ESTATE OF WILLIAM CLINTON BRYANT, BY AND THROUGH HIS EXECUTRIX, TINA S. BRYANT; TINA S. BRYANT, INDIVIDUALLY, CLINTON BRYANT, JR., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, TINA S. BRYANT v. MID-STATES PLASTICS, INC.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 24, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
MAY 12, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002145-MR
ESTATE OF WILLIAM CLINTON BRYANT,
BY AND THROUGH HIS EXECUTRIX, TINA
S. BRYANT; TINA S. BRYANT, INDIVIDUALLY,
AS WIFE TO THE DECEASED; AND WILLIAM
CLINTON BRYANT, JR., A MINOR, BY AND
THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
TINA S. BRYANT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-90240
MID-STATES PLASTICS, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The Estate of William Clinton Bryant, by and
through his Executrix, Tina S. Bryant, Tina S. Bryant,
Individually, as wife of the deceased, and William Clinton
Bryant, Jr., a minor, by and through his mother and next friend,
Tina S. Bryant (the Bryant Estate), have appealed from the award
of summary judgment by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of
Mid-States Plastics, Inc.1 in an action instituted by the Bryant
Estate to recover damages from Mid-States for its vicarious
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Having
concluded that there are genuine issues as to material facts
precluding summary judgment, we reverse and remand.
On October 15, 2002, Daniel Edwards leased a private
plane and took a business trip to Indianapolis, Indiana, on
behalf of Mid-States.2
Edwards invited his minister,
Rev. William Clinton Bryant, to accompany him on the trip so
Rev. Bryant could visit his relatives living in Indianapolis.
Edwards and Rev. Bryant met at the Montgomery County Airport and
departed that morning and they then met up again at the
Indianapolis airport that afternoon.
During the return flight
to Mount Sterling, Kentucky, Edwards negligently flew the plane
and hit a guy wire of a cell phone tower owned by Cingular
Wireless, Inc.
The plane crashed, causing the deaths of both
1
Mid-States is a Kentucky corporation, with its headquarters and executive
offices in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky, and it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
UPONOR, ETI, a Finnish company located within the United States. Daniel
Edwards founded the company and in 1998 sold Mid-States to UPONOR. MidStates’s business is the manufacturing and distribution of plastic meter
boxes throughout the United States and its business is conducted through its
sales representatives and distributors.
2
Edwards’s own private plane was not available due to maintenance repairs;
therefore, he made arrangements to lease a rental plane. To prepare for the
flight, Edwards went to the Montgomery County Airport to be checked out on
the Cessna with a flight trainer. Mid-States argues that it did not require
Edwards to fly on business trips, nor did it own, rent, lease, operate,
possess, control, or have any relationship to the plane, and that Edwards
paid for the leased aircraft in his own name.
-2-
Edwards and Rev. Bryant.
The Bryant Estate filed this wrongful
death action against Mid-States, the Edwards Estate, and
Cingular Wireless.3
For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are
undisputed: (1) on the date of the accident, Edwards had flown
to Indianapolis for the purpose of training a sales
representative;4 (2) Rev. Bryant was never an employee of MidStates, he was a non-business passenger on the trip, and his
presence served no business purpose and furthered no interest
for Mid-States; and (3) Edwards’s negligence contributed to the
plane crash.
Prior to his death, Edwards was the president and
general manager of Mid-States and he was the chief executive for
all operations for Mid-States nationwide.
Edwards and Mid-
States had entered into an employment agreement, dated
February 27, 1998, which charged Edwards with the following
duties:
1.
EMPLOYMENT. [Mid-States] shall employ
[Edwards] as the General Manager of
[Mid-States], with responsibility for
supervision of all aspects of operation
3
Mid-States argued that the lawsuit was filed against it solely because
Edwards was an employee. The Bryant Estate argued in its complaint that
Edwards was an agent, servant, and employee of Mid-States. Mid-States denied
in its pleadings that Edwards was “acting as an ‘agent, servant and employee’
of [Mid-States]” at the time of the crash but stated that he was a “contract”
employee, with the titles of general manager and president.
