JAMES R. HAZELWOOD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2006; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002232-MR
JAMES R. HAZELWOOD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 96-CR-00029, 96-CR-00030 & 96-CR-00032
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
James R. Hazelwood challenges the denial of
his motion under CR 60.02 to vacate his amended judgment and
sentence under a plea agreement.
Under the terms of his plea
agreement, Hazelwood is serving a 14 year sentence for robbery
in the first degree in Washington County.
In addition,
Hazelwood pled guilty to three class D felonies in Marion County
-- knowingly receiving stolen property, possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine) in the first degree, and theft by
failure to make required disposition of property valued more
than $300 -- for which the trial court sentenced him to five
years on each to run concurrent with each other and with the 14
year sentence in Washington County.
Because we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hazelwood’s
motion for relief under CR 60.02, we affirm.
In this appeal, Hazelwood only challenges the denial
of the CR 60.02 motion for the Marion County charges, not the
Washington County charge.
charges are as follows:
The indictment numbers and original
(1) 96-CR-00029, receiving stolen
property over $300.00 and persistent felony offender in the
second degree (PFO II); (2) 96-CR-00030, possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree and PFO II; and (3) 96CR-00032, failure to make required disposition of property over
$300 and PFO II.
Hazelwood elected to go to trial on the charges under
indictment 96-CR-00029.
The jury convicted him of both charges
and recommended a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
On
August 9, 1996, Hazelwood pled guilty to the remaining charges
in indictment numbers 96-CR-00030 and 96-CR-00032.
Consequently, the trial court issued a judgment against him,
sentencing him to imprisonment for a total of ten years, to run
concurrently with the previously-imposed sentence in 96-CR00029.
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The majority of the charges and sentences that form
the basis of this appeal stemmed from Hazelwood’s activities in
Washington and Marion counties on the evening of February 13 and
in the early morning hours of February 14, 1996.
The charge of
failure to make required disposition of property, however,
concerned a time period shortly before February 13, 1996.
Even
so, he committed all the offenses while on parole from a ten
year sentence he received in Marion County under indictment
number 86-CR-00024 for robbery in the first degree and assault
in the first degree.
He pled guilty to those charges and was
sentenced on January 29, 1987 (the 1987 conviction).
A little over ten years after the 1987 conviction and
while imprisoned as a result of his commission of the current
offenses, Hazelwood filed an RCr 11.42 motion.
In his
collateral attack, he sought to vacate the 1987 conviction on
the basis that his attorney was ineffective in failing to advise
him that the charge of first-degree assault merged into the
first-degree robbery charge.
Hazelwood.
A panel of this Court agreed with
In an unpublished opinion (1997-CA-001611-MR), this
Court vacated Hazelwood’s conviction and remanded the case to
the trial court to allow Hazelwood to withdraw his guilty plea.
In so doing, the court noted that while Hazelwood could not be
convicted of both first-degree robbery and first-degree assault,
he may be tried on both offenses, with the instructions worded
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such that the jury could only convict on one offense or the
other.
In the eleven or so years that passed between
Hazelwood’s 1987 conviction and this Court’s opinion, the
complaining witness in the 1987 conviction died.
The
Commonwealth had no choice but to dismiss the charges against
Hazelwood under indictment number 86-CR-00024.
Because the
underlying charge on which the PFO II charges were based had
been dismissed, Hazelwood filed a motion under CR 60.02(b) -newly discovered evidence -- to allow him to withdraw his guilty
pleas.
At a later hearing on Hazelwood’s motion held on July
19, 1999, he amended his motion to a motion under CR 60.02(e) to
alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
At the hearing, Hazelwood, his attorney, two attorneys
for the Commonwealth representing Marion and Washington counties
and a victim’s advocate reached an amended plea agreement.
In
exchange for Hazelwood’s plea, the Commonwealth agreed to remove
one year from the Washington County robbery first-degree
sentence.
years.
So that sentence was reduced from 15 years to 14
In addition, the Commonwealth agreed to dismiss the PFO
II charges under the three Marion County indictments and run
each of the five year sentences concurrent with the 14 year
Washington County sentence.
A review of the hearing reveals
that while all parties were in agreement, Hazelwood was the
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master of the plea and was extremely anxious to get it entered
that day.
Ten days after the hearing that resulted in the plea
agreement, on July 29, 1999, the trial court issued an order
amending the judgment and sentence in accordance with the
agreement.
A little less than 5 years later, Hazelwood filed a
pro se motion under CR 60.02 (d) and (f) to vacate and set aside
the July 29, 1999 Order on the basis that the trial court failed
to comply with KRS 532.050 in not ordering a presentence
investigation (PSI) report before imposing a sentence for the
conviction.
Hazelwood contended that had the trial court
complied with the mandatory sentencing statutes, it could have
determined that he no longer had a prior felony conviction, and
considered other sentencing alternatives under KRS 533.010 on
each Class D felony.
As relief, he requested that the court
vacate the July 29, 1999 Order, reinstate the former judgment
and hold a hearing.
