KELLY W. WILSON v. SHARON L. WILSON; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY EX REL. SHARON L. WILSON
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000276-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001648-MR
KELLY W. WILSON
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00218
v.
SHARON L. WILSON;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
EX REL. SHARON L. WILSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
BARBER, JUDGE:
These consolidated appeals stem from a
dissolution of marriage proceeding originating in Meade County,
Kentucky.
On August 26, 1998, Appellee, Sharon L. Wilson
(hereinafter referred to as Sharon), filed for divorce from
Appellant, Kelly W. Wilson (hereinafter referred to as Kelly).
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
A separation agreement between the parties was filed with the
trial court on August 9, 1998.
Each party was duly represented
by counsel during the execution of the settlement agreement.
At
that time, Kelly was still on active duty in the military.
Subsequently, a dissolution decree incorporating the terms of
the separation agreement was entered on October 13, 2000.
On
December 12, 2000, an amended decree was entered to correct a
typographical error dealing with the parties’ and their minor
child’s social security numbers.
All other terms were verbatim
of the original decree.
Following the entry of the decree, several motions
were filed by Sharon in relation to benefits she felt due to her
pursuant to the separation agreement.
The two judgments which
ultimately led to this appeal dealt with maintenance and child
support arrearages.
The first judgment was entered on January
9, 2004, and found arrearages through November 2003 in the
amounts of $2,170.14 for maintenance and $2,233.88 for child
support.
Following this order, Sharon received child support
services through the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(Cabinet).
The Cabinet utilized the services of the Meade
County Attorney’s office to seek reimbursement for services
rendered to Sharon as evidenced by an order entered March 4,
2004.
With the assistance of the Meade County Attorney’s
office, Sharon received the second judgment August 9, 2004.
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The
August 9, 2004 judgment, which is the subject of this appeal,
found arrearages beginning December 1, 2003 through June 30,
2004 in the amounts of $2,304.88 for child support and $2,407.57
for maintenance.
Kelly’s arguments can be categorized into three
primary issues.
First, Kelly argues that Sharon was entitled to
maintenance of $1,000 per month until his date of retirement on
May 31, 2003 per their separation agreement; therefore, he could
not accumulate an arrearage for monies he had no legal
obligation to pay.
Second, Kelly argues that Sharon has been
and is being paid all monies due to her from his military
retirement benefits in accordance with the separation agreement.
Third, Kelly argues he owes no child support arrearage, because
his child support obligation should have been reduced in June
2003 due to a change in his economic circumstances.
We shall
review each argument accordingly.
Kelly first argues that Sharon was entitled to
maintenance of $1,000 per month until his date of retirement on
May 31, 2003 per their separation agreement.
the language of the separation agreement.
We first turn to
The separation
agreement states in pertinent part:
[Kelly] shall pay to [Sharon] as
alimony and maintenance for [Sharon’s]
support, both temporarily and permanently,
$1,000 per month commencing immediately and
lasting for five (5) years or until [Kelly]
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retires from the United States Air Force
whichever first occurs. (Emphasis added.)
[Kelly] shall cause the aforesaid $1,000
monthly maintenance to be paid by voluntary
allotment. 2
Kentucky Revised Statute 403.180 governs separation
agreements in dissolution proceedings.
Kentucky Revised Statute
403.180(2) states “. . . the terms of the separation agreement,
except those providing for the custody, support, and visitation
of the children, are binding upon the court unless it finds,
after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and
any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their
own motion or on request of the court, that the separation
agreement is unconscionable.”
In this instance, the separation
agreement was found to be conscionable by the trial court and
incorporated accordingly into the decree and subsequent amended
decree.
Kentucky Revised Statute 403.180(5) states “Terms of
the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all
remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including
contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms.”
This concept
has been reiterated in case law.
Questions relating to the construction, operation and
affect of separation agreements between a husband and wife are
governed, in general, by the rules and provisions applicable to
the case of other contracts generally.
2
Separation Agreement, paragraph 4.
