ROBERT FRASER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 9, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000917-MR
ROBERT FRASER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CR-00129
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, and McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
This is the second time Robert Fraser (Robert)
has been before this Court after the Pike Circuit Court’s denial
of relief under RCr 11.42 from his guilty plea.
The first time,
the circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary
hearing, and a panel of this Court affirmed.
In Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001), however, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that Robert was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
So
the Fraser court remanded the case to the circuit court for a
hearing.
The circuit court conducted the hearing on April 7,
2003, but ultimately denied Robert’s motion for relief.
Because
we conclude that (1) the trial court’s factual findings are not
clearly erroneous and (2) counsel’s performance was not
deficient, we affirm.
In May 1996, a Pike County Grand Jury indicted Robert
and his girlfriend at the time, Arlene Hall Rowe, along with
Rowe’s brother, Gary Lee Young, for the murder and attempted
disposal of the body of Rowe’s ex-husband, Everett Lee Hall.
On
April 21, 1997, Robert entered a guilty plea to one count of
murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence for
which he received a life sentence.
In pleading guilty, Robert admitted to shooting Mr.
Hall two times in the head.
When Robert shot Mr. Hall he was
asleep in his recliner in his own house.
After killing Mr. Hall, Robert enlisted Young’s help.
The two men wrapped Mr. Hall in a blanket and dumped him into an
abandoned coal mine.
After dumping the body, Robert returned to
Mr. Hall’s home, where he found that Rowe had begun cleaning up
the crime scene by removing the recliner and setting it on fire
in the yard.
After the murder, Robert continued to live with Rowe,
but he eventually returned to Florida, where he had lived most
of his life before moving to Kentucky.
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Once in Florida, Rowe
contacted Robert to state that she was concerned that Mr. Hall’s
body would be found and identified.
So Robert returned to Pike
County, Kentucky.
He located the body, and cut off Mr. Hall’s
head with an ax.
After removing the head, he left the body in
the mine and delivered the head to Rowe.
Rowe attempted to
dispose of the head by setting it on fire.
Robert returned to
his home in Florida.
We now turn to the events leading up to Robert’s
decision to plead guilty.
In April 1996, law enforcement
officers in Florida, in cooperation with the Pike County
Sheriff’s Office, apprehended Robert at his Florida residence.
Once in custody, Robert confessed to murdering Mr. Hall and
disposing of his body.
Upon information that the Commonwealth
would not pursue the death penalty against him, Robert did not
contest his extradition from Florida and returned to Kentucky.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky indicted Robert for
murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence and
appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
The
trial court initially assigned a trial date of February 24,
1997, but it ultimately reassigned the trial for April 21, 1997.
Three days before the April 21 trial date, Robert made two
motions.
The first was a motion to suppress his Florida
confession, and the second was a motion for a psychiatric
examination.
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The trial court heard both of the motions on April 21,
1997.
In support of the motion for a psychiatric examination on
the issues of competency to stand trial and criminal
responsibility for his conduct, Robert stated that he had not
been receiving his prescribed medications (Prozac, Desyrel and
Vistaril) while in custody in Pike County.
Because he had not
been on his medications, Robert’s trial counsel was concerned
that he could not communicate effectively with them in
preparation of his defense.
The trial court appointed a psychiatrist, Michael J.
Pravetz, to examine Robert.
After spending about an hour with
Robert, Dr. Pravetz appeared before the trial court to report on
Robert’s mental state.
Dr. Pravetz stated that he was asked to
perform an emergency competency evaluation.
Before meeting with
Robert, he qualified with the court that he would do a
preliminary evaluation, and he would spend more time with Robert
if necessary.
After meeting with Robert, however, he did not
see a need to conduct additional tests.
Dr. Pravetz found that Robert was competent to stand
trial.
He further stated that Robert was depressed, for which
he had been taking antidepressants, but that depression in no
way detracted from his ability to cooperate.
Dr. Pravetz made a
recommendation that Robert should receive antidepressants while
in custody.
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Following Dr. Pravetz’s testimony, the trial court
denied Robert’s motion to suppress his Florida confession.
After a recess following the competency hearing,
Robert made a motion to enter a guilty plea.
After conducting a
hearing under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709,
23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), the trial court accepted Robert’s plea,
but deferred his sentencing.
The case against Robert’s co-defendants proceeded to
trial.
He was the Commonwealth’s chief witness at trial.
A
jury convicted Rowe of complicity to murder and two counts of
complicity to tampering with physical evidence.
She was
sentenced to life in prison.
After Rowe’s conviction and sentencing, Robert was
sentenced.
