LOGAN ALUMINUM, INC. v. GREGORY BULLARD; HON. JOHN B. COLEMAN, ALJ; AND THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 16, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000980-WC
LOGAN ALUMINUM, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-00479
GREGORY BULLARD;
HON. JOHN B. COLEMAN, ALJ; AND
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Logan Aluminum, Inc. (Logan), petitions for
our review of an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board
affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order on remand
from the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In an opinion and order dated
October 24, 2000, the ALJ awarded Gregory Bullard temporary
total disability benefits and permanent partial disability
benefits, which included income, medical and vocational
rehabilitation benefits.
Logan appealed the award to the Board,
which affirmed the ALJ’s award.
Logan then filed a petition for
review with this court, which affirmed the Board’s opinion.
Thereafter, the Kentucky Supreme Court rendered an opinion
affirming in part and remanding the case to the ALJ for a
determination of whether Logan was prejudiced by Bullard’s
unexcused eight-month delay in providing Logan notice of his
injury.
On remand, the ALJ found that Logan suffered no
prejudice.
The Board affirmed, and this petition for review by
Logan followed.
When this case was initially before the ALJ, Gregory
Bullard was 39 years old with a high school education and was
pursuing an undergraduate degree at Western Kentucky University.
He had previously served in the United States Marine Corps for
10 years as an air traffic controller.
Bullard had passed a
physical exam upon leaving the military in 1993.
In February 1995, Bullard began working for Logan as a
forklift operator.
Logan that year.
He passed a physical exam administered by
His job required him to look over his
shoulders while driving a forklift in reverse, often over rough
surfaces, which would jar his neck.
In 1996 he gradually
developed stiffness in his neck, suffered from headaches, and
felt numbness in both arms.
Bullard sought treatment from Dr.
Merrill Patterson, a chiropractor, beginning in 1997.
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Dr.
Patterson advised Bullard that he had suffered a gradual neck
injury that in his opinion was work-related.
On August 18, 1999, Dr. Patterson wrote a letter to
Logan, in which he explained Bullard’s diagnosis and recommended
that Bullard permanently refrain from driving the forklift.
Bullard testified that he delivered the letter to Logan’s
medical department, his supervisor, and to personnel
representatives.
He also said that he informed his supervisors
of the painful condition of his neck and that “the fork truck
was just killing me.”
Bullard testified that he told the
medical staff he believed his condition was work-related.
Bullard went to Dr. Richard Berkman, a neurosurgeon,
for a second opinion.
Dr. Berkman was an approved physician
under Logan’s insurance carrier.
Dr. Berkman performed an MRI
on September 8, 1999, which revealed that Bullard’s condition
was in an advanced stage.
Dr. Berkman recommended Bullard
undergo surgery to repair his cervical spine, which Dr. Berkman
performed successfully on September 23, 1999.
Thereafter,
Bullard applied for short-term disability benefits.
Logan terminated Bullard’s employment on April 12,
2000.
Bullard filed the underlying workers’ compensation claim
on April 26, 2000.
He admitted he had properly filed injury
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reports for previous injuries, but he did not fill out an injury
report prior to filing this claim.
The ALJ heard the testimony of lay witnesses, mostly
individuals who worked with Bullard at Logan, as well as expert
witness testimony from several physicians.
Relying on the
opinions of Dr. Berkman, Dr. David Gaw, and Dr. Robert Byrd, the
ALJ determined that Bullard’s injury was caused by the
repetitive neck movements Bullard did on a daily basis at Logan.
The ALJ came to that conclusion despite the opinion of Dr. Leon
Ensalada.
It was Dr. Ensalada’s opinion that Bullard’s injury
was a result of the natural aging process.
The ALJ concluded that the injury was work-related and
awarded Bullard permanent benefits based on a 15% impairment
rating, as well as temporary benefits from September 8, 1999,
through June 5, 2000.
Although Bullard apparently believed he
had given Logan notice of his injury and Dr. Patterson’s belief
it was work-related, the ALJ concluded that Bullard did not give
actual notice until he filed his claim on April 26, 2000.
constituted an eight-month delay.
That
However, the ALJ concluded
that such a delay was excusable in this case because Bullard
relied on the letter written to Logan by Dr. Patterson.
Additionally, the ALJ held that the statute of limitations did
not bar Bullard’s claim because he did not discover his
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condition was work-related until August of 1999, when Dr.
Patterson so informed him.
The ALJ also ordered a vocational
evaluation to be conducted to determine if Bullard was entitled
to vocational rehabilitation benefits.
