B.W. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000395-MR
B.W.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00444
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2005-CA-002583-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00444
B.W.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
ABRAMSON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
In January 2003, B.W. and two other juveniles
went on a robbery spree.
During a brief period they forced
their way into two Lexington residences and stole items from
several people they held at gunpoint.
All three juveniles were
transferred to Fayette Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 635.020 to
be proceeded against as youthful offenders, and all eventually
pled guilty to various counts of first and second-degree
robbery.
The two juveniles who were not yet eighteen when they
were sentenced were remanded to the custody of the juvenile
authorities until their eighteenth birthdays, at which point,
pursuant to KRS 640.030, they were returned to the circuit court
for final sentencing.
Both were granted probation.
B.W., on
the other hand, turned eighteen in April 2003, shortly before
his indictment.
At that point, apparently, he was remanded to
the adult detention facility and was thereafter proceeded
against as an adult rather than a youthful offender.
In
particular, when the court sentenced B.W. in July 2003, it did
not order the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) to conduct
his pre-sentence investigation, and it did not consider the
option then available under KRS 640.030 of committing B.W. to
DJJ for six months of rehabilitative treatment and postponing
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
-2-
his final sentence until the completion of that treatment.
Instead, the Department of Corrections prepared B.W.’s presentence investigation report (PSI), and the court, after
sentencing him as an adult to twenty-five years’ imprisonment,
remanded B.W. to the adult authorities.
In October 2004, B.W. moved for CR 60.02 relief from
his sentence on the ground that he had been improperly sentenced
as an adult rather than as a youthful offender.
The
Commonwealth and the court both conceded the error and agreed
that the sentence should be reopened, but a dispute arose over
the relief to which B.W. was entitled.
B.W. claimed that his
PSI should be prepared anew by DJJ, and that the court should
consider anew whether to probate him.
The Commonwealth did not
object to a new PSI, but argued that, as a violent offender
under KRS 439.3401, B.W. was not eligible for probation.
At the
conclusion of the January 7, 2005, hearing on the matter, the
circuit court agreed with the Commonwealth.
The court
acknowledged that DJJ ought to have prepared B.W.’s original
PSI, but ruled that ordering a new PSI at that point would be an
empty gesture, since B.W. had long since left DJJ’s custody and
was no longer eligible for DJJ services.
The court also agreed
with the Commonwealth that the violent offender statute barred
B.W.’s probation.
-3-
At that point B.W. moved the court to reconsider his
consecutive sentences and to order that they be served
concurrently instead.
The Commonwealth argued that given the
gravity of B.W.’s offenses his consecutive sentences and twentyfive year total sentence were appropriate.
Taken by surprise by
B.W.’s motion, the trial court first expressed doubt about its
authority to alter B.W.’s consecutive sentences, because they
were within the confines of the law.
The court then added that
even if it had the authority to change B.W.’s sentence it would
not do so, because in its estimation the original sentence was
“proper and just.”
Finally, B.W. moved to have the court
reconsider its rulings in six months.
He noted that had he been
correctly sentenced originally, he could have been remanded to
DJJ for six months and then “finally” sentenced after that
period.
To correct the error, he argued, his new sentence
should likewise be “finally” reconsidered later.
By order
entered January 14, 2005, the court granted B.W.’s motion.
Although the trial court sentenced him anew to the same twentyfive year sentence imposed in July 2003, it set the matter for
review in July 2005.
Challenging what he characterizes as the trial court’s
erroneous refusal to reconsider his consecutive sentences, B.W.
appealed from the January 14, 2005, order.
In appeal No. 2005-
CA-000395-MR he emphasizes the trial court’s apparent
-4-
uncertainty about its authority to reconsider concurrent
sentences and contends that the court erred by deeming itself
bound by the original sentence.
While B.W.’s appeal was being perfected, the trial
court conducted its own promised reconsideration of B.W.’s
sentence.
The matter was heard in August 2005, and by that time
the trial court’s opinion about B.W.’s eligibility for probation
had changed.
Persuaded that B.W.’s sentencing had been badly
mishandled and noting that both of B.W.’s robbery cohorts had
been probated, the trial court ruled that the violent offender
statute did not apply to youthful offenders and indicated that
it would entertain B.W.’s motion for shock probation.
That
motion was duly filed, and by order entered November 23, 2005,
the court granted B.W. probation.
In appeal No. 2005-CA-002583-
MR, the Commonwealth challenges that ruling and the trial
court’s about-face concerning the applicability of the violent
offender statute to youthful offenders.