4
Edwards was paid for the workday on October 15, 2002, and Edwards’s widow
was paid the workers’ compensation death benefit.
-3-
and administration of [Mid-States], and
[Edwards] hereby accepts such employment
and agrees to perform such duties and
undertake such responsibilities as are
customarily performed by others holding
positions similar to that assigned to
[Edwards] in similar businesses, subject
to the general and customary supervision
of [Mid-States’s] Board of Directors.
. . .
7.
FACILITIES AND EXPENSES. [Mid-States]
shall make available to [Edwards] such
office space, secretarial services,
office equipment and furnishings as are
suitable and appropriate to [Edwards’s]
title and duties. [Mid-States] shall
promptly reimburse [Edwards’s] for all
reasonable expenses incurred in the
performance of his duties hereunder,
including without limitation, expenses
for entertainment, travel, management
seminars and use of the telephone,
subject to [Edwards’s] satisfying [MidStates’s] reasonable requirements with
respect to the reporting and
documentation of such expenses [emphasis
added].
At this time, Mid-States also had a board of directors, which
consisted of four people, including Edwards.5
None of the other
three board members was an employee of Mid-States, nor did any
of them have an active role in the day-to-day activities of the
company.
As part of his position with Mid-States, Edwards
traveled to various locations in the United States where he met
5
The other directors included Scott Long (chairman), Jerry Kukuchka, and
Jerry Dukes.
-4-
with existing and prospective customers and trained sales
representatives for the company.
It is the position of the
Bryant Estate that Edwards had complete discretion to determine
what trips he would make and what mode of transportation he
would use.
Further, it asserts that before Edwards took a
business trip, he did not have to notify any other executive of
Mid-States or members of its board of directors of his plans.
Mid-States did not supply Edwards with a company
automobile to perform his duties for the company, but Mid-States
paid for the insurance on his personal vehicle.
Edwards had his
own plane, which he used in approximately one-half of his
business trips of record from January 1, 2000, through October
15, 2002.6
Mid-States had no written policy as to reimbursement
of travel expenses, but it did have a consistent practice.
JoAnne McVey, Mid-States’s controller,7 testified that it was her
duty to process all travel expenses and to maintain the related
records.8
She testified that after a business trip, Edwards
would customarily submit an expense form for mileage and any
6
Mid-States’s records indicated that Edwards was reimbursed for 46 business
trips during this time period. He used a private plane for 23 of the trips,
and was reimbursed for all of them, with the exception of the last.
7
McVey had been controller at Mid-States since May 2000.
immediate supervisor on the date of the accident.
8
Edwards was McVey’s
McVey testified that she was not aware of the travel policies at the
corporate level of UPONOR, but that Mid-States was not required to follow
those policies. She further testified that while Edwards would be the one
who would initiate a policy for Mid-States, it would probably still go
through the corporate office for approval.
-5-
out-of-pocket expenses,9 and she would review it.
Afterwards,
she would send the expense form to the corporate office for
approval and upon approval pay Edwards the reimbursement.
If
Edwards drove his personal automobile, he would receive mileage
based on the federal income tax rate.
If he took a commercial
flight, he was reimbursed for the cost of the airline ticket.
If he flew his personal plane, he received payment equivalent to
the cost of mileage if he had driven his personal automobile to
his destination.
McVey testified that per her discussions with
both Edwards and Long, the board chairman, Edwards had
discretion to use his private plane for business trips.
McVey testified that to her knowledge, the only person
who had previously traveled with Edwards as a non-business
passenger was his wife, Pam Edwards;10 however, regardless of
whether Pam traveled with him or not, Edwards’s expenses were
treated as business-related and were reimbursed.
McVey further
testified that Mid-States never objected to Edwards taking nonbusiness passengers along with him on business trips.
McVey
knew the day before the fatal trip that Edwards was going to
Indianapolis, but she did not know he was flying or that
9
This included meals and costs related to the parking of Edwards’s private
plane at various airports.
10
Pam was formerly the chief financial officer of Mid-States. However, it is
unclear from the record how many times she accompanied Edwards on business
trips when she was not an officer of the company.
