GLENN THOMAS TAYLOR v. RHONDA LYNN TAYLOR
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RENDERED: May 5, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002054-MR
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002164-MR
GLENN THOMAS TAYLOR
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-502123
RHONDA LYNN TAYLOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002054-MR
AND
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002164-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Glenn Thomas Taylor brings this appeal from a
June 28, 2004, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
of the Jefferson Family Court regarding the division of property
incident to the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
entered July 15, 2003.
from the same order.
Rhonda Lynn Taylor brings a cross-appeal
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand Appeal No. 2004-CA-002054-MR.
We affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand Cross-Appeal No. 2004-CA-002164-MR.
Glenn and Rhonda Taylor married on August 21, 1991.
One week prior to the marriage, Glenn and Rhonda executed a
“Premarital Agreement” (agreement).
Pursuant to the agreement,
the parties disclosed and valued their respective assets.
Relevant to this appeal, Glenn disclosed the business of Air
Comfort Heating & Air Conditioning (Air Comfort), which Glenn
began in 1982.
Rhonda disclosed no assets.
Rhonda and Glenn’s
marriage was subsequently dissolved by decree of dissolution
entered July 15, 2003.
The decree reserved all property issues
for later adjudication.
The family court subsequently entered its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
Therein, the family
court addressed disposition of the parties’ assets, spousal
maintenance, and attorney’s fees.
The court found as follows:
The Court finds, therefore, that when
the business was sold for the gross sum of
$532,000, that sum represented a recoupment
by the Petitioner of $135,000 (25% of total
value) in nonmarital value and the receipt
by the parties of $397,000 (75% of total
value) in marital equity. Of the $478,200
net proceeds realized, $119,500 (25%) is the
Respondent’s nonmarital property and
$358,700 (75%) is the parties [sic] marital
property.
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The court divided the marital property interest by awarding
sixty percent (60%) to Glenn and forty percent (40%) to Rhonda.
This appeal follows.
APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002054-MR
Glenn contends the family court erroneously determined
the increase in the value of Air Comfort was marital property.
Glenn asserts the court improperly interpreted the agreement.
Specifically, Glenn asserts the agreement provided that Rhonda
“waives” all interest in property Glenn owned; thus, Rhonda
waived any and all property interest in Air Comfort, including
its increased value.
The parties’ agreement provided, in
relevant part, as follows:
For good and valuable consideration,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
and for the further consideration of the
solemnization of the proposed marriage
between the parties hereto, each party
hereto hereby waives, relinquishes, bars and
surrenders all of his or her right, title
and interest in and to the property now
owned by the other or traceable to said
property which property is specifically
listed in the exhibit schedules attached
hereto and made a part hereof (Exhibit
Schedule A is a list of the assets of
Intended Wife and Exhibit Schedule B is a
list of the assets of Intended Husband)
which interest or right shall, or may, be
hereinafter vested in said party because of
said marriage, as the husband, or wife, or
widower, or widow of the other party, and
consisting of dower, curtesy, homestead
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rights, right to act as administrator or
executor in the estate of the other, right
of statutory exemptions and all right, title
and interest in and to all lands, tenements,
hereditaments, and all other property of
every nature that the other party now owns.
(Emphasis added).
Exhibit B of the agreement described the business of
Air Comfort as follows:
The business of Air Comfort Heating & Air
Conditioning, including inventory which
would be valued at any time approximately
$65,000.00.
Premarital (also referred to as prenuptial) agreements
are generally enforceable in Kentucky.
S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990).
Gentry v. Gentry, 798
In Gentry, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that premarital agreements are subject to three limitations
including whether the agreement is obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation, whether the agreement is unconscionable on
its face, or whether the facts and circumstances have changed
since the agreement was entered into so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable.
Id.
The family court made
no findings regarding the enforceability of the agreement and
since the family court did allocate a nonmarital value for Air
Comfort to Glenn, we can only assume that the family court
determined the premarital agreement to be valid and enforceable.2
2
The record on appeal is meager at best. An arbitrator was assigned by the
family court to hear all proof in this proceeding. However, no transcript or
record of these proceedings was preserved or included in the record on
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It is well-established that interpretation of a
contract is a matter of law to be decided by the court.
