SAMUEL C. EDWARDS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000457-MR
SAMUEL C. EDWARDS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 03-CR-00042
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Samuel Edwards1 was convicted by an Adair Circuit
Court jury of two counts of first-degree assault.2
He was also
convicted of second-degree wanton endangerment,3 leaving the
1
In this opinion, Samuel Edwards will be referred to as “Edwards”;
and his brother, Patrick Edwards, will be referred to as “Patrick.”
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.010.
3
KRS 508.070.
scene of an accident,4 and operating a motor vehicle with a blood
alcohol concentration of .08 or above or while under the
influence of alcohol or other substance which impairs driving
ability.5
He was sentenced to a total of fifteen years’
imprisonment and a $500.00 fine.
On appeal from that judgment, Edwards asserts that the
trial court made the following errors:
failing to grant
directed verdicts on one count of first-degree assault and on
the wanton endangerment charge; admitting the results of his
blood alcohol test despite the Commonwealth’s failure to
establish the chain of custody and the forensic scientist’s
inadequate training; failing to strike for cause a juror who had
come upon the scene shortly after the crime occurred; and
deviating from the jury’s recommendation of concurrent
sentencing.
Because we find each of these claims to be either
unpreserved or without merit, we affirm.
On March 16, 2003, while driving a purple Nissan
pickup truck, Edwards struck a motorcycle carrying Wesley
Hutchinson and Leslie Smith.
Witnesses said Hutchinson and
Smith were knocked off the motorcycle with great force.
Officer
Justin Claywell, who was standing in a nearby parking lot,
heard, but did not see, the collision.
He then saw Smith and
4
KRS 189.580.
5
In the part of this opinion that follows, this charge will be
referred to as driving under the influence (DUI). KRS 189A.010.
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Hutchinson lying in the road and the purple truck attempting to
turn around.
He recognized the occupants of the truck as
Edwards and Edwards’s identical twin brother, Patrick.6
Claywell, who was in uniform, shouted and gestured for the
driver to stop.
Instead of stopping, Edwards drove off rapidly
through a parking lot.
Edwards was apprehended minutes later by Officer Mark
Harris,7 who heard the radio call to be on the lookout for the
distinctive vehicle.
Harris noticed that the driver of the
truck, Edwards, smelled of alcohol.
When Harris had Edwards
step out of the vehicle, he observed that Edwards’s balance was
very poor and that he was staggering noticeably.
He did not
have Edwards perform any field sobriety tests because he did not
think Edwards would be able to perform them safely; Edwards’s
balance was so impaired that he appeared to be on the verge of
falling down.
influence.8
Harris arrested Edwards for driving under the
Sergeant Bobby Sullivan arrived in time to assist
6
Claywell could not tell which twin was driving only that the driver
was wearing glasses. When the truck was stopped by police minutes
later, Edwards was driving. He was also wearing glasses but his
brother was not. Edwards has not denied that he was the driver of
the truck at the time of the accident.
7
Approximately one month after this accident, Mark Harris was
promoted to chief of police. To avoid confusion, this opinion
refers to him throughout as Officer Harris, the rank he held at the
time of the accident.
8
Patrick, who also appeared impaired, was arrested for public
intoxication.
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Harris with the arrest.
Sgt. Sullivan testified that he had
made hundreds of DUI stops and that he, too, believed that
Edwards was under the influence of alcohol because of his
demeanor and lack of coordination.
Edwards consented to a blood alcohol test.
transported Edwards to Westlake Hospital in Columbia.
Harris
Harris
then watched a female employee of the hospital draw Harris’s
blood and fill the vials of a blood alcohol test kit.
Harris
prepared the kit to be mailed to the Kentucky State Police (KSP)
forensic lab in Frankfort and actually mailed it himself.
The kit containing the blood sample was received, with
tamper-evident tape intact, at the KSP forensic lab by Jennifer
Kendall, a forensic scientist specialist.
Kendall tested the
blood sample and determined that Edwards had a blood alcohol
level of 0.14.
Additional facts will be supplied as needed.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON WANTON ENDANGERMENT CHARGE
Edwards asserts that he was entitled to a directed
verdict on the wanton endangerment charge because there was
insufficient evidence to support this charge.
He preserved this
issue at trial by twice moving for a directed verdict on this
charge.
