JAY H. MCKENZIE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 13, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002243-MR
JAY H. MCKENZIE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 02-CR-00008 AND 04-CR-00030
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ACREE, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE:
Jay McKenzie (McKenzie) appeals from a judgment
of the Johnson Circuit Court convicting him of second-degree
manslaughter and being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree and sentencing him to eighteen years’
imprisonment.
McKenzie was charged as a result of a fatal car
accident after he was found to be impaired from consumption of a
combination of prescription medications.
On appeal, he argues
that his lack of knowledge of the effects of combining these
medications negated the wanton state necessary to convict him.
Further, he raises issues concerning the admissibility of
evidence regarding the results of blood and urine tests, the
jury instruction on voluntary intoxication by prescription
medication, and the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the PFO
charge which was obtained by a subsequent indictment two years
after the original charges were brought.
We have examined all
of the issues presented and conclude that no reversible error
occurred.
Thus, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Two years prior to the incident giving rise to the
charges herein, McKenzie was involved in a serious car accident
which left him with severe back injuries.
After an initial,
unsuccessful surgery, McKenzie had a second surgery to implant
titanium rods in his back.
As a result, his back pain
diminished from the excruciating pain he had constantly suffered
to pain that was manageable with prescription pain medication
and muscle relaxants.
In November and December 2001, McKenzie traveled from
Ohio to Kentucky to visit relatives living in Johnson County.
Because the four-hour drive was hard on his back, McKenzie took
Roxicet prior to leaving Ohio and Valium and Lortab the night he
arrived at his brother’s house.
The next morning, some of the
men in his family decided to visit the stockyards.
McKenzie
initially stayed at the house before leaving to join them a
little later.
He had taken a Soma and two Lortab prior to
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driving his van that day.
Expecting to be gone for several
hours, he carried additional pills in a prescription bottle with
his brother’s name on the label.
While driving along the highway, McKenzie allegedly
became distracted looking at a cedar house built on a hillside.
He failed to notice when his van left the road, traveled over
barriers separating the road from a ditch and slammed into a car
operated by mail carrier Cheryl Shepherd (Shepherd) as she
distributed mail to houses at the bottom of a hill.
Shepherd’s
spine was severed and she died as a result of injuries sustained
in the collision.
Tests of McKenzie’s blood and urine taken
after the accident revealed the presence of several chemical
substances, including Valium, Soma, oxycodone, codeine and
hydrocodone.
On August 17, 2002,1 McKenzie was indicted for wanton
murder.
His first trial in January 2004 ended in a mistrial
when one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses became ill.
The
Commonwealth obtained an additional indictment in March charging
McKenzie with being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree.
McKenzie filed a pretrial motion to exclude the urine
evidence and another to dismiss the PFO charge, arguing that it
1
McKenzie was originally indicted on January 21, 2002; however, a superseding
indictment was returned that August after defense counsel filed a motion to
dismiss the original indictment due to alleged false testimony in front of
the grand jury. It is this August 2002 indictment which was the charging
document in both the aborted January 2004 trial and the July 2004 trial which
resulted in the judgment herein appealed from.
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was a violation of his constitutional rights due to
prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The trial court denied both
motions.
Both the murder and the PFO indictments proceeded to
trial on July 12, 2004.
After hearing the evidence against him,
the jury convicted McKenzie of the lesser-included offense of
second-degree manslaughter, enhanced by his status as a
persistent felony offender.
The trial court sentenced him to
eighteen years’ imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s
recommendation, and this appeal followed.
McKenzie first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a directed verdict because the
Commonwealth failed to prove that his conduct in driving after
ingesting prescription medication was wanton.
The test on
appeal for determining whether a directed verdict should have
been granted is “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be
clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.”
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
In
addition to the evidence regarding the medication which McKenzie
ingested prior to driving, there were witnesses who testified to
his erratic driving before the accident, as well as his apparent
intoxication immediately afterwards.
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Phyllis Goble (Goble), a registered nurse, saw
McKenzie drive his van on and off the road, completely swerving
from one lane into the other and back again.
She testified that
he narrowly avoided hitting several cars and a bridge abutment
at an overpass.
Goble observed McKenzie drive completely off
the road on both sides prior to driving off the right side of
the road, on a straight section, and slamming into the back of
Shepherd’s car.
Goble never saw his brake lights flash.
At the scene of the accident, Goble found McKenzie
without apparent injuries, but with a glazed expression and
unresponsive to her questions.
She checked on Shepherd and
noted that she did not appear to be breathing and barely had a
pulse.