First
Com. Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829 (Ky.App. 2000).
In the case sub judice, the operative language of the agreement
clearly states that Rhonda waived all interest in the property
Glenn owned and all interest traceable to said property.
The
specific language “waives. . . all . . . interest in and to
property” can only be reasonably interpreted as meaning any and
all interest in the other’s property, including any increase in
the value of Air Comfort.
Any other interpretation would
completely disregard the clear intent of the parties as
expressed through the agreement.
In light of the foregoing language of the agreement,
we conclude the family court erred as a matter of law in its
interpretation of the parties’ agreement.
In sum, we hold that
absent a showing that the agreement was invalid or should be
modified, Rhonda “waived” all property interest in Air Comfort,
including any increase in the value of the business during the
marriage.
See Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky.App. 2001).
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002164-MR
Rhonda contends on cross-appeal that the family court
erred by ordering Glenn to pay only a portion of her attorney’s
appeal. We, thus, are limited to reviewing the findings and conclusions made
by the arbitrator which were recommended to and adopted by the family court.
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fees.
Specifically, Rhonda asserts that the court erred by
ordering Glenn to pay only $7,500.00 of the $24,125.85 in
attorney’s fees incurred by her.
When attorney’s fees are awarded directly to the
attorney, the attorney is the real party in interest and, thus,
an indispensable party to an appeal from the award.
v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001).
Neidlinger
If, however, the fees
are awarded to the client as reimbursement for fees previously
paid, the client is the real party in interest and the attorney
need not be named.
Id.
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment, the family court held:
The Petitioner [Glenn] shall pay the
sum of $7,500 as a contribution toward the
attorney’s fees of the Respondent [Rhonda]
from his separate assets awarded in this
Judgment. This sum shall be paid on or
before thirty (30) days from and after entry
of this Judgment. This sum shall be paid to
and is enforceable in the name of
Respondent’s [Rhonda’s] counsel. Each party
shall otherwise pay their own attorney’s
fees and other costs incurred in this
action. (Emphasis added).
In the above judgment, it is clear that the court awarded the
attorney’s fees directly to Rhonda’s attorney and not to Rhonda
as reimbursement for fees previously paid.
Under these
circumstances, it was necessary to name Rhonda’s attorney as a
party to this cross-appeal.
See Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513.
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As
Rhonda’s attorney was not named a party, we decline to address
the merits of Rhonda’s contention regarding attorney’s fees.
Rhonda next asserts the family court erred by not
awarding maintenance.
Specifically, Rhonda asserts the court
failed to make the necessary findings of fact and abused its
discretion in denying maintenance.
Whether to award maintenance is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court.
S.W.2d 823 (Ky.App. 1977).
Browning v. Browning, 551
However, it is well-settled that a
maintenance award must satisfy the elements of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 403.200(a) and (b).
728 (Ky. App. 1986).
Drake v. Drake, 721 S.W.2d
To award maintenance under KRS 403.200(a)
and (b), the court must find: (1) the spouse seeking maintenance
lacks sufficient property, including the marital property
apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable needs; and (2)
is unable to support herself through appropriate employment.
Id.
As the family court treated a portion of Air Comfort as
marital property and allocated a part thereof to Rhonda, which
we have found to be in error, we believe it proper to vacate the
family court’s decision not to award maintenance and remand for
consideration in light of this Court’s opinion holding that Air
Comfort is the nonmarital property of Glenn.
Hollon, 623 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1981).
See Hollon v.
We do not reach the merits
of a maintenance award nor do we suggest by this opinion that
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maintenance is warranted.
We simply hold that on remand the
family court should make necessary findings upon reaching its
decision in accordance with KRS 403.200.
For the foregoing reasons, the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Jefferson Family Court in
Appeal No. 2004-CA-002054-MR is affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion, and Cross-Appeal No. 2004-CA-002164-MR is affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
John Allen Taylor
Thomas B. Merrill
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas V. Haile
Louisville, Kentucky
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