On a motion for directed verdict, “[i]f the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
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reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given.”9
In rendering this decision, “the
trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.”10
On appellate
review, the test of a directed verdict is whether, under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury
to find the defendant guilty.11
Only if this is true is the
defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.12
As described above, despite Officer Claywell’s efforts
to get Edwards to stop, Edwards turned the truck around and left
the scene of the accident rapidly through a parking lot.
Claywell testified that in the process of turning the truck
around, Edwards drove his pickup truck “within inches” of
Hutchinson’s head while Hutchinson was lying injured on the
pavement.
This near miss of Hutchinson was the basis of the
wanton endangerment charge.
According to KRS 508.070(1), “[a] person is guilty of
wanton endangerment in the second degree when he wantonly
engages in conduct which creates a substantial danger of
physical injury to another person.”
Edwards asserts that he
9
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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could not help coming close to Hutchinson or someone else while
turning around because the roadway was narrow and crowded with
onlookers.
But he also asserts that Hutchinson was never placed
in substantial danger of physical injury.
Notwithstanding these
naked assertions, when the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, it was not unreasonable for the
jury to find that Edwards’s coming within inches of striking the
already injured Hutchinson in the head with a moving vehicle
created a substantial risk of physical injury to him.
We are
unpersuaded by Edwards’s argument that the trial court erred by
submitting the wanton endangerment charge to the jury rather
than directing a verdict.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON FIRST-DEGREE ASSAULT CHARGE
Edwards also asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to grant a directed verdict on the count of first-degree
assault based on Smith’s injuries from the collision.
Edwards
asserts that he was entitled to a directed verdict on this count
because the Commonwealth failed to establish that Smith incurred
a “serious physical injury,” an element of first-degree
assault.13
13
Serious physical injury is defined by KRS 500.080(15)
KRS 508.010 states as follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
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as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death,
or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged
impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily organ.”
After the accident, Smith and Hutchinson were taken to
Westlake Hospital in Columbia but were later transferred by
helicopter to University Hospital in Louisville because they
were believed to have potentially life-threatening injuries.
Smith’s most severe injury was a broken jaw, which required
surgery.
She was hospitalized for four days.14
wired shut for six weeks.
Her jaw was
She was restricted to a liquid diet
for six weeks15 and was unable to chew for a total of eight
weeks.
At the time of trial, over nine months after the
(a)
He intentionally causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument; or
(b)
Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another and
thereby causes serious physical injury to another person.
14
Smith also suffered a number of abrasions and cuts. She had a cut
to the bone in her chin, which required stitches. She has been left
with some small facial scars. She also has been left with scars on
her knees. Since the accident, her knees pain her on cold days or
after long shifts at work. She testified that she might someday
need knee replacement surgery as a consequence of the accident.
15
In fact, for the first three weeks, Smith was further restricted to
clear liquids because she had problems with nausea. If she had
vomited with her jaw wired shut, the consequences could have been
serious. On one occasion, she had to have a shot to stop her
nausea.
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accident, she still could not chew well on one side of her
mouth, and it was painful to chew gum.
She broke several teeth in the accident, and one and a
half teeth had to be removed during the surgery to wire her jaw.
Repairing her broken and missing teeth is a gradual process,
which was not yet complete at the time of trial.
After all of
her broken teeth are repaired and missing teeth are replaced,
Smith anticipated oral surgery to remedy the displacement of her
teeth due to the accident.
The accident caused her previously-
straight teeth to become crammed together.
Since the accident,
Smith suffers from headaches, tingling, and localized numbness
in her head, none of which occurred before the accident.
Edwards asserts that Smith’s injuries could not rise
to the level of serious physical injury.
However, Edwards
ignores the precedent of Clift v. Commonwealth,16 in which a
panel of this Court held that a reasonable juror could find that
the significant impairment of an 11-month-old’s use of his arm
for four weeks due to a broken humerus is either a “prolonged
impairment of health” or a “prolonged loss or impairment of the
function of [a] bodily organ” under KRS 500.080(15) and, thus, a
“serious physical injury.”17
The infant in question had to wear
16
105 S.W.3d 467 (Ky.App. 2003).
17
Id. at 470, 472.
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a sling for four weeks, impairing his mobility.18
He resumed
normal activity after four to six weeks, but there was medical
testimony presented that this type of injury to a child of his
age generally requires 18 to 24 months to completely heal.19
Nevertheless, at the time of trial, the child was free of pain
or any permanent disfigurement due to the injury.20
We find Smith’s injury and impairment to be at least
as severe as that of the injured infant in Clift, if not more
so.
