B.F. V. T.D.
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RENDERED:
April 15, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000083-ME
B.F.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-503456
V.
T.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND MINTON, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MINTON, JUDGE:
B.F.2 brings this appeal from the denial of her
petition for de facto custodian status of a minor child, M.D.
The family court concluded that B.F., as the child’s primary
financial supporter, was not the child’s primary caregiver and,
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the
Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
Because this is a child custody case, the parties will be identified
by their initials.
therefore, did not meet the statutory definition of de facto
custodian.
The court also ruled that B.F. did not have standing
to pursue custody of M.D. under KRS3 403.420.
Finding no error,
we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
In 1995, B.F. and T.D., both women, became involved in
a committed relationship.
Within weeks of meeting, T.D. moved
into B.F.’s home in Indiana.
They eventually bought and
occupied a home together in Louisville.
After living together for some time, B.F. and T.D.
decided they wanted to raise a child together.
T.D.’s attempts
at becoming pregnant, via artificial insemination, were not
successful.
child.
So, in 1997, B.F. and T.D. decided to adopt a
T.D., who was a social worker, found out that a client
wished to give her child up for adoption.
B.F. and T.D.
arranged to adopt this child; and, on July 15, 1997, they
brought a daughter, M.D., into their home.
Because Kentucky law does not permit joint adoption by
same-sex couples, T.D., alone, adopted M.D.
There is no
question that upon M.D.’s adoption, T.D. became M.D.’s sole
“natural parent.”4
But B.F. and T.D. both raised this child.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
See, KRS 199.520(2):
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Both women contributed to M.D.’s financial, emotional, and
physical care.
The record reveals that B.F. provided the
majority of the financial support for M.D., while T.D. was more
involved with M.D.’s daily activities, such as school,5
extracurricular interests, and doctor’s visits.
Although B.F.
testified that she and T.D. discussed drafting an agreement
granting B.F. custodial rights to M.D., no such agreement was
ever written.
T.D. did prepare a will naming B.F. as M.D.’s
guardian; however, the will was later revoked, and T.D.’s new
will was drafted without the guardianship provision.
After raising M.D. together for six years, the
relationship between B.F. and T.D. dissolved bitterly.
July 17, 2003, T.D. left the home, taking M.D. with her.
On
Upon
leaving the home, T.D. refused to allow B.F. to have contact
with M.D.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
B.F. filed a petition in the family court seeking
joint custody and visitation of M.D.
She also filed a motion
Upon entry of the judgment of adoption, from and
after the date of the filing of the petition, the
child shall be deemed the child of petitioners
and shall be considered for purposes of
inheritance and succession and for all other
legal considerations, the natural child of the
parents adopting it the same as if born of their
bodies.
5
A copy of M.D.’s school roster indicates that T.D. was listed as the
child’s only parent.
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for temporary visitation.
Within a few days, the family court
granted B.F. temporary, supervised visitation with M.D.
At that
time, the court also scheduled a hearing solely on the issue of
whether B.F. qualified as a de facto custodian.
Although
counsel for B.F. requested a significant amount of time for the
hearing, the court limited the hearing to two hours.
Each side
was given one hour in which to present a case for or against
B.F.’s de facto custodian status.
Both sides presented testimony at the hearing.
At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that although B.F.
established she was the primary financial supporter of M.D., she
had failed to prove she was the primary caregiver.
Therefore,
the court concluded that B.F. had not met the statutory
requirements for de facto custodian status.
One week later, B.F. filed a motion to alter, amend,
or vacate this order.
The court denied the motion, stating that
its ruling was consistent with this Court’s opinion in
Consalvi v. Cawood.6
This appeal follows.
B.F. brings three arguments:
first, that the family
court abused its discretion in limiting the de facto custodian
hearing to two hours and refusing counsel’s request for crossexamination; second, that the court erroneously found that B.F.
6
63 S.W.3d 195 (Ky.App. 2001).
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did not satisfy the definition of de facto custodian and did not
have standing to pursue custody; and, third, that the court
erred by dismissing the action without allowing B.F. to present
evidence of her custodial standing under several common law
doctrines.