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Richey v. Richey, 389
S.W.2d 914, 917, (Ky.App. 1965).
The primary object in
construing a contact or compromise settlement agreement is to
effectuate the intentions of the parties.
Cantrell Supply, Inc.
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 384, (Ky.App.
2002); see also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152, 153, (Ky.
1966).
Also, absent an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’
intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the
instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Cantrell,
supra 94 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d
176, 178, (Ky. 2000)).
The plain language of the separation agreement states
that the monthly maintenance of $1,000 was to occur for either
five years or until Kelly retired from the Air Force, whichever
occurred first.
In this instance, Kelly retired from the Air
Force prior to the end of the five year period.
was effective as of May 31, 2003.
His retirement
Therefore, Kelly’s obligation
to pay Sharon $1,000 per month under this provision in the
separation agreement ceased to exist on June 1, 2003.
Kelly
states he continued to pay Sharon $1,000 per month in June and
July 2003 despite not being obligated to do the same.
Sharon
concedes that she received these payments in her brief 3 and her
September 10, 2003 affidavit.
Kelly is entitled to
reimbursement for these overpayments.
3
Appellee’s Brief p.5.
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See Wheeler v. Wheeler,
579 S.W.2d 378, 380, (Ky.App. 1979).
We remand to the trial
court so that an appropriate method of repayment of the $2,000
to Kelly by Sharon may be determined.
Another separation agreement provision became
applicable following Kelly’s retirement from the Air Force and
is the subject of his second argument.
Kelly claims Sharon has
been and is being paid all monies due to her from his military
retirement benefits in accordance with the separation agreement.
The relevant separation agreement provision states:
“As a part of the division of marital
property, [Sharon] shall receive forty-three
percent (43%) of [Kelly’s] Air Force
retirement pay which is roughly the
percentage [Sharon] would receive based upon
[Kelly] remaining in the Air Force for
twenty (20) years, despite the fact that
[Kelly] might remain in the Air Force for
longer than twenty (20) years. It is
specifically understood that in the event
that [Kelly] medically retires or if [Kelly]
retires with full or partial disability
benefits, or for any other reason which
would cause [Sharon’s] portion of [Kelly’s]
retirement benefits to be less than she
would received had [Kelly] retired with full
retirement, or 100 percent retirement
benefits, then in any such eventuality
[Kelly] shall pay to [Sharon] maintenance in
an amount to cause [Sharon’s] monthly income
to equal the portion of [Kelly’s] retirement
which [Sharon] would otherwise have received
had [Kelly] received his full, 100%
retirement benefits.” 4 (Emphasis added.)
4
Separation Agreement, portion of paragraph 16.
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It is important to note that a military retiree may
receive disability benefits only to the extent that he waives a
corresponding amount of his military retirement pay.
§5305.
38 U.S.C.
Also, disability benefits are exempt from taxation under
38 U.S.C. §5301(a), retirees who waive retirement pay in lieu of
disability benefits will increase their after-tax income.
When Kelly retired on May 31, 2003, he was rated 50%
permanently disabled by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA”).
As such, Kelly opted to receive 50% of his entitled
retirement benefits in the form of disability benefits under
Title 38 of the U.S. Code. 5
Kelly now argues that this
particular section cannot be enforced due to contradiction with
federal law and a United States Supreme Court case.
The United States Supreme Court case Kelly refers to
is Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d
675 (1989).
In Mansell, the court held that the Former Spouses’
Protection Act (“Act”)does not grant state courts the power to
treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay
that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.
Id. 490 U.S. at 594-595.
In reaching its decision, the High
Court reviewed 10 U.S.C. §1408 which deals with the payment of
retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders.
The
term “disposable retired pay” is defined in 10 U.S.C.
5
Title 38 of the U.S. Code contains the provisions related to VA disability
benefits.
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§1408(a)(4) as the total monthly retired pay to which a member
is entitled less certain deductions.
584-585.
