VICKI WILSON; TAMMY PRICE v. HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY; EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE CORPORATION and VICKI WILSON; TAMMY PRICE v. KENTUCKY SCHOOL BOARDS INSURANCE TRUST (EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION); EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION; HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 21, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
FEBRUARY 11, 2004 (2003-SC-0293-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2000-CA-001826-MR
VICKI WILSON; TAMMY PRICE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01349
HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY;
EMPLOYERS’ REINSURANCE CORPORATION
APPELLEES
AND:
NO.
2001-CA-001033-MR
VICKI WILSON; TAMMY PRICE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01349
KENTUCKY SCHOOL BOARDS INSURANCE
TRUST (EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION);
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION;
HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING AND
DISMISSING APPEALS
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
APPELLEES
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellants, Vickie Wilson and Tammy Price
(hereinafter “Appellants”), seek review of orders of the
Franklin Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the
Appellee insurers on the issue of coverage under an educator’s
liability policy, and dismissing claims for bad faith, outrage,
wrongful use of civil proceedings, concert of action and
conspiracy, in this consolidated appeal.1
Finding no error, we
affirm.
On November 4, 1998, Appellants filed a Complaint and
Motion for Declaratory Judgment in the Franklin Circuit Court
naming the Kentucky School Board Insurance Trust (“KSBIT”)2,
Employers’ Reinsurance Corporation (“ERC”), and Horace Mann as
defendants (hereinafter, the “Appellee insurers”).
Appellants
sought a declaration that certain policies of insurance provided
coverage for their judgment against the insured, Tony Luttrell,
1
No. 2000-CA-001826 is the appeal from the trial court’s June 5, 2000
order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee insurers with
respect to the coverage issue. By order entered July 19, 2000, the
trial court amended its June 5, 2000 order to the effect that summary
judgment was granted only on the contractual claims, and did not
affect the remaining extra-contractual claims. No. 2001-CA-001033 is
the appeal from the circuit court’s order dated April 26, 2001,
dismissing the extra-contractual claims.
2
KSBIT is a trust which administers a self-insured pool; however, we
shall refer to KSBIT, ERC and Horace Mann as the Appellee insurers,
for ease of reference. By order of this Court entered May 2, 2001 in
No. 2000-CA-001826, KSBIT was dismissed as a party to that appeal.
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an Edmonson County High School teacher, for sexual misconduct.3
Appellants also sought damages for common law bad faith,
statutory bad faith (violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act), outrage, wrongful use of civil proceedings, and
concert of action and conspiracy.
On July 23, 1999, the Franklin Circuit Court entered an
order granting the Appellee insurers’ motion to bifurcate the
plaintiff’s extra-contractual claims from the declaratory judgment
action.
APPEAL NO. 2000-CA-001826 – THE COVERAGE ISSUE
On June 5, 2000, the Franklin Circuit Court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee insurers:
FACTS
In November of 1998 plaintiffs filed suit
against ERC, Kentucky School Board Trust
[KSBIT], and Horace Mann . . . seeking a
declaratory judgment that the policies issued
by the defendant insurers provide coverage for
a judgment entered against Mr. Tony Luttrell
in federal court. The insured, formerly
employed as a teacher . . . was found liable
to . . . Wilson on claims of civil rights
violations, third degree sexual abuse, and
indecent exposure, and to . . . Price on
claims of civil rights violations, assault,
battery, and third degree sexual abuse.
3
On August 5, 1998, judgment was entered in the US District Court for
the Western District of Kentucky at Bowling Green, for Wilson in the
amount of $51,000.00 compensatory damages and $100,000.00 punitive
damages, and for Price in the amount of $100,000.00 compensatory
damages, and $200,000.00 punitive damages.
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A judgment in the amount of $451,000, as
well as attorneys’ fees and costs, has been
entered in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky. The
plaintiffs as third party beneficiaries, now
seek to recover this judgment from ERC under
the terms of the insured’s policy coverage.