Finally, the ALJ held
that Logan was entitled to a credit against short-term benefits
if it complied with KRS 1 342.730.
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s opinion and award on
March 21, 2001.
This court affirmed the opinion of the Board on
February 7, 2003, and adopted a large portion of the opinion as
our own.
On February 19, 2004, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed in part but remanded the case to the ALJ.
See 2003-SC-
1062-WC, rendered February 19, 2004 (not to be published).
The
supreme court held that the eight-month delay violated the
notice requirement in KRS 342.185(1), which requires notice of
an injury to be given to the employer “as soon as
practicable[.]”
Likening Bullard’s case to the facts in
Northeast Coal Co. v. Castle, 202 Ky. 505, 260 S.W.2d 336
(1924), where the injured worker thought he had given notice but
actually had not, the supreme court disagreed with the ALJ that
Bullard’s delayed notice was excusable under the “mistake or
other reasonable cause” provision of KRS 342.200. 2
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
KRS 342.200 states:
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The court
held that the ALJ’s reasoning could result in the practical
nullification of the notice requirement.
Thus, the court
remanded the case to the ALJ to determine whether Logan was
prejudiced under that statute by Bullard’s untimely notice.
On remand, the ALJ reviewed additional evidence
submitted by Logan.
Logan filed the medical report of Dr. Gene
Wilson, a medical evaluation by Dr. Patrick Bray, and a partial
transcript of evidence from a separate jury trial involving
Logan and Bullard.
Dr. Wilson is the plant physician for Logan,
and he indicated in his report that Logan had an established
procedure in place for evaluating work-related injuries.
He
testified that normally an employee triggers those procedures by
suffering an injury or claiming that a gradual injury is workrelated.
He claimed that the process in this case was not begun
until after Bullard underwent surgery, and thus no investigation
into the cause of the injury or preventive measures could have
been taken.
The notice shall not be invalid or insufficient
because of any inaccuracy in complying with KRS
342.190 unless it is shown that the employer was in
fact misled to his injury thereby. Want of notice or
delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to
proceedings under this chapter if it is shown that
the employer, his agent or representative had
knowledge of the injury or that the delay or failure
to give notice was occasioned by mistake or other
reasonable cause.
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Dr. Bray similarly opined that Logan’s ability to
determine the work-relatedness of Bullard’s injury was
irretrievably lost after the surgery.
Dr. Bray came to this
conclusion by examining Bullard’s medical evidence as well as
the ergonomic report of Bullard’s job, which was conducted
December 13, 2000.
Based on medical reports from Bullard’s
service in the Marine Corps, Dr. Bray concluded that Bullard had
a pre-existing degenerative cervical spine disease at a
relatively early age and prior to his employment at Logan.
He
opined that Bullard suffered no specific cervical injury at
Logan and that Dr. Berkman’s findings during the September 1999
surgery indicated a degenerative condition, rather than a
traumatic one.
Dr. Bray’s conclusion was that any determination
of work-relatedness of Bullard’s gradual injury became
impossible after Bullard underwent surgery by Dr. Berkman.
Analyzing the evidence presented during the first
hearing and the new evidence presented on remand, and taking
into account the purposes behind the notice requirement, the ALJ
found that Logan had not been prejudiced by Bullard’s untimely
notice.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the ALJ, observing that
the opinions of the Logan’s new expert witnesses were somewhat
disingenuous.
It reasoned that it is not uncommon for medical
experts to examine a claimant after surgery or treatment.
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In
addition, the Board noted that the experts gave no reason why
Bullard’s job duties could not be examined by placing another
forklift driver in Bullard’s place and by using that evidence in
combination with the MRI and the surgeon’s report to determine
causation.
The Board acknowledged that Bullard’s cervical
anatomy has been permanently altered after the surgery, but it
found that fact to be only superficial support for Logan’s
assertion that the difficult question of causation was rendered
impossible to determine because of the surgery.
The Board
characterized the issue of causation as one of conflicting
medical evidence, which was strictly within purview of the ALJ
to decide.
Reasoning that the applicable principle in this case
placed the burden on Logan to prove prejudice and that it had
failed to do so, the Board affirmed.
This petition for review
by Logan followed.
In its February 19, 2004 opinion, the Kentucky Supreme
Court, after finding Logan did not have actual notice of the
injury and that Bullard’s eight-month delay was inexcusable as
mistake or other reasonable cause, remanded this case to the ALJ
for a determination of whether or not Logan was prejudiced.