Because the car door was wedged shut by the guard rail,
Goble was unable to get close enough to Shepherd to perform CPR.
While she was trying to administer first aid, Goble heard
McKenzie starting his van.
Afraid that this might cause a fire,
she ran back to the van and turned off the key and told him not
to start the engine.
When the fire department arrived, Goble
saw McKenzie staggering around the crash scene and watched him
fall into the road, scraping his forehead and arm.
She
testified that he did not smell of alcohol, but his glazed look,
pinpoint pupils and difficulty walking indicated that he was
under the influence of something.
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In Goble’s opinion, his
staggering did not look like it was caused by an injury to his
leg or back.
Sheriff’s Deputy Aaron Fairchild (Fairchild) was the
first officer to respond to the crash scene.
He testified that
a blue minivan had collided with the rear end of a red car and
that the vehicles had come to rest 120 feet away from the point
of impact.
He spoke with McKenzie who was swaying but claimed
to be fine.
Fairchild described him as having a dazed
appearance, slurred speech and glazed eyes.
He testified that
McKenzie could not understand what Fairchild was saying to him
nor could McKenzie follow directions.
The deputy attempted to
administer field sobriety tests, but McKenzie was unable to
perform any of the tasks requested.
McKenzie refused medical treatment, but agreed to
furnish blood and urine samples.
He told Fairchild he was
distracted by a cedar house on a hillside and was looking at it
until his van crashed into Shepherd’s car.
McKenzie admitted to
having taken Somas and two Lortabs prior to driving.
In
addition, he told Fairchild that the pills were from his wife’s
prescription.
Fairchild noted that the label on the pill bottle
had McKenzie’s brother’s name on it, and that the pills it
contained looked like Somas and Lortabs.
Although he was charged with wanton murder, the jury
which heard all of this evidence convicted McKenzie of the
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lesser-included offense of second-degree manslaughter.
Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 507.040 defines second–degree manslaughter
in relevant part as follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of manslaughter in
the second degree when he wantonly
causes the death of another person,
including, but not limited to,
situations where the death results from
the person's:
(a) Operation of a motor vehicle[.]
Wanton behavior occurs when a person
is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
result will occur or that the circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe in
the situation. A person who creates such a
risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason
of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly
with respect thereto.
KRS 507.020(3).
(Emphasis added.)
Voluntary intoxication takes
place when a person “knowingly introduces [substances] into his
body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or
ought to know, unless he introduces them pursuant to medical
advice[.]”
KRS 501.010(4).
McKenzie claims on appeal that he was never advised
that the particular combination of medications he ingested could
impair his driving.
Thus, he argues the jury could not properly
convict him of an offense requiring a mens rea of wantonness.
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At trial, McKenzie testified in his own defense.
He
denied that he was impaired or that he drove erratically prior
to the crash that killed Shepherd.
However, he did admit that
the label on the Soma bottle warned of possible drowsiness and
advised using caution when driving.
McKenzie also stated that
Soma had caused him drowsiness in the past.
Further, a patient
history introduced as a defense exhibit failed to show that he
had ever had a prescription for Soma.
Thus, he fails to prove
that a jury could not reasonably find that he was voluntarily
intoxicated when he chose to take a combination of Soma (for
which he could not furnish the prescription he claimed to have)
and Lortab pills shortly before driving.
Our courts have previously held that voluntary
intoxication is no defense to offenses involving wantonness.
McGuire v.Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Ky. 1994); Nichols
v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Ky. 2004).
In fact, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has specifically determined that
“voluntary intoxication . . . is not a defense to second-degree
manslaughter.”
1997).
Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 857 (Ky.
The Commonwealth relies on the case of Estep v.
Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. 1997), in countering
McKenzie’s argument that he was unaware of the effects of
combining several prescriptions medications.
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In Estep, the
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a wanton murder conviction based
on the following facts:
Estep was charged with wanton murder and
assault as the result of a fatal automobile
accident on a two-lane road in Pike County.
Testimony at trial indicated that the blue
pickup truck driven by Estep passed a
witness who was driving about 50 miles per
hour. The pickup truck crossed the doublelined no passing zone and did not return to
the right side of the road after passing the
witness. The pickup truck collided head-on
with a car traveling in the opposite
direction. Evidence was presented that Estep
was found to have five different
prescription drugs in her system, three of
which were found to be within proper
therapeutic levels and the other two were at
levels less than therapeutic quantities.
This appeal followed the judgment of
conviction.