At the sentencing hearing, his attorney stated that
Robert had accepted responsibility for his crimes by pleading
guilty.
In addition, he reminded the trial court that Robert
had assisted the Commonwealth at Rowe’s trial.
He argued for
leniency and urged that the trial court sentence him to 20
years.
The Commonwealth made no recommendation at final
sentencing.
The trial court sentenced Robert to life
imprisonment on the murder charge and five years’ imprisonment
on each of the tampering with physical evidence charges, with
those sentences to run consecutively.
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In announcing the
sentence, the trial court stated that it was giving Robert what
it thought the jury would give him if he had stood trial.
Four days after final sentencing, Robert made a
motion to alter or amend the sentence.
In the motion, he argued
that the trial court should reduce his life sentence on the
murder charge to 20 years due to the assistance that Robert
provided in obtaining Rowe’s conviction, his assumption of
responsibility, his remorse, and the time and expense he saved
the Commonwealth in pleading guilty.
He further argued that the
sentences on the tampering convictions should run concurrently
instead of consecutively.
The following day, the trial court
altered the judgment so that the five-year sentences would run
consecutively to each other, but run concurrently with the
unchanged sentence of life imprisonment on the murder charge.
Less than one year after the trial court issued its
amended final judgment and sentence of imprisonment, Robert
filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion in which he sought to set aside
his conviction and sentencing on the ground that his counsel was
ineffective.
In this opinion, however, we will not set out the
procedural history of the initial collateral attack in this case
as the Fraser opinion, 59 S.W.3d 448, outlines it in all the
necessary detail.
Instead, we will pick up with the remand to
the Pike Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing on the issues
of ineffective assistance of counsel and the voluntariness of
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Robert’s guilty plea.
See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 458.
Based on
assertions made by Robert in his RCr 11.42 motion, the Fraser
opinion was particularly concerned with whether the Commonwealth
orally made a secret deal with Robert by which he would plead
guilty and testify against Rowe in exchange for the imposition
of the minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.
See id. at
456.
The circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing on
April 7, 2003.
An attorney represented Robert at the hearing.
Robert’s counsel called the following individuals to
testify:
Eric Y. Drogin, a clinical and forensic psychologist;
Robert; Billy Joe Bentley, an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex; Kirby Ramey, an inmate at the Roederer
Correctional Complex; Harolyn Howard, the directing attorney for
the public defender’s office covering Pike and Floyd Counties;
Steve Owens, Robert’s appointed trial counsel; and Robert
Bishop, Robert’s co-counsel who Steve Owens brought in for
assistance.
The Commonwealth called Ron Burchett, the assistant
Commonwealth Attorney who prosecuted Robert.
Almost one year after it conducted the hearing, the
trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order.
The trial court concluded that Robert’s allegations were
not supported by (1) the taped record of the competency hearing
and the guilty plea held on April 21, 1997; (2) the taped record
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of the sentencing hearing held on May 16, 1997; or (3) the
testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly,
the trial court denied Robert’s RCr 11.42 motion.
The trial
court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order denying
RCr 11.42 relief form the basis of this appeal.
On appeal, Robert argues that his guilty plea was
involuntary by reason of ineffective assistance because his
counsel failed to reasonably inform him, a mentally ill person,
of his legal situation before advising him to plead guilty.
Since being incarcerated in Kentucky, Robert has been diagnosed
with bi-polar disorder.
But he argues that he had obvious
mental health issues at the time he entered his guilty plea, and
his trial counsel should have made a motion for a defense expert
in psychiatry or psychology, which expert could have assisted
with mental health defenses.
In addition to the failure to pursue mental health
defenses, Robert lists the following ways in which his trial
counsel was ineffective.
First, his counsel never requested his
medical records from the Florida Department of Corrections,
which would have shown that he was treated recently in Florida
and had psychotropic drugs until his transfer to Pike County,
Kentucky.
Second, his counsel did not meet with him enough in
preparation for his defense at trial.
Third, his counsel did
not cross-examine the court’s expert at the competency hearing.
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Fourth, his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to enter
into a plea agreement with no written terms, which agreement
required him to perform a service for the state and give up his
rights to a trial and jury sentencing.
Fifth, his trial counsel
failed to properly prepare for the guilty plea.
In a challenge arising from the entry of a guilty
plea, the defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
must first prove that counsel's performance was deficient in
that he made errors so serious that he was not functioning as
the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. App. 1986)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
The inquiry pertaining to
deficient performance is whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.