Smith’s normal activities were restricted for an even
longer period of time due to her broken jaw than the injured
infant.
And unlike that child, who appeared to fully heal,
Smith continues to suffer headaches, jaw pain, tingling,
localized numbness, and broken and missing teeth as a result of
her injury.
We note that these facts might be sufficient to
establish that Smith suffered a “serious and prolonged
disfigurement,”21 which is another way to prove that she suffered
a serious physical injury within the meaning of KRS 508.010.
For all of these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s
instructing the jury on this count of first-degree assault
rather than granting a directed verdict on this charge.
18
Id. at 470.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See KRS 500.080(15).
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CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Edwards asserts that the trial court erred by
admitting the results of his blood alcohol test over his
objection that the chain of custody was deficient because there
was some question about who drew the blood.
He asserts that
this unanswered question deems the evidence concerning the blood
alcohol test results not sufficiently reliable; and, hence, its
admission violated due process.22
At trial, Tonya Luttrell testified that she had been a
lab technician at Westlake Hospital for four years and that her
job duties including drawing and testing blood and other bodily
fluids.
About twice a year, she is asked to draw blood by the
police.
She initially stated that she had no memory of drawing
Edwards’s blood or being asked to draw blood at the request of
Officer Harris on March 16, 2003.
She then testified about the
specific procedures which she follows every time that she draws
a blood sample for the police.23
When asked if she followed this
22
If Edwards’s claim were true, it would undermine not only his DUI
conviction but, also, his conviction for two counts of first-degree
assault. This is because the element of wantonness in his assault
convictions seems to have been based primarily on his driving while
under the influence of alcohol. See KRS 508.010.
23
We note that this is evidence of habit or custom. To the extent
that it was offered to show that Luttrell acted in accordance with
this procedure on a particular occasionwhich appears to be why
this evidence was offeredit is inadmissible. See Burchett v.
Commonwealth, 98 S.W.3d 492, 494-499 (Ky. 2003); Thomas v. Greenview
Hospital, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 663, 669-671 (Ky.App. 2004). However,
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procedure in drawing Edwards’s blood on March 16, 2003, she
said, “I think so.
Yes.”
However, this tentative, affirmative
statement was later contradicted on cross examination:
Defense counsel: You don’t have any
personal recollection of taking blood from
Mr. Edwards and giving it to an officer, do
you?
Luttrell: I very vaguely remember.
it’s been a long time ago.
I mean,
Defense counsel: I’ll remind you you’re
under oath. . . . [D]o you have a personal
recollection of on that date, March the 16th,
of . . . an officer bringing Mr. Edwards in
and you drawing blood?
Luttrell:
Not really.
Luttrell explained that without referring to her documentation,
which she did not have with her, she had no way of recalling
whether she drew a particular person’s blood or drew blood at
the request of a particular officer.
Edwards repeatedly
objected to Luttrell’s testimony on the ground that she had no
personal knowledge.
However, these objections were overruled.
Officer Harris testified that he witnessed Edwards’s
blood being drawn at Westlake Hospital; but he did not know the
name of the female employee of the hospital, whom he described
as a nurse, who took the blood.
But he described how the woman
drawing the blood collected the blood from Edwards and filled
Edwards never objected to this habit testimony at trial and has not
raised this issue on appeal.
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the vials from the blood alcohol test kit.
Harris then
described how his name, Edwards’s name, and the name of the
woman who drew the blood were all placed on the sample, along
with the date and time the sample was taken.
Finally, he
testified that he sealed the test kit with the sample inside
with tamper-evident tape and mailed it to the KSP forensic lab
at Frankfort.
He stated that the blood sample was never out of
his sight from the time he witnessed the blood being drawn from
Edwards until he mailed the kit containing the blood sample to
the KSP lab.
Jennifer Kendall, a forensic science specialist at the
KSP lab, also testified about the blood sample.
Kendall stated
that she picked up the blood alcohol test kit from the mail when
it arrived.
The tamper-evident tape was intact, and the names
of Edwards and Harris were on the sample.
Kendall stated that
the blood sample was in her custody from the time it arrived at
the lab by mail until she tested the blood.
Kendall testified, without objection, that the results
of the blood alcohol test showed that Edwards had a blood
alcohol level of 0.14.
Approximately a minute later, the
Commonwealth moved to introduce into evidence Kendall’s written
report on the results of Edwards’s blood alcohol test.
