ELIZABETH TURPIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 5, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002750-MR
ELIZABETH TURPIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 86-CR-00172
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
On February 3, 1986, Michael Turpin was stabbed
to death by Keith Bouchard with the aid of Karen Brown.
Michael’s body was dumped into a pond on Lakeside Golf Course in
Lexington, Kentucky.
Indictments were returned versus Bouchard,
Brown, and Elizabeth Turpin, Michael’s widow and the beneficiary
of his $50,000 life insurance policy.
sought against all three.
The death penalty was
Bouchard entered a guilty plea and
agreed to testify against Brown and Turpin, who were tried
together.
Each of the women was found guilty of murder and
received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole
for twenty-five years.
Turpin’s conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court on November 30, 1989.
780 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1989).
See Turpin v. Commonwealth,
She unsuccessfully sought habeas
corpus relief in the federal court system.
Kassulke, 26 F.3d 1392 (6th Cir. 1994).
See Turpin v.
Turpin filed her motion
pursuant to RCr 11.42 on September 30, 1997.
In 2002 this Court
affirmed the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of relief, but the
Kentucky Supreme Court subsequently reversed and remanded to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the standards
enunciated in Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001),
and Norton v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 175 (Ky. 2002).
The
Fayette Circuit Court held the evidentiary hearing on January 22
and 23, 2003.1
Turpin was again denied relief2 on November 26,
2003, and she appeals.
We affirm.
Turpin first argues that the trial court “failed to
utilize the proper standards in assessing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”
In presenting this argument, Turpin
alludes to the trial court’s and this Court’s earlier reliance
1
By the time the hearing was held, more than seventeen years had elapsed
since the murder of Michael Turpin. One of Turpin’s trial attorneys was
deceased, and other witnesses at the hearing acknowledged imperfect memory.
2
We note that co-defendant Brown was granted post-conviction relief by the
Fayette Circuit Court on November 25, 2003. The Commonwealth has appealed,
and Brown has cross-appealed, from that order in case Numbers 2003-CA-2624
and 2003-CA-2714, respectively. Those appeals are being considered by a
separate panel of this Court.
-2-
on the now overturned criterion enunciated in Robbins v.
Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 742 (Ky.App. 1986), overruled by
Norton, supra.
Robbins had held the RCr 11.42 movant to the
higher standard of proving that, but for counsel’s deficiencies,
the evidence would have compelled an acquittal.
However, when
the Supreme Court remanded this matter for an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Fraser and Norton, the trial court was put
on notice to avoid the Robbins standard.
And there is nothing
in the post-evidentiary hearing ruling to indicate that Robbins
was instrumental in the trial court’s decision to deny once
again Turpin’s requested relief.
Turpin’s first argument must
fail.
Turpin next claims that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to inadmissible evidence.
In this vein,
Turpin refers to unchallenged witness testimony that she was,
among other things, cold and calculating, more inconvenienced
than concerned, a leader rather than a follower, and (by her exmother-in-law) that she had killed Michael Turpin; appellant
continues that other inadmissible evidence included testimony
that she used drugs, engaged in extra-marital sex, and would
have performed a coat hanger abortion had she become pregnant by
her husband.
Without considering each instance individually, we
uphold our earlier opinion wherein we stated that “many, if not
most, would not be considered inadmissible evidence.”
-3-
Furthermore, Turpin could or should have brought the majority of
these issues to the attention of our Supreme Court on direct
appeal.
Bronston v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1972).
Even were we to consider these allegations as actual
errors by trial counsel, we are nonetheless obligated to
determine whether they affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
See also Hodge v.
Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003); and Norton, supra.
Turpin’s defense was one of complete denial of involvement in
the scheme to murder her husband, with the focus on the lack of
physical evidence tying her to the case.
She fails to convince
us of the reasonable probability that the absence of these
alleged errors would have resulted in her acquittal or
conviction of a lesser included charge.
Trial counsel credibly
claimed at the evidentiary hearing that the lack of objections
were the result of either strategic decisions on the part of the
defense team or singly of his late associate during the trial.
His further explanation about the decision not to join codefendant Brown’s request for an admonition regarding pretrial
custody was satisfactory as well.
Turpin fails to meet her
burden under Strickland and its progeny.
We are lastly asked to consider Turpin’s
dissatisfaction with her representation during the penalty
-4-
phase.
She specifically criticizes the deficient investigation
into and presentation of mitigation evidence.
Again, we defer
to the trial court’s acceptance of counsel’s explanation
regarding the joint decision not to present further testimony
during the penalty phase.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Franklin P. Jewell
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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