On all three points, we disagree.
TIME ALLOTTED FOR HEARING AND RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
B.F. first contends that the family court abused its
discretion by limiting the de facto custodian hearing to two
hours.
She also claims her rights of due process and
confrontation were violated by the court’s refusal to allow her
to cross-examine T.D.
It is within the sole discretion of the trial judge to
decide how much time should be allotted for arguments.7
In
determining the proper amount of court time to be devoted to a
matter, “the importance of the case, the legal questions
involved . . . [and] the extent and character of the testimony,
are all elements that must be considered.”8
In setting the time for the de facto custodian
hearing, the trial judge decided that two hours would be a
sufficient amount of time in which to hear the de facto
custodian matter.
The judge noted that because the hearing was
7
Asher v. Golden, 244 Ky. 56, 50 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1932); see also,
Reed v. Craig, 244 S.W.2d 733 (Ky. 1951).
8
Asher, supra, 50 S.W.2d at 4.
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limited solely to the issue of B.F.’s de facto custodian status,
the parties did not require a substantial amount of court time
in which to present their evidence.
This decision does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
KRS 403.270 outlines the
limited elements that must be proved in order to establish
de facto custodianship.
And the time allowed by the judge was
sufficient for each party to present testimony to either
establish or refute those elements.
B.F. also claims that she was denied her right to
cross-examine opposing witnesses.
Because the parties were
limited to one hour each to present testimony, B.F. argues that
the time set for the hearing expired before she could confront
T.D.
She claims the judge’s refusal of her request for cross-
examination violated her rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, Sections Two and
Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution, KRE9 611, and CR10 43.
We recognize that “the right of cross-examination is a
substantial and vital one.”11
But we also recognize that “the
trial court is vested with a sound judicial discretion as to the
9
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
10
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
11
Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Smith, 390 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Ky.
1965).
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scope and duration of cross-examination.”12
A court’s discretion
with regard to the scope of cross-examination may only be
reversed “in cases of clear abuse of such discretion, resulting
in manifest prejudice to the complaining party . . . .”13
This
Court will “disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”14
Our review of the hearings confirms that the trial
court’s decision in this case did not result in injustice to
either side.
Although B.F. was precluded from cross-
examination, this action was not prejudicial, nor did it violate
B.F.’s constitutional rights.
B.F. is correct in asserting that
both the United States and Kentucky constitutions provide for a
right to confrontation; however, that right is only guaranteed
in criminal cases.15
Moreover, CR 43 does not mention the right
to cross-examination; and KRE 611 only states that a party “may
be cross-examined.”
Therefore, we do not believe B.F.’s
inability to cross-examine her opposing witnesses affected her
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
CR 61.01.
15
U.S. CONST., amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him[.]”); see also, Ky. Const., sec. 11 (“In all criminal
prosecutions the accused has the right . . . to meet the witnesses
face to face . . . .”)
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substantial rights, or resulted in manifest prejudice to either
party.
The court acted within its discretion by limiting the
de facto custodian hearing to two hours and precluding B.F. from
cross-examination after that time had expired.
We do not
believe either of these decisions constitutes an abuse of that
discretion.
So we affirm.
B.F.’s DE FACTO CUSTODIAN STATUS
AND STANDING TO PURSUE CUSTODY
B.F.’s second argument is that the trial court erred
in finding that she did not qualify as the de facto custodian of
M.D.
In support of this contention, B.F. points to specific
evidence in the record that she believes proves she was M.D.’s
primary caregiver.
KRS 403.270 defines the requirements that are
necessary to establish an individual as a de facto custodian.
The statute reads:
“[D]e facto custodian” means a person who
has been shown by clear and convincing
evidence to have been the primary caregiver
for, and financial supporter of, a child who
has resided with the person for a period of
six (6) months or more if the child is under
three (3) years of age and for a period of
one (1) year or more if the child is three
(3) years of age or older . . . .16
16
KRS 403.270(1)(a) (emphasis added).
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In Consalvi v. Cawood,17 this Court interpreted the
KRS 403.270 definition of de facto custodian.
