COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. TOYA M. BEELER
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RENDERED: October 2, 1998; 2:00 p.m.
MODIFIED: October 23, 1998; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 18, 1999 (98-SC-000971)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court Of Appeals
NO.
1997-CA-002988-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS G. PAISLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-1000
TOYA M. BEELER
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
The Commonwealth appeals an order of the
Fayette Circuit Court probating the five-year sentence imposed
upon Toya Beeler after her conviction for welfare fraud and
second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO II).
The
Commonwealth argues that the court erred when it found Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 532.080 unconstitutional and that Beeler
was eligible for probation.
After reviewing the record, the
applicable law, and the arguments of counsel, we vacate and
remand.
A grand jury indicted Beeler for welfare fraud and PFO
II on September 9, 1997.
According to evidence in the record,
Beeler failed to report a change in her eligibility and
continued to receive AFDC, food stamps, and medical benefits
when she was not entitled to them.
Approximately $8,000.00 of
the $13,459.52 she received was in the form of medical benefits
resulting from her hospitalization for diabetes.
The PFO II
charge was based on a 1993 conviction for second-degree
burglary.
On September 26, 1997, Beeler withdrew her former
plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty.
The
Commonwealth recommended a one-year sentence on the first count,
enhanced to five years under the PFO II count, and restitution.
The court accepted her guilty plea and set a date for sentencing.
At sentencing, Beeler asked the court to consider
probating her sentence.
The Commonwealth objected, arguing that
Beeler was ineligible under KRS 532.080.
The court stated that
it was considering probation, but could only do so by declaring
the statute unconstitutional.
The court advised the defendant
to serve notice on the Attorney General of her constitutional
challenge to KRS 532.080.
See, Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky.
App., 947 S.W.2d 416 (1997).
The court continued the matter,
and Beeler filed a written motion for probation challenging the
constitutionality of KRS 532.080 with service on the Attorney
General.
By order entered November 17, 1997, the court
sentenced Beeler to one year for welfare fraud, enhanced the
sentence to five years on the PFO II count, probated the
sentence for five years, and ordered her to pay restitution.
This appeal followed.
The Commonwealth maintains that Beeler was ineligible
for probation under KRS 532.080(5), and that the statute is
constitutional.
We agree.
Having pleaded guilty to PFO II, Beeler’s sentence is
determined by KRS 532.080(5).
Under that statute,
A person who is found to be a persistent
felony offender in the second degree shall
be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing
provisions of KRS 532.060(2) for the next
highest degree than the offense for which
convicted. A person who is found to be a
persistent felony offender in the second
degree shall not be eligible for probation,
shock probation, or conditional discharge.
(Emphasis added).
Under the express language of the statute,
Beeler was not eligible for probation.
The circuit court declared the statute
unconstitutional and granted Beeler probation because a
similarly situated PFO I defendant would have been eligible for
probation.
KRS 532.080(7) provides:
If the offense the person presently stands
convicted of is a Class A, B, or C felony, a
person who is found to be a persistent
felony offender in the first degree shall
not be eligible for probation, shock
probation, or conditional discharge, nor for
parole until having served a minimum term of
incarceration of not less than ten (10)
years.
(Emphasis added).
provision in 1994.
The General Assembly added the highlighted
1994 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 396, Section 11,
House Bill 390.
KRS 532.080(5), relating to second-degree PFOs,
remained unchanged.
The legislature amended KRS 532.080 again in 1996.
1996 Kentucky Acts, Chapter 427, House Bill 267, effective April
4, 1996.
The 1996 amendment made the 1994 amendment
retroactive.
Section 2 of the 1996 act reads: “Whereas this
statute will reduce current prison and jail overcrowding, an
emergency is
declared to exist, and this Act takes effect upon
its passage and approval by the Governor or upon its otherwise
becoming law.”
The act became law on April 4, 1996.1
Thus, under the law as it existed in 1997, a defendant
with two prior felony convictions who stood convicted of a Class
D felony was eligible for probation, and would be eligible for
parole after serving twenty percent of his sentence.
KRS
532.080(6),(7), 501 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR)
1:030 Sec. 4(a).
A defendant with one prior felony conviction
who stood convicted of a Class D felony was not eligible for
probation, and would be eligible for parole after serving twenty
percent of his sentence.
KRS 532.080(5), 532.060(2); 501 KAR
1:030 Sec. 4(a).
