JERRY L. WILSON v. THYSSENKRUPP BUDD COMPANY; HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 23, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2005-CA-001567-WC
JERRY L. WILSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-00757
v.
THYSSENKRUPP BUDD COMPANY;
HON. R. SCOTT BORDERS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Jerry L. Wilson appeals from a June 24, 2005,
opinion and order by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board)
affirming a February 11, 2005, order by the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) dismissing his claim for benefits from his employer,
ThyssenKrupp Budd Company (ThyssenKrupp).
Wilson contends that
the issue of causation was not properly before the ALJ, that the
evidence was uncontradicted that his carpal tunnel syndrome was
caused by his employment, and that the ALJ applied the wrong
standard to determine causation.
We agree with Wilson that the
ALJ mischaracterized the proof necessary to establish causation.
Hence, we reverse the Board and remand for further findings by
the ALJ.
Wilson began working as a production associate/welder
for ThyssenKrupp in June 2000.
Prior to working for
ThyssenKrupp, Wilson served in the Army for twenty years, and in
a military-related job for several years thereafter.
During his
service in the military, Wilson broke his ankle (in 1976),
sustained a knee injury (in 1984), and sustained a back injury
(in 1993).
He re-injured his back in 1997 in a motor vehicle
accident.
Wilson testified he continued to have back symptoms
depending on the amount of activity.
In June 2001, while
working for ThyssenKrupp, Wilson sustained a right shoulder
injury and underwent treatment for a rotator cuff condition.
Wilson testified he was given medication and placed on light
duty, and the problem resolved.
He re-injured the shoulder in a
motor vehicle accident in August 2001, and underwent right
shoulder surgery in October 2001.
Wilson was assigned to a station using an air tool and
a grinder during the spring of 2002.
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He testified that he began
experiencing numbing sensations in his right hand in April.
Wilson also testified the numbness continued when he took a
break and his hand swelled to the point he could not close it.
Wilson tendered his resignation on May 10, 2002, informing
ThyssenKrupp that he could no longer perform his job duties due
to the problems with his hands.
He has not returned to paid
employment since that time.
Wilson first saw Dr. Joseph Mesa for complaints of
carpal tunnel syndrome on May 21, 2002.
He explained he saw Dr.
Mesa that day for follow-up for his shoulder surgery and advised
his doctor of the right hand symptoms.
Dr. Mesa performed
carpal tunnel release on April 5, 2004, and released Wilson to
physical activities in June 2004.
Dr. Mesa diagnosed Wilson with bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, worse on the right than left.
impairment at 1%.
He rated Wilson’s
Based on Wilson’s work-history involving
repetative motion and use of vibratory tools, Dr. Mesa opined
that Wilson’s employment was responsible for at least some of
the carpal tunnel symptoms, but he was unable to specify the
degree to which Wilson’s work contributed to the condition.
On cross-examination, Dr. Mesa was asked whether it
would be an indication there were other factors involved in his
symptoms if an individual continued to have symptoms two years
after he was no longer doing the specific work.
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Dr. Mesa
replied, “[t]here could be other factors.”
He explained there
would not be any way to discern what portion was due to work and
what portion was due to other factors.
Dr. Mesa agreed that the
continuation of symptoms after stopping work, and even
increasing over a period of two years after being out of the
working environment could be an indication other factors were
playing a part, if not a material part, of the problem.
On re-
direct examination, however, Dr. Mesa stated that he could not
relate Wilson’s carpal tunnel syndrome to any specific non-work
related factors.
The ALJ also considered the records of Dr. Paresh
Sheth, who treated Wilson in 2003.
The records of Dr. Sheth
indicate Wilson was seen on December 1, 2003, for nerve
conduction studies of bilateral upper extremities.
Dr. Sheth
received a history of 1 ½ years of hand numbness, tingling and
pain gradually worsening.
EMG/NCV studies were abnormal and
consistent with bilateral mild carpal tunnel syndrome with
involvement of bilateral median sensory fiber at the wrist
level.
There was no mention in Dr. Sheth’s records of Wilson’s
carpal tunnel syndrome originating from his work.
After reviewing the lay and medical evidence, the ALJ
found that Wilson was suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome.