Defense
counsel objected on the ground that the chain of custody of the
blood sample was not established because of the question
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concerning who drew the blood.
The trial court gave Edwards the
opportunity to cross-examine Kendall on this specific issue.
Upon cross-examination, Kendall admitted that she did
not draw the blood herself and had no personal knowledge of who
did.
She stated that she believed that the person who drew the
blood signed the sample.
She conceded, however, that she only
knew what name was listed on the sample, not whether the named
person actually drew the blood and/or signed the sample.24
trial court overruled Edwards’s objection.
The
After making this
ruling, the trial court clarified that it deemed Edwards’s
objection as an objection limited to the introduction of the
written report and not to Kendall’s earlier testimony concerning
the results of the blood alcohol test.
Defense counsel
responded to the trial judge’s comment that her objection was,
in effect, an objection to Kendall’s testimony concerning the
blood alcohol test results also.
its ruling.
The trial court did not change
The written report was allowed into evidence.
The first matter to be addressed is whether Edwards
preserved this issue with a timely objection.
When Edwards
objected to the admission of the report of the blood alcohol
test, Kendall had already testified, without contemporaneous
objection, as to the blood alcohol test results.
24
We note that
Kendall never revealed the name of the person listed on the kit as
the person who allegedly drew Edwards’s blood.
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this identical fact patternan objection to the introduction of
a report on a blood alcohol content test after unchallenged
testimony was presented on the results of the blood alcohol
testoccurred in Matthews v. Commonwealth.25
In that case, the
Kentucky Supreme Court alluded to the potential preservation
problem by quoting a passage from the Appellant’s reply brief in
which he admitted that he may have “waited two questions too
late to object to the introduction of the blood alcohol content”
but blamed his delay on being duped into believing that the
Commonwealth could lay a proper foundation for the testimony.26
Although the Supreme Court, never expressly stated that the
issue was sufficiently preserved, the opinion proceeds to
analyze the merits of the appeal in Matthews.27
Following this
precedent, we will also address the merits in this case.
Nevertheless, the better trial practice would have been for
defense counsel to have interposed an objection, if she had one,
before Kendall told the jury the results of the blood alcohol
lab test rather than after.
It is well-established that a chain of custody is
required for substances such as blood, which are not clearly
identifiable or distinguishable, to show that the sample tested
25
44 S.W.3d 361, 363-364 (Ky. 2001).
26
Id. at 364.
27
Id. at 364-365.
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was the same sample drawn from the person in question.28
The
chain of custody does not need to be perfect, eliminating any
remote possibility of tampering or misidentification, however.29
The chain of custody is sufficient “so long as there is
persuasive evidence that ‘the reasonable probability is that the
evidence has not been altered in any material respect.’”30
Additionally, any gap in the chain of custody normally goes to
the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.31
In Matthews v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth was
unable to locate for trial the hospital employee who drew blood
for a blood alcohol test from a defendant suspected of driving
under the influence.32
But the veteran police officer, who had
requested that the blood be drawn, witnessed the entire
process.33
He saw the hospital employee, whom he believed to be
a registered nurse named Susan, clean the defendant’s arm and
28
Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); Robert Lawson,
THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK, § 11.00[3], pp. 843-846 (4th ed.
Matthew Bender 2003); Henderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 454, 461
(Ky. 1974); Calvert v. Commonwealth, 708 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Ky.App.
1986).
29
Rabovsky, supra at 8; Brown v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 738, 740
(Ky. 1969).
30
Rabovsky, supra at 8 (quoting United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d
1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989)).
31
Rabovsky, supra at 8 (citing United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244,
250 (7th Cir. 1988)).
32
Supra at 363.
33
Id.
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draw his blood, filling two vials of blood for the blood alcohol
test kit.34
The police officer stated that he was familiar with
the prescribed procedures for drawing blood for a blood alcohol
test and that Susan followed these procedures.35
While he could
not remember Susan’s surname at trial, he knew that he noted it,
as well as the time the blood was drawn, on the blood kit at the
time the sample was drawn.
The defendant in Matthews objected to the admission of
the report of his blood alcohol test results prepared by a
chemist at the KSP forensic lab because of the lack of proper
foundation, specifically the credentials of the person who drew
the blood.36
The defendant in Matthews argued that KRS 189A.103(6),
which authorizes blood to be drawn by a physician, registered
nurse, phlebotomist, medical technician, or medical
technologist, means that these are the only persons qualified to
draw blood for a blood alcohol test and that the failure of the
Commonwealth to prove that blood was drawn by one of these
individuals renders evidence concerning the blood sample
inadmissible.37
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 363-364.