The circuit court found that there was no rational
1The General Assembly amended the statute yet again in
1998. Effective July 15, 1998, both PFO I and PFO II defendants
are eligible for probation if all the offenses for which they
stand convicted are Class D felonies which do not involve a
violent act against a person. Omnibus Crime Bill, HB 455
section 76. The act did not make these changes retroactive.
Accordingly, this opinion will only address the statute as it
read at the time Beeler was sentenced in 1997.
basis for probation to be available to Class D PFO I defendants
but not Class D PFO II defendants, held the statute
unconstitutional, and probated Beeler.
The parties agree that
this is an equal protection claim subject to rational basis
scrutiny.
See Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently addressed this test in a
constitutional challenge to KRS 189A.010(1)(e), the DUI “zero
tolerance” law, which established a lower blood alcohol limit
for drivers under age 18.
Under the rational basis test, a
classification must be upheld against an
equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the
classification. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257
(1993), citing F.C.C. v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.
Ct. 2096, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993). . . .
In the appellate review of a statute
involving classification, the law must be
upheld against an equal protection challenge
if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.
Cf. Heller.
. . .
The state has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of
statutory classifications. Heller. A
statute is presumed constitutional. Heller,
citing Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 35 L. Ed.
2d 351 (1973).
Legislative classification is not subject
to a court-room fact-finding process and
"may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data."
Heller, quoting Beach Communications.
Merely because the statute may result in
some practical inequity does not cause it to
fail the rational basis test for review.
So long as the statute's generalization is
rationally related to the achievement of a
legitimate purpose, the statute is
constitutional. Cf. [Commonwealth v.] Smith,
[Ky., 875 S.W.2d 873 (1994),] supra. A state
does not violate the equal protection clause
merely because the classifications made by
the statutes are imperfect. Stephens v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., Ky.,
894 S.W.2d 624 (1995).
. . .
In order for the statute to survive an equal
protection challenge, the classification
must be rational and it must also be related
to achieving a legitimate state purpose.
Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 700, 703-704 (1998).
See
also, Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1992);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S. Ct.
1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d
282 (1973).
The parties agree that a rational basis exists for
classifying persistent felony offenders differently according to
the number of prior felonies they have committed.
This
classification serves the legitimate state purpose of punishing
more severely those defendants who repeatedly commit felonies.
This is not, however, the rationale the Commonwealth relies on
as the basis for making Class D felon PFO I defendants eligible
for probation but not Class D felon PFO II defendants.
Instead,
the Commonwealth first suggests that this choice is rationally
related to the state’s interest in eliminating prison
overcrowding.
We agree.
The 1994 amendment exempted Class D PFO I defendants
from the ban on probation and parole before ten years.
The 1996
act made this amendment retroactive, with the express intent of
reducing prison overcrowding.
Although prison overcrowding may
also have motivated the General Assembly when it passed the 1994
act, that rationale is not expressed in the language of the act
as it was in 1996.
Before the 1994 amendment, every defendant sentenced
as a PFO I was ineligible for probation and spent a mandatory
ten years in prison before becoming eligible for parole.
The
amendment not only made Class D felon PFO I defendants eligible
for parole earlier but also created the possibility that some
would not spend any time in prison.
Depending on the number of
PFO I and PFO II prisoners incarcerated at a given time, this
may not have been the best way to lessen overcrowding.
But as
Howard, supra, explains, to be constitutional the classification
does not have to be perfect and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
Although
the effect of this amendment may seem inequitable to those
defendants in Beeler’s position, it withstands rational basis
review.
Id.
We find that the 1994 amendment to KRS 532.080 was
rationally related to the legitimate state goal of reducing
prison overcrowding.
The Commonwealth also argues that the difference in
probation eligibility is rationally related to the state’s
interest in ameliorating harsh provisions of KRS 532.080(7).
Having concluded the first rationale offered by the Commonwealth
is sufficient, we need not address this argument.
Accordingly, since KRS 532.080(5) expressly prohibited
probation for second-degree PFO defendants like Beeler and is
constitutional, the circuit court erred in probating her fiveyear sentence.
We do not necessarily disagree with the circuit
court that, as a factual matter, probation was proper in this
case.
However, probation was not a legal option at the time
Beeler was sentenced.
The order of the circuit court is vacated
and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Sammie E. Pigg, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
Christopher M. Brown
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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