“[KRS 342.200] makes lack of prejudice a controlling
consideration only in relation to an inaccuracy in compliance
with the notice requirements [in KRS 342.190]; delay is excused
only by the employer’s actual knowledge of the claim or by
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mistake or other reasonable cause.” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Stepp, 445 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky. 1969).
“If there is a delay in
giving notice, the burden is on the claimant to show that it was
not practicable to give notice sooner.”
Newberg v. Slone, 846
S.W.2d 694, 700 (Ky. 1992).
Here, our supreme court did not address any inaccuracy
by Bullard in complying with KRS 342.190.
Instead, the court
found that Bullard’s delay violated KRS 342.185 and remanded the
case to the ALJ for a determination of whether or not Logan was
prejudiced by the delay.
According to the statutes and case law
cited by the Board in its opinion, if there was no inaccuracy
and no actual knowledge, mistake, or other reasonable cause,
Bullard’s claim should be barred.
See Coslow v. General Elec.
Co., 877 S.W.2d 611, 614 n.1, and Blue Diamond Coal Co., supra.
Nevertheless, the Board analyzed the prejudice issue, noting
that the supreme court’s opinion became binding under the “law
of the case” doctrine.
“The ‘law of the case’ rule is that parties on a
second appeal may not relitigate matters affecting the subject
of the litigation that could have been introduced in support of
the contention of the parties on the first appeal.”
Hutchings
v. Louisville Trust Co., 276 S.W.2d 461, 466 (Ky. 1955).
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In
addition, SCR 3 1.030(8)(a), states, “[t]he Court of Appeals is
bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in
the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.”
Logan argues that the burden to prove lack of
prejudice should have been on Bullard, not on Logan as held by
the Board.
The Board noted that KRS 342.200 provides that
“[t]he notice shall not be invalid or insufficient because of
any inaccuracy in complying with KRS 342.190 unless it is shown
that the employer was in fact misled to his injury thereby.”
[Emphasis added.]
We agree with the Board that the statute
requires the burden to be placed on the employer, not the
employee.
Logan’s second argument is that the ALJ and the Board
erred in determining that Logan suffered no prejudice due to the
eight-month delay in receiving notice of the injury.
Logan
presented new expert testimony before the ALJ on the issue of
prejudice.
The ALJ reviewed that new evidence and the evidence
from the prior hearing.
He analyzed Logan’s claim of prejudice
under the standard set forth in Harlan Fuel Co. v. Burkhart, 296
S.W.2d 722, 723 (Ky. 1956).
That standard states the reasons
for the notice requirement are: (1) to give the employer an
opportunity to place the employee under the care of competent
3
Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court.
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physicians in order to minimize his disability and the
employer’s subsequent liability; (2) to enable the employer to
investigate at an early time the facts pertaining to the injury;
and (3) to prevent the filing of fictitious claims when lapse of
time makes proof of lack of genuineness difficult.
With respect to the first element of the standard, the
ALJ noted that Logan sent Bullard to Dr. Berkman, a physician
approved by Logan’s insurance company, for immediate treatment.
The results of that treatment were successful, and they
undoubtedly minimized Logan’s liability for ongoing treatment.
Under the second element, the ALJ noted and the Board
agreed that the facts pertaining to the injury did not change.
Logan conducted an extensive investigation of the working
environment, and its experts had full access to Bullard’s
relevant medical records.
The Board reasoned that the fact this
investigation occurred after Bullard’s surgery is of little
consequence.
It stated that an investigation as to the cause of
an injury frequently occurs after the claimant has undergone
therapy or treatment.
The Board considered Logan’s experts to
be somewhat disingenuous by giving the opinion that Logan’s
ability to investigate was irreparably damaged by Bullard’s
successful surgery.
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As to the third element, the ALJ did not find any
indication that Bullard presented a fictitious claim or that his
injury occurred under suspicious circumstances.
Bullard had a
pre-existing condition, but he brought his new injury and its
work-relatedness to his supervisors’ attention after being so
advised by his chiropractor.
Since the burden of proof was on Logan to prove
prejudice and it was unsuccessful before the ALJ, the question
now is whether the evidence compelled a finding in Logan’s
favor.
See Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735
(Ky.App. 1984).
The ALJ analyzed the issue of prejudice by
reviewing the reasons for the notice requirement as stated in
the Harlan Fuel Co. case.
We have stated the ALJ’s analysis
above, and we conclude that the evidence does not compel a
contrary result.
We will correct the ALJ and the Board only
where we perceive they have “overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
See Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 687-88 (Ky.
1992).
Such is not the case herein.
The Board’s opinion is affirmed.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Charles E. Lowther
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, GREGORY
BULLARD:
William J. Rudloff
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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