TIMOTHY HUTCHINSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 9, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002726-MR
TIMOTHY HUTCHINSON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00212
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
McANULTY AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
McANULTY, JUDGE:
A jury convicted Timothy Hutchinson
(Hutchinson) of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
In this matter of right appeal, Hutchinson challenges the
validity of the search warrant that law enforcement obtained to
search Hutchinson’s residence where they discovered the handgun
underlying his charge and conviction.
1
In the lower court
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
proceedings, the trial court heard the challenge on Hutchinson’s
motion to suppress.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
court denied the motion.
Because we find no error in the ruling
of the trial court, we affirm.
On the evening of February 8, 2002, two detectives
with the Mayfield Police Department allegedly conducted a drug
buy from Hutchinson at his residence using a confidential
informant (the CI).
The following morning, one of the
detectives that was working the case, Detective Kenneth A.
Waters (Detective Waters), completed an affidavit in support of
a search warrant.
In the affidavit, Detective Waters swore to the
following:
On February 8, 2002, at approximately 20:00
p.m. [sic], Affiant received information
from/observed:
On above date and approx [sic] time, officer
was working with Det. B. Caskey and a “CI”.
The “CI” was wearing a covert listening
devise [sic] that was monitored and recorded
by above officer. Officers observed the
“CI” go to the residence located at “822
College Street”. While at the residence the
“CI” purchased 2 small baggies containing a
green substance represented to him to be
marijuana. The “CI” paid $50.00 dollars for
these items with money that the above
officers gave to him. The officers observed
the “CI” leave the residence and returned to
the “meeting spot” to turn over the
suspected marijuana to the officers. The
“CI” and vehicle was [sic] searched prior to
and after the transaction. The officers had
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the “CI” in visual contact to and from the
residence.
Officers have received numerous complaints
from various people in the area, and have
obsearved [sic] themselves several visitors
to the residence on various dates and times
that would stay for a short length of time
at the residence, which is common for drug
trafficing [sic]. Officers have also in the
past made controlled undercover narcotics
purchases from this residence.
In addition to the above typewritten portion,
Detective Waters wrote in the following two sentences:
The purchase was made from Tim Hutchinson
who resides there.
The substance field-tested positive for
marijuana.
The typewritten portion of the affidavit then
continued and stated as follows:
Acting on the information received, Affiant
conducted the following independent
investigation:
Officers set up surveilance [sic] on the
residence at various times and days.
Officers observed several visitors to the
residence that would only stay for a short
length of time. Officers working with a
“CI” made controlled narcotics purchases
from the residence on various dates and
times. Each suspected narcotic field tested
positive.
A judge issued a search warrant on the basis of this
affidavit.
Law enforcement officers executed the warrant that
afternoon.
Pursuant to the warrant, police searched
Hutchinson’s residence and found, among other items, a .22
caliber semi-automatic pistol.
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Four months later, the Graves County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging Hutchinson with (1) illegal
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) while in
possession of a firearm; (2) trafficking in a controlled
substance within 1000 yards of a school while in possession of a
firearm; (3) illegal possession of a firearm (handgun) by a
convicted felon; and (4) illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia.
Hutchinson’s attorney obtained a copy of the taperecorded drug buy, which was the foundation for the issuance of
the search warrant.
After listening to the recording,
Hutchinson filed a motion to suppress the items seized in the
search on the basis that Detective Waters submitted erroneous
information and omitted certain facts in the affidavit for the
search warrant.
Hutchinson argued that the tape recording of
the drug buy contradicted Detective Water’s assertion in the
affidavit that he observed the “CI” in transit to and from
Hutchinson’s residence.
According to Hutchinson, the tape
recording indicated that the officers made no visual
observations of the CI to and from the residence and then
attempted to mislead the finder of probable cause.
In addition,
Hutchinson contended in his motion to suppress that the affiant
omitted certain facts that would have shown that the CI drove to
at least one other residence, picked up a female and drove
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around with her.
Not only did the CI have contact with this
female, but he also made contact with other individuals that
were not named in the affidavit.
Finally, Hutchinson argued
that the affidavit supplied no information establishing the
credibility of the CI.
In his motion, Hutchinson concluded that if the
affidavit were purged of its falsities and supplemented by the
omitted information, it would not be sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause.
Hutchinson argued that the remaining
statements in the affidavit were merely conclusory statements
that gave no basis for making a judgment regarding probable
cause.
Hutchinson requested (1) that all items seized under the
search be suppressed after a hearing; and (2) that the
Commonwealth reveal the identity of the CI prior to the hearing.
The trial court set a hearing date for Hutchinson’s
motion.
At the hearing, the Commonwealth called the two
officers that were involved in the investigation to testify
about the events of February 8, 2002.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court made findings on the record.
The trial court found that on February 8, 2002, the
officers gave the CI money to purchase drugs.
and then searched him.
They wired the CI
The CI drove to Hutchinson’s residence,
and the officers followed in another car.
But because the
person that was the subject matter of the investigation was not
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there, the CI had to come back a second time.
On both
occasions, however, the officers observed the CI pull up to the
residence of the defendant, stop his car and get out.
The court
noted that whether or not the officers saw the CI go through the
door of the residence was not relevant.
Based on these
findings, the trial court denied Hutchinson’s motion to
suppress.
Hutchinson later made a motion to sever the charge of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from the other
three charges in the indictment.
The trial court granted this
motion and the trial on the firearm possession charge was
conducted on September 25, 2003.
Before the trial began, Hutchinson renewed his motion
to suppress the evidence recovered in the search.