-6-
Rev. Bryant would be accompanying him.11
McVey did not receive
any request for reimbursement for the October 15, 2002, business
trip, but if the Edwards Estate had requested it, she would have
authorized the reimbursement.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and
on August 10, 2004, a hearing was held before the trial court on
both motions.
The Bryant Estate relied on records of Mid-
States, the deposition testimony of McVey, and an affidavit from
Pam.
Mid-States also offered in support of its motion an
affidavit from Chairman Long, which the trial court did not
consider in entering its summary judgment in favor of MidStates.12
The trial court focused on whether Rev. Bryant’s
accompanying Edwards on the trip in any way benefited Mid-States
and it also considered “equitable” issues.13
Ultimately, the
trial court granted Mid-States’s motion for summary judgment and
11
Mid-States argues that it did not expressly authorize Edwards to take
Rev. Bryant on the trip and did not know that Rev. Bryant was going on the
trip. To Mid-States’s knowledge, Edwards had not taken Rev. Bryant or any
other friend on any previous business trips.
12
The Bryant Estate filed a motion to strike this evidence from the record
because at that point, it had not been allowed an opportunity to depose
Chairman Long. This was disputed by Mid-States. The trial court denied the
motion to strike, but stated at the hearing that it was not considering
Chairman Long’s affidavit in making its summary judgment rulings.
13
At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court asked if the Edwards
Estate was a party to the action. At that time, she was informed that it was
and that it had offered the policy limits on Edwards’s insurance policy of
one million dollars. The trial court was also informed at that time that
Mid-States did not have an insurance policy in place to pay any award given
to the Bryant Estate. The trial court stated that, while it was not the
legal standard, it should consider these “equitable” issues.
-7-
denied the Bryant Estate’s summary judgment motion.
The Bryant
Estate filed a motion for reconsideration on August 18, 2004,
and the trial court denied the motion by an order entered on
October 11, 2004.
This appeal followed.
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary
judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”14
“The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts
are to be resolved in his favor” [citations omitted].15
Summary
judgment “is only proper where the movant shows that the adverse
party could not prevail under any circumstances.”16
Because the
trial court concluded that the relevant facts were not in
dispute, we are not required to defer to the trial court and
thus we review the trial court’s summary judgment ruling de
novo.17
CR 56.03 states that “[t]he judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
14
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996) (citing Kentucky Rule
of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03).
15
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991).
16
Id.
17
Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 781 (citing Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components,
Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1992)).
-8-
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.”
The Bryant Estate argues that it was entitled to
summary judgment because there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact as to Edwards’s authority to take non-business
passengers on business trips and, thus, Mid-States, as Edwards’s
employer, is vicariously liable for his negligence, or in the
alternative, Mid-States’s summary judgment award should be
reversed because questions of fact exist as to Edwards’s
authority.
Mid-States argues that it had no knowledge of
Edwards’s transporting a passenger; and if it had been aware of
this, it would have prohibited it.
It contends that summary
judgment in its favor was proper because the Bryant Estate’s
proof fails under both the scope of Edwards’s employment and his
authority as an employee.
The sole issue on appeal is whether there is a genuine
issue as to a material fact concerning Mid-States’s vicarious
liability to the Bryant Estate for Edwards’s negligence under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.18
18
If a negligent act of an
See Black’s Law Dictionary 927 (7th Ed. 1999) (defining vicarious liability
as “[l]iability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the
actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee)
because of the relationship between the two parties”); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary 1313 (defining respondeat superior as “[t]he doctrine holding an
employer or principal liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts
committed within the scope of the employment or agency”). The terms
“vicarious liability” and “respondeat superior” are often used
-9-
employee occurs in the course and scope of the employer’s
business, an employer can be held vicariously liable.19
This
liability extends to the employee’s own vehicle if the
employee’s conduct at the time of the occurrence was within the
scope of his employment.20
Mid-States relies primarily upon Wigginton Studio v.
Reuter’s Adm’r,21 where the studio was a corporation engaged in
the general photography business, and its secretary-treasurer
allowed his personal automobile to be used for business and nonbusiness purposes by the studio’s officers and employees.
