WILLIAM ROBERTS v. FAYETTE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001201-MR
WILLIAM ROBERTS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-04633
v.
FAYETTE COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
William Roberts appeals from a
summary judgment granted to the Fayette County Board of
Education.
Roberts had filed suit alleging that the Board
violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 161.100 when it failed
to employ him, a qualified special education teacher, and
instead hired emergency certified teachers.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 21.580.
Roberts is certified to teach special education by the
Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board.
He worked as a
special education facilitator and teacher at Lafayette High
School in Lexington, Kentucky, on a limited contract basis, 2 for
four years.
A teacher becomes eligible for a continuing
contract (or tenure) after he or she has been employed for four
years in the same district within a six-year period. 3
Roberts’
fourth year of employment with the Fayette Board was in 20012002.
Had he been hired for the 2002-2003 school year, he would
have become eligible for tenure.
In November 2001, however, two of Roberts’ students
filed complaints against him, alleging harassment.
One student
claimed that Roberts pulled him up by his shirt and pinned him
against the classroom wall with a table.
The other student
claimed that Roberts squeezed his hand, pulled his hair, yelled
at him, tapped him on the forehead with the palm of his hand and
yelled at him that “he had five F’s [a reference to the
student’s grades].”
The father of one of the students
contemplated bringing criminal charges of harassment against
Roberts.
2
“The term ‘limited contract’ shall mean a contract for the employment of a
teacher for a term of one (1) year only or for that portion of the school
year that remains at the time of employment.” KRS 161.720(3).
3
See KRS 161.740(1)(b).
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Dr. Robin Fankhauser, who was then the Superintendent
of the Fayette Board, suspended Roberts for thirty days with pay
while an investigation into the students’ allegations was
conducted by John Toye, who was then Director of the Department
of Law Enforcement for Fayette County Public Schools.
His
report to Fankhauser concluded that
Teacher Roberts is obviously frustrated with
some of his students and uses unprofessional
and juvenile methods when dealing with
defiant or disorderly students. He resorts
to yelling and using a physical approach.
In many instances the problem escalates
instead of subsiding and becoming under
control. If Roberts intends to remain in
the special education field he should be
required to be re-trained in dealing with
defiant, disorderly youth and should also be
fully trained in safe physical management.
When the investigative report was completed,
Fankhauser met with Roberts and Toye, on December 17 or 18,
2001.
Also present at the meeting were Ken Cox, Director of
High Schools, and Mike McKenzie, the principal of Lafayette High
School.
Fankhauser thereafter addressed a letter to Roberts,
concluding that he had used “inappropriate strategies to refocus
students” and that he had violated the Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA) 4 by discussing a student’s grades in
front of other students.
Fankhauser directed Roberts to create
a “professional growth plan” to address these issues.
4
20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g.
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The
letter also directed him not to touch or yell at students in the
future.
Roberts claims that he did not understand what this
directive to create a new growth plan entailed, and wrote a
letter to Fankhauser expressing his confusion, 5 but that
Fankhauser did not respond to his request for clarification.
Ultimately, a professional growth plan for Roberts was created
in February 2002, with the assistance of other administrators. 6
Meanwhile, on January 14, 2002, Roberts had filed a grievance in
accordance with formal Board policies.
The grievance voiced
concerns over the investigation of the student complaints and
the lack of support provided by the district. 7
During the months of February and March 2002, Roberts
was evaluated by Principal McKenzie (this appears to have been a
routine evaluation) and found to be in need of further
improvement in several areas of professional development.
Although the evaluation has not been included in the record,
Roberts’ deposition testimony indicates that McKenzie found that
Roberts was not meeting several of the standards listed on the
evaluation form.
In his summative evaluation (also not in the
record), McKenzie indicated that the standards that were not met
created serious concerns about the possibility of Roberts
5
The letter is cited as an exhibit to Roberts’ deposition, but it is not in
the record.
6
The growth plan is not in the record.
7
The grievance is not in the record.
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obtaining tenure, and he recommended that Roberts not be rehired
for the next school year.
Roberts formally appealed Principal McKenzie’s
evaluation on March 22, 2002.
On April 16, 2002, the Certified
Evaluation Appeals Panel held a hearing into the matter, but was
unable to reach a consensus concerning the status of Roberts’
Final Summative Evaluation.
The record contains no details
regarding the appeals process, except for a memorandum from the
chair of the panel stating that
[a]fter deliberation, the appeals panel was
unable to reach consensus, concerning the
status of Mr. Roberts’ Final Summative
Evaluation. The panel voted 2 votes for
option “C,” and 1 vote for option “B.”
Therefore, by a 2 to 1 vote, the panel
recommends that the superintendent of
schools conduct further investigation
concerning the Final Summative Evaluation of
Mr. Roberts (Option “C”).
It is unclear from the record what option “B” was.
Roberts submitted a letter of resignation on April 30,
2002.
In his deposition, he explained that it was his
understanding that the Board has a policy that if a teacher’s
limited contract is nonrenewed for cause, that teacher will
never be eligible to be rehired within the school district.