Mansell, supra 490 U.S. at
Among the allowed deductions are amounts waived in
order to receive disability benefits under Title 38.
585, (citing 10 U.S.C. §1408(a)(4)(B)).
Id. at
The language of the Act
covers both community property and equitable distribution
states.
Id. at 584, n.2.
State courts are given the power to
divide disposable retired pay in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction.
Id. at 588-589, (citing 10 U.S.C. §1408(c)(1)).
It is important to note that the Mansell ruling only applied to
a state court’s division of such benefits and not the parties
division of those benefits.
Nothing within the Mansell ruling
prevents the parties to a dissolution proceeding from reaching
an agreement that varies from the statute.
While there are no
Kentucky cases directly on point regarding the issue at hand,
several other jurisdictions have held that parties should be
free to agree to a division of property, including military
retirement benefits, through a separation agreement despite
variations from the restrictions given state courts by the Act.
See Stone v. Stone, 908 P.2d 670 (Mont. 1995); Hoskins v.
Skojec, 265 A.D.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Dexter v. Dexter,
661 A.2d 171 (Md. App. 1995), cert. denied 668 A.2d 36 (Md.
1995); Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d 494 (S.D. 1996); Gatfield v.
Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. App. 2004); In re Marriage of
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Mansell, 217 Cal.App.3d 219 (Cal. App. 1989); Krapf v. Krapf,
786 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 2003); Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So.2d 235
(Fla. 1997); and Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. 2001).
In Kentucky, parties have the option to reach amicable
separation agreements in dissolution proceedings.
As we do not
wish to hinder the ability of parties to reach amicable
separation agreements, we opt to follow the above jurisdictions.
Kelly cites Davis v. Davis, 777 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1989),
as support for the proposition that the veteran disability
benefits at issue are not marital property subject to division
by the court.
Kelly’s reliance is misplaced because this is
another instance where the court divided the property between
the parties rather than a division by the parties through a
separation agreement.
The only limitation the General Assembly
has placed upon parties’ ability to reach a settlement agreement
in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is that its terms be
conscionable.
KRS 403.180(2).
The trial court found the
parties’ separation agreement to be conscionable as evidenced by
the decree and amended decree.
Based on the foregoing, we
believe the section of the settlement agreement entitling Sharon
to a percentage of Kelly’s retirement benefits is enforceable.
As such, Sharon is entitled to 43% of what Kelly’s retirement
pay would have been had he not opted to receive a portion in the
form of disability benefits under Title 38 of the U.S. Code.
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We
remand for the trial court to determine the appropriate amount
Sharon is entitled to each month in accordance with the
separation agreement.
Kelly shall be liable for any amount
remaining owed to Sharon after payment by Defense Accounting and
Finance Service (“DAFS”).
In relation to Sharon’s entitlement to Kelly’s
military retirement benefits, Kelly also argues that he should
not be held liable for an arrearage for a delay in her receipt
of payment of benefits following his retirement.
We agree.
The
payment of benefits to a former spouse is governed by 10 U.S.C.
§1408(d), which states, in pertinent part:
“In the case of a
member not entitled to receive retired pay on the date of the
effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin
not later than 90 days after the date on which the member first
becomes entitled to receive retired pay.”
Kelly retired on May
31, 2003 and Sharon received her first payment in early
September 2003 in accordance with the statute. 6
There is no
provision in the separation agreement for the interim between
Kelly’s retirement and Sharon’s receipt of her first payment and
we are not inclined to add one at this time.
As such, we
believe Kelly could not accumulate an arrearage for the period
of time between June 2003 and Sharon’s first payment from DAFS.
6
The payment received in September 2003 was for maintenance earned in August
2003. This is conceded by Sharon in her Affidavit filed September 10, 2003,
in which she states she is owed an arrearage of $359.48 for August 2003
rather than the full amount.
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However, we do not believe that there could not be an arrearage
for the period of time beginning with Sharon’s receipt of her
first payment from DAFS.
