BRANDEE TOCHE v. THE AMERICAN WATERCRAFT ASSOCIATION; POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC.; THE FRIENDS OF LAKE CUMBERLAND, INC.; DAVIS OUTDOOR SPORTS, INC.; DANA DAVIS, DON LOKOVICH, AND LISA PRICE, Individually and d/b/a JET STREAM PRODUCTIONS & JAM PRODUCTIONS
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 4, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001074-MR
BRANDEE TOCHE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00201
v.
THE AMERICAN WATERCRAFT ASSOCIATION;
POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC.;
THE FRIENDS OF LAKE CUMBERLAND, INC.;
DAVIS OUTDOOR SPORTS, INC.;
DANA DAVIS, DON LOKOVICH, AND
LISA PRICE, Individually and d/b/a
JET STREAM PRODUCTIONS & JAM PRODUCTIONS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This appeal concerns the statute of
limitations for injuries suffered in a personal watercraft
accident.
1
Having concluded that the trial court correctly
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
applied the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury
actions of KRS 413.140(1)(a), we affirm.
On May 17, 2002, appellant, Brandee Toche, sustained
serious personal injury while she was a passenger riding on the
back of a personal watercraft commonly referred to as a
“waverunner.”
Matthew Moseley was operating the waverunner at
the time of the accident, which occurred on Lake Cumberland in
Russell County, Kentucky.
Toche’s complaint alleged that the
accident occurred when an individual, Don Lokovich, was
operating another waverunner in such a negligent way so as to
bring about a collision between the two waverunners.
The accident took place during an event known as the
Lake Cumberland PWC Jamboree and Freestyle Fest, referred to as
“The Jam”.
The complaint alleged that The Jam was organized and
directed by two of the appellees, The American Watercraft
Association (“AWA”) and The Friends of Lake Cumberland, Inc.
(“FLC”).
The complaint further alleged that appellee, Polaris
Industries, Inc. (“Polaris”), was the primary sponsor of The
Jam, which provided Polaris with the opportunity to market its
personal watercraft.
It was alleged that Lokovich was operating
a Polaris personal watercraft on behalf of Polaris in an effort
to promote Polaris products, and that the watercraft may have
been owned by Polaris.
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Toche filed her complaint on June 27, 2003,
approximately one year and one month following the accident.
The action was filed against several defendants, including
appellees Polaris, the AWA, and the FLC.
Polaris moved for summary judgment on grounds that
Toche’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of
limitations for bodily injury claims per KRS 413.140(1)(a).
AWA and the FLC joined in the motion.
The
In an order entered May
3, 2004, the trial court dismissed Toche’s complaint as to the
moving parties as untimely filed as it was not within the oneyear statute of limitations for personal injury actions under
KRS 413.140.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Toche contends that the trial court erred
in finding that the one-year statute of limitations of KRS
413.140 applies to her claims.
KRS 413.140(1) provides:
“The
following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after
the cause of action accrued:
(a) An action for an injury to the
person of the plaintiff . . . .”
Toche contends that KRS
413.120, not KRS 413.140(1)(a), is controlling, on grounds that
her claims arise by statute.
KRS 413.120, provides:
“The
following actions shall be commenced within five (5) years after
the cause of action accrued: . . . (2) An action upon a
liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by the
statute creating the liability.”
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Toche argues that, as to her claims, liability is
created by statute, KRS Chapter 235 (“Boats and Boating”), in
particular, KRS 235.300, “Civil liability for negligent
operation”, which provides: 2
The operator of a vessel or motorboat shall
be liable for any injury or damage
occasioned by the negligent operation of
such vessel or motorboat, whether such
negligence consists of a violation of the
provisions of the statutes of this state or
neglecting to observe such ordinary care and
operation as the rules of the common law
require. Where the owner is not the
operator of the vessel or motorboat he shall
not be liable for such injury or damage
unless such owner is aboard the vessel or
motorboat at the time of such injury or
damage or unless the operator at such time
of injury or damage is operating said boat
upon the owner’s business or in the course
and scope of his employment with the owner.
The “Family Purpose Doctrine” as it is
applied in the use and operation of
automobiles shall be applicable to the use
and operation of vessels or motorboats.
Nothing contained herein shall be construed
to relieve any other person from any
liability which he would otherwise have, but
nothing contained herein shall be construed
to authorize or permit any recovery in
excess of injury or damage actually
incurred.
2
KRS Chapter 235, “Boats and Boating”, governs watercraft in the
Commonwealth, including registration, operations, and safety. It is
undisputed that the type of personal watercraft at issue are included in the
definition of “vessel” for purposes of KRS Chapter 235. See KRS 235.010(1)
and (4). Toche’s complaint alleged violations of several provisions of KRS
Chapter 235. Toche also cites in particular to KRS 235.285(4) which states,
in part: “A personal watercraft or motorboat operated on public waters shall
at all times be operated according to the ‘Rules of the Road’ and in a
reasonable and prudent manner so as not to endanger human life, human
physical safety, or property.”
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Toche contends that because KRS Chapter 235 does not set forth a
time limitation for bringing a civil action, per KRS 413.120(2),
the five-year period applies.
We disagree with Toche that KRS
413.120(2) applies to her claims.
A panel of this court considered a similar argument in
Stivers v. Ellington, 140 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.App. 2004), wherein the
snowboarding appellant was injured when she collided with the
downhill skiing appellee in Colorado.
The appellant’s
complaint, which claimed the appellee’s negligence caused the
collision which resulted in her injuries, was dismissed as
untimely filed per the one-year limitations period of KRS
413.140(1)(a).