However, the ALJ was not persuaded that Wilson met
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his burden of proving that the condition was caused by his work
for ThyssenKrupp:
Carpal tunnel syndrome, unlike in the case
of an amputation, for example, is not a
condition for which causation can be
inferred. As Dr. Mesa correctly set forth in
his testimony only, carpal tunnel syndrome
is a condition that can be multi-factorial.
In fact, Dr. Mesa could not state within
reasonable medical probability that the
Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
was caused by his work. The best he could
say was that the work at least in part
aggravated or perhaps even brought it into
disabling reality.
However, Dr. Mesa could not state within
reasonable medical certainty that it was the
direct and proximate cause.
Based on this finding, the ALJ dismissed Wilson’s
claim for benefits.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the ALJ in a
two-to-one opinion.
A majority of the Board found that the
evidence of work-relatedness did not compel a finding in
Wilson’s favor.
On appeal to this Court, Wilson again argues that the
ALJ erred by finding that he had failed to prove that his carpal
tunnel syndrome was causally related to his work.
Wilson first
argues that ThyssenKrupp did not contest the issue of causation,
and consequently the ALJ should not have considered it.
After
reviewing the record, the Board found, and we agree, that the
issue of causation was properly before the ALJ:
We disagree with Wilson that the issue of
causation was not preserved despite the fact
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that ThyssenKrupp did not argue lack of
causation in its brief before the ALJ.
ThyssenKrupp, in its Form 111, denied
Wilson’s claim on the grounds the injury
“did not arise out of and in the course of
employment.” Further, the Benefit Review
Conference order and memorandum entered on
December 9, 2004 specifically identified
“work relatedness/causation” as a “contested
issue.”
ThyssenKrupp does not contest the ALJ’s finding that
Wilson is suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
The
only issue concerns the sufficiency of Wilson’s proof on the
issue of work-relatedness.
The Board majority held that:
Since Wilson, the party with the burden
of proof, was unsuccessful on the issue of
work causation, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence on which he relies is
so compelling as to require the result he
seeks as a matter of law. Snawder v. Stice,
[356 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Ky.App. 1979)],
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d
735 (Ky.App. 1984). The ALJ, as fact finder,
has the sole authority to determine the
weight, credibility, substance, and
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695
S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985). Furthermore, the ALJ
has the absolute right to believe part of
the evidence and disbelieve other parts,
whether it comes from the same witness or
the same party’s total proof. Caudill v.
Maloney's Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15
(Ky. 1977). It is not enough to show that
there is some evidence which would support a
contrary conclusion. McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn
Corp., 514 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974). So long as
the ALJ’s opinion is supported by any
evidence or substance, ordinarily we may not
reverse. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d
641 (Ky. 1986).
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When the cause of a condition is not
readily apparent to a lay person, medical
testimony supporting causation is required.
Mengel v. Hawaiian-Tropic Northwest &
Central Distributors, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 184
(Ky. App. 1981). Medical causation must be
proven by medical opinion within “reasonable
medical probability.” Lexington Cartage Co.
v. Williams, 407 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1966). The
mere possibility of work-related causation
is insufficient. Pierce v. Kentucky
Galvanizing Co., Inc., 606 S.W.2d 165
(Ky.App. 1980).
The Board majority agreed that Dr. Mesa’s testimony
would support a finding of work-relatedness, but concluded that
it did not compel a finding in Wilson’s favor.
The dissenting
member Stanley agreed with this analysis, but was troubled by
the ALJ’s statement that “[c]arpal tunnel syndrome … is not a
condition for which causation can be inferred”.
The dissenting
member was concerned that the ALJ limited himself to considering
only medical evidence of causation, and improperly discounted
inferences from the medical and lay testimony that would support
a finding of work-relatedness.
We agree. In Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Scearce, 1 the
Supreme Court affirmed a decision by an ALJ who relied on a
combination of medical testimony and the work history provided
by the injured worker.
The ALJ’s decision was affirmed as being
supported by substantial evidence, even though the
1
896 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1995).
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uncontradicted medical opinion was that the condition was not
work-related.