Because Roberts had received an unsatisfactory evaluation from
his principal with the attendant recommendation that he not be
renewed, he decided to resign.
He believed, and testified that
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various officials within the district had indicated to him, that
his resignation meant that he would still be eligible to teach
in the Fayette County district.
He stated in his deposition
that “[w]hat was presented to me was that if I resigned from my
position at Lafayette, that I would be left alone so that I
could be rehired and given that opportunity to work with other
people within the district.”
He also admitted, however, that no
one had guaranteed him a position for the following year.
He then began to apply for vacant teaching positions
with the Fayette Board for the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school
years, but he was not hired for any of them.
Some of these
numerous vacancies (over forty in the 2002-2003 school year)
were filled instead by emergency certified personnel, rather
than by people like Roberts who were certified special education
instructors.
KRS 161.100 provides that a school district may
hire such individuals with “emergency” certification when “it is
impossible to secure qualified teachers for a position.”
The statute provides:
When a district board of education satisfies
the Education Professional Standards Board
that it is impossible to secure qualified
teachers for a position in a school under
the control of the district board, the
Education Professional Standards Board may
issue emergency certificates to persons who
meet the qualifications determined by the
Education Professional Standards Board for
emergency certificates. An emergency
certificate shall be valid only for the
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specific job for which issued and for the
current school term.
Meanwhile, however, Roberts was able to find
employment on a limited contract basis with Clark County Public
Schools for the 2002-2003 year, as a special education teacher.
His salary was approximately $3,000.00 less than he had earned
in Fayette County.
On November 15, 2002, Roberts filed a complaint
against the Fayette County Board of Education in Fayette Circuit
Court, alleging that the Board had violated KRS 161.100 when it
hired persons with emergency certification to teach special
education, and did not hire him, a certified applicant.
He
asked for damages, injunctive relief including an order
directing the Board to comply with the statute requiring it to
hire certified applicants before persons with emergency
certification, costs and fees, and a trial by jury.
The Fayette Board ultimately filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that it was protected from suit by
governmental immunity, and that it was in any case the wrong
defendant.
In the alternative, the Board also cited to an
administrative regulation that defines “qualified teacher” as
a teacher who holds the appropriate
certification for the position unless the
superintendent of the employing school
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district has documented evidence that the
teacher is unsuitable for appointment. 8
In its opinion and order granting summary judgment,
the circuit court held that Roberts had failed to state a claim
under KRS 161.100 because there was sufficient documentation for
the superintendent to determine that Roberts was “unsuitable for
appointment” pursuant to 16 KAR 2:120 and therefore not a
qualified teacher pursuant to KRS 161.100.
Alternatively, the
court also found that the board was immune from claims such as
Roberts’ under the doctrine of governmental immunity.
This
appeal followed.
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” 9
The circuit court must view the
record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in
his favor.” 10
On appeal, our duty is to determine “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as
8
16 Ky. Adm. Reg. (KAR) 2:120 (emphasis supplied).
9
Ky. R. Civ. Proc. (CR) 56.03.
10
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991) (citations omitted).
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to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” 11
We are hampered in our review of this case by the
incompleteness of the record.
Both parties make references to
exhibits that were attached to Roberts’ deposition, but these
exhibits are not in the record provided to this Court.
It is
the duty of the appellant to see that the record is complete on
appeal. 12
To the extent that the record is incomplete, the
reviewing court must presume that the omitted portions support
the summary judgment. 13
We turn first to the question of whether the Board is
protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
Although we
agree with the circuit court that the Board enjoys immunity for
its governmental functions under the holding in Yanero v.
Davis, 14 we note that the Supreme Court was careful in that case
to discuss governmental immunity specifically in the context of
“limiting the imposition of tort liability on a government
agency.” 15
11
Roberts has aptly pointed out that his claim for
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
12
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Ky.
1968).
13
Id.
14
65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001).
15
Id. at 519, quoting 57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School and State Tort
Liability § 10 (2001).
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injunctive relief, directing the Board to comply with the
statute, sounds in equity rather than in tort.
We note also
that the doctrine of governmental immunity was not invoked in a
recent, factually-similar case from the Supreme Court. 16
Roberts argues that the genuine issue of material fact
which should have barred the grant of the motion for summary
judgment is whether he was unsuitable for employment in the
District.
Roberts acknowledges that the superintendent may
determine that a certified teacher is not “qualified” pursuant
to 16 KAR 2:120.
He nonetheless argues that the Board never
informed him he was “unsuitable” and that this term was only
used after he made his allegation that the Board had acted in
violation of KRS 161.100.
Roberts contends that the evidence
establishes that there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding his qualifications.
He points out that the
investigation into the student complaints did not lead to
disciplinary action against him.
He warns that if complaints by
students were sufficient to disqualify certified teachers from
further employment, every teacher in the district could be
subject to dismissal.
In his view, a jury should have been
permitted to determine whether he was unsuitable for
appointment.