The two appeals have been consolidated for review, and
we now reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.
We agree
with the Commonwealth that B.W. was not eligible for probation,
so the order probating him must be reversed.
We also agree with
B.W. that he was entitled to have his underlying consecutive
sentences reconsidered.
We vacate the underlying sentences,
-5-
therefore, and remand so that the trial court may reconsider
whether to impose them concurrently or consecutively.
The parties do not dispute that B.W. was originally
sentenced as an adult, that he should have been sentenced as a
youthful offender pursuant to KRS 640.030 and KRS 640.040, and
that it was appropriate under CR 60.02 to reopen his sentence
and belatedly apply those statutes to whatever extent possible.
Cf. Gourley v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. App. 2001)
(remanding for complete resentencing where record did not
establish that youthful offender had been sentenced in accord
with KRS 640.030).
At the time of B.W.’s initial, July 2003,
sentencing, KRS 640.030 provided in pertinent part that
[a] youthful offender, who is convicted of,
or pleads guilty to, a felony offense in
Circuit Court, shall be subject to the same
type of sentencing procedures and duration
of sentence, including probation and
conditional discharge, as an adult convicted
of a felony offense, except that: . . .
(3) If a youthful offender has attained the
age of eighteen (18) prior to sentencing,
that individual shall be returned to the
sentencing court at the end of a six (6)
month period if that individual has been
sentenced to a period of placement or
treatment with the Department of Juvenile
Justice. The court shall have the same
dispositional options as currently provided
in subsection (2)(a) [probation or
conditional discharge] and (c) [commitment
to the Department of Corrections] of this
section.
-6-
As B.W. notes, therefore, he could have been remanded for six
months of DJJ treatment before being finally sentenced in accord
with whatever final sentencing options were available.
B.W. asserts, and the trial court ruled, that
probation under KRS 640.030(2)(a) was an available option.
The
Commonwealth maintains that probation was not an option because
KRS 439.3401(1) designates those, such as B.W., who commit
first-degree robbery as “violent offenders,” and because KRS
439.3401(3) provides that such a “violent offender shall not be
released on probation or parole until he has served at least
eighty-five percent (85%) of the sentence imposed.”
Relying on Britt v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 147 (Ky.
1998), the trial court ruled that the limitation on violent
offender probation does not apply to youthful offenders.
Britt
concerned the application of KRS 640.040(3), which provides that
“[n]o youthful offender shall be subject to limitations on
probation, parole or conditional discharge as provided for in
KRS 533.060.”
The Britt court held that this express exemption
from KRS 533.060, which denies probation to those convicted of
serious felonies involving the use of a firearm, applies even to
those youthful offenders subject to expedited transfer to
circuit court because of a firearm-related offense.
Although
KRS Chapter 640 contains no similarly express exemption from KRS
439.3401, the trial court apparently believed that the express
-7-
exemption from KRS 533.060 addressed in Britt implied a like
exemption from KRS 439.3401 so as to effectuate what the Britt
court referred to as the “ameliorative sentencing procedures
authorized for youthful offenders.”
Britt v. Commonwealth, 965
S.W.2d at 150.
In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1997),
however, our Supreme Court rejected the notion that youthful
offenders are implicitly exempt from probation restrictions.
On
the contrary, the Court noted that in general youthful offenders
are “subject to the same sentencing procedures as an adult,
including probation.”
Id. at 423.
Absent an express exemption,
therefore, such as the express exemption from KRS 533.060,
youthful offenders are subject to the same probation
restrictions as are adults.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a
certain juvenile sex offender was not exempt from KRS
532.045(2), which prohibits probation for offenders of that
type.
Thus, although we share the trial court’s concern that
foreclosing probation for all juvenile violent offenders tends
to undermine what is otherwise a sharp statutory distinction
between juveniles and adults, we nevertheless agree with the
Commonwealth that the trial court erred by deeming B.W. exempt
from KRS 439.3401.
As noted, KRS Chapter 640 contains no
express exemption from that statute, and in light of Taylor the
trial court erred by inferring one.
-8-
Accordingly, we reverse the
November 23, 2005, order of the Fayette Circuit Court probating
B.W. and remand so that he may be resentenced.
We turn now to the scope of that resentencing.