In order to prevail on their claim, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the sexual
abuse perpetrated by Mr. Luttrell
constitutes an “educational employment
activity” and is therefore covered by the
insurance contract.
JUDGMENT
The issue of whether sexual misconduct by a
schoolteacher constitutes an “educational
employment activity” is a matter of first
impression in Kentucky.
The insurance contract provides that . . .
in order for the policy to be triggered, the
loss for which recovery is being sought must
derive from an “educational employment
activity.” The policy defines “educational
employment activities” in pertinent part as
“activities of the insured performed . . .
pursuant to the express or implied terms of
his or her employment by an educational unit
. . . at the express request or with the
express approval of his or her supervisor,
. . . or as a member of a state board or
commission. . . ."
. . . .
The California Court of Appeals addressed
this very issue of policy construction in
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Analisa N., 214 Cal.
App.3d 850, 263 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal.Ct.App.
1989). In Analisa, the insured was a third
grade teacher who was alleged to have
sexually abused one of his students on
school property. The defendant’s insurance
carrier sought a declaratory judgment
seeking a determination that it had no duty
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to pay any judgment entered against the
teacher. Id., at 852. The trial court
found that the teacher’s conduct was not
within the coverage provided by the policy.
The decision was affirmed by the appellate
court which held:
Contrary to Analisa’s argument, . . .
the plain language of the policy
requires at the very least, that an
insured event occur while the teacher
is engaged in an activity which is
reasonably related to the goal of
educating children. This conclusion
is suggested not only by the language
of the insuring clause and the
applicable definitions, which as we
have seen, restrict coverage to
activities performed pursuant to the
terms of the teacher’s employment,
but by the very name of the policy –
“Educator’s Employment Liability
Policy.” Given its terms and its
title we do not believe a reasonable
insured could expect that exclusively
personal pursuits would be protected
by the policy . . . we cannot fathom
a more personal activity less related
to the goal of education than [the
teacher’s] acts.
214 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 263 Cal. Rptr. at
64.
Further support for this position is found
in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. D.A.C., 710 So.2d
1274 (Ala. Civ. App., 1998), in which the
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama held
coverage under Horace Mann’s Educator’s
Employment Liability Policy was not
triggered because a teacher’s acts of
sexually molesting a student were not
“educational employment activities” as
defined in the policy. Id., at 274 [sic].
In reaching this decision, the court held
that “sexually abusive acts ‘were not of the
kind [a school employee] was employed to
perform’ and were not ‘motivated . . . by a
purpose to serve the employer.’” Id., at
- 5 -
1275 (citing Worchester Ins. Co. v. Fells
Acres Day School, Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 558
N.E. 2d 958 (1990)).
Finally, the Court relies upon Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Fore, 785 F.Supp. 947 (M.D. Ala
1992), where the district court held that a
teacher’s sexually abusive acts do not
constitute “educational employment activity”
within the meaning of an insurance
policy. . . .
In addition to the reasons set forth above,
this Court also believes that public policy
demands the result reached in this case. To
find liability on the insurance carrier
would subsidize sexual abuse of
schoolchildren at the ultimate expense of
other insureds to whom the added costs of
indemnifying sex offenders will be passed
and would have the effect of providing
insurance coverage for intentional criminal
acts. While the Court is sympathetic to the
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, these
sympathies do not justify holding the
insurance carrier liable for the sexual
abuse committed by Mr. Luttrell.
Any argument presented by the parties,
whether addressed in this opinion or not,
has been reviewed and considered by this
Court.
For these reasons, the defendants’ Motion
for summary Judgment is GRANTED and this
matter is DISMISSED. (Emphasis original).
By order entered July 18, 2000, the above order was
amended to the extent that the plaintiffs’ claims for coverage
under the specific contractual language of the policies written
by ERC and Horace Mann were dismissed; however, the remaining
claims for “common law bad faith, statutory bad faith, outrage,
wrongful use of civil proceedings, concert of action and
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conspiracy, and concert of action” were not dismissed or
affected.