Upon motion, the trial court later allowed
Hazelwood to supplement the CR 60.02 motion and argue that he
did not waive the PSI report.
The Commonwealth did not respond
to the initial CR 60.02 motion or the supplemental motion.
In a seven-page order, the trial court fully addressed
Hazelwood’s arguments.
The trial court ultimately denied his
request for relief on the ground that he had not demonstrated
why he was entitled to the special, extraordinary relief
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provided by the rule when the trial court issued an order that
amended Hazelwood’s sentence exactly the way he wanted it to be
amended.
In this appeal, consistent with his arguments before
the trial court, Hazelwood challenges his sentence.
However, he
raises an additional argument that he did not raise before the
trial court:
the amended judgment stripped him of the seven
years and nine months he served in jail on the vacated sentence.
He argues that the trial court made substantial changes to his
original judgment when it was only given limited jurisdiction to
review a certain aspect of the original judgment for error.
Hazelwood contends that the trial court thereby subjected him to
double jeopardy.
The substantial change he alleges was that his
original judgment ordered his Washington County robbery sentence
to run concurrent with his 1987 conviction, but the trial court
removed that term in amending his sentence by way of the July
29, 1999 Order.
Actions under CR 60.02 are addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996).
abuse of discretion.
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 932
Thus, our standard of review is
See id.
CR 60.02 is for relief that is not available by direct
appeal and not available collaterally under RCr 11.42.
See
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
And CR
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60.02 should only be used to provide relief when the movant
demonstrates why he or she is entitled to the special,
extraordinary relief provided by the rule.
See Gross, 648
S.W.2d at 856.
The Commonwealth defends Hazelwood’s claims on
procedural grounds only.
Without addressing the merits at all,
the Commonwealth simply argues that Hazelwood’s motion is
successive.
Thus, the Commonwealth contends that Hazelwood is
foreclosed from filing a third motion raising new grounds.
While this is a correct statement of law, the Commonwealth is
mistaken as to the number and substance of the CR 60.02 motions
that Hazelwood has filed pertaining to the three Marion County
indictments at issue.
Hazelwood’s second CR 60.02 motion is not
successive as it challenges the trial court’s July 29, 1999
Order.
Hazelwood did not file a third motion.
Apparently, the
Commonwealth counted a CR 60.02 motion that Hazelwood filed in
Washington County and attached to his Marion County motion as an
exhibit.
We acknowledge that the circumstances of the case are
unusual and procedurally complex, but observe that the
Commonwealth has done nothing to assist the trial court or this
Court in addressing the merits of Hazelwood’s pro se
contentions.
We now turn to the merits of Hazelwood’s first
contention.
In considering the merits, however, this Court must
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follow the law pertaining to relief under CR 60.02.
As stated
above, CR 60.02 is for relief that is not available by direct
appeal.
In this case, despite the fact that Hazelwood pled
guilty, the sentencing issues Hazelwood raises could have been
raised on direct appeal “since all defendants have the right to
be sentenced after due consideration of all applicable law.”
See Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1994).
The direct appeal avenue notwithstanding, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Hazelwood relief under CR 60.02 for four reasons.
waive the PSI at the July 19, 1999 hearing.
First, he did
Hazelwood argues
that he did not waive it, but we agree with the trial court that
he did.
He contends that his attorney waived the PSI, not him.
We disagree.
Even though he could not be seen on camera when
his attorney said they would “waive sentencing because he is a
state prisoner anyway,” Hazelwood was standing right behind his
attorney and was actively participating in the hearing.
Hazelwood expressed his desire on numerous occasions to get
everything taken care of that day.
Second, the trial court was well aware that the 1987
conviction had been dismissed.
That is the sole reason that the
1996 judgment was amended to dismiss the PFO II charges and
reduce the enhanced sentences to within the sentencing range of
a Class D felony.
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Third, Hazelwood did not bring his CR 60.02 motion
within a reasonable time as required by CR 60.02.
He brought
his motion a little less than five years after the trial court
issued the amended judgment.
He offers no reason for the delay.
Fourth, having received an updated PSI, it is highly
unlikely that the trial court would have considered that
probation, probation with an alternative sentencing plan, or
conditional discharge as provided in KRS Chapter 533 was
appropriate for Hazelwood.
been vacated.
Granted, the 1987 conviction had
It was vacated, not reversed, however; and
Hazelwood had initially pled guilty to the charges.
Moreover,
while on parole, he committed four offenses in Marion and
Washington Counties, one of which was robbery in the first
degree, a Class B felony.
In short, we agree with the trial
court that Hazelwood has not shown that he is entitled to the
special, extraordinary relief provided by Rule 60.02.
As to Hazelwood’s second argument, it is clearly not
preserved.
In spite of the fact that it is unpreserved, the
record refutes his argument.
The 1996 plea agreement does not
specify that the Washington County sentence was to run
concurrent with the 1987 conviction that was later dismissed.
And there was no discussion of this term in the July 19, 1999
hearing.
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We affirm the order of the Marion Circuit Court that
denied relief under CR 60.02.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James R. Hazelwood, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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