B.W.
contends that in January 2005 when, pursuant to his CR 60.02
motion, the court reopened his sentence and sentenced him anew,
the court was authorized to reconsider, and should have
reconsidered, the entire sentence including whether to run his
then-consecutive sentences concurrently.
Noting comments by the
trial judge during the hearing to the effect that she doubted
the court’s authority to alter either B.W.’s probation status or
his term of years, B.W. maintains that the court erred by
deeming itself unable to consider his request for concurrent
sentences.
We agree.
The trial court reacquired jurisdiction to sentence
B.W. pursuant to CR 60.02, and the Commonwealth does not dispute
that the reacquisition of that jurisdiction essentially returned
the case to the status quo prior to the entry of B.W.’s
sentence, authorizing the trial court to impose a new sentence
in accord with the youthful offender sentencing statutes and
B.W.’s guilty plea.
See Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of
Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002)
(explaining that by vacating an order pursuant to CR 60.02 the
court “returned the case to the status quo prior to” the vacated
order).
The court was authorized therefore, as B.W. contends,
-9-
to run his sentences concurrently if it so chose.
The record,
however, leaves us in doubt that the trial court appreciated the
scope of its authority.
B.W. did not request concurrent sentences until late
in the hearing when the court had rejected his request for
probation.
In an attempt to bring the hearing to a conclusion,
the court stated that there was nothing improper about the
structure or the length of B.W.’s July 2003 sentence, and it
doubted, therefore, that it was authorized to modify that
sentence.
It is true, as the Commonwealth points out, that a
few moments later the court stated that it would not alter
B.W.’s sentence even if it could and, as the Commonwealth also
points out, that the January 14, 2005, order reimposing B.W.’s
twenty-five year sentence refers to that sentence as “proper and
just.”
Nevertheless, in the unique circumstances of this case,
these added comments by the trial court do not assure us that
the court gave B.W.’s request for concurrent sentences the
consideration it would have had it been confident of its
authority to depart from the initial sentence.
As the trial
court notes in its order of November 30, 2005, B.W.’s sentencing
has been marred from the beginning by the failure of the court
and counsel alike to realize that he should be sentenced as a
youthful offender.
The trial court believed that equity
demanded B.W.’s probation but, as explained above, probation is
-10-
not an option.
B.W.’s sentence, however, should be finally
imposed by a court certain of the full scope of its authority to
sentence him in accordance with the law and the circumstances of
his case.
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence the Fayette
Circuit Court imposed on January 14, 2005, and left intact on
August 8, 2005, and remand for resentencing in accordance with
this opinion.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY.
While the
majority opinion has stated the law correctly, I write
separately to express my concern as to the final result caused
by the obvious ineffective assistance of B.W.’s counsel.
Had
B.W.’s counsel done his job properly, B.W. would have been
treated as a youthful offender and received the same treatment
as his co-defendants.
They each served six months in a juvenile
facility and were then probated.
The Commonwealth did not
appeal probation of their sentences and one can assume would not
have appealed B.W.’s probated sentence either.
Instead, B.W.
was improperly treated as an adult and when that legal mistake
was finally determined, was sent back to court for resentencing.
When he was resentenced, the trial court, as the majority points
out, failed to consider concurrent sentencing.
-11-
However, for
whatever reason the court decided to consider shock probation
and eventually granted it.
Now this court has determined that
shock probation was improperly granted.
The result being that
B.W. may be resentenced to a sentence of ten to twenty-five
years, but more importantly he must serve 85% of any sentence.
I believe based upon the facts of this case and the
fact that B.W.’s attorney was so ineffective that we should
vacate the plea agreement and allow B.W. to start over.
If
B.W.’s attorney was negligent in allowing him to be treated as
an adult we can assume he was negligent in not knowing about or
advising him of the violent offender consequences.
In the
interest of justice, I would vacate the entered plea.
This
would allow a new plea agreement to be entered with the
assurance that B.W.’s constitutional rights are protected and
justice is achieved.
A plea agreement in which B.W. pleads to
all second-degree robbery charges would insure that he could be
sentenced to ten to twenty-five years as before but permit the
court to consider probation which it has already deemed
appropriate and based upon the facts of his co-defendants’ cases
would also seem appropriate.
Also if, since B.W. has been
probated he has not turned his life around or has committed new
crimes or is not otherwise eligible for some leniency, the court
could reinstate the same sentence it had erroneously imposed
initially.
-12-
BRIEFS FOR B.W.:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Matthew R. Krygiel
Lou Anna Red Corn
Assistant Attorneys General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.