466 U.S. at 688.
See Strickland,
Second, he must prove that he was prejudiced
by the deficiency such that there exists a reasonable
probability that but for those errors he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
See Taylor,
724 S.W.2d at 226 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.
Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)).
“A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Despite the test
having two components, however, a court deciding an ineffective
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assistance claim need not address both the attorney’s deficient
performance and prejudice to the defendant if the defendant
makes an insufficient showing on one component.
See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697.
When the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing,
as was the case here, RCr 11.42(6) requires the trial court to
make findings on the material issues of fact.
We review the
trial court’s factual determinations under a clearly erroneous
standard.
See Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148, 167 (Ky.
2001); Adams v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. 1968)
(citing CR 52.01).
Factual findings are not clearly erroneous
if they are supported by substantial evidence.
See Black Motor
Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1965).
“The test for
substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone, or in
the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.”
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Ky. App.
1999).
In reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, we
must recognize that the trial court is in a superior position to
judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony.
See McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694,
698 (Ky. 1986).
We review de novo, however, the trial court’s
legal conclusion on the issues of deficient performance and
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actual prejudice.
See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1310-
1311 (6th Cir. 1996).
Mindful of these guidelines, we turn to the testimony
at the evidentiary hearing.
Dr. Drogin stated that Robert
related his memory of the events leading up to the guilty plea.
Consistent with Robert’s primary argument on appeal, Robert
informed him of the secret deal.
As to Robert’s mental health, Dr. Drogin had reviewed
the Florida medical records.
Robert did not introduce the
records at the hearing, but Dr. Drogin referred to them during
his testimony.
He testified that Robert had been diagnosed with
a depressive condition in Florida and placed on medication to
control depression and anxiety, which medication included
Prozac.
Dr. Drogin had reviewed Dr. Pravetz’s evaluation and
noted that Dr. Pravetz failed on the record to refer to any
testing or investigation regarding Robert’s appreciation of the
nature and consequences of the action against him.
Dr. Drogin
learned that Dr. Pravetz had since lost his license to practice
medicine.
Dr. Drogin found it curious that Dr. Pravetz found
Robert competent, yet he volunteered to write a prescription to
resume Robert’s antidepressants in Pike County.
But, as Dr.
Drogin was not a physician, he repeatedly refused to testify
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about any specific effects stemming from the withdrawal of the
antidepressants.
As to Robert’s mental health, Dr. Drogin testified
that in 2002 Robert was diagnosed as suffering from bi-polar
disorder.
He admitted, however, that the Florida records did
not contain any such diagnosis.
Robert testified that he could not think clearly on
the day he pled guilty because he was not on his medication.
He
maintained that he believed he was going to be sentenced to 20
years if he pled guilty and testified against Rowe.
He
testified that his attorneys told him that the Commonwealth
would let him plead to 20 years.
Kirby Ramey (Ramey) and Billy Joe Bentley (Bentley)
had been in jail at the time Robert returned after entering his
guilty plea and were offered to corroborate Robert’s belief as
to the plea bargain.
Ramey testified that he remembered that
Robert said he received a 15-20 year plea bargain.
Bentley
testified that Robert told Bentley and the other inmates that
the Commonwealth offered him 20 years, but he did not know if
Robert accepted the offer or chose to go to trial.
Steve Owens (Owens), Robert’s appointed attorney,
testified that, in light of Robert’s confession, his trial
strategy was to have the confession suppressed.
Moreover, he
had concerns about the effect on Robert of the withdrawal of his
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antidepressant medication and brought these concerns to the
trial court’s attention.
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress
and a psychiatrist opined that Robert was competent to stand
trial, Owens advised Robert to plead guilty and cooperate with
the Commonwealth.
He believed that this was Robert’s best
chance at receiving less than a life sentence.
In reaching this
decision, Owens and Robert also discussed the possibility that
Rowe would make a deal and testify against Robert.
Owens testified that he was prepared for trial in this
case.
He believed the most damaging piece of evidence against
Robert was Robert’s confession.
Owens stated that the Commonwealth made a blind offer,
which Owens admitted was not really an offer at all.
Owens
denied that there was any secret deal, and he denied telling
Robert that he would get a 20-year sentence.
He did advise
Robert, however, that the penalty range for murder was 20 years
to life.
Owens fully expected Robert to get a break from the
trial court at sentencing.
When the trial court gave Robert a
life sentence in spite of his cooperation in Rowe’s case, Owens
was surprised.
As to Robert’s mental health, Owens stated that he
requested a psychiatric evaluation out of an abundance of
caution due to the fact that Robert had made him aware that he
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had not received in Pike County the medication he had been
prescribed in Florida.
