PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY; RACHAEL PRICE, PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF D.P., AN INFANT CHILD UNDER 18; AND WAEDELL HARRIS v. ROSE GARCIA; AND YELLOW CAB CO., LLC
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RENDERED: MAY 19, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000562-MR
RACHAEL PRICE, INDIVIDUALLY;
RACHAEL PRICE, PARENT AND
NEXT FRIEND OF D.P., AN
INFANT CHILD UNDER 18;
AND WAEDELL HARRIS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-000233
v.
ROSE GARCIA; AND
YELLOW CAB CO., LLC
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
REVERSING AND REMANDING;
DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE;
DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS.
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND McANULTY, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Rachael Price (Price), appeals the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s Order Dismissing the action for lack
of prosecution.
We reverse the order of dismissal and order
denying Price’s motion to reinstate the action, finding that
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
under the particular circumstances of this case dismissal was
improper.
Yellow Cab filed a motion to strike the Price’s reply
brief, requesting that sanctions be imposed on Price for the
filing of that brief, pursuant to CR 73.02(4) and CR 11.
Price’s reply brief addresses, primarily, Yellow Cab’s alleged
concealment of the location of the driver of the cab involved in
the accident with Price.
During most of the time when Yellow
Cab contended that it had no idea where Garcia was, she was in
fact employed by a wholly owned subsidiary of Yellow Cab.
The
reply brief also addresses the failure of Yellow Cab to apply
local rules regarding discovery and disputes between parties.
Price’s reply brief argues that the conduct of Yellow Cab was
egregious.
Yellow Cab asserts in the Motion to Strike that the
statements made by Price were “unsupported by the court record
and have absolutely no basis in fact or relevance to the issue
on appeal.”
Although this Court cannot verify, based on the
minimal record thus far created in this action, that all the
assertions made in the Reply brief are true, this Court can and
does believe that the record supports a finding that Yellow Cab
acted deceptively in its defense of this matter, and that for
this reason, the dismissal was improper.
Yellow Cab’s claims to
the contrary are unsupported in the motion or in its brief
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before this Court.
In the motion Yellow Cab does not provide a
reference to the briefs or the record in support of its claim
that Price’s contentions were not true.
Yellow Cab also fails
to reference any conduct by Price which would support striking
the brief or an imposition of sanctions.
For the foregoing
reasons, the motion to strike and motion for sanctions are
denied.
Price and her minor child were injured in an
automobile accident in January, 1999.
filed in January, 2001.
The action was timely
The suit named Yellow Cab and Rosa
Garcia, the cab driver, at the time of the accident as
defendants.
The complaint was served on Yellow Cab.
Price was
unable to effectuate service on Garcia as she had moved since
the accident.
whereabouts.
Yellow Cab denied any knowledge of her
During the pendency of the action Yellow Cab
denied knowledge of Garcia’s whereabouts, and even filed
pleadings stating that the claim should be dismissed because
Yellow Cab could not defend the action in the absence of Garcia.
Price sought the appointment of a Warning Order attorney, and
took other steps to locate Garcia.
Yellow Cab filed a motion to dismiss the action in
September, 2004, claiming unreasonable delay in prosecution of
the action by Price.
In October, 2004, after the trial court
had dismissed the action, Price located Rosa Garcia in Indiana.
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Rosa Garcia was working for Yellow Cab of Southern Indiana at
the time.
Yellow Cab of Southern Indiana is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Defendant/Appellee Yellow Cab.
Investigation by
counsel for Price revealed that Rosa Garcia had worked for
Yellow Cab or its subsidiaries for all but six months of the
four years between the accident and the dismissal of the action.
Yellow Cab had not disclosed this fact to the parties or to the
court.
In fact, Yellow Cab had filed documents before the trial
court indicating that it was unable to find Garcia, despite
taking steps to do so.
When Garcia was discovered working for
Yellow Cab, Yellow Cab neither admitted nor denied that it had
knowledge of Garcia’s whereabouts.
Yellow Cab does not address
its alleged deception in the briefs before this Court.
Price contends that Garcia and Yellow Cab used
improper techniques to prevent prosecution of this matter,
ultimately resulting in dismissal of the case.
Price argues
that dismissal of the case was an unwarrantedly harsh remedy,
and that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the
action.
We agree, particularly in light of the fact that Yellow
Cab knew where Garcia was and withheld this knowledge from the
plaintiffs and the trial court.
Yellow Cab’s argument that “no
obligation exists on the part of the defendant to bring the case
to trial. . . .” (citing Gill v. Gill, 455 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ky.
1970)), is disingenuous at best.
Yellow Cab is not charged with
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prosecuting the plaintiffs’ case, but Yellow Cab does have a
duty to be honest and forthright with the plaintiffs and with
the trial court.
