JAMES ANDERSON v. HOMELESS AND HOUSING COA; HON. MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: MAY 20, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2005-CA-000419-WC
JAMES ANDERSON
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-01270
v.
HOMELESS AND HOUSING COA;
HON. MARCEL SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
James Anderson appeals from a January 28, 2005
opinion and order by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board)
which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) order
dismissing his claim for benefits.
Anderson contends that the
ALJ misconstrued the medical evidence in concluding that he had
failed to prove causation.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Anderson, who was sixty years old at the time of the
incident, previously worked in coal mining, construction, and as
the proprietor of a hardware store.
He underwent left-knee-
replacement surgery in 1997, but stated that his knee did not
cause him any problems after the surgery.
Later in 1997,
Anderson began working for Homeless and Housing as a supervisor,
overseeing volunteers building homes.
On October 26, 1998, Anderson was working on the roof
when he fell through a vent hole.
He testified that he fell
approximately six feet and caught himself, landing with his
right leg down and his left leg up in the trusses.
evening, he went to Pikeville Methodist Hospital.
That
The emergency
room records indicate that he complained of injury to his right
knee.
However, Anderson testified that he struck both knees.
Anderson eventually underwent surgery to rebuild the previouslyreplaced knee.
In the initial review, the ALJ dismissed Anderson’s
claim, finding that Anderson was not covered by the Workers’
Compensation Act.
reversed.1
Ultimately, the Kentucky Supreme Court
On remand, Anderson relied on a medical report from
Dr. James Templin.
After performing an evaluation, Dr. Templin
diagnosed (1) chronic left knee pain, (2) S/P total left knee
replacement, and (3) S/P arthrotomy of the left knee with
exchange of tibial poly component.
1
He opined that within
Anderson v. Homeless and Housing COA, 135 S.W.3d 405 (Ky.
2004).
2
reasonable medical probability, Anderson’s October 1998, injury
caused his complaints.
Dr. Templin further assessed a 5%
impairment to the body as a whole due to the work-related
injury.
He explained that Anderson had a 15% impairment based
on his prior 1997 surgery, and Dr. Templin gave an additional 5%
impairment for complaints of increased discomfort or pain.
At a later deposition, however, Dr. Templin was
presented with the emergency room records from Pikeville
Methodist Hospital.
The records indicated complaints of right
knee pain following the work-related incident.
Given that
Anderson’s left knee complaints appeared to have begun, at the
earliest, three weeks after the work injury, Dr. Templin
testified that he could not relate any increase in impairment to
the work injury.
Dr. Templin was also asked whether there was
anything in the surgery which indicated a new acute injury as
opposed to a continuation of longstanding degeneration.
Dr.
Templin testified that it was his understanding that there was
no fracture noted, but there was evidence of scuffing with some
granulation tissue noted within the synovium.
He stated it
could be from either or both an acute trauma or repetitive minitraumas, but there was no way to tell.
Without summarizing the evidence, the ALJ concluded
that Anderson had failed to prove that his complaints of knee
pain were caused by the October 1998, incident.
3
In particular,
the ALJ relied on Dr. Templin’s deposition testimony that he
could not causally relate any impairment rating to the alleged
work injury.
On appeal, the Board affirmed, finding this
conclusion to be supported by substantial evidence of record.
This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, Homeless and Housing notes that
Anderson failed to preserve any objection to the adequacy of the
ALJ’s findings.
We agree.
In Eaton Axle v. Nally,2 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a party is required to file a petition
for reconsideration with the finder of fact before seeking
appellate relief.3
In 1994, the General Assembly effectively
abrogated this rule when it amended KRS 342.281, to provide that
"[t]he failure to file a petition for reconsideration shall not
preclude an appeal on any issue."
However, this language was
deleted from the statute in 1996.
The deletion of this language
revived the holding of Eaton Axle, meaning that Anderson waived
this issue by not including it in its petition for
reconsideration.4
Thus, the only issue properly raised in this appeal
concerns the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the ALJ’s
2
688 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Ky. 1985).
3
Id. at 338.
4
Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 330
(Ky.App. 2000).
4
conclusion that Anderson failed to meet his burden of proving a
work-related injury.
As the Board correctly noted, Anderson had
the burden of proving that his injury was work-related.5
Since
Anderson was unsuccessful before the ALJ, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence compels a different result.6
However, if
the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence of
record, it must be upheld.7
Furthermore, as finder of fact, the
ALJ had the sole authority to judge the weight, credibility,
substance, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.8
Anderson agrees that the ALJ had the discretion to
believe or disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless
of whether it comes from the same witness or the same adversary
party's total proof.9
Nevertheless, Anderson urges that the ALJ
took Dr. Templin’s deposition testimony out of context.
Anderson points out that there was other evidence showing that
he had complained of bilateral knee pain immediately after the
5
Baylis v. Lourdes Hospital, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky.
1991).
6
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App.
1984).
7
8
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
Paramount
1985).
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky.
9
Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky.
1977).
5
accident. He also questions the ALJ’s conclusion that Anderson’s
failure to report pain in his left knee would preclude a finding
of causation.
It seems apparent that Anderson suffered some sort of
injury to his knees on October 26, 1998.
However, after
reviewing the emergency room records, Dr. Templin testified that
he could not causally relate any of Anderson’s disability to
that incident as opposed to his pre-existing condition.
In
light of this testimony, we agree with the Board that the ALJ’s
assessment of the evidence was not manifestly erroneous.10
Accordingly, the January 28, 2005, opinion and order
of the Workers Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
JAMES ANDERSON:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
HOMELESS & HOUSING COA:
Kristie M. Goff
Glenn M. Hammond
Glenn M. Hammond Law Office
Pikeville, Kentucky
H. Brett Stonecipher
Ferreri & Fogle
Lexington, Kentucky
10
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 655, 688 (Ky.
1992).
6
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