On August 2, 2000, Appellants filed a notice of appeal
to this court.
On appeal, they make a variety of arguments in
an attempt to persuade us to construe the policy to provide
coverage.
First, they argue that public policy should allow
insurance coverage for the sexual abuse of children, because
insurance coverage is available for the sexual harassment of
adult female workers.
Appellants also contend that allowing
coverage would not “subsidize sexual abuse of schoolchildren,”
as the trial court believed.
We disagree.
In Thompson v. West American Insurance Company,4 this
court held, in determining the issue of coverage under a
homeowner’s policy:
[It] is inconceivable that a criminal act of
sexual molestation, the essence of which is
the gratification of sexual desire, could
possibly be an "occurrence" for purposes of
insurance coverage.
. . . .
We believe that sexual molestation is so
inherently injurious, or substantially
certain to result in some injury, that the
intent to injure, or the expectation that
injury will result, can be inferred as a
matter of law.
4
Ky., 839 S.W.2d 579 (1992).
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. . . .
Because we hold there is not coverage under
the insurance contract for Thompson's
alleged acts of sexual molestation, we need
not discuss the application of the
"intentional loss" exception of the
insurance contract. However, our holding
that sexual molestation is an intentional
act and the harm resulting therefrom is
likewise intended, would be applicable to
any such inquiry.5
Although Thompson was Kentucky's first incursion into
the field of insurance-child molestation law, it was nothing new
to many state and federal courts.6
The majority view follows
the inferred-intent approach:
[A] person who sexually manipulates a minor
cannot expect his insurer to cover his
misconduct and cannot obtain such coverage
simply by saying that he did not mean any
harm. The courts following the majority
approach have concluded that sexual
misconduct with a minor is objectively so
substantially certain to result in harm to
the minor victim, that the perpetrator
cannot be allowed to escape society's
determination that he or she is expected to
5
Id. at 581.
6
Goldsmith v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Ohio, Ky. App., 890
S.W.2d 644, 645 (1995). Goldsmith dealt with the issue of the
applicability of the “inferred intent rule” when the insured
asserts an incapacity to form an intent. Goldsmith extended
Thompson to reflect the approach that, in cases “such as child
sexual abuse, where the insured’s conduct is both intentional and
of such a nature and character that harm inheres in it,” there is
no need for a separate inquiry into capacity. Id. at 646-47.
- 8 -
know that. Hence, these courts infer the
intent to harm as a matter of law in sexual
misconduct liability insurance cases
involving minors.7
In Goldsmith, this Court rejected the argument that
public policy should not preclude recovery, responding with a
quote from Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Fore.8
“Forcing the insurer
to indemnify the insured ‘subsidizes the episodes of sexual
abuse of which its victims complain, at the ultimate expense of
other insureds to whom the added costs of indemnifying child
molesters will be passed.’”
9
Fore is among the authorities relied upon by the trial
court in determining that there is no coverage in this case.
Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in that regard.
The trial court's interpretation of the insurance policy is a
question of law which we review de novo.10
Evaluation of an
educator’s liability policy requires consideration of the
particular policy provisions, as does any coverage analysis.
In
claims made against teachers, the analysis includes whether the
teacher’s acts were within the meaning of educational employment
7
Id. at 646, quoting from Whitt v. DeLeu, 707 F.Supp. 1011
(W.D.Wis.1989).
8
785 F.Supp. 947, 956 (1992).
9
Id. at 647.
10
Cinelli v. Ward, Ky. App., 997 S.W.2d 474 (1998).
- 9 -
activities.
Courts have consistently held that a teacher
engaging in sexual molestation is not acting within his
educational employment activities.11
Our coverage analysis does
not lead us to a contrary result in the case sub judice.
[I]n this state doubts concerning the
meaning of contracts of insurance are
resolved in favor of the insured. State
Auto. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ellis, Ky. App.,
700 S.W.2d 801, 803 (1985). But, in the
absence of ambiguities or of a statute to
the contrary, the terms of an insurance
policy will be enforced as drawn. Osborne v.