Although the ALJ must consider the worker’s
medical condition when determining the extent of his
occupational disability at a particular point in time, the ALJ
is not required to rely on the vocational opinions of either the
medical experts or the vocational experts. A worker’s testimony
is competent evidence of his physical condition and of his
ability to perform various activities both before and after
being injured. 2
More recently, in Dravo Lime Co., Inc. v. Eakins, 3 the
Kentucky Supreme Court again emphasized that a finding of
causation need not be based solely on a physician's opinion. 4
Rather, an ALJ has the authority to infer causation based upon
all properly admitted evidence. 5
Consequently, the ALJ erred in
stating that the causation of Wilson’s carpal tunnel syndrome
could not be inferred.
The clear-error standard applies to a review of an
ALJ’s findings of fact.
6
A majority of the Board and the
dissenting Board member agreed that there was evidence which
would support a finding either that Wilson’s carpal tunnel
2
Id. at 9.
3
156 S.W.3d 283 (Ky. 2005).
4
Id. at 289.
5
Id.
6
See Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky. 2004).
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syndrome was work-related or that it was not.
But it is not
sufficient that the ALJ’s ultimate result is within a range
which the evidence would support if the ALJ did not apply the
correct legal standard in reaching that conclusion.
The result
is arbitrary even if the evidence could justify the ultimate
conclusion.
Because the ALJ applied an incorrect standard in
assessing the evidence, we agree with the dissenting member of
the Board that this case must be remanded for additional
findings. KRS 342.0011(1) defines an injury under the Act as any
work-related traumatic event or series of traumatic events,
including cumulative trauma, arising out of and in the course of
employment which is the proximate cause producing a change in
the human organism.
Wilson is not required to identify a single
source of causation for his injury or condition before being
entitled to recover benefits under the Act. 7
Where work-related
trauma causes a dormant degenerative condition to become
disabling and to result in a functional impairment, the trauma
is the proximate cause of the harmful change.
Hence, the
harmful change comes within the definition of an injury. 8
If the
7
See Ryan’s Family Steakhouse v. Thommason, 82 S.W.3d 889 (Ky.
2002) and McNutt Construction/First General Services v. Scott,
40 S.W.3d 854 (Ky. 2001).
8
McNutt Construction/First General Services v. Scott, supra at
859.
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ALJ concludes that Wilson’s work activities contributed to the
development of his carpal tunnel syndrome, then Wilson would be
entitled to benefits under the Act. But if the ALJ reaches a
contrary conclusion after a proper consideration of the
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from all of the
evidence, then Wilson’s claim must be dismissed again.
Lastly, Wilson argues that the ALJ failed to recognize
that causation may be proven based upon a “differential
diagnosis”.
A reliable differential diagnosis typically, though
not invariably, is performed after physical examinations, the
taking of medical histories, and the review of clinical tests,
accomplished by determining the possible causes for the
patient’s symptoms and then eliminating each of these potential
causes until reaching one that cannot be ruled out or
determining which of those that cannot be excluded is the most
likely. 9
As previously noted, the ALJ is entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support a finding of
causation.
Differential diagnosis is an acceptable method of
determining causation. 10
Thus, the ALJ may consider a
differential diagnosis in determining causation.
9
But the ALJ is
Hardyman v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260
(6th Cir. 2001).
10
Id. at 261.
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not required to do so if Wilson’s proof does not establish
causation within a reasonable degree of probability. 11
Accordingly, the June 24, 2005, opinion and order by
the Workers’ Compensation Board is reversed, and this matter is
remanded to the ALJ for additional findings as set forth in this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
JERRY L. WILSON:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
THYSSENKRUPP BUDD COMPANY:
Harlan E. Judd, III
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Bowling Green, Kentucky
G. Kennedy Hall, Jr.
Bradley E. Cunningham
Middleton & Reutlinger
Louisville, Kentucky
11
In its brief, ThyssenKrupp notes that it also asserted that
Wilson failed to give timely notice of the injury as required by
KRS 342.185(1). Having decided the claim based solely on the
issue of causation, the ALJ declined to reach this issue. On
remand, however, timeliness of notice will be an issue for the
ALJ to determine.
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