WENDELL CLAYTON SAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: June 17, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000383-MR
WENDELL CLAYTON SAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WOODFORD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT B. OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 88-CR-00006
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Wendell Clayton Sams has appealed from the
January 29, 2004, order of the Woodford Circuit Court which
denied his motion to vacate and set aside the trial court’s
final judgment of conviction and sentence of imprisonment
pursuant to RCr1 11.42.
relief:
Sams’s motion asserted two grounds for
(1) that the trial court erred when it found that his
guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
of counsel.
Having concluded that the trial court did not err
in finding that Sams entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently, and that he received adequate representation
by counsel, we affirm.
In 1988 Sams was indicted on one count of rape in the
third degree2 and one count of custodial interference.3
2, 1988, Sams pled guilty to both charges.
On March
On April 6, 1988,
Sams was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count,
with the sentences to run consecutively for a total of ten
years, probated for five years.
Sams’s probation was revoked on
November 2, 1988, and he was sentenced to ten years in prison.
On July 1, 1996, Sams filed a motion to vacate his
sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Sams alleged that his guilty
plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
because at the time of the plea he was under the influence of
prescription medication which prevented him from fully
understanding the proceedings and the significance of the
proceedings.
Sams claimed that his defense counsel, James
Springate, knew that he was on medication, but failed to inform
the trial court of that fact.
Sams also contended that
Springate’s failure to inform the trial court that Sams was on
medication constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040.
3
KRS 509.070.
-2-
a competent attorney would have informed the trial court,
thereby compelling the trial court to hold a hearing to
determine whether Sams was capable of entering a voluntary plea.
On September 11, 1996, the trial court denied Sams’s
motion without appointing counsel, without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, and without reviewing the transcript of the
guilty plea.
The trial court ruled that Sams’s RCr 11.42 motion
was untimely filed, and that it had no merit on its face.
On
March 11, 1998, this Court remanded the case to Woodford Circuit
Court holding that Sams’s RCr 11.42 motion was timely filed, and
that the merits of the motion could not be determined on its
face.
The trial court was directed to review the record to
determine whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary.4
On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing on
August 4, 1999.5
hearing.6
Sams did not have counsel present at the
Sams testified at this abbreviated hearing that at the
time of his plea he was under the influence of prescription
medication.
Sams further testified that he had told his
attorney that he was on medication, but that his attorney told
him to keep quiet and not to tell the trial court.
4
Case No. 1996-CA-002739-MR, rendered January 30, 1998, not-to-be published.
5
Apparently, the trial court conducted an abbreviated hearing to determine
whether Sams was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing.
6
The record reflects that Sams had an attorney at this time, but it is
unclear if counsel was appointed. Further, for some unexplained reason
counsel failed to appear at the hearing.
-3-
After reviewing the record, the trial court denied
Sams’s RCr 11.42 motion, finding that nothing in the record
supported Sams’s assertions that his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and finding that
Sams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was unfounded.
In an Opinion rendered on March 22, 2002, this Court affirmed.7
The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted Sams’s motion for
discretionary review, vacated this Court’s Opinion, and remanded
the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing with
appointed counsel to represent Sams.8
On remand, the trial court appointed counsel to
represent Sams and held, for the first time, a full evidentiary
hearing.
At this hearing, Sams introduced evidence to support
his argument that his medication prevented him from knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entering his plea.
The trial
court heard testimony from Sams, attorney Springate, and Dr.
Eljourn Don Nelson, a professor of Clinical Pharmacology at the
University of Cincinnati College of Medicine.
Dr. Fikret
Yalkut, who had worked as a physician at the Woodford County
Jail while Sams was in custody there, testified by affidavit.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
again denied Sams’s RCr 11.42 motion.
This appeal followed.
7
Case No. 2000-CA-000289-MR, not-to-be published.
8
Case No. 2002-SC-0290-D, rendered April 17, 2003.
-4-
For an RCr 11.42 motion to succeed, the movant must
“establish convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial
right which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by
the post-conviction proceedings provided in RCr 11.42.”9
In
addition, “a prisoner who has slept on his rights will bear a
heavy burden to affirmatively prove the facts on which his
relief must rest.”10
Thus, the burden of proof rests upon Sams
to show that his allegations are, in fact, true.
Merely raising
a question as to their truthfulness is not sufficient.
First, Sams asserts that the trial court erred when it
found his guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.11
Sparks v. Commonwealth,12 sets out the test for
determining the validity of a guilty plea:
The test for determining the validity
of a guilty plea is whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant. North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). There
must be an affirmative showing in the record
that the plea was intelligently and
voluntarily made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d
274 (1969). However, “the validity of a
guilty plea is determined not by reference
9
Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky.App. 1968) (citing
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 415 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ky. 1967)).
10
Prater v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1971).
11
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969).
12
721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky.App. 1986).
-5-
to some magic incantation recited at the
time it is taken but from the totality of
the circumstances surrounding it.” Kotas v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447
(1978), (citing Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 747 (1970)).
In examining the totality of the circumstances, the
court considers such factors as “the accused’s demeanor,
background and experience, and whether the record reveals that
the plea was voluntarily made.”13
The trial court is in the best
position to determine whether there was involuntariness or
incompetence to plead guilty, and solemn declarations in court
carry a strong presumption of verity.14
If the allegations in
the motion can be resolved on the face of the record, there is
no need for a hearing.15
However, if a material question of fact
is raised as to whether the plea is valid, an evidentiary
hearing is necessary.16
At the hearing, the trial court is
required to make findings on those material issues of fact.17
Those factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly
13
Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky.App. 1990).