Unigard Indemnity Co., Ky. App., 719 S.W.2d
737, 740 (1986); Woodard v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., Ky., 239 S.W.2d 267, 269 (1951).
Unless the terms contained in an insurance
policy have acquired a technical meaning in
law, they "must be interpreted according to
the usage of the average man and as they
would be read and understood by him in the
light of the prevailing rule that
uncertainties and ambiguities must be
resolved in favor of the insured." Fryman v.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., Ky., 704 S.W.2d 205,
206 (1986). Although restrictive
interpretation of a standardized adhesion
contract is not favored, neither is it the
function of the courts to make a new
contract for the parties to an insurance
contract. Moore v. Commonwealth Life Ins.
Co., Ky. App., 759 S.W.2d 598, 599 (1988).
Under the "doctrine of reasonable
expectations," an insured is entitled to all
the coverage he may reasonably expect to be
provided according to the terms of the
11
Harold A. Weston, Annotation Educator’s Liability Insurance, 94
A.L.R.5th 567 (2001).
- 10 -
policy. Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.,
Ky., 743 S.W.2d 835, 839 (1987).12
The insuring agreement in the ERC contract states:
Employers’ Reinsurance Corporation, called
ERC in the contract, agrees to provide the
insured, as defined in Part II(H) below,
with the coverages shown on the declarations
page in return for the payment of the
premium, and subject to the limits of
liability, exclusions, conditions and other
terms of this contract.
Coverage A, entitled “Educators liability” provides:
ERC agrees to pay on behalf of the insured
any and all loss, subject to the limit of
liability, as set out in the declarations
page for Coverage A. Such loss must be
sustained by the insured by reason of
liability imposed by law for damage caused
by an occurrence in the course of the
insured’s educational employment activities.
(Emphasis original).
“Educational employment activities,” is defined under
the ERC contract.
The applicable provision states:
The term “Educational Employment Activities”
means
the
activities
of
the
Insured
performed:
1. Pursuant to the express or implied terms
of his or her employment by an educational
unit. (Emphasis original).
12
Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Ky. App., 823 S.W.2d 937,
938 (1991).
- 11 -
An educational unit is also defined under the ERC
contract; for our purposes, the term “Educational Unit” means a
school district.
The “Insuring Agreements” provision in the Horace Mann
contract provides:
Horace Mann Insurance Company, called we in
this contract, agrees to provide the
insured, as defined in part II(H) below,
with the coverages shown on the declarations
page in return for the payment of the
premium, and subject to the limits of
coverage, exclusions, conditions and all
other terms of the contract.
Section III “Coverages” of the Horace Mann contract
states:
In this part we indicate the contract
coverages subject to the exclusions,
conditions, limits of coverage and other
terms of this contract.
A. EDUCATORS LIABILITY. We agree to pay all
damages which you shall become legally
required to pay as a result of any claim:
Which comes from an occurrence in the course
of your educational employment activities;
and which is caused by your acts or
omissions or those of other persons for
whose acts you are held liable, not to
exceed the limit of coverage stated in the
declarations for this coverage.
“Educational employment activities” is defined
under the Horace Mann contract.
The applicable provision
states:
EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES. The term
“Educational Employment Activities” means
the activities of the insured performed:
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1. Pursuant to the express or implied terms
of his or her employment by an educational
unit; (emphasis original).
An educational unit is also defined under the Horace
Mann contract; for our purposes, it means a school district.
As noted by the trial court, the California Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of policy construction with which we
are now confronted in Analisa N.13
abuse of a third grade pupil.
The case involved sexual
At the time of the abuse, the
teacher was covered by an “Educators Employment Liability
Policy.”
The insurer sought summary judgment, in the
declaratory judgment action, asserting that the teacher’s
conduct was not within the coverage provided by the policy;
further, that sexual abuse was barred by an intentional acts
exclusion and a provision of the Insurance Code.