The appellant argued the action was governed by
the five-year limitations period of KRS 413.120 on grounds that
liability was created by statute, the Colorado Ski Safety Act,
which provided, in part:
Each skier has the duty to maintain control
of his speed and course at all times when
skiing and to maintain a proper lookout so
as to be able to avoid other skiers and
objects. However, the primary duty shall be
on the person skiing downhill to avoid
collision with any person or objects below
him.
Id. at 600.
The Stivers court concluded that the Colorado Ski
Safety Act did not create any new liability, but “merely
substituted the legislature’s determination of the standard of
care for the common-law standard of care in such negligence
actions.”
Id. at 601.
Accordingly, the court held the
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applicable statute of limitations as one year per KRS
413.140(1)(a).
In Robinson v. Hardaway, 293 Ky. 627, 169 S.W.2d 823
(1943), the appellant was injured in an automobile collision
caused by the negligence of the minor son of the appellee.
Appellant obtained a judgment against the son for the injuries
sustained.
found.”
Execution on the judgment returned “no property
Appellant therefore sought to recover the amount of the
judgment from the appellee (the minor’s father) pursuant to then
section 2739m-53 of the Kentucky Statutes (now KRS 186.590)
which provided that “[a]ny negligence of a minor . . . when
driving any motor vehicle upon a highway, shall be imputed to
the person who shall have signed the application of such minor
for said license, which person shall be jointly and severally
liable, with such minor, for any damages by such negligence.”
Robinson, at 824.
The trial court found appellant’s action
barred by the one-year statute of limitation for personal injury
per then section 2516 of the Kentucky Statutes (now KRS
413.140).
Appellant argued that the five-year statute of
limitations of section 2515 of Kentucky Statutes (now KRS
413.120) applied because section 2739m-53 created liability by
statute.
The Robinson court disagreed, concluding that the one-
year period, per section 2516, applied, rather than the fiveyear period of section 2515, because “[t]he action is, in its
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final analysis, an action for injury to the person . . . .”
Id.
The court went on to explain:
The statute under which appellee’s liability
is asserted merely imposes responsibility on
the father for the son’s negligence. A
right of action, a liability for the
negligence, was in existence. The statute
created no new type of liability but only
brought others into the area of
responsibility. We think it is clear that
section 2515 was not intended to embrace
such a situation as this and that the one
year limitation provided by section 2516 as
to an action for injury to the person
applies.
Id.
In the present case, KRS 235.300 merely codifies
common law liability and does not create a new theory of
liability.
Toche’s claim is still a basic personal injury claim
under common law.
We therefore conclude that the trial court
correctly found that the one-year statute of limitations of KRS
413.140(1)(a) applied.
We next address Toche’s argument that the five-year
statute of limitations of KRS 413.120 applies to her claims
against the AWA and the FLC because the action is based in part
on civil liability arising out of KRS 446.070.
Lisa Price, a
promoter of The Jam, received citations from the U.S. Corps of
Engineers for federal violations related to The Jam. 3
3
Toche
Citations for failure to pay permit fee in violation of 36 CFR § 327.23(a)
and failure to follow posted restrictions in violation of 36 CFR § 327.21(a).
-7-
contends that Price was acting as an agent of the AWA and the
FLC, and that one of the violations (failure to follow posted
restrictions, in violation of 36 CFR § 327.21(a)) has a nexus to
her injuries.
Toche contends that Price’s violation of this
federal regulation permits her to recover under the “per se”
statute, KRS 446.070, which provides:
“A person injured by the
violation of any statute may recover from the offender such
damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a
penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.”
Toche
contends that because KRS 446.070 does not set forth any
limitation period for filing suit, that the applicable statute
of limitations is five years per KRS 413.120(2).
Again, we
disagree with Toche that KRS 413.120(2) applies.
KRS 446.070
does not create a new theory of liability.
See Alderman v.
Bradley, 957 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Ky.App. 1997) (“KRS 446.070 was
enacted to ensure that a person for whose benefit a statute was
enacted may recover from an offender although the statute does
not prescribe a civil remedy for violation.”). 4
As discussed
above, Toche’s claim is a basic personal injury claim under
common law.
See Robinson, 169 S.W.2d 823.
Accordingly, the
applicable statute of limitations is one year per KRS
413.140(1)(a).
4
Although we are deciding this case on statute of limitations grounds, we
note that KRS 446.070 is limited to violations of Kentucky statutes and does
not extend to federal regulations. Alderman, 957 S.W.2d at 266.
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For the aforementioned reasons, the May 3, 2004 order
of the Russell Circuit Court dismissing Toche’s claims against
Polaris Industries, Inc., The Friends of Lake Cumberland, Inc.,
and The American Watercraft Association is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Jonathon N. Amlung
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THE
AMERICAN WATERCRAFT
ASSOCIATION:
R. William Tooms
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE POLARIS
INDUSTRIES, INC.:
Donald P. Moloney, II
Andrew DeSimone
Lexington, Kentucky
George W. Soule
David S. Miller
Minneapolis, Minnesota
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THE FRIENDS
OF LAKE CUMBERLAND, INC.:
R. Kent Westberry
Caroline Pitt Clark
Louisville, Kentucky
NO BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES DAVIS
OUTDOOR SPORTS, INC.; DANA
DAVIS, DON LOKOVICH, AND LISA
PRICE, Individually and d/b/a
JET STREAM PRODUCTIONS & JAM
PRODUCTIONS
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ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC.:
Donald P. Moloney, II
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES,
THE FRIENDS OF LAKE
CUMBERLAND, INC. AND THE
AMERICAN WATERCRAFT
ASSOCIATION:
Jennifer A. Peterson
Louisville, Kentucky
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