Consalvi are, admittedly, highly unusual.
The facts of
However, we believe
the holding is applicable to the current case.
Chris Cawood and Scarlett Consalvi were involved in an
on-again, off-again relationship.
They were married for a brief
period, divorced, and then reunited again for a few years.
During the time they were involved, Consalvi gave birth to two
children, T.C. and S.C.18
Although Consalvi claimed Cawood knew
he was not the father of either child, Cawood argued that
Consalvi led him to believe that he was.
After the parties
finally separated, a paternity test revealed that Cawood was not
the father of either T.C. or S.C.19
Lacking this biological relationship, Cawood,
nonetheless, filed a petition for de facto custodianship of the
two children.
The trial court found that Cawood had established
a relationship with the children and determined that it would be
in the children’s best interest to permit joint custody between
Cawood and Consalvi.
17
Supra.
18
Id. at 196.
19
The court held that Cawood was a de facto
Id.
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custodian under KRS 403.270 “and thus had the same standing as a
natural parent.”20
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s
decision.
We held:
We are bound by the plain language of the
statute, and words not defined must be given
their ordinary meanings. In this case, it
is clear that the statute is intended to
protect someone who is the primary provider
for a minor child in the stead of a natural
parent; if the parent is not the primary
caregiver, then someone else must be. The
de facto custodian statute does not . . .
intend that multiple persons be primary
caregivers. The court’s finding that he was
“a primary caregiver” and “a financial
supporter” is not sufficient to establish
that he was indeed “the primary caregiver”
within the meaning of the statute. It is
not enough that a person provide for a child
alongside the natural parent; the statute is
clear that one must literally stand in the
place of the natural parent to qualify as a
de facto custodian. To hold otherwise would
serve to expand a narrowly drawn statute
intended to protect grandparents and other
persons who take care of a child in the
absence of a parent into a broad sweeping
statute placing all stepparents on an equal
footing with natural parents.21
Our reasoning in Consalvi controls the outcome of the
present case.
It is clear from the record that both B.F. and
T.D. raised M.D. for the first six years of her life.
It is
also evident, as the court found, that B.F. was the primary
20
Id. at 197.
21
Id. at 198 (emphasis in original).
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financial supporter of M.D.
However, we believe the evidence
overwhelmingly indicates that T.D. was M.D.’s primary caregiver.
Although it is undeniable that B.F. served as a caregiver for
M.D., Consalvi plainly holds that to qualify as a de facto
custodian, an individual must be the primary caregiver for a
child.
The court properly found that B.F. did not meet this
standard.
Therefore, since B.F. did not satisfy the elements
required by KRS 403.270, she does not qualify as the de facto
custodian for M.D.
B.F. also argues that the court improperly held that
she did not have standing to pursue custody.
The court
determined that because B.F. was not M.D.’s de facto custodian
and because she failed to satisfy the elements of KRS 403.420,
she was without standing to petition for the custody of M.D.
We
agree with this assessment.
KRS 403.420(4)(b) and (c)22 state that a child custody
proceeding may be commenced in circuit court by a nonparent by
filing a petition for custody, but only if the child is not in
22
We recognize that the entirety of the former Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJA), including KRS 403.420, was
repealed in July 2004. The UCCJA is now embodied in KRS 403.800 –
403.880. However, the transitional provision, KRS 403.878(1)
states: “A motion or other request for relief made in a child
custody proceeding . . . which was commenced before July 13, 2004,
is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other
request was made.” B.F.’s original petition for custody was filed
in September 2003. Therefore, although KRS 403.420 has since been
repealed, it, nonetheless, controls in this case.
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the physical custody of one of his parents; or by a de facto
custodian of the child.
In Moore v. Asente, this Court held
that “‘custody contests between a parent and a nonparent who
does not fall within the statutory rule on ‘de facto’ custodians
are determined under a standard requiring the nonparent to prove
that the case falls within one of two exceptions to parental
entitlement to custody.’”23
Those two exceptions are first, “if
the parent is shown to be ‘unfit’ by clear and convincing
evidence[;]”24 and, second, “if the parent has waived his or her
superior right to custody.”25
Because B.F. did not legally adopt M.D., she is a
“nonparent” insofar as custody determinations are concerned.