As in the case
sub judice, the policy in Analisa N. provided coverage for “all
damages which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as a result of any claim arising out of an occurrence in the
course of the insured’s educational employment activities, and
caused by any acts or omissions of the insured or any other
person for whose acts the insured is legally liable.”14
13
Supra.
14
Id., 214 Cal. App.3d at 851.
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Coverage
there, as here, depended upon whether the teacher’s acts
occurred in the course of activities performed pursuant to the
express or implied terms of his employment as a teacher.
In analyzing the issue, the California court
considered the doctrine of reasonable expectations which
requires construction of the policy so as to give the insured
the protection he reasonably had a right to expect.
Despite its
sympathy for Analisa’s injuries, the court declined to expand
the risks assumed by the insurer in issuing a policy to the
teacher.
A reasonable insured could not expect that
“exclusively personal pursuits” would be protected by the
policy.
At the very least, the policy required that an insured
event occur “while the teacher is engaged in an activity . . .
reasonably related to the goal of educating children.”15
The
California court could not fathom a more personal activity less
related to that goal than the teacher’s acts.
Nor can we.
As
the court stated in Fore, it is “intuitively obvious” that
sexual abuse is not an activity concerned with education.”16
We conclude that no coverage exists for Luttrell’s
acts, under the plain language of the ERC and Horace Mann
15
Id., 214 Cal. App.3d at 856.
16
Supra, at 948.
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contracts; accordingly, we do not discuss the remaining issues
on appeal in No. 2000-CA-001826.
APPEAL NO. 2001-CA-001033 – THE EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
In an Opinion and Order entered April 26, 2001, the
trial court entered summary judgment for the Appellee insurers,
explaining that:
During the course of this litigation [in
federal court against Luttrell], it was
revealed that Wilson had committed perjury
in several earlier proceedings. Based upon
this information, leave was sought and
granted by the district court for Luttrell
to file a counter claim. It is the
defendants’ [insurers] involvement in this
suit which forms the basis of the present
action.
On January 12, 1998, Wilson moved for
summary judgment on the counterclaims. In
an order issued on March 24, 1998, the
district court granted summary judgment on
the false light and wrongful use of civil
proceedings claims but allowed Luttrell’s
outrage and abuse of process claims to
proceed.
A trial was conducted and on May 6, 1998,
the jury found Luttrell liable for sexual
misconduct and returned an award in [sic]
favor of Price and Wilson. At this time the
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the
remaining counterclaims. The district court
granted this motion.
Luttrell’s insurance carriers, KSBIT, ERC,
and Horace Mann, each denied coverage for
the intentional torts. Suit was filed in
this Court contesting this denial, and on
June 5, 2000, the Court granted summary
judgment to the defendant insurers, holding
that the policies did not indemnify sexual
misconduct.
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The plaintiffs have now filed suit alleging
the torts of outrage, concert of action and
conspiracy, as well as bad faith, the
wrongful use of civil proceedings, and
waiver of the defendants’ reservation of
rights. . . . [T]he Court now grants the
defendants summary judgment.
On this appeal, Appellants raise numerous issues
involving the extra-contractual claims.
In a nutshell, they
contend:
[D]efending a sexual predator under a
reservations of rights while actively
financing and participating in a
counterclaim against the predator’s victim
is not only actionable under the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act but is
conduct that is outrageous and, because the
counterclaim has now been terminated in
favor of Vickie Wilson, it is grounds for
wrongful use of civil proceedings. Because
all of the insurance companies acted
together, they are liable for conspiracy and
concert of action.
We will refer to the record as only as necessary to
resolve the issues before us.
First, Appellants contend that
the Appellee insurers cannot meet their burden of proving, on a
summary judgment motion, that “it would be impossible for the
Plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to support their
claim.”
Appellants do not explain what evidence they had hoped
to produce, but contend that summary judgment is premature,
because there is “not enough evidence of record . . . [to] make
an informed decision” on the extra-contractual issues.