In response
to the renewed motion, the trial court stated that he had
already made a finding on the matter that the police officers
did, in fact, observe the confidential informant enter and leave
Hutchinson’s residence.
Having denied Hutchinson’s renewed
motion to suppress, the case proceeded to trial on the evidence
recovered in the search.
At the conclusion of the trial, the
jury found Hutchinson guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon for which he was later sentenced to five years
in the state penitentiary.
This appeal followed.
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In this direct appeal, Hutchinson challenges the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds.
First,
Hutchinson asserts that law enforcement officers procured the
search warrant by presenting a false and misleading affidavit to
the judge.
Because the affidavit contained intentionally
misleading information and omitted other information, the items
seized in the search should be suppressed and the case should be
reversed and dismissed.
Second, Hutchinson challenges the warrant on the
ground that the affidavit lacked any indicia of reliability of
the CI.
In the event that this Court concludes that Hutchinson
failed to preserve this error, he asks that we review the issue
as palpable error under RCr 10.26.
Hutchinson concludes each of his two arguments by
stating that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
found in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), is inapplicable.
Consistent with his arguments before the trial court,
Hutchinson first contends that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant is grossly misleading because it implies that the
police officers searched the CI and the car.
It then implies
that the CI traveled directly to Hutchinson’s residence, bought
the marijuana, and returned to the meeting spot where the
officers searched him again.
Hutchinson asserts that the buy
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tape transcript shows that the CI did much more traveling than
Detective Waters intentionally omitted from the affidavit.
The
omitted facts likely would have affected the judge’s decision to
issue the search warrant.
Hutchinson believes that Detective
Waters’ statement that “[t]he ‘CI’ and vehicle was [sic]
searched prior to and after this transaction,” stretches
credulity.
With respect to denial of a motion to suppress, this
Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error
and the legal issues de novo.
See Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92
S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002); United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265,
267 (6th Cir. 2002).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable search and seizures.
See United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85
(1984) (Fourth Amendment protects against both illegal searches
and seizures).
In this case, Hutchinson sought and the trial
court granted an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
holds:
that, where the defendant makes a
substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit, and if the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of
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Franks
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment
requires that a hearing be held at the
defendant’s request. In the event that at
that hearing the allegation of perjury or
reckless disregard is established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false
material set to one side, the affidavit’s
remaining content is insufficient to
establish probable cause, the search warrant
must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable
cause was lacking on the face of the
affidavit.
Id. at 155-156.
Regarding omissions, cases decided after Franks have
held that the same basic standard is applicable when it is
alleged that the affidavit omits material facts.
An affidavit will be vitiated only if the
defendant can show that the police omitted
facts with the intent to make, or in
reckless disregard of whether the omission
made, the affidavit misleading and that the
affidavit, as supplemented by the omitted
information, would not have been sufficient
to support a finding of probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 496, 503 (Ky.App. 1995)
(citing United States v. Sherrell, 979 F.2d 1315, 1318 (8th Cir.
1992) and State v. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d 870, 872-873, 827 P.2d
1388, 1390 (1992)).
In granting a Franks hearing, it may be implied that
the trial court believed that Hutchinson satisfactorily made the
requisite preliminary showing.
Whether Hutchinson prevailed at
the hearing, however, was another issue.
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See Franks at 172.
After hearing the testimony of the officers, the trial
court concluded that the affidavit did not contain any false
statements.
At a suppression hearing, the ability to assess the
credibility of witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from
the testimony is vested in the discretion of the trial court.
See Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002).
Having reviewed the hearing in this case, we see no clear error.
Because the buy tape recording was inaudible and incomplete at
times, it does not contradict the officers’ testimony.
It was
not improper for the trial court to refuse to accept
Hutchinson’s characterization of the buy based on Hutchinson’s
interpretation of the CI’s activities.
As to the alleged omissions, the trial court was not
convinced that the police officers omitted this information with
the intent to mislead.
As stated above, the ability to assess
the credibility of witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences
from the testimony is vested in the discretion of the trial
court.
After reviewing the suppression hearing and Hutchinson’s
renewed motion to suppress that he presented before trial, we do
not believe the trial court abused its discretion in this case.
In support of his first argument, Hutchinson contends
that the search warrant affidavit does not establish a nexus
between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.
We
conclude, however, that this argument was not preserved for our
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review.
Likewise, Hutchinson did not preserve his second
argument on appeal, which pertains to the reliability of the CI.
We acknowledge that Hutchinson questioned the
reliability of the CI in his arguments in support of his motion
to suppress and sought the identity of the CI in the Franks
hearing.
But in the Franks hearing, the Commonwealth objected
to Detective Caskey revealing the identity of the CI.
In
response to the objection, the trial court stated that
Hutchinson hadn’t challenged the reliability of the CI.
Hutchinson’s attorney responded, “All right.”
Instead of
directing the court’s attention to the two sentences pertaining
to the CI in his suppression motion, Hutchinson dropped the
issue.
Thus, the trial court did not hear or rule on the merits
of Hutchinson’s contention that the officers failed to provide
an indicia of reliability of the confidential informant, and a
reviewing court will not take up an issue for the first time on
appeal.
“Even when an objection or motion has been made, the
burden continues to rest with the movant to insist that the
trial court render a ruling; otherwise, the objection is
waived.”
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 40 (Ky.
2004).
Hutchinson urges this Court to review any unpreserved
errors as palpable error under RCr 10.26.
In this case, we are
not convinced that manifest injustice occurred.
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We affirm the
decision of the trial court denying Hutchinson’s motion to
suppress.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Astrida L. Lemkins
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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