37
But the court stated the effect of the statute
Id.
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and regulations was to create a “presumption of regularity” when
blood is drawn by a person authorized by the statute and
regulations.38
This is based on the presumption that these named
individuals will perform the procedures involved in drawing
blood correctly because of their skill and training.39
However,
the Court noted that persons other than those authorized to draw
blood by the statute and regulations may be able to draw blood
properly.40
Based on the testimony presented by the veteran
police officer who was familiar with the procedures required to
draw blood for a blood alcohol test, the Court concluded that
“the proper procedures were followed.”41
The Court also stated
as follows:
Moreover, to reject this evidence in the
absence of any indication whatsoever of
contamination or inaccuracy would place form
over substance. . . . While a proper
foundation may not have been laid, and the
Commonwealth may have been remiss in failing
to prove that a registered nurse drew the
blood, the record contains sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain the
conviction.42
38
Id. at 364.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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In the instant case, Edwards does not base his
challenge to the admissibility of the blood test evidence on the
allegation that the Commonwealth did not prove that whoever drew
his blood was authorized to do so under KRS 189A.103(6).
Instead, he asserts that the Commonwealth’s failure to present
evidence by someone who remembers drawing the blood compromised
the chain of custody.
Edwards argues that the facts in the
instant case are like those in Henderson v. Commonwealth or
Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, in which Kentucky’s highest court held
that evidence concerning blood samples should not have been
introduced into evidence because of deficiencies in the chain of
custody.43
case.
But these cases are distinguishable from the instant
In Henderson, there was no evidence concerning the
integrity of the blood sample from the time it was released at
the scene by the investigating officers to another police
officer until it reached the laboratory analyst.44
This gap
created the very real possibility that the sample could have
been tampered with or misidentified during that time period.
In
Rabovsky, the chain of custody did not merely have a gap in it,
it was nonexistent.
No evidence was introduced to prove who
43
But see Henderson, supra at 461 (holding that the admission of the
blood samples and comparisons was harmless because they only proved
that blood on the weapon, found near the victim’s body, was the
victim’s type and that there was blood on the defendant’s socks and
towels, which he admitted), Rabovsky, supra at 8-9.
44
Supra at 461.
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collected the blood samples, how they were stored, how they were
transported to one private laboratory, how (or if) they were
transported to a second private laboratory, or what method was
used to test the samples.45
The instant case does not pose such a problem.
The
whereabouts of the blood sample are fully accounted for from the
time it was drawn until it was tested.
And, as in Matthews,
sufficient evidence is provided that the blood was properly
drawn based on the testimony of an experienced police officer
who observed the procedure.46
Moreover, Edwards does not assert
that the blood sample was actually misidentified, tampered with,
or improperly drawn.
While the Commonwealth may not have laid the perfect
chain of custody due to an unprepared witness, Luttrell, it did
present sufficient evidence to show that the blood sample tested
was the sample drawn from Edwards and that it had not been
tampered with.
This is enough to support the admissibility of
the blood alcohol evidence and sustain the conviction.
And, as
the Supreme Court noted in Matthews, “to reject this evidence in
the absence of any indication whatsoever of contamination or
45
Rabovsky, supra, at 7-8.
46
Officer Harris testified at trial that he had fifteen years of
experience as a police officer.
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inaccuracy would place form over substance.”47
We find no error
in the admission of the testimony and report concerning
Edwards’s blood alcohol level.
CALIBRATION OF BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTING EQUIPMENT
Edwards also asserts that the trial court improperly
admitted the testimony and report concerning the blood alcohol
test results because the results were not sufficiently reliable.
Kendall, the forensic scientist specialist at the Kentucky State
Police lab who performed the test testified that she has a
bachelor’s degree in chemistry and has received in-house
training by the KSP, including training on how to operate the
device which tests blood alcohol levels.
She stated that she
calibrated the machine before performing the first blood alcohol
test on the day that she tested Edwards’s sample and that she
performed controls throughout the day as she tested blood
alcohol samples to verify that the machine was still performing
accurately.
Edwards asserts that the test results are unreliable
because Kendall had received no specialized training on
calibration from the manufacturer of the device which tests
blood alcohol.
Edwards never raised this issue at trial.
sought to suppress the test results only on the ground of
47
Supra at 364.