While
the vice-president was using the vehicle for a weekend trip in
the company of another studio employee and two non-business
passengers, the vice-president negligently wrecked the
automobile killing one of the non-business passengers.
The
Court noted that the vice-president and the other studio
employee “decided to go to Middlesboro ostensibly for the
purpose of securing the business of enlarging the picture for
[the other employee’s] stepfather . . . and to visit [the other
interchangeably, but respondeat superior is actually one type of vicarious
liability as are estoppel, contract, and joint tortfeasor. See 59 Am.Jur.2d
Parties § 52 (2005).
19
Roethke v. Sanger, 68 S.W.3d 352, 361 (Ky. 2001).
20
See Chittum v. Abell, 485 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Ky. 1972).
21
254 Ky. 128, 71 S.W.2d 14 (1934).
-10-
employee’s] family over the week-end.”22
The two employees took
with them for entirely social reasons the decedent and another
young lady.
Since the presence of the decedent in Wigginton,
like the presence of the decedent herein, served no business
purpose, the analysis in Wigginton turned on whether the vicepresident “acted beyond the scope of her authority as an
employee of the corporation[.]”23
In defending the negligence suit brought by the estate
of the deceased against the studio based on vicarious
liability,24 the studio maintained that the deceased was an
invitee of the vice-president, not the studio, and that her act
of inviting the deceased on the trip was beyond the scope of her
authority as an employee of the studio.
Upon concluding that
the deceased was a personal invitee of the vice-president, the
Court stated:
[A]nd, therefore, the question for
determination is whether or not Miss
Adams’[s] position as vice president of the
studio corporation and being in charge of
its business, had any more binding effect on
the corporation with respect to an invitee,
than if Miss Adams had only been a servant
or other employee. The rule is well settled
in this jurisdiction that a servant has no
implied authority to invite or permit a
third person to ride on a vehicle in his
22
Wigginton, 71 S.W.2d at 14.
23
Id. at 16.
24
Wigginton, 71 S.W.2d at 14-15.
-11-
charge and if, in so doing, the invitee
sustains injuries through negligence of the
servant, the master will not be liable, as
the servant is not acting within the scope
of his authority. . . .
An officer of a corporation, when rendering
services for the corporation, is an employee
or servant of the corporation and the fact
that he is an officer or a stockholder gives
him no more authority to bind the
corporation than any other employee has to
render his principal liable for his
acts. . . .
[I]n order for a company to be held
responsible for the tort of one of its
officers he must be acting within the scope
of his employment and in the furtherance of
the corporation’s business.25
Unlike Wigginton, the sole purpose of Edwards’s trip
in the case before us was related to the employer’s business
interests.
While Rev. Bryant, like the decedent in Wigginton,
was traveling only for social purposes, Edwards’s trip, unlike
the vice-president’s in Wigginton, was only for the business of
his employer.
Thus, our case does not fall squarely under
Wigginton; and in determining whether Mid-States can be held
vicariously liable for Edwards’s negligence, a factual finding
must be made as to whether Mid-States had actual knowledge of
Edwards’s practice of allowing a non-business passenger to
accompany him on a business trip and failed to object.
25
Wigginton, 71 S.W.2d at 16.
-12-
Approximately 44 years after Wigginton, this Court
revisited the issue of vicarious liability of an employer in
Estell v. Barrickman.26
The pertinent facts of that case differ
from those in Wigginton as follows: (1) the employee was clearly
on company business when he negligently wrecked the company
vehicle he was driving; (2) the employee was accompanied by a
non-business passenger who was merely providing him with
companionship; and (3) while the employer was not aware that the
non-business passenger had accompanied the employee on this
particular trip, he was aware that this employee and other
employees had used this practice in the past.
The trial court
found the employer was not liable because the employee had no
authority to invite the non-business passenger to ride along and
thus was not acting within the scope of his employment.
On appeal, the injured plaintiff argued that because
the employer placed no restrictions on the employee concerning
non-business passengers riding along while on company business
and had never objected when it had knowledge of such practice,
“his apparent acquiescence raises a question of fact as to
whether [the employee] had permission or authority to take
guests with him on service runs.”27
The employer argued that
based on Wigginton, “the law is clear that an employee has no
26
571 S.W.2d 650 (Ky.App. 1978).
27
Estell, 571 S.W.2d at 651-52.