He said he believed Robert was stressed,
then added that anyone facing murder charges would be under some
amount of stress.
Aside from the medication issue, Owens did
not believe Robert was incompetent.
The next witness that Robert called in the evidentiary
hearing was Robert Bishop (Bishop), his other attorney in the
underlying proceedings.
When questioned about Robert’s mental
health, he stated that he had informed his attorneys that he had
been receiving medication in Florida; however, he had not been
receiving any medication since returning to Kentucky.
In
response, he drafted a statement on Robert’s behalf stating that
he desired his medication.
a competency evaluation.
In addition, he drafted a motion for
Bishop admitted that he did not make a
request for Robert’s Florida medical records.
Bishop was then asked about any defenses Robert might
have had.
Bishop responded that a possible defense was that
Robert was subject to manipulation by Rowe.
While acknowledging
that this was a possible line of defense, Bishop pointed out
that he did not know if the jury would accept it.
As to Robert’s guilty plea, Bishop testified that he
advised Robert that if he cooperated, he would be in the best
possible position to get favorable treatment by the trial court
at sentencing.
Bishop stated that he made it clear to Robert
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that there was no offer.
According to Bishop, Robert repeatedly
expressed to him his desire for a minimum sentence.
Bishop
stated that this was a tough case because of the facts of the
crimes.
Bishop testified that he hoped Robert would receive a
20-year sentence and admitted that he felt deflated when the
trial court sentenced Robert to life in prison.
The Commonwealth’s only witness was Ronald Burchett
(Burchett), the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney responsible for
Robert’s case.
Burchett testified that there was no incentive
for him to make a deal considering the fact that the trial court
had ruled that Robert’s confession was admissible.
In
Burchett’s opinion, in pleading guilty, Robert at least got a
chance that the judge would give him less than a life sentence,
but he had no such chance of that if his case had gone to a
jury.
Burchett went on to explain that there was a good chance
that the jury would have given Robert a large term of years
after hearing that he shot a man as he slept in a chair for no
better reason than he wanted to stay in the man’s house and
continue to have sex with his ex-wife.
After conducting the hearing, the trial court made the
requisite findings of fact.
It found that the Commonwealth and
Robert did not have a secret deal by which he would get the
minimum sentence in exchange for his testimony against Rowe.
addition, the trial court found that Robert was competent to
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In
plead guilty.
Finally, the trial court found that Robert
subjectively knew that he did not have a deal with the
Commonwealth and that he could receive a sentence of life
imprisonment.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
In
short, the trial court believed the testimony of Owens, Bishop
and Burchett that there was no oral plea agreement by which
Robert would get the minimum sentence.
And the trial court
stood by its initial competency determination.
As the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence,
they are not clearly erroneous.
Consistent with its findings,
the trial court entered a final order denying any relief under
RCr 11.42.
Turning our attention to the court’s legal conclusion
that Robert’s trial counsel did not fail to render adequate
legal assistance, with respect to the performance component,
Owens testified that his strategy was to have the confession
suppressed.
Once the trial court ruled, however, that the
confession was admissible, Owens advised Robert to plead guilty
and cooperate.
Given the facts of the murder, Robert’s disposal
and later beheading of the body, and motive for killing Mr.
Hall, we believe counsel’s advice was the result of reasonable
professional judgment.
See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d
-16-
687, 694-95 (Ky. 2003) (reasoning that it is not uncommon trial
strategy to plead guilty in reliance on the judge imposing a
lenient sentence when there is strong evidence of a charged
crime, the details of which are particularly gruesome).
And
given Dr. Pravetz’s testimony, the decision not to seek more
psychiatric evidence than was already in hand was likewise
reasonable.
Although Dr. Drogin appeared somewhat critical of
Dr. Pravetz’s assessment, we must make every effort to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight and evaluate the challenged
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.
See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.
As to Robert’s allegations that his trial counsel was
not prepared for trial or the guilty plea proceedings, Robert
does not offer any evidence -- other than the Florida medical
records -- which his attorneys failed to investigate.
Interestingly, in the evidentiary hearing, Robert did not
confront his trial attorneys with the allegation that either
attorney said he would have to try the case by the seat of his
pants, as Robert alleged before the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 456.
See
To the contrary, the evidence was
that his attorneys were prepared to try his case.
This case is about Robert’s unfulfilled expectation of
a lighter sentence.
of counsel.
It is not a case of ineffective assistance
And having concluded that Robert’s trial counsel
-17-
did not render ineffective assistance, we need not address any
alleged prejudice to Robert.
The decision of the circuit court denying Robert's RCr
11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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