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The standard for summary judgment is
abundantly clear in Kentucky. A movant must
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. CR 56.03. The record must be viewed in
a light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion for a summary judgment and all
doubts must be resolved in favor of that
party. . . . When any claim has no
substance, or controlling facts are not in
dispute, a summary judgment can be proper.17
In deciding the motion, the trial court assumed the
evidence to be in Appellants’ favor – specifically that the
Appellee insurers “not only had knowledge of the counterclaim,
but also approved and actively participated in its litigation.”
The trial court appropriately entered summary judgment, as more
fully discussed below, because Appellants’ various theories were
either legally insufficient or unsupported by competent legal
authority.
Next, Appellants contend that the Appellee insurers
violated the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (“UCSPA”),
because they “authorized, funded, approved and actively
participated in a counterclaim on behalf of the perpetrator”
while defending under a reservation of rights.18
17
In addition,
Com. v. Whitworth, Ky. 74 S.W.3d 695, 698 (2002).
18
Horace Mann explains that it was initially misinformed by the
Kentucky Education Association that the date of Luttrell’s
participation was outside its coverage period. Horace Mann advises
that it did not participate in Luttrell’s defense, because judgment
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
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Appellants contend that Horace Mann also violated the statute,
by not opening a claims file and by failing to “adopt and
implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of
claims arising under its insurance policy.”
The trial court
held that:
Even if the plaintiffs could prove that
Horace Mann violated the UCSPA by not
opening a file, there simply is no evidence
the plaintiffs suffered any harm as a
result. Further there is no evidence Horace
Mann was reckless or acted with improper
motive by not opening a claim file.
Likewise the UCSPA does not provide a cause
of action against either KSBIT or ERC. . . .
this Court has already ruled that denial of
coverage was appropriate. Therefore, this
claim must fail as a matter of law.
Kentucky law holds:
[T]here is no such thing as a "technical
violation" of the UCSPA, at least in the
sense of establishing a private cause of
action for tortious misconduct justifying a
claim of bad faith:
"[A]n insured must prove three
elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for
alleged refusal in bad faith to
pay the insured's claim: (1) the
insurer must be obligated to pay
the claim under the terms of the
policy; (2) the insurer must lack
a reasonable basis in law or fact
for denying the claim; and (3) it
must be shown that the insurer
had already been entered in the federal district court action, by the
time Horace Mann received corrected information.
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either knew there was no
reasonable basis for denying the
claim or acted with reckless
disregard for whether such a basis
existed.... [A]n insurer is ...
entitled to challenge a claim and
litigate it if the claim is
debatable on the law or the
facts."
This is a quote from Leibson, J., in
dissent, in Federal Kemper, supra, 711
S.W.2d at 846-47, stating views which were
incorporated by reference in this Court's
Majority Opinion in Curry v. Fireman's Fund,
784 S.W.2d at 178. It applies to a claim of
bad faith made by an insured against his own
insurer, and a fortiori to a third-party's
claim of bad faith against an insurance
company.19
We agree with the trial court that these claims must
fail as a matter of law, because the Appellee insurers were not
obligated to pay the claim under the terms of the policy.
The next argument is that the Appellee insurers
“subjected themselves to direct liability for wrongful use of
civil proceedings” by authorizing and financing the counterclaim
against Wilson.
An essential element of the wrongful use of
civil proceedings is that the tortfeasor acted without probable
cause in the prior lawsuit.
for the court to decide.20
The existence of probable cause is
Wilson provides no authority for her
19
Wittmer v. Jones, Ky. 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (1993).
20
Prewitt v. Sexton, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 891, 894 (1989).
- 19 -
assertion that there is “never probable cause” for insurance
companies defending under a reservation of rights to pursue “a
separate bifurcated tort claim against its insured’s victim.”
The trial court found that the (lack of) probable cause
requirement could not be satisfied as a matter of law, because
the counterclaim was filed with the trial court’s permission
based upon the admitted perjury of Wilson.
The trial court
determined, as a matter of law, that the defendants had probable
cause for bringing the countersuit.