14
Id.
15
Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1971).
16
RCr 11.42(5).
17
RCr 11.42(6).
-6-
erroneous standard.18
In denying relief under RCr 11.42, the trial court, in
considering the totality of the circumstances, was entitled to
examine all evidence in the record as well as the evidence
produced at the evidentiary hearing.
Considering the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court had
substantial evidence upon which to base a finding that Sams
possessed a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’” and
that he had a “‘rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings[.]’”19
Our review of the record indicates that when Sams
entered his guilty plea, he answered during the colloquy with
the trial court that he was not under the influence of drugs,
that he was not impaired in his judgment in any way, and that he
was entering his guilty plea willingly, freely, voluntarily, and
intelligently.
Sams’s defense counsel told the trial court that
in his opinion Sams understood his rights and the nature of the
proceedings, and that his plea was being made willingly, freely,
voluntarily, and intelligently.
Furthermore, at the subsequent
sentencing hearing, Sams carried on a constructive and
18
Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky.App. 2002) (citing Carnes v.
Carnes, 704 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Ky. 1986)). See also Thompson v. Commonwealth,
147 S.W.3d 22, 33 (Ky. 2004).
19
Thompson, 147 S.W.3d at 32 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)).
-7-
substantive conversation with the trial court, demonstrated an
understanding of his personal history, and submitted a
sentencing option to the trial court which he considered to be
in his best interests.
In its January 29, 2004, order denying Sams’s RCr
11.42 motion, the trial court found no “irregularities” in the
record or proceedings, and thus determined that Sams’s motion
had no merit.
Sams claims the trial court erred because it
should not have relied upon the face of the record, but should
have instead relied upon evidence adduced at the hearing.
Sams
is correct that the trial court must consider the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing, but it need not base its
determination entirely on that evidence.
Again, the trial court
is required to consider the totality of the circumstances.20
Sams testified at the evidentiary hearing that at the
time of his plea and at the time of the sentencing hearing, he
was taking both Mellaril and Sinequan, and that he was unable to
remember any of the proceedings because of the effects of the
drugs.
Dr. Yalkut testified by affidavit that he had regularly
prescribed Mellaril to Sams from October 29, 1987, through April
1, 1988.
Dr. Nelson testified that Mellaril would have impaired
Sams’s ability to weigh the consequences of the plea, but also
20
Kotas, 565 S.W.2d at 447.
-8-
admitted upon cross-examination that such impairment would not
necessarily have rendered him incompetent to enter a plea.
It was reasonable for the trial court, which is the
best position to observe witnesses and determine their
credibility,21 to have still found the record more persuasive
than either the testimony by Sams or Dr. Nelson.
Thus, though
the trial court must consider all the evidence presented, it may
find the evidence in the record more persuasive than that
produced at the hearing.
We reiterate that Sams bears the
burden of showing that he was incompetent, and that he must
overcome the strong presumption that his plea was valid.22
Accordingly, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
relying on this evidence, as the trial court may have found it
more persuasive than the evidence presented at the hearing.
Sams’s second assignment of error is that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty
plea, a movant must prove both
(1) that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel’s performance fell outside the wide
range of professionally competent
assistance; and (2) that the deficient
performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea process that, but for
the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
21
Centers, 799 S.W.2d at 54.
22
Id.
-9-
probability that the defendant would not
have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted
on going to trial [citations omitted].23
Review of counsel’s performance is to be highly deferential.24
We agree with the trial court that Sams was represented
competently and was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.
Sams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
closely related to his claim of incompetence.
Sams alleges that
at the time of his plea and sentencing, he told his attorney
that he was on medication, that Springate told him not to inform
the trial court, and that Springate failed to further ascertain
whether Sams was impaired by his medication.
Sams’s RCr 11.42
motion asserts that this was ineffective assistance of counsel
because Springate should have informed the trial court that Sams
was on medication.
The only evidence that supports Sams’s allegation that
Springate knew that he was on medication is Sams’s testimony
itself.
At the evidentiary hearing, Springate testified that
though he had no recollection of Sams’s case, it was his
practice not to allow “official business be transacted” if he
was informed that a person was on medication.
Sams also submits
that Springate should have discovered through independent
research that Sams was impaired.
23
For support, Sams cites
Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 727-28.
24
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
-10-
Strickland, supra, where the Court stated, “counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”25
We do not accept Sams’s contention that Springate’s
failure to investigate Sams’s competence was unreasonable.
In
order to prove deficient conduct by counsel, Sams must show that
Springate’s actions fell outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.26
The position advocated by Sams would
require an attorney, without notice of any deficiency or
impairment, to nevertheless investigate his client’s competency.
Such a standard does not exist.
Thus, the trial court did not
err in ruling that Sams failed to prove that Springate’s
performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.
In addition to proving that his counsel’s
representation was deficient, Sams must also show that he was
prejudiced by that deficiency,27 and that but for the deficiency,
there is a reasonable probability that he would have insisted on
a trial.28
Once again, Sams has not met this burden.
Since the
trial court has found that Sams was indeed competent to enter a
25
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
26
Id. 466 U.S. at 688-89; Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Ky.
2002); Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999).
27
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
28
Sparks, 721 S.W.2d at 728.
-11-
plea, Sams cannot show that he was prejudiced in any way.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that Sams
received adequate representation.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Woodford
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah J. Jost
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-12-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.