-13-
implied authority to permit a third person to ride in his
employer’s vehicle, and that, if the guest sustains injuries as
a result of the employee’s negligence, the employer will not be
liable because the employee is not acting within the scope of
his authority.”28
Further, the employer argued that regardless
of his knowledge, the non-business passenger was not his
invitee.
This Court concluded as follows:
While it is true that, in general, a
servant has no implied authority to invite a
third party to ride in his employer’s
vehicle,29 we cannot agree with Barrickman’s
contention that his knowledge of other
occasions where nonbusiness passengers rode
in his vehicle is immaterial to this case.
Rather, we are of the opinion that if
evidence of such knowledge is substantial
enough, a question of fact is raised as to
whether this knowledge and lack of objection
28
Id. at 652.
29
See Hottovy v. United States, 250 F.Supp. 315, 316-17 (D.Az. 1966) (which
stated:
While the general rule is that the employer is
liable for the torts of the servant who is in the
scope of his employment, even if the servant’s
conduct consists of forbidden acts, where the injured
plaintiff is an unauthorized invitee of the employee,
a recognized exception exists. Restatement of the
Law, Agency 2nd (1958) § 242 states:
“Liability to Invitee of Servant.[’]”
“A master is not subject to liability for the conduct
of a servant towards a person harmed as the result of
accepting or soliciting from the servant an
invitation, not binding upon the master, to enter or
remain upon the master’s premises or vehicle,
although the conduct which immediately causes the
harm is within the scope of the servant’s
employment”).
-14-
make the nonbusiness passenger an invitee of
the employer or constitutes a grant of
apparent authority to the employee to offer
these rides. . . [emphases added].30
This Court distinguished between implied and apparent
authority by stating as follows:
Implied authority is actual authority,31
circumstantially proven, which the principal
is deemed to have actually intended the
agent to possess, and includes only such
powers as are practically necessary to carry
out the duties actually delegated. Apparent
authority is not actually authority, but
rather “is that which, by reason of
prevailing usage or other circumstance, the
agent is in effect held out by the principal
as possessing. It is a matter of
appearances, fairly chargeable to the
principal and by which persons dealt with
are deceived, and on which they rely”
[citations omitted].32
In conclusion, this Court stated as follows:
It is our opinion that whether Estell’s
theory of recovery against Barrickman is
30
Estell, 571 S.W.2d at 652.
31
See 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 70 (2005) stating as follows:
32
Actual authority is such as a principal
intentionally confers upon the agent, or
intentionally or by want of ordinary care allows the
agent to believe himself or herself to possess. The
actual authority may be either express or implied;
and if it appears that the principal sought to be
charged has, orally or in writing, delegated
authority to another by words which authorize such
other to do a certain act or series of acts, then the
authority of the agent in that respect is express
authority. Express authority is directly granted to
or conferred upon the agent or employee in express
terms, and it extends only to such powers as the
principal gives the agent in direct terms, with the
express provisions controlling [footnotes omitted].
Estell, 571 S.W.2d at 652.
-15-
premised upon the apparent authority of the
employee . . . or merely on the principle of
respondeat superior based on the appellee
making the appellant his invitee by his
acquiescence, . . . the evidence presented
to this point requires the judgment be
reversed and the case remanded for trial on
the question of Barrickman’s liability for
Estell’s injuries. In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, all
doubts as to the existence of a question of
fact must be resolved against the moving
party. . . . In this case, we believe that
Barrickman’s inaction with respect to his
employee’s practice of permitting
nonbusiness passengers to ride in his
vehicle raises sufficient doubt so as to
preclude summary judgment.33
Under Wigginton and Estell, a court in determining
vicarious liability of an employer to a non-business passenger
who serves no benefit to the employer should consider (1)
whether the employee, in furtherance of the employer’s business,
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he
committed the negligent act;34 and (2) whether there is
substantial evidence to support a finding of apparent authority
because the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s
practice of allowing a non-business passenger to accompany him
on a business trip and failed to object.
