THE NORMAN CLAY MARTIN PRESENT INTEREST TRUST, BY AND THROUGH NANCY M. ERWIN, TRUSTEE v. STOCK YARDS BANK & TRUST COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002304-MR
THE NORMAN CLAY MARTIN
PRESENT INTEREST TRUST,
BY AND THROUGH
NANCY M. ERWIN, TRUSTEE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. McDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-002549
STOCK YARDS BANK
& TRUST COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND MINTON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
The Norman Clay Martin Present Interest Trust,
by and through Nancy M. Erwin, Trustee, appeals from an order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing its action against Stock
Yards Bank & Trust Company.
1
The trust alleged that Stock Yards
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
breached a fiduciary duty and converted trust assets by
improperly exercising control over the corpus of the trust after
Stock Yards’s security interest in the trust was released.
The
trial court dismissed the action upon finding that Stock Yards
retained a security interest in the trust assets after those
assets were transferred to Merrill Lynch.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
On March 21, 1997, a trust agreement was executed for
the benefit of Norman Clay Martin.
Under the terms of the
trust, Nancy M. Erwin was appointed trustee, and her minor
nephew Martin was granted the right to terminate the trust and
control its assets upon reaching age 21.
In June, 1997, Erwin,
as trustee, entered into an agreement with Stock Yards allowing
Stock Yards to manage the trust assets.
On June 29, 2000, Martin, then age 20, executed a
$275,000 line of credit agreement with Stock Yards.
Martin and
Erwin each signed the agreement, which pledged the trust assets
as security.
The agreement went on to state that the loan would
be held in default if the value of the trust dipped below
$345,000.
On August 23, 2002, Erwin transferred the trust
account from Stock Yards to Merrill Lynch.
Contemporaneously,
Stock Yards executed a lien release stating that it no longer
had an interest in the collateral, and a “Collateral Account
-2-
Control Agreement” giving Stock Yards contractual rights to the
trust assets now being managed by Merrill Lynch.
It is the
interpretation of the Collateral Account Control Agreement which
forms the basis of the instant dispute.
Thereafter, Erwin and/or Martin withdrew at least
$60,000 from the Merrill Lynch account.
When the account
balance fell below $345,000, Stock Yards exercised its rights
under the Collateral Account Control Agreement and caused
Merrill Lynch to liquidate trust assets of $101,510 equaling the
amount then outstanding on the Martin loan.
On March 24, 2004, Erwin, as trustee, filed the instant
action against Stock Yards asserting theories of breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion and breach of an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
On April 30, 2004, Stock Yards
responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that when the
applicable law was applied to the allegations, the trustee had
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2
Erwin subsequently filed an amended complaint.
Upon considering the matter, on September 17, 2004,
the trial court rendered an opinion and order granting Stock
Yards’s motion to dismiss.
As a basis for the motion, the court
found that the agreement unambiguously allowed Stock Yards to
control the trust assets in the event the loan agreement was
2
CR 12.02.
-3-
breached.
It also disposed of the breach of fiduciary duty
claim by finding that Erwin, as trustee, rather than Stock
Yards, owed the fiduciary duty to Martin.
In sum, it found that
Erwin had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and dismissed the action.
This appeal followed.
Erwin now argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing the action.
She maintains that the pleading
sufficiently stated a claim for conversion of trust assets,
breach of a duty of ordinary care, and breach of duty of good
faith and loyalty.
She argues Stock Yards’s motion to dismiss
raised only one question – whether the complaint stated a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Since, she contends, the
complaint and amended complaint state such claims, the trial
court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
CR 12.02 states that “[E]very defense, in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading, . . . shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: . . . (f) failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted . . . .”
The rule goes on to state,
[I]f, on a motion asserting the defense that
the pleading fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
-4-
parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
In the matter at bar, the trial court grounded its
order dismissing the action on its interpretation of various
documents not contained in or appended to the complaint.
These
documents include the Collateral Account Control Agreement, and
a Notice of Exclusive Control sent from Stock Yards to Merrill
Lynch notifying the latter that Stock Yards was exercising a
contractual right to take control of the collateral.
As these documents and other evidence outside of the
compliant were referenced by the parties in the motion and
response thereto, and relied upon by the court, we conclude that
Stock Yards’s motion to dismiss was treated by the parties and
the court as a motion for summary judgment.
Treating a motion
to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment is proper where
evidence outside the complaint is relied upon, and the
conclusion that the matter was treated as a motion for summary
judgment may be inferred from the order. 3
The issue then arises as to whether the matter was
correctly disposed of under CR 56.03. Summary judgment "shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together
3
CR 12.02; Pearce v. Courier-Journal, 683 S.W.2d 633 (Ky.App. 1985); see
also, Whisler v. Allen, 380 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1964).
-5-
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." 4
"The record must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor." 5
"Even though a trial court may believe the party
opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not
render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material
fact." 6
Finally, "[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 7
In the matter at bar, the trial court found that no
issue of fact existed.
Rather, the issue was purely one of law,
to wit, the effect of the Collateral Account Control Agreement.
The court found the agreement’s language to be unambiguous on
the issue of whether Stock Yards had the contractual right to
control the trust’s assets if certain criteria were not met, and
this finding was dispositive.
Having examined the Collateral
Account Control Agreement, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that it operates to allow Stock Yards to exercise
4
CR 56.03.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991).
6
Id.
7
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
5
-6-
control over the trust assets in the event that the trust value
falls below $345,000.
Accordingly, we find no error on this
issue.
Similarly, the record is also dispositive of the
trust’s claim that Stock Yards breached a fiduciary duty owed to
the trust.
While Stock Yards had certain duties related to its
administration of the account, it did not serve as trustee and
undertook no fiduciary duty in that capacity.
Lastly, the trial court properly disposed of the claim
that Stock Yards wrongfully converted trust assets.
The trust
claimed that the conversion occurred when Stock Yards
misinformed Merrill Lynch of its rights in the new trust account
created at Merrill Lynch.
Again, the Collateral Account Control
Agreement states in clear and unambiguous terms that Stock Yards
retained a security interest in the trust assets after the
assets were transferred to Merrill Lynch.
No genuine issue of
material fact existed on this issue, and it was properly
disposed of as a question of law.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew W. Stein
Louisville, KY
David B. Tachau
Louisville, KY
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.