We find no error.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ next argument,
that ERC is estopped from asserting a reservation of rights, for
its alleged failure to disclose its reservation of rights letter
to Wilson and Price.
One of the basic elements of an estoppel
is that the person claiming it must have been prejudiced by the
action of the person against whom it is asserted.21
do not claim any prejudice in this regard.
Appellants
Nor do they cite any
authority that an insurer is required to notify persons claiming
against the insured of a reservation of rights.22
21
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., Ky., 451
S.W.2d 616, 622 (1970).
22
We note in the record a letter from Luttrell’s counsel, Winter Huff,
to Appellants’ counsel, dated October 7, 1998, which states, in part:
As I previously explained in my letter of September 11,
1998, I did not deliberately omit supplementation of those
responses to discovery. Rather, I simply did not recall a
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
- 20 -
Nor are we persuaded by the argument that the Appellee
insurers waived their reservation of rights by filing a
counterclaim against Wilson in the federal district court
action.
The trial court stated that “the plaintiffs have been
unable to cite any statutes or case law from this jurisdiction
to support their position.
Absent such authority this Court is
unable to conclude the defendants have waived their rights and
will not impose liability.”
Nor will we.
We find no error.
Appellants also argue that a fiduciary relationship
existed between them and the Appellee insurers, and that “an
egregious breach” of that relationship occurred rising to the
level of outrage.
Presumably, the basis for this claim is the
filing of the counterclaim against Wilson in the federal
district court action.
The trial court found as a matter of law
that the action of the defendants could not be deemed
particular request for a reservation of rights letter made
more than two years earlier, and further, you had long
since been well aware by that time of the fact that the
insurers were defending under a reservation of rights, and
denying coverage for your clients’ claims against Mr.
Luttrell. You were made so aware verbally by both me and
by representatives of the insurers, at least as early as
May of 1995, when you sought to join ERC as a defendant in
this action. Further, as I have explained to you ad
nauseam, I do not represent ERC, and had advised you I had
no objection to your communications directly with the
insurers. By May of 1995, it was well established that you
were in direct communication with the insurers, and had
been advised of the lack of coverage for your clients’
claims. (Emphasis original).
- 21 -
intolerable or outrageous in a civilized community,23 because the
counterclaim was based upon Wilson’s admissions that she had
committed perjury on several prior occasions.
“These admitted
lies provided a solid factual basis for the filing of a
counterclaim.”
We agree.
The trial court properly dismissed
this claim, because a requisite element of outrage cannot be
satisfied.
The trial court also properly dismissed the remaining
claims for conspiracy and concert of action, having concluded
that they too failed as a matter of law.
Conspiracy requires an
agreement to do by concerted action an unlawful act24; as the
trial court stated, “the filing of a judicially authorized
counterclaim is not an unlawful act.”
Further, concert of
action involves a tortious act in concert with another,25 and the
trial court would “not construe the filing of a judicially
authorized counterclaim as a tortious act.”
Having determined that the trial court properly
entered summary judgment for the Appellee insurers on the
coverage issue and on the extra-contractual claims, the
remaining discovery-related issues are rendered moot.
23
Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984).
24
McDonald v. Goodman, Ky. App., 239 S.W.2d 97 (1955).
- 22 -
We affirm
the Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court entered June
5, 2000, as amended by Order entered July 18, 2000, and the
Opinion and Order entered April 26, 2001, and dismiss these
consolidated appeals.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: March 21, 2003
_/s/ David A. Barber____
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
J. Dale Golden
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, HORACE
MANN INSURANCE COMPANY:
James W. Taylor
Lexington, Kentucky
W. Brian Burnette
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE CORPORATION:
Kristin R. Connor
Atlanta, Georgia
J. Randolph Evans
Atlanta, Georgia
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, KENTUCKY
SCHOOL BOARDS INSURANCE TRUST:
Robert E Stopher
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert D. Bobrow
Louisville, Kentucky
25
Farmer v. City of Newport, Ky. App., 748 S.W.2d 162 (1988).
- 23 -
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