The ongoing failure to do so led, at least in
part, to the dismissal of the action.
Under such circumstances,
the dismissal must be found improper.
The trial court entered a show cause order threatening
dismissal of the action in January, 2004.
by Price.
No response was filed
The court dismissed the action in February, 2004.
Notice of the show cause order and the dismissal was not served
upon counsel for Price due to counsel’s change in address.
Counsel discovered this error, and objected to the dismissal.
For that reason, the court reinstated the action.
Yellow Cab
then filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, 2004, claiming that it
was being prejudiced by the delay in prosecution.
Discovery
requests were filed by Yellow Cab in February, 2001, but Price
did not provide responses thereto until June 2004.
Price did
not propound discovery upon Yellow Cab or Garcia until June,
2004.
The case was set for trial on September 1, 2004.
Yellow
Cab argued at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, in August,
2004, that prosecution of the action would prejudice Yellow Cab.
Yellow Cab claimed that the trial could not take place in
September because Garcia had neither been located, nor served.
Yellow Cab filed a motion for protective order barring
it from being forced to respond to Price’s discovery requests
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while the motion to dismiss was pending.
The court overruled
the motion for protective order and stated that Yellow Cab must
respond to the discovery requests so that court could “then
review the status of defendants’ ability to defend against the
claim of plaintiffs to determine if there is any prejudice from
the delay in prosecution.”
is found in the record.
trial court stated:
No discovery response of Yellow Cab
In the order dismissing the action, the
“A review of the discovery indicates there
is a substantial likelihood that Defendants do not have any
liability in this case.”
Price asserts that this statement was
in error, and created a question as to the court’s impartiality.
While we do not believe that this statement shows any bias on
the part of the court, we do note that where matters outside the
pleadings are reviewed, the motion may properly be treated as
one for summary judgment.
Kreate v. Disabled American Veterans,
33 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Ky.App. 2000).
A motion to dismiss may be
reversed where an abuse of discretion is shown.
Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Ky.App. 1991).
Ward v.
Dismissal of the
action where there is a claim that a party improperly concealed
relevant evidence preventing prosecution of the action is
improper.
For this reason, we reverse the dismissal of the
action.
An additional ground for Yellow Cab’s motion to
dismiss was that the police officer who investigated the
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accident had retired, and could not be located.
report is made part of the record.
That officer’s
The officer was not a
witness to the accident, but only arrived after it was over.
Yellow Cab contends that the report shows that the accident was
the fault of Appellants.
In fact, the report shows that the
roadway was “a solid sheet of ice” and notes that both cars
began sliding on the hill and that the car in which Price was a
passenger struck the Yellow Cab vehicle when the Yellow Cab
vehicle turned sideways, blocking the roadway.
The report does
not contend or suggest that the accident was the fault of the
plaintiffs.
The report does assert that the accident was
unavoidable.
The question of whether the delay prejudiced the
defendants because of the difficulty locating the witnesses was
one properly addressed by the trial court.
claims of Yellow Cab convincing.
We do not find the
With regard to the absence of
Garcia, we find that Yellow Cab has failed to refute the
argument that it knew where she was as its subsidiary was her
employer.
With regard to the retirement of the police officer,
we find no convincing evidence that Yellow Cab used all
available means to locate that officer, yet was unable to do so.
We further note that the law provides means of appropriately
refreshing a witness’ memory, should the police officer fail to
recall the accident once he is located.
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See, e.g., Robert G.
Lawson, The Kentucky Civil Law Handbook, Section 3.20(2), 238
(4th ed. 2003).
Further, the record shows that Yellow Cab
undertook its own investigation of the accident, and had an
investigator who should be able to testify.
Yellow Cab also demanded dismissal because Price had
failed to respond to discovery requests propounded by Yellow
Cab.
With regard to this assertion we note that the record is
devoid of any evidence tending to show that Yellow Cab availed
itself of the local rules or civil rules providing remedies to
discovery abuses or mandate provision of responses.
court has broad discretion to regulate discovery.
Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Ky. 2004).
The trial
Bratcher v.
Failure of Yellow
Cab to request such regulation or the remedies available to it
forecloses any claim of prejudice at this late date.
Dismissal of an action is a drastic step, and should
only be used as a last resort.
(Ky.App. 1985).
Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363
Under the particular circumstances present in
this case, we find that dismissal was improper, and that the
case should have been reinstated upon Price’s motion and
presentation of evidence of the continuing employment of Garcia
with Yellow Cab.
For the foregoing reasons, the case is
reversed and remanded.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
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ENTERED: _MAY 19, 2006
/s/David A. Barber__________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Mark Joseph Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
Bradley D. Harville
Louisville, Kentucky
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