At
no point during the proceedings did B.F. allege that M.D. was
not in T.D.’s physical custody, that T.D. was an unfit parent,
or that T.D. waived custody.
Therefore, B.F. may not file a
custody petition as a nonparent under KRS 403.420; and because
B.F. is not a de facto custodian and does not qualify for
custody under KRS 403.420, she does not have standing to seek
custody of M.D.
23
110 S.W.3d 336, 359 (Ky. 2003), quoting, 16 L. Graham & J. Keller,
Kentucky Practice, Domestic Relations Law 21.26 (2nd ed. West Group
2003) (Pocket Part).
24
Moore, supra, at 359.
25
Id.
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On a final note, B.F. contends that this case involves
a matter of first impression in Kentucky because it involves the
adjudication of custody rights of former same-sex partners.
Although we recognize the difficulty that same-sex couples have
with regard to issues such as child adoption and custody, we do
not believe the outcome of this case is in any way predicated on
the sexual orientation of the parties.
B.F. points to case law
from other jurisdictions that provides same-sex couples with
“de facto parent” status when custody is at issue;26 she argues
that the same status should be afforded to same-sex couples in
Kentucky.
But B.F. fails to recognize that Kentucky’s
definition of “de facto custodian” is statutory, whereas other
jurisdictions recognize the concept under the common law.
Regardless of whether B.F. and T.D. were involved in a
homosexual or a heterosexual relationship, the fact remains that
B.F. did not meet the definition of de facto custodian; and she
has not satisfied the necessary elements to pursue custody under
KRS 403.420.
Therefore, although we empathize with B.F.’s
predicament, we are statutorily precluded from providing her
26
See, E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 829, 711 N.E.2d 886, 891
(1999) (holding that “[a] child may be a member of a nontraditional
family in which he is parented by a legal parent and a de facto
parent. A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to
the child, but has participated in the child’s life as a member of
the child’s family.”); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Me.
2004) (non-biological, same-sex parent had “functioned as the
child’s de facto parent throughout his life” and, therefore, was
eligible for parental rights and responsibilities).
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with any relief.
So we affirm the decision of the Jefferson
Family Court.
COMMON LAW RIGHTS TO CUSTODY/VISTATION
B.F.’s third argument is that she should have been
given custody and/or visitation rights under the doctrines of
in loco parentis, waiver and estoppel, equitable powers of the
court, or exceptional circumstances.
We recognize that courts in other jurisdictions have
applied these doctrines to provide relief for nonparents seeking
custody.27
And we note that the Kentucky Supreme Court has
employed the doctrine of in loco parentis to allow visitation
rights to nonparents.28
But it is clear from the record that B.F. failed to
raise these issues before the family court.
It is well settled
that “a question not raised or adjudicated in the court below
cannot be considered when raised for the first time in this
court.”29
Because B.F. did not preserve these issues by a ruling
27
See, J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa.Super. 78, 682 A.2d 1314 (1996)
(common law doctrine of in loco parentis provided a non-biological
parent in a same-sex relationship standing to pursue custody and
visitation); T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913 (2001)
(in loco parentis status imparts standing upon a third party seeking
custody); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 (2000) (court
granted visitation rights to non-biological, same-sex parent based
upon the notion of the “psychological parent”).
28
See, Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979).
29
Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky. 1940).
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in the court below, we decline to address the merits of this
argument on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In sum, B.F. does not satisfy the statutory definition
of de facto custodian; and because she has neither alleged, nor
proved, that T.D. is unfit or has waived custody, she does not
have statutory standing to pursue custody under KRS 403.420.
Moreover, B.F. failed properly to preserve the issue of the
applicability of the common law doctrines of in loco parentis,
waiver and estoppel, equitable powers of the court, or
extraordinary circumstances.
Therefore, we affirm the decision
of the Jefferson Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bryan D. Gatewood
Louisville, Kentucky
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, Kentucky
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