The principal issue is whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find
Estep guilty of wanton murder. She argues
that there was no evidence that she was
aware of and consciously disregarded the
risk that taking the various drugs would
impair her ability to drive. She testified
that no doctor had told her not to take
these drugs in combination and that she did
not know the effect of these drugs together.
Estep also testified that she was well aware
of the debilitating effects of these drugs.
She stated that she did not take Elavil if
she was home alone because it produced too
deep a sleep and she was afraid that someone
might break into her house and that she
would not be aware of it. She further
testified that she would not take Dilantin
if she was by herself.
Id. at 192.
McKenzie argues that Estep is readily
distinguishable from the facts in his own case.
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We disagree.
Witnesses at the crash scene described his erratic driving prior
to the fatal accident and his demeanor immediately afterwards.
Blood and urine tests showed the presence of several substances
which are used as muscle relaxants, pain medications, or
sedatives.
McKenzie admitted that Soma had previously made him
drowsy and testified that he did not like its side effects.
He
also claimed that he would not take Soma and Valium together.
Nevertheless, both substances were found in his blood.
Despite Estep’s identical claim of lack of awareness
of the effects of combining multiple medications, the Kentucky
Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the more serious offense
of wanton murder which requires “the operation of a motor
vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life. . . .”
KRS 507.020(1)(b).
In light of the holding
in Estep, we do not believe the Commonwealth was required to
prove that McKenzie had been advised of the possible side
effects of combining these medications in order for a jury to
convict him of second-degree manslaughter.
McKenzie next contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it instructed the jury on voluntary
intoxication by prescription medication.
Instruction No. IV,
which defense counsel objected to at trial, read as follows:
It is not a defense to impaired driving
that the person is legally entitled to use
any substance, even if prescribed by a
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physician. Voluntary Intoxication does not
provide a defense to Wanton Murder.
McKenzie contends that this instruction was improper because it
derived from the language of KRS 189A, which has previously been
limited to prosecutions for driving under the influence.
Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1975).
Further,
McKenzie points out that Instruction No. III, which contained
definitions, excluded voluntary intoxication as a defense to
wanton conduct and defined voluntary intoxication.
Thus, he
argues Instruction No. IV was unnecessary and prejudicial.
While we might agree with the first contention,
we must point out that the instruction objected to specifically
eliminated voluntary intoxication by prescription medication as
a defense to wanton murder.
Since the jury declined to convict
McKenzie of murder and instead found him guilty of second-degree
manslaughter, we hold any error in giving this instruction
harmless.
McKenzie makes two arguments with regard to the
evidence of test results on his blood and urine.
First, he
contends that the urine evidence was inadmissible due to
irrelevance, prejudice and lack of scientific accuracy.
In
addition, he claims that the Commonwealth failed to establish a
sufficient chain of custody to permit the results of tests on
his blood and urine to be admitted.
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McKenzie filed a pretrial
motion in limine seeking the exclusion of the urinalysis
evidence, and the trial court denied the motion.
Two chemists from the Kentucky State Police (KSP) lab
testified regarding the results of tests on McKenzie’s blood and
urine.
Diazepam (contained in Valium) and its metabolite,
nordiazepam, and carisoprodol (contained in Soma) were found in
his blood.
In addition, chemists found oxycodone (contained in
Roxicet), codeine and hydrocodone (contained in Vicoprofen and
Lortab) in his urine.
The Valium and Soma and their metabolites
found in McKenzie’s blood were individually within or below
therapeutic ranges.
Jane Purcell (Purcell), a KSP chemist
testified that there was no way to measure whether the
substances found in urine were within therapeutic levels.
Consequently, between the time McKenzie’s urine sample was taken
and his trial almost three years later, KSP’s lab had stopped
reporting quantities of drugs in urine.
McKenzie now argues on appeal that the results of his
urine tests did not possess sufficient scientific accuracy to
meet the standards set forth in Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956
S.W.2d 883 (Ky. 1997) and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000).
KRS 189A.103(1) provides
for implied consent to blood, breath or urine tests, or a
combination thereof any time an officer suspects a violation of
KRS 189A.010(1).
Although, as McKenzie correctly points out, he
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was not charged with driving under the influence, the statute
specifically states that it applies “to any person who operates
or is in physical control of a motor vehicle . . . in this
Commonwealth.”
Cleary, the circumstances surrounding McKenzie’s
accident created reasonable grounds for an officer to believe
that he was under the influence of substances which impaired his
driving as required by the implied consent statute.
This
statute was last amended in April 2000, after the Goodyear
decision.