It is possible that Kelly may be
required to supplement Sharon’s payment from the DAFS in
accordance with their separation agreement.
issue for the trial court’s determination.
Kelly’s final issue and argument:
We remand that
We will now turn to
his adjudged child support
arrearage.
Kelly argues he does not owe child support arrearage
because his obligation should have been reduced in June 2003 due
to a change in his income.
Child support was discussed in the
parties’ separation agreement and set at $654.72 per month. 7
This figure was calculated in accordance with the Kentucky Child
Support Guidelines 8 based on Sharon’s gross income being $2,309
per month with an additional $1,000 for maintenance received and
Kelly’s gross income being $7,425 less $1,000 maintenance paid.
Kelly claims that following his retirement on May 31, 2003, he
suffered a drastic change in his income and was eligible for a
reduction in his child support obligation pursuant to KRS
403.213.
A settlement agreement incorporated into a decree does
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to decrease child
support due to a change in conditions.
7
8
Parties’ Separation Agreement, paragraph 3.
KRS 403.212
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Richey, supra 389 S.W.2d
at 919 (citing Ullman v. Ullman, 302 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1957)); see
also KRS 403.180(6).
Modification of a child support obligation is governed
in part by KRS 403.213(1) which states “. . . [C]hild support
may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to
the filing of the motion for modification and only upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances that is
substantial and continuing.”
The question then arises as to
whether Kelly filed a motion to decrease his child support
obligation following his change in circumstance.
The rule
applicable to the basic requirements of a motion is Ky. CR
7.02(1).
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02(1) states, in
pertinent part, that “An application to the court for an order
shall be by motion . . . shall be made in writing, shall state
with particularity the grounds therefore, and shall set forth
the relief or order sought.”
Under Ky. CR 8.06 all pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
“Motions”
are not included in the definition of a “pleading” pursuant to
Ky. CR 7.01.
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court analyzed a
motion under the purview of Ky. CR 8.06 in Dalton v. Dalton, 367
S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ky. 1963).
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
8.06 is a “liberal construction” rule, requiring that a pleading
be judged according to its substance rather than its label or
form.
McCollum v. Garrett, 880 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky. 1994).
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Upon a review of the record, we do not see any motions
filed by Kelly.
Having found no filed motions, we look to see
if the substance of any of his filed documents could be
construed as a motion even though it was not identified as such.
On July 21, 2003, a document was filed by Kelly entitled
“Objections to Commissioner’s Report.”
In this document,
following his objections, Kelly additionally requested the court
to reduce his child support based on his current gross income.
Kelly states that his retired pay statement was attached for the
court’s use.
While this is not the ideal form for a child
support reduction motion, we believe it was sufficient to put
the court on notice he was requesting a hearing on the issue of
child support reduction.
As such, this issue shall be remanded
to the trial court for a hearing on the proper amounts of child
support due by Kelly from August 2003 until present or until the
date of the parties’ youngest child’s emancipation in accordance
with KRS 403.212.
In the event an overpayment is calculated by the trial
court, Kelly will not automatically be entitled to a
reimbursement.
Kelly’s entitlement to reimbursement depends
upon the circumstances of the case.
If the direct recipient has
not, in fact, expended the “overpayment” for the support of the
child and has it, or its equivalent (in whole or in part),
available for repayment, it is only fair and just that the
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paying parent be able to recover it.
352, 354 (Ky.App. 1986).
Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d
Whether, and to what extent, the
receiving parent in fact used the “overpayment” for the support
of the child and whether the receiving parent has the funds from
which to permit a proper recoupment without depriving the child,
is a determination that must necessarily be made by the trial
court, exercising its discretion upon the relevant evidence.
Id.
The trial court shall make a ruling in accordance with the
foregoing in the event an overpayment is calculated.
For the reasons set forth above, the arrearage
judgments entered on January 9, 2004 and August 9, 2004,
respectively, shall be vacated and remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kelly W. Wilson, Pro Se
Madison, Florida
Heather Curry Paynter
Radcliff, Kentucky
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