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He
alleged defect in the chain of custody concerning who drew the
blood.
Therefore, this issue was not preserved for review.
Even if the issue were preserved, we would find no
merit in Edwards’s claim.
Edwards never asserts that training
by the manufacturer of the equipment is even available.
If such
training were available, he does not state how or if it is
superior to the in-house training offered by KSP.
In fact, he
does not allege any actual deficiency in the training in
calibration which Kendall received.
Nor does he allege that the
blood alcohol test results were actually erroneous due to a
calibration error.
Thus, this claim is both unpreserved and
without merit.
FAILURE TO STRIKE JUROR FOR CAUSE
Edwards asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to strike Juror #125 for cause because he
happened to arrive at the scene of the accident shortly after it
occurred when some police officers and bystanders were still
standing about talking.
According to the trial record, Edwards
waived this issue at trial.
Edwards asserts that he preserved this issue by
requesting that Juror #125 be struck for cause, but this
statement is misleading and not totally accurate.
The fact that
Juror #125 had come upon the scene of the accident first came to
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light during the Commonwealth’s voir dire.
Although he had not
seen the accident or talked to anyone at the scene about it,
Juror #125 still expressed some concern about whether he could
totally put what he saw out of his mind and judge the case based
solely on the evidence.48
Juror #125 for cause.
Defense counsel moved to strike
The trial court denied this motion as
premature at that point but stated that defense counsel could
question Juror #125 further during defense voir dire.
During defense voir dire, defense counsel did question
Juror #125 further.
Juror #125 continued to express some
uncertainty about whether his having stopped at the scene might
affect him as juror.
The trial court then questioned
Juror #125, eliciting the responses that nothing Juror #125 had
observed or heard that day had made him form an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of Edwards and that he still had no
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Edwards.
The trial
court then informed defense counsel that she was free to
question Juror #125 further or to approach the bench for a bench
conference giving the defense the opportunity to renew the
motion to strike Juror #125 for cause if Edwards still wished to
do so.
48
Instead, the defense simply dropped the issue.
It is unclear from the record exactly what Juror #125 did see or
hear at the accident scene. He was never asked to describe what he
saw or heard that day.
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Under these circumstances, we deem Edwards to have
waived this issue by failing to renew his motion to strike for
cause at the appropriate time.
We must presume from the trial
record that Edwards was satisfied by the answers he received
during the additional voir dire.
Therefore, this issue is not
preserved for appellate review.
DEVIATING FROM JURY RECOMMENDATION ON SENTENCING
Edwards asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to deviate from the jury’s recommendation of
concurrent sentencing.
The jury recommended that Edwards’s two,
ten year sentences for first-degree assault be served
concurrently.
But the trial court overlapped the terms so that
they are partially concurrent and partially consecutive, for a
total of fifteen years’ imprisonment.
In making this sentencing
decision, the trial court reviewed the victim impact statements
and PSI report.
The PSI report revealed that Edwards had been
an alcoholic for twenty of his thirty-nine years and continued
to abuse alcohol, morphine, marijuana, and heroin, despite
having tried various substance abuse treatment programs.
Observing that the jury had been specifically informed that its
decision regarding concurrent and consecutive sentencing was
only a recommendation, the trial court chose to deviate from the
jury’s recommendation for fully concurrent sentencing.
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The
reasons given by the trial court for increasing Edwards’s
sentence to be served from ten to fifteen years were the fact
that Edwards had been unable to resolve his substance abuse
problem in twenty years and the fact that he had come “extremely
close” to killing Hutchinson and Smith as a result.
Based on
these facts, the court deemed it appropriate that Edwards “be
removed from society for a considerable period of time.”
It is well established that the trial court is not
obligated to accept the recommendation of the jury on concurrent
sentencing.49
Upon review, the question is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in rendering a decision which is
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.50
In the instant case, the trial court provided
several reasons for declining to follow the jury’s recommendation to run both of the ten-year sentences concurrently.
Under
these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s sentencing.
Having concluded that each of the points of appeal
which Edwards has raised is either unpreserved or without merit,
we affirm.
49
See Murphy v.
Commonwealth,
Commonwealth,
Commonwealth,
50
See Murphy, supra at 178; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson,
11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ky. 2001); Swain v.
887 S.W.2d 346, 348-349 (Ky. 1994); Nichols v.
839 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Ky. 1992); Dotson v.
740 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 1987).
-24-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Shannon Dupree
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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