WILLIE RAY HINES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000545-MR
WILLIE RAY HINES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Willie Ray Hines brings this appeal from a March
11, 2004, judgment of the Logan Circuit Court upon a jury
verdict finding appellant guilty of theft by failure to make
required distribution of property (Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 514.070).
We affirm.
Appellant was originally indicted for various offenses
on January 8, 2002; however, an amended indictment was returned
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
on March 4, 2003, charging appellant with, inter alia, Count II,
which alleged:2
That on or about the 24th day of October,
1999, in Logan County, Kentucky, the above
named defendant unlawfully obtained property
upon agreement or subject to a known legal
obligation to make a specified payment or
disposition and intentionally dealt with the
property as his own wherein defendant kept
approximately eight (8) head of cattle
valued at more than $300.00.
Being in violation of KRS 514.070 – UOR
0232300 (Theft by failure to Make Required
Disposition of Property – Over $300.00)
At trial, the evidence indicated that appellant was
traveling in another state on October 24, 1999, and thus, could
not have committed the offense upon that date.
After the close
of the Commonwealth’s proof, the Commonwealth sought to amend
the indictment so as to conform with the evidence.
Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to amend the date so that
the offense of theft by failure to make required distribution in
Count II occurred between the time period of October 29, 1999,
through January 15, 2003.
Appellant made a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal upon Count II.
The trial court
denied appellant’s motion for directed verdict and granted the
2
As to the March 2003 amended indictment, no true bill was returned upon
Count II; therefore, the trial court renumbered the amended indictment by
omitting the charge which no true bill was returned. Thus, Count III of the
amended indictment became Count II. To avoid confusion, we shall refer to
Count II as renumbered by the trial court. Appellant was charged with three
counts altogether. The trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal
upon Count I, and the jury returned a verdict of acquittal upon Count III.
-2-
Commonwealth’s motion to amend Count II.
The court, however,
gave appellant a continuance of two weeks to prepare a defense
in light of the date amendment to Count II.
After submission to the jury, the jury returned a
verdict finding appellant guilty of Count II and recommended a
sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment.
By judgments entered on
February 9, 2004, and March 11, 2004, appellant was sentenced
pursuant to the jury recommendation of 27 months in the
penitentiary; however, the sentence was probated for a period of
five years.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the trial court committed
reversible error by amending Count II of the indictment from the
date of October 24, 1999, to “on or about October 29, 1999,
through January 15, 2003.”
As the date amendment was erroneous,
appellant maintains he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal upon Count II.
We disagree.
Ky. R. Crim. P. 6.16 allows amendment of an indictment
before the return of a jury verdict under limited circumstances:
The court may permit an indictment,
information, complaint or citation to be
amended any time before verdict or finding
if no additional or different offense is
charged and if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced. If justice
requires, however, the court shall grant the
defendant a continuance when such an
amendment is permitted.
-3-
It is clear the amendment to Count II did not charge appellant
with any additional or different offense.
changed the date the offense occurred.
The amendment simply
Generally, an amendment
changing the time or date of an indicted offense is considered
an amendment of form and not of substance.
42 C.J.S.
Indictments and Informations § 193 (1991); 41 Am. Jur. 2d
Indictments and Informations § 184 (1995).
An amendment to date
or time, however, must not prejudice defendant.
Such amendment
is generally permissible if the charged act was committed within
the statute of limitations, prior to the return of the
indictment date, and the date is not a material element of the
charged crime.
41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and Informations §
184 (1995).
In the case at hand, appellant argues the amendment
prejudiced his defense.
Specifically, appellant maintains that
he intended to present a time specific defense by proving that
on the original indictment date of October 24, 1999, he was in
California.
Moreover, appellant contends the two-week
continuance did not cure the resulting prejudice; instead,
appellant believes a continuance of some 30 days was needed to
prepare a new defense.
This dispute enjoys a long drawn out litigious history
that simply cumulated in the instant criminal action.
Appellant
unsuccessfully defended a civil action concerning the disputed
-4-
cattle.
It is incredulous that appellant was somehow surprised
and prejudiced by the date amendment; rather, it is more
probable that appellant was fully aware of the true date of the
indicted offense.
Considering the particular facts of this
case, we conclude a two-week continuance was sufficient for
appellant to revamp his defense and cured any resulting
prejudice.
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not
commit reversible error by amending the date in Count II of the
indictment to read “on or about October 29, 1999, through
January 15, 2003.”
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Logan
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth E. Dillingham
DILLINGHAM, RITCHIE & PETRIE
Elkton, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
William Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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