Thus, our legislature still believed that urinalysis
possessed sufficient scientific reliability to indicate the
presence of drugs which may impair a person’s ability to drive.
McKenzie has provided no authority to support his position that
such evidence is inadmissible.
McKenzie also claims that the evidence of substances
found in his urine was irrelevant and prejudicial.
Purcell
testified that substances ingested would show up in urine longer
than they would in blood.
She specifically listed hydrocodone
as a substance that would show up in a urine sample, even if
several days had passed since it had been ingested.
Since
hydrocodone and oxycodone were found in McKenzie’s urine, but
not his blood, Purcell concluded that they were not in his
system at the time his blood sample was taken.
Thus, McKenzie
claims that admission of the urinalysis was prejudicial to him.
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Inasmuch as he admitted to taking Roxicet (oxyocodone) the day
before his accident and Lortabs (hydrocodone) prior to driving,
we fail to perceive any prejudice from evidence of a laboratory
analysis confirming that he had taken these substances in the
past, but indicating they were not in his system at the time of
the accident.
At trial, McKenzie objected to the admission of
evidence regarding blood and urine tests, arguing that the
Commonwealth failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody.
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 901(a) requires “evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims” in order to establish authentication
prior to admitting evidence.
McKenzie claims that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that the blood and urine tested
were the same substances taken from him after the accident.
Fairchild transported McKenzie to a nearby medical
center, witnessed a lab technician draw his blood, watched the
restroom being prepared to prevent tampering with the urine
sample, and watched as the test kit was signed and sealed.
The
lab technician was present at trial to testify to performing all
of the above actions.
Fairchild told the jury that he delivered
the samples to the evidence room at the sheriff’s office.
In an
earlier deposition, Fairchild stated that he mailed the samples
to the KSP lab.
At trial he clarified his prior statement,
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saying that he never mailed samples himself and he had only
meant that he intended the samples to be mailed to the lab.
Deputy Howard Dotson (Dotson) testified that he
received the samples from the evidence officer and hand
delivered them to the KSP lab in Ashland.
was not called to testify.
The evidence officer
Matthew Ryan Cross (Cross), an
analyst for KSP, testified that the samples were still sealed
and there was no evidence of tampering when Dotson delivered
them to him at the lab.
After performing a blood alcohol test,
Cross resealed the kit and sent it to the Central Lab in
Frankfort where additional tests were performed.
McKenzie contends that Fairchild’s trial testimony,
which differed from his deposition, indicated uncertainty as to
the fate of the samples after they were taken to the sheriff’s
office.
Further, he points to the absence of the evidence room
officer and claims that the chain of custody was destroyed,
rendering the evidence inadmissible.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
has previously held in the case of Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973
S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998), that it is unnecessary to establish a
perfect chain of custody.
Rather, the Commonwealth is only
required to provide persuasive evidence that no one tampered
with the sample; however, gaps in the chain of custody may
affect the weight given to the evidence by the jury.
Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 821 (Ky. 2001).
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Love v.
The evidence
introduced at trial indicated that law enforcement agencies
maintained sufficient control over McKenzie’s blood and urine
samples to prevent tampering and to reliably maintain their
identity.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying
McKenzie’s motion to exclude this evidence due to defects in the
chain of custody.
McKenzie’s final argument concerns the PFO charge that
was added two years after the original indictment charging
wanton murder.
He filed a pretrial motion, which was denied by
the trial court, to dismiss the new indictment.
On appeal, he
argues that the PFO indictment was a violation of fundamental
fairness and a vindictive prosecution.
It is a violation of constitutional protections to
punish a criminal defendant for exercising a legal right.
North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656
(1969).
Nevertheless, the Pearce holding has been narrowed over
time, and the Supreme Court has stated that “the Due Process
Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased
punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that
pose a realistic likelihood of ‘vindictiveness.’”
Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27; 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102; 40 L.Ed.2d 628
(1974).
Even the case of United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), cited by McKenzie in
support of his position, declined to apply a blanket presumption
-16-
of prosecutorial vindictiveness to invalidate a prosecutorial
decision to pursue felony charges after a defendant declined to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor.
In the case at hand, the mistrial of the original
charge resulted, not from anything that McKenzie did, but rather
from the inability of the Commonwealth’s own witness to attend
trial due to a sudden, severe illness.
Thus, McKenzie fails to
point to any act on his part for which we might assume that the
prosecutor wished to punish him.
This absence of any indication
of actual prosecutorial vindictiveness is fatal to his claim
that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the PFO
indictment.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Johnson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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