33
Id. at 652-53.
34
Mid-States argues that Rev. Bryant’s travel with Edwards was not an act
within the scope of Edwards’s employment. Mid-States concedes that Edwards’s
flying home on a business trip was within the scope of his employment, but it
contends the issue is whether transporting a non-business passenger was
within the scope of Edwards’s employment. Under these cases, the relevant
act was the flying home on the business trip, not the act of allowing
Rev. Bryant to travel with him.
-16-
Mid-States contends that had it known of Edwards’s
practice of taking non-business passengers on business trips, it
would have prohibited this practice.
However, we agree with the
Bryant Estate that even if Edwards had violated Mid-States’s
policy by allowing Rev. Bryant to fly with him, Mid-States could
be held vicariously liable because Edwards’s flying home from
business was within the scope of his employment.
Subsequent to
Wigginton, the former Court of Appeals held in Sam Horne Motor &
Implement Co., Inc. v. Gregg,35 that once it is determined that a
master-servant relationship exists between a company and the
person negligently causing an injury, “we do not think the
violation of a general rule of the company constituted a
deviation from [the employee’s] course of employment in view of
the fact that the automobile was taken in furtherance of the
company’s business for the very purpose for which [the employee]
was employed.”36
Still, an alternative argument relates to the amount
of control Edwards had over the policies of Mid-States and
whether his knowledge as an officer could be imputed to MidStates.
35
The undeveloped trial court record failed to address
279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955).
36
Gregg, 279 S.W.2d at 759; see also Bejma v. Dental Development &
Manufacturing Co., 356 F.2d 227, 229 (6th Cir. 1966) (relying on Gregg, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that a violation by an employee does not, as a matter
of law, prohibit a finding that he was in the scope of his employment. In
Bejma, an employee was returning from a business trip in his own vehicle and
had a car wreck while intoxicated, injuring passengers in a passing car).
-17-
this issue.
This Court in Paducah Newspapers v. Goodman,37
stated as follows:
In practice a corporation may, and often
does, bind itself by the actions of its
executive officer or agent without formal
granting of power to do so by some act of
the board of directors, or by permitting the
officer to act within his apparent
authority; or from the manner in which the
board of directors has permitted him to
transact its business of a similar character
. . . or his authority may arise from a
custom of the board of directors from long
practice, permitting him to act generally
for the corporation. Nothing is better
settled than that a corporation may be bound
by its officer or agent acting in the
regular course of business, even though no
specific authority be granted by the board
of directors, if by subsequent action, the
board ratifies his acts, or acquiesces
therein and receives the benefits or
advantages of his actions [emphasis added]
[citations omitted].
Mid-States offered no evidence of the extent of
Edwards’s authority, except for the affidavit of Chairman Long,
which the trial court did not consider in granting summary
judgment in Mid-States’s favor.
There was no evidence as to the
conversations between Edwards and Mid-States as to its policy
regarding a non-business passenger traveling with an employee on
a business trip to allow a determination as to whether it was a
prohibited or accepted practice.
37
251 Ky. 754, 65 S.W.2d 990, 992 (1933).
-18-
In the case before us, the trial court granted summary
judgment after very limited discovery had occurred.
For Mid-
States to be entitled to a summary judgment, it must demonstrate
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
concerning Mid-States’s knowledge of Edwards’s travel practices
or concerning Edwards’s authority as an officer of Mid-States in
establishing travel policies.
Mid-States argues that the Bryant
Estate has produced no evidence that it knew Edwards would
travel with a non-business passenger.
However, it is undisputed
that Mid-States knew that Edwards’s wife accompanied Edwards
from time to time on business trips.
After viewing the facts in
this case in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment, we conclude there are genuine issues of
material fact as to Mid-States’s knowledge of Edwards’s travel
practices and Edwards’s authority in setting the travel
policies.
Thus, we reverse the summary judgment of the
Montgomery Circuit Court and remand this matter for trial.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Thomas K. Herren
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Anne A. Chesnut
Lexington, Kentucky
Curtis J. Dickinson
Woodstock, Georgia
-19-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS:
Thomas K. Herren
Lexington, Kentucky
-20-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.