JAMES FULTON and LENNA FULTON v. JOHN CRANE, INC.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: July 28, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-002620-MR
JAMES FULTON and
LENNA FULTON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. HINES, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-CI-00661
JOHN CRANE, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND MINTON,1 JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
James Fulton began working as a
carpenter in 1965 and retired in 2001.
During his long career,
Fulton was employed by numerous contractors in western Kentucky
and primarily worked at industrial job sites such as power
plants and large chemical plants.
According to Fulton, he spent
most of his time either building scaffolds for pipe workers,
1
Judge John D. Minton concurred in this opinion prior to his resignation to
accept appointment to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Release of the opinion was
delayed by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
boilermakers and insulators or building forms in which to pour
concrete.
In 1998, Fulton was diagnosed with asbestosis.
In
that same year, Fulton filed a products liability lawsuit3 in
McCracken Circuit Court against numerous companies claiming that
he had been exposed to insulation and other building materials
containing asbestos that caused him to develop asbestosis.
One
of the several defendants named in Fulton’s lawsuit was John
Crane, Inc., a company which manufactured gaskets and gasket
material that allegedly contained asbestos.
Before we get to the merits of this appeal, we must
wade through a procedural morass.
On November 4, 2004, after
this case had been pending for some six years, John Crane filed
a motion for summary judgment and set it for a hearing on
December 3, 2004.
The motion was not accompanied by a
memorandum setting forth the reasons why the movant was entitled
to judgment in its favor.
Pursuant to a master order governing
this case, Fulton was to have filed a response to this
dispositive motion within fifteen days, but he did not do so.
John Crane tells us in its brief that a couple of days
prior to the scheduled hearing, Fulton’s counsel called John
Crane’s counsel and asked that the December 3, 2004, hearing be
postponed.
John Crane’s counsel agreed, and on December 3,
2004, Fulton’s associate counsel appeared in court and asked
3
Fulton’s wife, Lenna, joined in his lawsuit seeking damages for loss of
consortium.
-2-
that John Crane’s motion be removed from the motion docket.
For
reasons not apparent from the record, the circuit court went
ahead and ruled on the motion, granting John Crane summary
judgment.
Fulton did not move to set the judgment aside, but
instead, on December 17, 2004, timely appealed to this Court.
Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, McCracken Circuit Court
lost jurisdiction of this case.
Subsequent to December 3, 2004, John Crane re-noticed
its motion for summary judgment for a hearing on January 7,
2005.
John Crane’s counsel appeared at the hearing, but
Fulton’s counsel did not.
On February 3, 2005, the motion was
again sustained and summary judgment in favor of John Crane was
granted.
Since, as previously noted, McCracken Circuit Court
had already lost jurisdiction over this case because an appeal
was pending in this Court, the second summary judgment is of no
moment and need not be addressed.
So we are left with the
December 3, 2004, summary judgment and the question whether it
was properly granted.
Our first inquiry is whether there are
material issues of fact.
If the answer is “no,” we then look to
see whether John Crane was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Fulton argues that summary judgment in favor of John
Crane was not proper because the gasket manufacturer never
explained in a memorandum why summary judgment should have been
-3-
granted.
According to Fulton, by moving for summary judgment
without explanation, John Crane attempted to force Fulton to
produce evidence that he was entitled to go to trial.
Citing
Robert Simmons Construction Co. v. Powers Regulator Co.,4 Fulton
argues that John Crane never meet its initial burden of showing
that no issue of material fact exists.
In addition, relying on
Hoke v. Cullinan,5 Fulton argues that he was deprived of his
opportunity to properly respond to John Crane’s motion since he
was waiting for John Crane to file a memorandum in support of
its motion before he filed a response.
Thus, Fulton insists, a
grant of summary judgment was premature.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the
circuit court must view the record in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion (in this case, Fulton) and must
resolve all doubts in favor of that party.6
However, the party
opposing the motion must present, at the very least, some
affirmative evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact that requires a trial.7
The court should
not grant summary judgment if any issue of material fact exists.8
4
390 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1965).
5
914 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Ky. 1995).
6
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991).
7
Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky. 1992).
8
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., supra, note 5.
-4-
We, on the other hand, must determine whether the circuit court
correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and whether, as a matter of law, the moving party (in this case,
John Crane) was entitled to judgment in its favor.9
Since
findings of fact are not in issue, we review the circuit court’s
decision de novo.10
We are not persuaded by Fulton’s argument that summary
judgment was inappropriate because John Crane failed to file a
memorandum in support of its motion.
Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 56.01 through 56.07 govern motions for summary
judgment.
CR 56 does not require a party seeking summary
judgment to file an accompanying memorandum, although we agree
that it is a better practice to do so.
Nor does Fulton refer us
to any local rule, statute or case law that supports his
argument that John Crane was required to support its motion with
a memorandum.
Neither do we agree with Fulton that he was deprived
of an opportunity to respond to John Crane’s motion.
Fulton
states unequivocally that he was waiting for John Crane to file
its memorandum in support of summary judgment before he filed
his response.
However, as we discussed above, John Crane was
not required to file such a memorandum.
9
10
Nor was Fulton required
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
Id.
-5-
to wait for such a memorandum before he responded to John
Crane’s motion.
Fulton could have filed within fifteen days,
according to the master order, a response arguing that John
Crane’s motion failed to provide a basis for summary judgment.
After judgment was entered, Fulton could have filed a CR 59.05
motion to alter, amend or vacate the December 3rd order on the
ground that judgment had been prematurely granted since the
parties had agreed that John Crane’s motion for summary judgment
would be removed from the docket and rescheduled for a hearing
at a later date.
Fulton argues that by filing such a perfunctory
motion, John Crane was simply trying to force Fulton to produce
evidence that he was entitled to a trial.
this is prohibited.
Fulton contends that
However, a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment is required to do just that, produce some
affirmative evidence showing that a genuine issue of material
fact exists warranting a trial.11
Fulton testified in a discovery deposition that during
his career as a carpenter he occasionally saw boxes with the
logo “Crane Company” on them.
He said that these boxes
contained gaskets which he felt may have contained asbestos.
But, John Crane observes that the Crane Company is a company
that manufactured gasket material, which may or may not have
11
Hubble v. Johnson, supra, note 6.
-6-
contained asbestos; furthermore, John Crane points out that the
Crane Company has no affiliation whatever with John Crane.
Simply stated, the record contains no evidence that Fulton was
exposed to products manufactured by John Crane, although there
is some evidence that Fulton may have been exposed to products
manufactured by the Crane Company.
Thus, no genuine issue of
material fact exists regarding Fulton’s claim against John
Crane, and summary judgment was proper.
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
Paul J. Kelley
SALES, TILLMAN, WALLBAUM,
CATLETT & SATTERLEY
Louisville, Kentucky
Max S. Hartz
McCARROLL, NUNLEY & HARTZ
Owensboro, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.