16
See Young v. Hammond, 139 S.W.3d 895 (Ky. 2004), in which a teacher sued
her superintendent and school board for violating KRS 160.345 by refusing to
forward her application for a principalship to the district council.
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Roberts has provided no evidence, however, to suggest
that the superintendent abused her discretion in determining
that he was not a qualified candidate, nor that the Board
violated KRS 161.100 by implementing her recommendations.
“[A]
party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion
cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some
affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue
of material fact requiring trial.” 17
In fact, the record is replete with evidence that
Roberts could indeed be found unsuitable for appointment:
the
student complaints of harassment; the findings of the Certified
Evaluation Appeals Board that the investigation concerning his
final summative evaluation should be continued; and the
recommendation by Principal McKenzie that he not be rehired.
Roberts has simply failed to produce some affirmative evidence
that the superintendent abused her discretion in refusing to
recommend Roberts to the Board for appointment.
As the circuit
court aptly stated,
Roberts has not alleged in his Verified
Complaint that the superintendent failed to
have documented evidence supporting a
finding he was unsuitable for employment.
His resignation was submitted in the face of
knowledge his immediate supervisor had
recommended he not be renewed for employment
and upon learning of his likely receipt of a
17
Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky.App. 1992).
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notice of non-renewal based upon the events
during the 2001-02 school year. This
documentation which recommended against
contract renewal certainly was sufficient
for the superintendent to determine Roberts
was “unsuitable for appointment” despite
having a teaching certificate and was
therefore not a qualified teacher as used
and defined in KRS 161.100. Roberts has
failed to state a claim under KRS 161.100.
That being the sole cause of action alleged
in the Verified Complaint, Board is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law and the
Verified Complaint be dismissed.
Roberts voluntarily resigned his position, on the
understanding that his principal’s recommendation that his
contract not be renewed would prevent him from getting another
teaching position in the Fayette district.
By resigning, he
believed he had preserved his opportunity to be employed by
another school in the district.
Had he not resigned, however,
he could have requested the superintendent to provide the
grounds upon which the recommendation of nonrenewal was based,
pursuant to KRS 161.750, which states in pertinent part:
(1) Any teacher employed under a limited
contract may be reemployed under the
provisions of KRS 161.720 to 161.810 for the
succeeding school year at the same
salary, . . . upon notification of the board
by the superintendent of schools that the
contract of the teacher is renewed.
(2) If the superintendent does not renew the
contract he shall present written notice to
the teacher that the contract will not be
renewed no later than April 30 of the school
year during which the contract is in effect.
Upon receipt of a request by the teacher,
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the superintendent shall provide a written
statement containing the specific, detailed,
and complete statement of grounds upon which
the nonrenewal of contract is based. 18
Had the superintendent failed to produce such a
written statement, Roberts would have had a potential cause of
action to enforce the provisions of KRS 161.750(2). 19
As it is,
Roberts appears to have no statutory right to learn the
superintendent’s reasons for not recommending him.
As the
circuit court noted, “Roberts did not have tenure.
He had no
expectation of employment after he resigned.
No contract or
right to contract existed between Roberts and the Board.”
We
look to the case of Bowlin v. Thomas, 20 in which a non-tenured
teacher who was not rehired argued that the school board had
acted arbitrarily in failing to re-employ him, and that he was
entitled to a judgment reinstating him as a teacher.
We stated
that “[i]f Bowlin had been a tenured teacher serving under a
continuing contract, the school board could have terminated his
contract only for certain statutory causes.” 21
18
But because
Emphasis supplied.
19
See Phillips v. Board of Ed. of Muhlenberg Cty., 580 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.App.
1979).
20
548 S.W.2d 515 (Ky.App. 1977) (superseded by Phillips, supra note 19, at
732; under KRS 161.750, a later statute, Bowlin would have had the right to a
written statement from the superintendent containing the grounds upon which
the nonrenewal of his contract was based. Unlike Roberts, however, Bowlin
had not resigned).
21
Id. at 518.
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Bowlin was not tenured, he had no constitutional right to a
statement of the reasons for the school board’s decision not to
re-hire him for the next school year, or a right to a hearing to
contest that decision. 22
Furthermore, as in Bowlin’s case, Roberts has not
alleged that the decision not to employ him was based on a
constitutionally-prohibited reason, such as race, sex, religion,
place of birth, exercise of the right of free speech or because
of his political activities.
So long as it is not based upon a
constitutionally impermissible reason, a decision to terminate
the employment of a public officer or employee does not raise
any issue of arbitrariness. 23
Because Roberts has failed to provide any material
facts to support his contention that the Board violated KRS
161.100, and because his status in relation to the Board does
not implicate any constitutional concerns, or entitle him to any
statutory relief, the judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 519.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Beth A. Bowell
WALTHER, ROARK, GAY & TODD,
PLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert L. Chenoweth
CHENOWETH LAW OFFICE
Frankfort, Kentucky
ON BRIEF:
Jeffrey S. Walther
WALTHER, ROARK, GAY & TODD,
PLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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